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ABSTRACT
CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE ON THE EDGE OF EMPIRE: THE LIMITS OF
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE IBERIAN COLONIAL WORLD, 1450-1700
Alexander Ponsen
Antonio Feros
This dissertation examines the relationship between theory and practice in the exercise of
imperial sovereignty, including during the height of Iberian global hegemony in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It focuses in particular on remote regions of the
Spanish and Portuguese empires. The manuscript opens with an analysis of a range of
influential treatises, chronicles, epic poetry, cartography, and iconography, which glorified,
amplified, and aimed to legitimize the claims and aspirations of the Iberian rulers to
imperium beyond Europe. These texts coalesced to form a common, uniquely Iberian
discourse of empire, which crystallized around the turn of the seventeenth century, during
the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Then, through case studies on Southeast
Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la Plata, the study explores how complex jurisdictional
layering, physical distance, and the power of indigenous and local settler groups created
situations in which, beyond official centers of colonial power, the crown’s effective
sovereignty was diffuse, highly circumscribed, and constantly fluid in its geography. Beyond
highlighting this dissonant tension between ambition and effective rule, the dissertation
demonstrates how, in different moments, local actors on the peripheries of empire
rearticulated concepts of Iberian and broader European law and political theory, either to
affirm their obedience and belonging within the larger imperial body, or to claim authority as
sources of law in their own right and defend their autonomy against the extension of crown
power.
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INTRODUCTION

The completion of the peninsular Reconquest in 1492, the expansion of Habsburg
possessions across Europe, and the series of conquests in the Americas and Philippines gave
rise to an increasingly messianic discourse lauding the exploits of the Spanish Monarchy over
the course of the sixteenth century. Portugal’s parallel expansion into the Atlantic, along
coastal Africa and Brazil, and across maritime Asia produced a similar discourse hailing the
transcontinental dimensions of Portuguese dominion as well. Together, and with Papal
blessing, the Iberian monarchies laid exclusive claim to the “discovery” and conquest of the
entire extra-European world and aimed to spread Christianity to the globe’s most distant
corners. The enthusiastic fervor for Iberian empire reached crescendo in 1581 when Philip II
of Spain ascended the Portuguese throne achieving the long sought reunification of the
entire Iberian Peninsula for the first time since antiquity and bringing the two hemispheres
of Iberian expansion together under his singular sovereignty. By adding Portuguese
territories in Africa, Asia, and Brazil to his already sprawling possessions, Philip now looked
out from his new Lisbon palace over what contemporary observers and modern historians
alike have viewed as the world’s first global empire.
Although the Iberians are recognized as the first Europeans to found lasting colonies
on the distant shores of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, their position as pioneers in the
emergence of an interconnected world remains surprisingly obscured. In most
historiography on early modern or “proto-” globalization, emphasis remains on the empires
of northwest Europe in forging the first global circuits of exchange in the mid-seventeenth
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century.1 According to the conventional narrative, presented primarily through the history of
the development of capitalism, the expansions of the Dutch and English helped spread
commercial capitalism, the precursor to modern industrial capitalism, to the most distant
corners of the earth, giving birth to the first integrated global economy. Iberian expansion is
largely seen as medieval, redistributive, and extractive, as a process that simply transposed
ancient forms of feudalism from Iberia into the colonial world and failed to integrate the
globe in any meaningful way. The recent historiographical turn toward global history,
however, has renewed interest in early modern Iberian expansion and its role in the process
of global connectivity. Emphasizing commercial, intellectual, or cultural aspects, these
scholars have done sophisticated, paradigm-shifting work that has compelled us to revisit
earlier assumptions about the origins of global mercantile capitalism, of international law,
and of global migration and cultural exchange and mestizaje.2
Yet at the same time as we recognize and assess the various contributions of
European expansion to the process of globalization, it is also worth asking to what extent
European monarchs actually exercised full sovereignty over and within their overseas
possessions. What are we to make of vague claims stressing the globality of these empires?
These questions are especially relevant in relation to the early modern Iberian monarchs,

See A. G. Hopkins, ed., Globalization in World History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003). Several
recent works, including those by Timothy Brook and Harold Cook, sketch in vivid detail the rise of globespanning circuits of exchange in the first half of the seventeenth century, focusing on the Dutch as the prime
agents in hastening the “dawn of the global world.” See also, Timothy Brook, Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth
Century and the Dawn of the Global World (London: Bloomsbury, 2007); Harold Cook, Matters of Exchange:
Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch Golden Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); and Immanuel
Wallerstein, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, vol. 1 of The
Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
2 Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’: World Trade’s Origin in 1571,” Journal of
World History 6, no. 2 (1995): 201-221; Serge Gruzinski, Les quatre parties du monde: Histoire d’une mondialisation
(Paris: Martinière, 2004); and Antony Anghie, “Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International
Law,” Social Legal Studies 5, no. 3 (1996): 321-336, to name just a few.
1
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especially Philip II, who, according to several of his contemporaries, was sovereign over the
largest composite monarchy the world had ever known.3
Despite the truly impressive efforts of a range of actors – including conquerors,
missionaries, merchants, royal officials, humanists, jurists, and theologians – in giving
physical and ideological meaning to the Iberian empires as they expanded, the process of
extending imperial rule was constantly contested and hardly linear. It was marked by violence
and setbacks. A gaping divide existed between theory and practice, between the capacious
territorial claims of the empires and the monarchs’ ability to impose effective sovereignty
over those claims. Beyond the core regions of Iberian colonial authority and settlement,
crown rule was highly fragmented, often indirect, and occasionally even inverted.
Interestingly, however, the limits of royal sovereignty were in some ways more pronounced
in certain autonomous kingdoms and lordships of Europe, including of the Iberian
Peninsula, than in distant colonial strongholds like Mexico City, Goa, Lima, or Salvador da
Bahia. But nowhere was the crown’s effective authority more circumscribed than in places
like Southeast Africa, much of the Philippines and the upper reaches of the Río de la Plata
watershed. In many parts of these regions, which were among the empires’ most remote
territories far from the main centers of both metropolitan and colonial power, the presence
of royal officials and institutions was minimal, transient, or in some cases non-existent. In
many areas beyond the reach of official colonial enclaves, Iberian settlers and officials
represented but one of a range of forces vying for influence and survival. In many cases,
Iberians were far from the hegemonic powers in the region, and their presence was often
dependent on the ability to ingratiate themselves with indigenous rulers or integrate within
local systems of social and political organization.
On the concept of “composite monarchies,” see J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past &
Present 137 (1992): 48-71.
3
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But what does it mean to speak about imperial sovereignty in places at great
distances from colonial power where the crown had such a limited direct, formal presence?
How far did imperial sovereignty extend? In what ways was it circumscribed? How and why
did local actors in these regions mobilize the globalized discourses of Iberian empire either
to reinforce their belonging within the larger imperial body or to defend their own local
authority and jurisdiction? And finally, how did champions of Spanish and Portuguese
empire reconcile their capacious claims to sovereignty over non-European peoples and
territories with the reality of the crowns’ limited power or subservience to indigenous polities
in several of these more remote regions?
The main purpose of this study is to gain a sharper understanding of the diffuse
nature of imperial power and its geography, especially at the apex of Iberian global
hegemony during the early years of the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. I
analyze the methods the crowns used to extend their direct and indirect sovereignty over
remote parts of the empires, and I examine the fluid process through which, at different
moments, indigenous groups and settlers of European extraction leveraged their power
either in support of Iberian colonial rule or against it. In certain colonial core regions the
crown achieved undisputed, wide-reaching dominance over local societies and territories.
Beyond those cores, however, while missionaries or independent traders and adventurers of
Iberian origin may have penetrated deep into the hinterland, the crown’s official presence
was limited, its status sometimes reduced to vassal of a given dominant indigenous polity. As
I aim to show, each Iberian empire possessed a vast repertoire of sovereignties, which varied
widely both across colonies and within them.4 Yet despite the many limits on imperial

4 My reference to “repertoires of sovereignty” is inspired by the concept of “repertoires of power,” as proposed
in Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010).
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power, it was precisely this diversity of experience accrued from a variety of colonial
contexts in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, which provided champions of Iberian expansion
with the new practical knowledge and conditions of possibility necessary for the articulation
of a discourse of empire that could be applied, for the first time, on a truly global scale.

This project sits at the nexus of three broad fields of scholarship. First, and most
specialized, is the literature on the connected history of early modern Spain, Portugal, and
their empires. But is it appropriate to speak of a connected Iberian history and of a singular
process of Iberian expansion? Or, should the Spanish and Portuguese empires be considered
distinct or even opposed in their structures, methods, ambitions and ideologies? In an
influential article published in 2007, Sanjay Subrahmanyam reminded us that although in
perpetual competition, and often in direct violent conflict, the Spanish and Portuguese
empires also shared much in common, collaborated on numerous occasions, and were
surprisingly integrated despite remaining officially closed off from one another in theory.5
And while this was most obvious during the union of the Iberian crowns from 1580 to 1640,
it was also true long before. The connected history of the Iberian empires has roots in the
early fifteenth century, with their first parallel movements into the Atlantic and along the
west coast of Africa. And the connected history of the various territories of Iberia, of course,
stretches back far earlier, at least to when they were united under the Romans, as Hispania, if
not before.
Until recently, however, the histories of Portugal, Spain, and their empires were
largely presented as separate. In this sense, historiography on the Iberian world had been
indicative of larger tendencies across the discipline. The enduring predominance of nationSanjay Subrahmanyam, “Holding the World in Balance: The Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas
Empires, 1500-1640,” American Historical Review 112, no. 5 (2007): 1359-1385.
5
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state centered history had largely eschewed studies in which, even in the early modern
period, national and imperial lines were blurred, complicating the supposed progressive
march toward the modern nation-state. This was even true for historiography on the period
of Iberian union.6 The bulk of that research focused on the court politics of dynastic
succession, on the cooptation of Portuguese elites by agents of Philip II, or on the military
history of Spain’s 1580 invasion of Portugal and of the subsequent Portuguese revolt of
1640. Moreover, it was largely confined to the peninsular context with little attention to
overseas questions. However, the connected history of Spain, Portugal, and their empires
has recently attracted new interest from historians led by Fernando Bouza, Pedro Cardim,
Serge Gruzinski, Antonio Manuel Hespanha, Giuseppe Marcocci, José Antonio Martínez
Torres, Jean-Frédéric Schaub, and Rafael Valladares, among others, who have turned their
attention toward the foundational conjuncture that gave rise to the union, and have assessed
its consequences in a range of colonial spaces and from a variety of conceptual approaches.7
6 For reflections critiquing the distinctly nationalist flavor of much of this historiography, see António Manuel
Hespanha, “Os Austrias em Portugal: Balanço historiográfico,” Lusotopie 1 (1998): 145-155; see also,
Subrahmanyam “Holding the World in Balance;” and Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, “1580 e a Restauração,” in
Ensaios II sobre história de Portugal, ed. Vitorino Magalhães Godinho (Lisbon: Livraria Sá da Costa Editora, 1968),
255-292; for a comprehensive analysis of twentieth century historiography on the Portuguese empire and the
question of nationalism, see Catarina Madeira Santos, “Expansión y descubrimientos portugueses: problemática
y líneas de investigación,” Cuadernos de historia moderna 20 (1998): 111-128; see also Ângela Barreto Xavier,
“Tendências da historiografia da expansão portuguesa nos últimos quinze anos: Os caminhos da História
Social,” Penélope 22 (2000): 141-179.
7 Pedro Cardim, Portugal unido y separado: Felipe II, la unión de territorios y la condición política del reino de Portugal
(Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, Cátedra Felipe II, 2014); Pedro Cardim and Gaetano Sabatini, eds.,
António Vieira, Roma e o universalismo das monarquias portuguesa e espanhol (Lisbon: CHAM, 2011); Santiago Martínez
Hernández, ed., Governo, Política e Representações do Poder no Portugal Habsburgo e nos seus Territórios Ultramarinos,
1581-1640 (Lisbon: CHAM, 2011); Gruzinski, Les quatre parties du monde; Jean-Frédéric Schaub, Le Portugal au
temps du comte-duc d’Olivares (1621-1640): Le conflit de juridiction comme exercice de la politique (Madrid: Casa de
Velázquez, 2001); Jean-Frédéric Schaub, Portugal na Monarquia Hispânica, 1580-1640 (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte,
2001); Roberto López Vela, “Historiografía y recreación de la historia: Felipe II y el debate sobre la monarquía
en la restauración,” Revista de Estudios Políticos 126 (2004): 59-90; Rafael Valladares, Castilla y Portugal en Asia,
1580-1680: Declive imperial y adaptación (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001); Rafael Valladares, “El Brasil y
las Indias españolas durante la sublevación de Portugal, 1640-1668,” Cuadernos de Historia Moderna 14 (1993):
151-172; Rafael Valladares, “Olivares y Oriente: La Unión de Armas en Asia, 1622-1642,” in Imperios y naciones
en el Pacífico, Vol. 1, La formación de una colonia: Filipinas, ed. María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, José María
Fradera and Luis Alonso (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2001), 73-82; Fernando
Bouza Álvarez, Portugal en la Monarquía Hispánica, 1580-1640: Felipe II, las Cortes de Tomar y la Génesis del Portugal
Católico (Madrid: Editorial de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1987); Pablo Fernández Albaladejo,
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Building on that new foundation, this present project adopts a global frame in analyzing
combined Iberian contributions to the development of a common discourse of empire with
attention to the methods through which the Iberians carved out and attempted to
consolidate their spheres of sovereignty overseas.
Second, my project builds on the rich and extensive literature on imperial sovereignty
and colonial authority, a field reinvigorated by the turn toward global history and the
renewed interest in the comparative history of early modern empires.8 The central question
framing this research is how empires attempted to impose control over highly diverse,
internally differentiated native polities, as well as over European settler communities often

“Common Souls, Autonomous Bodies: The Language of Union under the Catholic Monarchy, 1590-1630,”
Revista internacional de estudios vascos 5 (2009): 73-81; Pedro Cardim, “Los Portugueses frente a la Monarquia
Hispanica,” in La Monarquia de las Naciones, ed. Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño and Bernardo José García
García (Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2004), 355-383; Pedro Cardim, “O governo e a administração
do Brasil sob os Habsburgo e os primeiros Bragança,” Hispania. Revista del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Científicas, Madrid, 216 (2004): 117-156; Guida Marques, “Entre deux empires: le Maranhão dans l’Union
ibérique, 1614-1641,” Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos (2010): 2-11; Giuseppe Marcocci, “Conscience and Empire:
Politics and Moral Theology in the Early Modern Portuguese World,” Journal of Early Modern History 18 (2014):
473-494; José Antonio Martínez Torres, “Entre la autonomía y la dependencia: Las posesiones de los Austrias
en Asia, África y América (1580-1640): Un balance,” in Peso de todo el Mundo (1622) y Discurso sobre el aumento de
esta Monarquía (1625), de sir Anthony Sherley, eds. Ángel Alloza Aparicio, Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, and José
Antonio Martínez Torres, (Madrid: Polifemo, 2010), 71-84; José Antonio Martínez Torres, “‘There is but one
world’: Globalisation and connections in the overseas territories of the Spanish Habsburgs (1581-1640),”
Culture and History Digital Journal 3, no. 1 (June 2014): 1-15; Stuart Schwartz, “Luso-Spanish Relations in
Habsburg Brazil, 1580-1640,” Americas 25, no. 1 (1968): 33-48; Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, O tempo dos Filipes em
Portugal e no Brasil, 1580-1668: Estudos históricos (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1994); Ronald Cueto, “1580 and All
That…: Philip II and the Politics of the Portuguese Succession,” Portuguese Studies 8 (1992): 150-169; Geoffrey
Parker, “David or Goliath? Philip II and his World in the 1580s,” in Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World, ed.
Richard Kagan and Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 245-266; Rafael Valladares,
La conquista de Lisboa: Violencia militar y comunidad política en Portugal, 1578-1583 (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008);
António Manuel Hespanha, “O governo dos Áustrias e a ‘Modernização’ da Constituição Política Portuguesa,”
Penélope 2 (1989): 50-73; for a look at contemporary historians’ views of the union, see Manuel Bustos
Rodríguez, “Los historiadores españoles y portugueses ante de la unidad peninsular de 1580 a 1640,” Gades 9,
no. 11 (1983): 161-181.
8 See Jeremy Adelman, “Mimesis and Rivalry: European Empires and Global Regimes,” Journal of Global History
10 (2015): 77-98; Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History; Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds.,
Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997);
Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire (London:
Bloomsbury Press, 2007); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “A Tale of Three Empires: Mughals, Ottomans, and
Habsburgs in a Comparative Context,” Common Knowledge 12, no. 1 (2006): 66-99. And for an alternative view
that argues for the need to examine the persisting, multiple connections between “states” and “empires,” see
Giuseppe Marcocci, “Too Much to Rule: States and Empires across the Early Modern World,” Journal of Early
Modern History 20 (2016): 511-525.
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protective of their local authority and jurisdictions. Over two decades ago Jack Greene’s
study, Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History, systematically
subverted the idea of an absolutist, centralized structure of early modern European imperial
rule.9 Despite the fact that his work focused on British America and on the crown’s
relationship to its European colonial subjects in particular, the fundamental argument that
imperial authority was decentralized and constantly renegotiated can also be applied fittingly
to the territories over which Spain and Portugal laid claim. In many ways, Greene’s work
paralleled that historians like John Elliott, António Manuel Hespanha, and Pablo Fernández
Albaladejo, who advanced related arguments for early modern Portugal and Spain and have,
along with others like John Leddy Phelan, Tamar Herzog, and Víctor Tau Anzoátegui, both
before and after, assessed the dynamics of dispersed, flexible structures of authority in the
colonial context as well.10
Similarly, Lauren Benton’s more recent comparative work has tied together the
disparate fields of geography, law, and cultural history, displaying the ways in which
European and non-European empires alike sought to maintain order over diverse dominions
through constant compromises between the imposition of top-down centralized forms of
rule and the ceding of legal and political autonomy to local indigenous groups within the
9 Jack Greene, Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1994).
10 J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past & Present 137 (1992): 48-71; António Manuel
Hespanha, As Vésperas do Leviathan: Instituições e Poder Político em Portugal, século XVI (Coimbra: Almedina, 1994);
Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, Fragmentos de monarquía: Trabajos de historia política (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992);
John Leddy Phelan, “Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy,” Administrative Science
Quarterly 5 (1960): 47-65; Víctor Tau Anzoátegui, Nuevos Horizontes en el Estudio Histórico del Derecho Indiano
(Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 1997); Víctor Tau Anzoátegui, El poder de
la costumbre: Estudios sobre el Derecho consuetudinario en América hispana hasta la Emancipación (Buenos Aires: Instituto
de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 2001); see also the edited volume, Thomas Duve and Heikki
Pihlajamäki, eds. New Horizons in Spanish Colonial Law: Contributions to Transnational Early Modern Legal History
(Frankfurt am Main: Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, 2015); Tamar Herzog, Frontiers of
Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); and
Pedro Cardim, Tamar Herzog, José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, and Gaetano Sabatini, eds., Polycentric Monarchies: How did
Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony? (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press,
2012).
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larger structure of empire.11 Like Benton, anthropologist James C. Scott has also reminded us
of the importance of geography in shaping the contours of imperial (or state) sovereignty, of
how rivers, lowlands, and mountains can facilitate the extension of imperial power or
resistance to it.12 Although Scott’s work has focused on the modern state, it can also be
applied usefully here to demonstrate the porosity of boundaries of imperial jurisdiction. Both
indigenous peoples and settlers of European origin moved frequently into or beyond the
effective reach of Iberian royal authority, sometimes seeking the crown’s protection and
other times that of neighboring polities.
The largely ethnohistorical scholarship of the “New Conquest History,” so termed
and in part shaped by Matthew Restall, has likewise emphasized the dynamism of native
peoples and the persistence of indigenous social, cultural, and political forms in the long,
complex process of encounter between Europeans and Native Americans.13 In addition,
much of the scholarship under the broad rubric of “borderlands history” has shed similar
light on the geographic and conceptual limits of European colonial rule, on the multifaceted
processes of syncretism and exchange between Native, European, and other non-indigenous
peoples, and has challenged historians to take seriously Native claims to sovereignty in both
11 See, for example, Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and
Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
12 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2009).
13 Matthew Restall, “The New Conquest History,” History Compass 10, no. 2 (2012): 151-160; Matthew Restall,
Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Matthew Restall, Maya
Conquistador (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998). See also, James Lockhart, The Nahuas after the Conquest: A Social and
Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1992); Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1570 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987); Laura E. Matthew and Michel R. Oudijk, eds., Indian Conquistadors: Indigenous
Allies in the Conquest of Mesoamerica (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); Ida Altman, The War for
Mexico’s West: Indians and Spaniards in New Galicia, 1524-1550 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
2010); Douglas Cope, The Limits of Racial Domination: Plebeian Society in Colonial Mexico City, 1660-1720 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1994); Rebecca Horn, Postconquest Coyoacan: Nahua-Spanish Relations in Central
Mexico, 1519-1650 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Serge Gruzinski, La colonisation de l’imaginaire:
Sociétés indigènes et occidentalisation dans le Mexique espagnol, XVIe-XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Gallimard, 1988); and George
W. Lovell, Conquest and Survival in Colonial Guatemala: A Historical Geography of the Cuchumatán Highlands, 15001821 (Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1985); among other works.
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the past and present.14 These contributions, among others, have added significant depth to
our understanding of the porosity, fluctuation, and imprecision of imperial boundaries, of
the limits of European domination, and of the diffusion of power inherent to early modern
empires, including that of Portugal and Spain. Inspired by this research, I show how the
Iberian empires were built upon a vast and varied constellation of authorities and
jurisdictions, how local actors navigated these invariably complex and fluid relations of
power, and how Iberian imperial sovereignty was by nature layered, fluid, and uneven across
space and time.
Finally, and most broadly, this project also aims to contribute to the booming
literature on globalization, which has largely obscured the role of Iberian expansion in that
process. Even Immanuel Wallerstein, in his magnum opus, The Modern World-System, affords
only cursory attention to earlier Iberian expansions in forging the rough contours of that
system, arguing that Portugal and Spain shifted quickly from Europe’s, and for him “the
world’s,” core to its semi-periphery in the early seventeenth century when the Dutch and
English took the lead in successfully developing the first “world economy.”15 This tendency

14 For a range of works on borderlands history and the concept of native sovereignty, see: Jeremy Adelman and
Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North
American History,” American Historical Review 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 814-841; Juliana Barr, “Geographies of
Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the ‘Borderlands’ of the Early Southwest,” William and Mary Quarterly 68, no.
1 (January 2011): 5-46; James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest
Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American
History and Culture, 2002); Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, “Entangled Histories: Borderlands Histories in New
Clothes?,” American Historical Review 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 787-799; Amanda J. Cobb, “Understanding Tribal
Sovereignty: Definitions, Conceptualizations, and Interpretations,” American Studies 46, nos. 3-4 (Fall-Winter
2005): 115-132; Kathleen DuVal, “Debating Identity, Sovereignty, and Civilization: The Arkansas Valley after
the Louisiana Purchase,” Journal of the Early Republic 26, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 25-58; Ramón A. Gutiérrez and
Elliott Young, “Transnationalizing Borderlands History,” Western Historical Quarterly 41 (Spring 2010): 27-53;
Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, “On Borderlands,” The Journal of American History (September 2011): 338361; David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); David J.
Weber, “The Spanish Borderlands, Historiography Redux,” The History Teacher 39, no. 1 (Nov., 2005): 43-56;
Michael Witgen, “The Rituals of Possession: Native Identity and the Invention of Empire in SeventeenthCentury Western North America,” Ethnohistory 54, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 639-668.
15 See, Wallerstein, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. For
discussion of the transition from early modern to “modern globalization”, forged primarily through the
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to separate a medieval, precapitalist Iberian world from a modern capitalist northwest
Europe, while not symptomatic of Spanish or Portuguese historiography, continues to frame
a range of research in Anglo-American historiography around the history of global
capitalism, empire, and the Atlantic world in general.16 However, several authors including
Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Glenn Ames, Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, and others, have explicitly
and successfully dismantled particular aspects of the idea of the Iberians as simple medieval
marauders as compared to their more “modern” counterparts from England, France, and the
Dutch Republic.17 And in his, Les quatre parties du monde: Histoire d’une mondialisation, published
in 2004, Serge Gruzinski has examined the transcontinental movement and mixture of
peoples, goods, and ideas across the Iberian empires during the period of their union, and

expansion of the British empire over the long nineteenth century, see C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World:
Global Connections and Comparisons, 1780-1914 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004).
16 There is a long, distinguished tradition in Spanish and Portuguese historiography, exemplified by the works
of Ramón Carande, Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, and Felipe Ruiz Martín, which argues for the existence of a
first, Iberian capitalism that took shape at least a century prior to the expansion northwest Europe. For the
most influential works, see Ramón Carande y Thovar, La economía y la expansión de España bajo el gobierno de los
Reyes Católicos (Madrid, 1952); Ramón Carande y Thovar, Carlos V y sus banqueros (Barcelona, 1943), Felipe Ruiz
Martín, Pequeño capitalismo, gran capitalismo: Simón Ruíz y sus negocios en Florencia (Barcelona: Crítica, D.L., 1990);
and Felipe Ruiz Martín, Los alumbres españoles: Un índice de la coyuntura económica europea en el siglo XVI (Madrid:
Fundación Española de Historia Moderna, 2005); and Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a
economia mundial (Lisbon: Editorial Presenca, 1963-1971).
17 See, in particular, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700: A Political and Economic
History (Malden, MA: John Wiley-Blackwell, 1993); Glenn J. Ames, Renascent Empire?: The House of Braganza and
the Quest for Stability in Portuguese Monsoon Asia c.1640-1683 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000); and
Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the
Eighteenth-century Atlantic World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). For a theoretical analysis of the
Iberian, especially the Portuguese, empires as baroque and subaltern, see Boaventura de Souza Santos,
“Between Prospero and Caliban: Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Inter-Identity,” Luso-Brazilian Review 39, no.
2 (Winter 2000): 9-43. The case of the France, with its early Calvinist Huguenot and later Catholic expansion, is
more complicated and therefore quite fascinating. In addition, the 1493 Inter caetera papal bull and 1494
Treaty of Tordesillas were fundamental, not only redefining the conceptualization of the globe, which is well
known, but also for their implications in excluding France (not to mention England or what became the United
Provinces) from gaining papal legitimacy as propagators of the faith beyond Europe. In the bulls, the Pope
sanctioned an exclusively Iberian religious legitimacy to the conquest and subjugation of non-European
territories and peoples, a fact, I argue, which has crucial significance in explaining the difference in trajectory
taken by the French, not to mention the fact that large-scale French expansion did not begin until somewhat
later.
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demonstrated that, at least from a cultural and intellectual standpoint, this process
represented a first globalization.18
While I argue for the development a globalized discourse of empire and trace how
early modern Iberian expansion forged the first globe-girdling flows of people, goods, and
ideas, the argument that any early modern empire, including either the Iberian ones or those
of northwest Europe, was truly global in any deep, substantive way is far more ambiguous
and therefore problematic.19 If the simple possession of a series of discontinuous territories
and enclaves in Europe, America, Africa, and Asia is sufficient proof that these empires were
“global,” then that is a rather low standard of analysis. In his penetrating critique of the
scholarship on globalization, Frederick Cooper rightly observed that what is lacking is
analysis of the historical depth of interconnections and of the structures and limits of those
connections.20 He noted that even the domineering empires of the nineteenth century
possessed “a strikingly unimpressive colonial capacity to exercise power systematically and
routinely over the territories under European rule. A globalizing language [justifying empire]
stood alongside a structure of domination and exploitation that was lumpy to the extreme.”21
Just as in the nineteenth century, what was “global” in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, to adapt Cooper’s phrasing, was not the actual ability of Europeans to exercise
18 Gruzinski, Les quatre parties du monde, see also Gruzinski, The Eagle and the Dragon: Globalization and European
Dreams of Conquest in China and America in the Sixteenth Century, trans. Jean Birrell (Malden, MA: Polity, 2014
[2012]). For another work which recognizes the role of Iberian expansion in the process of globalization, from
a cultural perspective, see Geoffrey C. Gunn, The First Globalization: The Eurasian Exchange, 1500-1800 (Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). Gunn’s work, however, while purporting to be a global history, focuses on
Eurasia and on cultural exchange between Europe and Asia with little attention to Africa or America. And for a
work that aims to treat global history from both a European and Asian perspective equally, see Romain
Bertrand, L’Histoire à parts égales: Récits d’une rencontre Orient-Occident, XVIe- XVIIe siècles (Paris, Le Seuil, 2011).
19 Hugh Thomas, World Without End: The Global Empire of Philip II (London: Allen Lane, 2014), for a recent
work explicitly emphasizing the global dimensions of Iberian imperium. In her 2009 essay, Tamar Herzog
nonetheless argued the contrary. See, Tamar Herzog, “The Meeting of Worlds: Did Early Modern Expansion
lead to Globalization?,” in New Ventures in Comparative History, ed. Benjamin Z. Kedar (Jerusalem: Magnes Press,
2009), 85-104.
20 Frederick Cooper, “Globalization,” in Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2005), 91.
21 Cooper, “Globalization,” 104.
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their effective imperial sovereignty on the ground, but the language, or “discourse,” which
justified that sovereignty.22 However, more than simply highlighting the tension and
disconnect between theory and practice, between ambition and effective rule, this study aims
to interrogate the mutually constitutive relationship between the two and to arrive at a more
precise understanding of the geographical and institutional limits of colonial authority in the
early modern Iberian empires.

I have employed Michel Foucault’s concept of a “discourse” in describing the wide,
polyphonic range of texts produced on the legitimacy of early modern Iberian empire.23
Following Foucault, I understand a discourse to be a reflection of power relations, which
through speaking and writing subjects comes to form a unified system of thought, language,
and action that in turn legitimates power. I should emphasize first that in advancing the
notion of such a discourse am I not arguing that there was a self-conscious, official
“ideology of Iberian empire” in a singular sense.24 Debates over the legitimacy of both the

Cooper, “Globalization,” 104.
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972),
and, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
24 For the major works on Spanish and Portuguese imperial ideologies or intellectual cultures, see For the major
studies examining this tradition in the Spanish case, see Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American
Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Pagden, Lords of
All the World; Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1990); Eva Botella-Ordinas, “‘Exempt from time and from its fatal change’: Spanish imperial ideology, 14501700,” Renaissance Studies 26, no. 4 (2012): 580-604; Lewis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949); James Muldoon, The Americas in the Spanish World
Order: The Justification for Conquest in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994);
Ricardo del Arco y Garay, La idea de imperio en la política y la literatura españolas (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1944); and
J. H. Parry, The Spanish Theory of Empire in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940);
Giuseppe Marcocci, A consciência de um império: Portugal e o seu mundo, sécs. XV-XVII, (Coimbra: Imprensa da
Universidade de Coimbra, 2012); Giuseppe Marcocci, “Conscience and Empire: Politics and Moral Theology in
the Early Modern Portuguese World,” Journal of Early Modern History 18 (2014): 473-494; Luís Filipe F. R.
Thomaz, “L’idée impériale manuéline,” in La Découverte, le Portugal et l'Europe: Actes du Colloque, ed. Jean Aubin
(Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, Centre Culturel Portugais, 1990), 35-103; Diogo Ramada Curto, “A
literatura e o império: Entre o espírito cavaleiroso, as trocas da corte e o humanismo cívico,” in História da
Expansão Portuguesa, Vol. I: A Formação do Império, 1415-1570, ed. Francisco Bethencourt and Kirti Chaudhuri
(Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 1998), 434-454; António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, Iustum imperium: Dos tratados como
fundamento do Império dos portugueses no oriente. Estudo de história do Direito internacional e do Direito português (Lisboa:
22
23
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Spanish and Portuguese empire were always polyphonic. Certain themes like the African
slave trade were more prominent in debates regarding the Portuguese empire than in those
regarding the Spanish, for instance. But even fierce critics like Bartolomé de las Casas, who
censured settlers’ abuse of Amerindians, and Francisco de Vitoria, who criticized the Pope’s
and by extension the Spanish monarch’s initial claims to sovereign title over the New World,
did not advocate the total illegitimacy or abandonment of overseas empire. Instead, in
critiquing specific features of Spanish imperialism they sought to reshape and improve the
nature of the empire in order to justify it in the eyes of God and according to natural law.
On the other hand, writers like Juan Ginés de Sepulveda, Seraphim de Freitas and Juan de
Solórzano Pereira, to name just three, offered more explicit, uncritical support for empire.
Although not constituting an official joint Iberian imperial ideology, critics as well as
unabashed champions of Iberian imperium did nonetheless draw on a shared vocabulary,
grammar, and set of beliefs, which coalesced into a discourse rooted in the religious,
juridical, and cultural traditions of early modern Christian Iberia. The process of expansion
prompted an array of unique moral and legal questions requiring new interpretations of
natural and ecclesiastical law, which slowly developed into a recognizable set of norms and
legal precepts, and came collectively to regulate Spanish and Portuguese imperial practice.
Foucault’s notion of a discourse as operating through rules of exclusion and ritual,
however, whereby only certain privileged voices are permitted to speak, only holds true to a
certain extent for the discourse I propose here. To be sure, highly educated humanists,
jurists, and especially theologians, were at the forefront in shaping that discourse, in setting
Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 2004); and Pedro Cardim, “La aspiración imperial de la
monarquía portuguesa (siglos XVI y XVII),” in Comprendere le monarchie iberiche: Risorse materiali e rappresentazioni
del potere. Atti del Seminario Internazionale. Roma, 8-9 novembre 2007, ed. Gaetano Sabatini (Rome: Viella, 2010), 3772; among others. For a rare study that attempts to treat the Spanish and Portuguese traditions together within
the space of one essay, see Xavier Gil Pujol, “Spain and Portugal,” in European Political Thought, 1450-1700:
Religion, Law and Philosophy, ed. H. A. Lloyd, G. Burgess and S. Hodson (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2007), 416-457.
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the parameters of its grammar and in identifying the legal and theological doctrines which
carried weight.25 The universities of Salamanca and Coimbra were among the institutions of
central importance in this process and produced many of the most influential participants in
these debates. But as the discourse gained depth and complexity, it also spread widely and
was mobilized by a broad array of actors. As I show, even local officials and settlers in the
most remote reaches of the empires, many of whom had little formal education, employed
similar arguments and ideas when justifying their actions and demonstrating their obedience
to the crown. Most surviving texts projecting indigenous voices were mediated through
missionaries or royal scribes and must therefore be analyzed with great caution and scrutiny.
But many indigenous peoples too, and not only elites, developed an impressive ability to
engage such discourse as they aimed either to protect their own autonomy or obtain the
crown’s favor or protection.
Like “discourse,” the terms “empire” and “sovereignty” also deserve clarification.
Neither the Spanish nor the Portuguese monarchies defined themselves as empires, after all.
In Castilian and Portuguese dictionaries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
“empire,” as a political unit, referred to the Roman Empire, or to its successor, the Holy
Roman Empire. With the exception of Charles V, who was Holy Roman Emperor from
1519 to 1556, no other Iberian monarch ever possessed the title of Emperor. In any case,
the Holy Roman Empire was based in central Europe, not Spain, and when Charles’ son
Philip II succeeded to the Spanish throne, he did not inherit the Imperial title, which instead
passed to his uncle Ferdinand. On the other hand, the early modern “Spanish Empire” of
modern parlance refers primarily to the transcontinental possessions of the crowns of Castile
and Aragon, including territories in the Mediterranean and North Africa, the Low Countries,
25

Marcel Bataillon, Études sur le Portugal au temps de l’humanisme (Coimbra: Por ordem da Universidade, 1952).
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the Philippines, and, of course, the New World. In a strict semantic sense, the Spanish
Empire never officially existed in its own day.26 Instead, contemporaries came to call that
political unit, “the Catholic Monarchy,” or “the Spanish Monarchy.” The Portuguese also
preferred to label their polity a “monarchy” (monarquia), or “kingdom” (reino), and like the
Spanish referred to their non-European possessions as “overseas conquests” (conquistas
ultramarinas), regardless of the precise manner in which those possessions had been
incorporated.27 And although already by 1501 King Manuel I had adopted the title, “Lord of
the Conquest, Navigation, and Trade of Ethiopia, Persia and India,” indicating his global
ambitions, no early modern Portuguese ruler ever held the official title of “Emperor”
either.28
In its general sense, the concept of “empire” – imperio in Portuguese and Castilian,
and imperium in Latin – meant simply, “lordship” and “power,” “to reign” and “to
command,” and could be used with a geographical connotation to denote the territorial
limits of a given realm. This concept of “empire” as government and command, explains
titles like that of the mid-seventeenth century manuscript by Alonso Martínez Calderón,
Imperio de la Monarquía de España.29 So even though “empire” was not the official designation
used to describe the transcontinental polities of early modern Spain and Portugal,
contemporaries did commonly use the term to convey the general vastness of Spanish and
Portuguese monarchical power. The two monarchies had designs to dominate nonEuropean peoples and territories, and sought to extend their power and imperio to all possible
regions of the globe. Moreover, if we accept the capacious definition of empires proposed
Anthony Pagden, “Great Expectations of Themselves,” Review of Spain’s Road to Empire: The Making of a
World Power, 1492-1763, by Henry Kamen. London Review of Books 25, no. 8 (17 April 2003): 32-33.
27 Pedro Cardim, “La aspiración imperial de la monarquía portuguesa.”
28 João de Barros, Ásia, edited by H. Cidade and M. Múrias (Lisbon: Agência Geral das Colonias, 1945): vol. 1,
227.
29 Pagden, Lords of All the World.
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by Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper as, “large political units, expansionist or with a
memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as
they incorporate new peoples,” then the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies were without
doubt “imperial.”30 Thus, and following many contemporaries including Martínez Calderón,
Gregorio López Madera and even Charles V himself, when I describe the composite,
transcontinental political conglomerations of Spain and Portugal as “empires,” and
“imperial,” I employ those terms in the lowercase, not to denote how the monarchies
officially self-identified, but as a way of characterizing their expansionary aspirations and
their composite, hierarchical political and social structures.31
The term “sovereign,” on the other hand, had long been used among the alternatives
to “majesty,” “king,” “monarch,” and “lord,” to refer to Iberian rulers in the third-person,
implying their supreme power within their respective monarchies. But “sovereignty,” as a
political and juridical concept, only slowly entered the European lexicon despite being first
theorized by French jurist Jean Bodin in 1576 on the eve of Iberian union.32 To be sure,
several earlier writers, including Ulpian and Machiavelli, had preceded Bodin in arguing for
the ruler’s supreme authority, but they did so without explicitly using the term “sovereignty.”
In theory, according to Bodin and later Hobbes, sovereign authority was absolute and above
all human or positive law, but not above natural or divine law. In its current meaning,
sovereignty today has come to refer to the supreme, indivisible authority of the state or the
head of state within a defined territory. Although the pursuit of dominion over nonBurbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, 8.
Xavier Gil Pujol, Imperio, Monarquía Universal, Equilibrio: Europa y la Política Exterior en el Pensamiento Político
Español de los siglos XVI y XVII (Perugia: Università di Perugia, 1995-96). See also Pablo Fernández Albaladejo,
“Imperio por si: La reformulación del poder universal en la temprana Edad Moderna”, in Estructuras y formas del
poder en la historia: Ponencias, eds. Pastor Reyna, et al (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1991),
143-156.
32 Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de la République (Paris: Chez Iacques du Puys, 1576). For translated edition in
Spanish, see Ivan Bodino, Los seis libros de la República (Turin: Por los Herederos de Bevilaqua, 1590), housed at
the Biblioteca Nacional de España in Madrid (BNE hereafter).
30
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European space was central to Iberian expansion since the fifteenth century bulls of
donation, the crown’s additional, some might say more immediate, aims were to achieve
effective control over colonial vassals and their labor, over resources extracted from the
land, and over trade routes, both maritime and terrestrial. The interest in drawing precise
boundaries of territorial sovereignty overseas only gathered pace slowly throughout the early
modern period, then accelerating significantly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
with the expansion of various competing empires across the interior of Africa, Asia, and
America.
Yet while sovereignty is absolute in theory, it has rarely been absolute in practice. As
historiography has shown, even during the supposed height of European royal absolutism in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as monarchs themselves well knew, their power
was often diffuse, delegated, and dependent on constant negotiations with nobles and other
elites over financial and military support to the crown, jurisdictional autonomy, and royal
recognition of local custom and privilege. This was especially true in Portugal and Aragon,
and a substantial body of scholarship has shown this to be true in Castile as well, where royal
power had conventionally been seen as having dominated local seigniorial and urban
corporate interests.33 As on the peninsula, Iberian crown sovereignty was also diffuse
overseas, especially beyond the confines of colonial strongholds, and to some degree even

33 For scholarship questioning the concept of absolutism, and of the state, in early modern Spain, see James
Amelang, “The Peculiarities of the Spaniards: Historical Approaches to the Early Modern State,” in Public Power
in Europe: Studies in Historical Transformations, ed. James Amelang and Siegfried Beer (Pisa: Pisa University Press,
2006), 31-56; Bartolomé Clavero, “Tejido de sueños: La historiografía jurídica española y el problema del
estado,” Historia contemporânea 12 (1996): 25-47; Charles Jago, “Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile,”
American Historical Review 86, no. 2 (April 1981): 307-326; Lesley Byrd Simpson, Gordon Griffiths and
Woodrow Borah, “Representative Institutions in the Spanish Empire of the Sixteenth Century,” Americas, 12,
no. 3 (January 1956): 223-257; and I. A. A. Thompson, Crown and Cortes: Government, Institutions and Representation
in Early-Modern Castile (Aldershot: Variorum, 1993).
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within them.34 This was despite the fact that as “conquests,” most overseas territories were
in theory fully subsumed within the legal systems of Portugal or Castile according to the
principle of accessory union.35
In grappling with its meaning, therefore, we see that imperial sovereignty existed
more in the realm of aspiration than reality. Shaded maps purporting to show the
geographical reach of European empires are deceptive in their tendency to exaggerate or
distort the geography of imperial sovereignty. They often fail to represent the fact that in
many places royal authority was only partial or indirect, extended through alliances and fluid
relations of vassalage with local indigenous polities, or through missionaries acting as
intermediaries at the vanguard of colonization. Thus, I use the term “imperial sovereignty”
primarily as a modern interpretive concept, which, importantly, reflects less an achieved
reality than an ambition on the part of the Iberian crowns to exercise full and indivisible
rule.36
I have generally preferred the concept of “sovereignty” to a more nebulous one like
“power,” which, according to sociologist Talcott Parsons’ definition, refers to “a ‘generalized
means’ for attaining whatever goals one wants to achieve.”37 Sovereignty, or better yet, the

This realization goes against more traditional interpretations of the Spanish Monarchy as exercising
centralized, absolute rule over and within its American possessions. For this traditional portrayal, see John
Lynch, Spain, 1516-1598: From Nation State to World Empire (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 211-212; John Leddy
Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century: Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish Empire (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 321-337; Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 90-91;
Horst Pietschmann, El Estado y su evolución al principio de la colonización española de América (México: Fondo de
Cultura Económica, 1989), 161-63; Enrique Semo, Historia del capitalism en México: Los orígenes, 1521-1763
(México: Ediciones Era, 1973), 65-70; J. M. Ots Capdequí, El Estado español en las Indias (México: Colegio de
México, 1941), 44-45. On the need to reappraise this historiography and re-emphasize the importance of
political culture and institutions in the history of Spanish colonial America, see, Alejandro Cañeque, “The
Political and Institutional History of Colonial Spanish America,” History Compass 11, no. 4 (2013): 280-291.
35 Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies.”
36 Although Bodin’s famous work, Les Six Livres de la République, was translated into Spanish as early as 1590,
the term “sovereignty” only slowly became common to the vocabulary of early modern Iberian political and
juridical culture.
37 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1 of A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 6.
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pursuit of it, is more precise for my purposes in that it refers specifically to the aim of the
state or head of state, represented here by the Iberian monarchs and the imperial officials
and institutions, to attain supreme, formalized, and effective legal authority over and within
specific political communities and territories.38 Early modern Iberian imperial culture was
litigious to the extreme, and even long before Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama
reached the New World and India, Spain and Portugal had engaged in a series of pitched
legal and military battles over claims to various Atlantic islands and beachheads along
Atlantic Africa. The monarchies’ appeals to Papal arbitration and endorsement in the early
phase of expansion represent examples of how they attempted to secure and justify exclusive
jurisdiction over newly claimed territorial and maritime spaces. And as the two monarchies
slowly wrested control from Rome over ecclesiastical affairs within their own their extended
jurisdictions, they appointed a series of temporary and semi-permanent councils of
theologians and jurists to debate and rule on a range of questions about the legal, moral, and
theological underpinnings of Iberian imperium, which is to say, about the justness and
legality of Iberian claims to imperial sovereignty beyond Europe.
Michael Mann’s transhistorical theory of “social power,” however, goes beyond
more vague definitions of power and complements the concept of imperial sovereignty in
helping us understand how empires attempted to impose diverse forms of control over vast,
internally differentiated polities and peoples. The overarching idea of social power in Mann’s
model emanates from the interrelation of four component sources: ideological power,
economic power, military power, and political power. He also distinguishes between internal
power, meaning the ability to organize tightly and exercise command within territories, and
38 As several scholars have pointed out, this notion of an early modern Spanish or Portuguese “state” is
anachronistic. See Clavero, “Tejido de sueños;” Clavero, “Institución política y derecho: Acerca del concepto
historiográfico de ‘estado moderno’,” Revista de estudios politicos 19 (January-February 1981): 43-57; Hespanha, As
Vésperas do Leviathan; and Albaladejo, Fragmentos de monarquía.
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external power, referring to the organization of large numbers of people over far-flung
territories to achieve minimally stable cooperation.39 This external aspect of power is
obviously key to understanding both the Portuguese and Spanish imperial systems, since
both consisted of territories that were not only vast but also discontinuous and spread across
several continents. Mann defines economic power as the satisfaction of subsistence needs
through control of the extraction, distribution, and consumption of products of nature;
military power as the organization of coercive strength and violence for physical defense and
aggression; and political power as the centralized, institutionalized, and territorialized
organization of the state in regulating many aspects of social relations.40
As is well known, the Spanish drew much of their “economic power” from the
extraction and distribution of precious metals, especially silver. Although perpetually
disappointed in the search for their own Potosí, the Portuguese did nonetheless find
substantial amounts of gold and other metals and stones in Southeast Africa and Brazil. And
through illicit trade with the Spanish in the South China Sea and Río de la Plata they
obtained vast quantities of Spanish America silver, a fact that also highlights the impressive
degree of informal economic integration between the two Iberian empires.41 Among myriad

Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 7.
I would add that, as reflected explicitly in the papal bulls of donation and in attempts to regulate Indian
Ocean trade through the cartaz system, the Iberian empires sought not only control over territory, but also over
maritime space. In the case of the Iberian empires then, it seems most apt to speak of political power as
“spatialized” rather than simply “territorialized.” In fact, the term “thalassocracy”, rather than “empire”, is
often used in describing early modern Portugal’s extended political conglomeration.
41 For the South China Sea, see Flynn and Giráldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’,” 201-221; Valladares, Castilla y
Portugal en Asia; Rafael Valladares, “Dominio y mercado: Sobre la contratación luso-española en Asia en el siglo
XVII,” in España y las 17 provincias de los países bajos: Una revisión historiográfica (XVI-XVIII), ed. Ana Crespo
Solana and Manuel Herrero Sánchez, vol.2 (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2002), 719-730; C. R. Boxer,
“A Note on the Triangular Trade between Macao, Manila and Nagasaki, 1580-1640,” Terrae Incognitae: The
Journal for the History of Discoveries 17 (1985a): 51-59; C. R. Boxer, “Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the
Conquest of Southeast Asia, 1580-1600,” Journal of Asian History 3 (1969): 118-136; José Manuel García,
“Relações históricas entre Macau e as Filipinas: Uma perspectiva portuguesa,” Anuario de estudios hispanoamericanos 65, no. 2 (2008): 39-70; Rui d’Ávila Lourido, “Portugueses e Espanhóis em Macau e Manila: com
olhos na China,” Revista de Cultura 7 (2003): 23-45; Manel Ollé, “Macau-Manila interactions in Ming Dinasty,”
in Macau during the Ming Dynasty, ed. Luís Filipe Barreto (Lisboa: Centro Científico e Cultural de Macau, I.P.,
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other products key to Spanish economic power were maté tea in the pampas and Andean
foothills of South America, rice in the Philippines, and livestock and tobacco throughout
various parts of the empire. For the Portuguese, sugar, and later tobacco, as well as livestock
were key products in Brazil, as were an array of spices from across maritime Asia and Africa.
And Amerindian and African slaves, also seen by contemporaries as key commodities,
provided the basic lifeblood of the Portuguese colonial economy in much of Brazil and
Atlantic Africa.42
“Military power” was crucial in several ways too. It provided essential physical force
for the initial conquest of territory and subjugation of native communities. It served to
protect existing positions against resurgent indigenous groups as well as attacks from
European rivals. In addition, it ensured the compliance of subjugated groups in the payment
of tribute, in the mobilization of coerced labor, and in securing political obedience and
military support during times of conflict.
The “political power” of the Iberian empires was exercised through a complex
framework of institutions and officials charged with extending and maintaining relations of
vassalage over indigenous groups and colonists of European origin. The viceroy or
governor-general was the monarch’s direct, highest representative. Reporting to him was a

2009), 152-176. For the River Plate region see Carlos Sempat Assadourian, El tráfico de esclavos en Córdoba de
Angola a Potosí, siglos XVI-XVII (Córdoba, Argentina: Dirección General de Publicaciones, 1966); Alice Piffer
Canabrava, O Comercio português no Rio da Prata, 1580-1640 (Belo Horizonte: Editora Itatiaia, 1984), Lewis
Hanke, “The Portuguese in Spanish America, with Special Reference to the Villa Imperial de Potosi,” Revista de
Historia de America 51 (1961): 1-48; Ricardo de Lafuente Machain, Los Portugueses en Buenos Aires, Siglo XVII
(Buenos Aires: Tipografía de Archivos, 1931); Schwartz, “Luso-Spanish Relations in Habsburg Brazil;”
Enriqueta Vila Vilar, Hispano-América y el comercio de esclavos: Los asientos portugueses (Seville: Escuela de Estudios
Hispano-Americanos, 1977); and José Carlos Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dos Felipes: Conexões na América
Meridional, 1580-1640 (São Paulo: Editora Intermeios, 2014).
42 The crown formally and repeatedly prohibited Amerindian slavery in colonial Brazil, but the practice
continued unabated in places like Sao Paulo and its environs, and even Rio de Janeiro, as I discuss in Chapter 5.
And in their recent analysis of the inter-colonial slave trade in the Americas, Alex Borucki, David Eltis and
David Wheat have shown the African slave trade to Spanish America was far greater than previously thought;
see: Alex Borucki, David Eltis and David Wheat, “Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America,”
American Historical Review 120, no. 2 (2015): 433-461.
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series of officials in charge of various aspects of colonial fiscal, military, and political
administration. High courts of appeal were also established in some colonies with
jurisdiction over specific territories and communities, and the judges of those courts
reported directly to king rather than to the viceroy.
Within the political, fiscal, ecclesiastical, judicial, and military institutions there
existed more or less clear orders of hierarchy, and all, with the exception of the regular
clergy, were subject to the ultimate authority of the monarch and his advisory councils in
Portugal and Spain. But between them, relations of hierarchy were not always clear. Town
councils, for instance, could appeal directly to the king if they felt the viceroy or another
colonial authority had violated their local rights and privileges. Jurisdictional disputes also
erupted frequently between the viceroy and judges of the high courts of appeal, since both
reported directly to the king. Rather than provoking anarchy, however, this complex political
structure actually produced an impressive cohesion while at same time affording local
colonial institutions high degrees of autonomy.43 And the checking of certain colonial
institutions by the power of others served to ensure that ultimate sovereignty remained in
the hands of the king.
The possession of economic, military, and political power has been central to the
success and survival of all empires, including those of Spain and Portugal. And true to

Francisco Bethencourt coined the term, “nebula of power”, in describing how the Portuguese empire was
founded on, “a permanent yet unstable balance among local, regional, and central crown agencies, competing
with each other but allowing royal tutelage of the system.” See Francisco Bethencourt, “Political Configurations
and Local Powers”, in Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800, eds. Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada
Curto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 199. Bethencourt’s work was itself influenced by the
earlier works of Luís Filipe Reis Thomaz, who, well before, spoke of network of powers in Asia, and of
Antonio Manuel Hespanha, who proposed the idea of a constellation of powers to characterize the Portuguese
situation in Asia. See, Luís Filipe Reis Thomaz, “A estrutura política e administrativa do Estado da Índia no
século XVI,” in II Seminário internacional de história indo-europeia (Lisboa: Centro de Estudos de História e
Cartografia Antiga, IICT, 1985), 511-540; and António Manuel Hespanha and Maria Catarina Santos, “Os
Poderes num Império Oceânico,” in História de Portugal, vol. 4, ed. by José Mattoso (Lisbon: Círculo de
Leitores, 1993), 395-413.
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Mann’s model, in the Iberian empires all these sources of power were interrelated and
interdependent. In addition, “ideological power,” also among his four sources of social
power, played a particularly prominent role in the development of Iberian imperium. For
Mann, ideological power derives from the endowment of meaning and the monopoly on its
production, from the development of norms regulating how people should think and act
morally, and from aesthetic, ritual practices, which function as visible, physical
manifestations of meaning and serve to reinforce it. In these ways, ideological power was
intimately tied to the discourse of Iberian empire I propose here.
Not everyone was a zealous defender of Iberian empire, of course. Critics found
many creative ways to voice their dissension, albeit often at great risk. Playwrights might
deliver subtle, masked criticism, while other authors were sometimes more brash, especially
those residing beyond the domain of the Iberian monarchies. The Spanish and Portuguese
crowns thus aimed, to the extent possible, to monopolize the production of meaning
through a range of strategies, including the appointment of official chroniclers and
regulations on the printing and circulation of texts. Direct editorial censorship of a text was
also common if it was perceived to have shed negative light on the empire, or simply to have
contained information deemed too sensitive to be leaked and potentially seized upon by
imperial competitors.44 For particularly flagrant infractions, authors could face the rigors of
the Inquisition. There were, however, certain approved venues for critical reflection, even
before the rise of arbitrismo literature in the early seventeenth century. Jurists and theologians,
for instance, were invited on occasion to debate and openly criticize certain aspects of
empire in order to decide on specific questions in the interest of establishing a generally

44 María M. Portuondo, Secret Science: Spanish Cosmography and the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2009); and Richard Kagan, Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
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agreed upon set of moral and legal standards of imperial thought and practice. And legal,
political, and theological treatises contributed in different ways to eulogizing or justifying
Iberian expansion, as did epic poetry and chronicles, more overtly. Cartography too, as well
as navigational charts and reports, added a spatial, physical dimension to impressions of the
vastness of Iberian imperium.
The opinions set down by learned jurists and theologians provided recommended
frameworks of thought and action not only for the monarchs and imperial officials, but also
for settlers at all levels of colonial society. Ideas of the sacred mission of the imperial
enterprise, of the preeminence of royal authority, and of basic belonging within larger,
transcontinental Spanish and Portuguese imperial worlds, were disseminated through printed
texts, a range of iconography on municipal buildings, churches and other structures, and
also, importantly, through ritual and spoken word in religious services, public
announcements and casual conversation. Ceremonies marking the conquest of new
territories, the founding of new towns, or the arrival of new viceroys who served as “the
king’s living image” helped formalize and popularize notions of royal authority.45 They
provided social and political cohesion through constant reinforcement of the notion that,
despite being far removed physically from the royal court and centers of colonial power,
colonists even in the most distant reaches of the empire all, in one way or another, formed
part of a larger imperial whole. This discourse which took shape over the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, and which reached the most distant colonial outposts with varying
degrees of intensity, endowed the Iberian empires with extraordinary ideological power.

45 Alejandro Cañeque, The King’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico (New
York: Routledge, 2004); and Pedro Cardim and Joan-Lluís Palos, eds., El mundo de los virreyes en las monarquías de
España y Portugal (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2012). On the importance of a range of other rituals and ceremonies
in consolidating local and imperial rule, see Frances Ramos, Identity, Ritual, and Power in Colonial Puebla (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 2012).
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Throughout this study, I explore the mutually reinforcing relationship between the
theory and practice of imperial sovereignty. I argue for the rise of a globalized discourse of
Iberian empire through an analysis of texts that substantiated and occasionally challenged the
aspirations of the Iberian monarchs to sovereignty over newly incorporated territories and
subjects overseas. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, these articulations
coalesced into a sophisticated discourse that identified necessary conditions for the waging
of just war, the legitimate subjugation or enslavement of various peoples, the exclusivist
control over maritime routes, and the occupation and settlement of overseas territory.
After providing an overview of these various discourses of empire, I then zoom-in to
analyze the contested, fluid nature of colonial authority on the ground through three
granular case studies of remote regions of the two empires in Southeast Africa, the
Philippines, and the Río de la Plata, encompassing the southeastern part of the Viceroyalty
of Peru and the hinterland of southern Brazil. I have chosen these three regions from among
a range of potential case studies. Similar dynamics of diffuse, indirect, and fluctuating
sovereignty were present in many other parts of the Iberian empires, including in Chile, the
Bay of Bengal, California, Angola, and Florida, to name just a few. In the interest of
examining these dynamics in relative depth within the space of one monograph, however, I
have limited myself to three cases. I have specifically chosen one from Africa, one from
Asia, and one from the Americas in order to reflect the global dimensions of Iberian
expansionary ambition and experience. Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la
Plata are – and were – vastly distinct in their social, political, and cultural contexts. For
precisely this reason, they are indicative of the dizzying array of territories and peoples the
Iberians encountered and over which they attempted to extend imperial rule.

27
Yet despite their diversity, the three cases also reveal a number of interesting parallels
representative of similar struggles for sovereignty across the margins of the Iberian empires,
which slowly came to define the physical limits of those empires. Such parallels could be
seen in the strategies through which the empires attempted to justify claims to sovereignty
and extend it in practice, in how indigenous groups reversed or helped shape that extension,
and in the constant instability and limits of imperial rule even at the height of Iberian global
power around the turn of the seventeenth century. Moreover, Spanish and Portuguese
settlers, missionaries, and imperial officials across the globe, including in these places, shared
a common worldview steeped in the cultural, theological, and juridical traditions of early
modern Christian Iberia. Regardless of their social position, their level of integration within
indigenous societies, or their relationship to royal power, they all understood that in one way
or another they formed part of larger Spanish and Portuguese imperial worlds. Having
expanded beyond the confines of Europe those worlds now extended to some of the globe’s
most distant corners and became one under the singular sovereignty of Philip II in 1581.46
In Chapter One, I trace the parallel, connected expansions of the two empires from
the late fifteenth century through the early seventeenth. Exploring tensions between political
theory, legal frameworks, and practice of government, I describe how the rulers of Portugal
and Spain integrated new territories and subject populations within their composite
monarchies. I analyze how this process played out in the context of Iberian union, when
Philip II of Spain incorporated the Kingdom of Portugal and its extended possessions within
his broader imperium in 1580. I examine and compare Spanish and Portuguese institutions
of imperial administration, and assess the impact of this union on the two overseas empires.
I then interrogate the limits of Iberian imperium writ large through an analysis of the
46
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incompleteness of “conquest” in core regions of the Iberian settlement and authority as well
as on the imperial margins. I analyze the jurisdictional layering and overlapping, the
persistence of local autonomy and customary law, and the relative extent of
(de)centralization, which came collectively to diffuse and disperse political authority
throughout the early modern Iberian world. I also highlight the impact of non-European
individuals and groups in the development of Iberian colonial rule, and in shaping the pace
and contours of European imperial expansion more broadly, a theme which I explore
throughout the manuscript.
In Chapter Two, I examine the development and impact of contemporary debates
on the legitimacy of early modern Iberian imperium. The writings of humanists like Gomes
Eanes de Zurara, João de Barros, and Luís Vaz de Camões for the Portuguese, and Gonzalo
Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, Pedro Mexía, and Francisco López de Gómara for the Spanish,
lauded the exploits of their respective sovereigns in extending Iberian Catholic rule
throughout the four parts of the world. And the polemical interventions of Las Casas,
Vitoria, Sepúlveda, and Fernão de Oliveira, among others, began coalescing to define an
increasingly specific set of justifications of Spanish and Portuguese imperial practice. These
juridical, theological, and humanistic discourses combined with an array of visual
iconography and cartography, which not only helped validate the Iberian monarchs’ claims
to overseas empire, but were revolutionary in shaping a new sense of the world as a vast yet
now finite space, as confirmed by the first circumnavigation of the globe by Magellan’s crew
completed in 1522. Maintaining their deep commitment to the Christian mission, champions
of Iberian monarchy slowly shifted from earlier writings that emphasized the universality of
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imperial rule in a messianic, extra-terrestrial sense to a discourse that first conceptualized the
globe as a bounded unit, with Iberia at its center.47
I then examine the crystallization of this discourse after the union of the Iberian
crowns and their extended possessions in 1580. With the empires united, excitement at the
unbridled potential of Iberian power reached fever pitch in the first two decades after union
and crystallized in the works of Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Tomasso Campanella,
João Baptista Lavanha, and Juan de Solórzano Pereira, among others.48 Over the same
period, however, setbacks against resurgent indigenous polities in several regions combined
with a dizzying series of defeats to the Dutch and English leading to a general recession of
Iberian power worldwide. Despite or arguably as a result of these mounting challenges, some
authors became ever more determined to defend the sovereign claims of the Iberian
monarchs. Building on the work of their sixteenth century predecessors they extolled and
provided moral and legal legitimacy for the wide-ranging claims to Spanish and Portuguese
imperium both in Europe and beyond. At no other time was the dissonance between the
discourse of empire and the practical limits of Iberian authority more pronounced.
Shifting from the discursive, textual realm to an analysis of the contested, fluid
nature of Iberian imperial sovereignty in practice, in Chapter Three, I examine the fraught,
incomplete process of Portugal’s attempt to establish its cultural and political hegemony in
Southeast Africa. Reports of gold mines and the murder of the Jesuit missionary envoy
Gonçalo de Silveira at the order of the Monomotapa “emperor” in 1561 compelled Lisbon
to sponsor a quixotic military expedition in 1569 aimed at punishing that native ruler,

47 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “On World Historians in the Sixteenth Century,” Representations 91 (2005): 26-57; and
Manoel Cardozo, “The Idea of History in the Portuguese Chroniclers of the Age of Discovery,” Catholic
Historical Review 49, no. 1 (1963): 1-19.
48 I also examine the writings of Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Diogo do Couto and Seraphim de Freitas among
others.
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expelling local Muslims, and conquering the mine fields of the powerful native kingdoms of
the interior. The Jesuits Francisco Monclaro and João Baptista de Ribeira penned
impassioned juridico-theological treatises, which fused the globalized discourse of Iberian
empire with references to specific circumstances on the ground to justify Portuguese
declarations of war on the Monomotapa and the enslavement of his native subjects. They
cited the murder of Silveira, as well as the natives’ supposed incapacity for reasonable
thought, their resistance to the Catholic faith and their generally barbaric, animalistic nature
in order to provide legal cover for an armed expedition of conquest.49 The expedition failed
in the face of local resistance, however, and the crown only managed a direct institutional
presence in the interior through the appointment of local captains at a handful of inland
trade posts, the most important of which – Massapa – depended on ultimate confirmation
by the Monomotapa ruler. The highpoint of Iberian power in the region came in the first
half of the seventeenth century, during a period of internecine conflict and fragmentation
among local kingdoms. In the vacuum, the crown confirmed a series of land titles in
exchange for quit-rents on those lands, officially recognizing the large territorial holdings
amassed by Portuguese and Luso-African settlers who served as intermediaries between
native polities and the Portuguese crown. But as several local polities were slowly
reconsolidated over the second half of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese crown’s
direct rule was again confined to Mozambique Island and a scattering of fortified trade posts
along the lower reaches of the Zambezi River.
Chapter Four is on Spanish efforts to consolidate sovereignty over the Philippines.
Spanish frustrations there were compounded by the archipelago’s mountainous topography
and the obvious difficulty of conquering peoples dispersed across thousands of islands.
49
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Although the Spanish managed rather quickly to subjugate the indigenous peoples around
Manila, they became embroiled in violent, cyclical conflict with the city’s Chinese merchant
community, making even the center of Spanish power in the Philippines perpetually
unstable. On the southern island of Mindanao, the local inhabitants successfully repelled
Spanish attempts to establish any lasting presence whatsoever. Although by the 1590s Spain
claimed sovereignty over the entire northern island of Luzon, where Manila was located, the
mountain peoples of the central cordillera always remained beyond the reach of Spanish
power altogether. And by the second quarter of the seventeenth century many of the
inhabitants of the lowland north had successfully thrown off Spanish rule. As in the New
World, a sharp polyphonic debate erupted between missionaries and settlers, theologians and
royal officials over Spanish abuse of natives through conquest and encomienda, viewed
together as the prime cause of Filipino unrest.50 The debates over Spain’s sovereignty in the
Philippines reverberated all the way from Manila to Mexico City to Madrid and revived
questions over the legality and morality of Spanish imperialism, this time in Asia. Yet, despite
the multipronged efforts to alleviate native suffering, abuses persisted, rebellions continued,
and most of the archipelago remained beyond the reach of the crown and even missionaries
until well into the nineteenth century.
The Río de la Plata region, the focus of Chapter Five, lay on the contested boundary
line separating the hemispheres of Spanish and Portuguese imperial jurisdiction in America
and thus became a site of conflict for sovereignty not only between Iberian and indigenous
groups but also between the two Iberian empires themselves. Neither the Portuguese nor the
Spanish crown had a significant direct, formal presence in the region and both depended on

50 An encomienda was a grant bestowed by the crown to an individual for the right to extract tribute in the form
of money, agricultural produce or labor from natives of a given area in return for providing protection and
instruction in the Catholic faith.
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intermediary groups in asserting a degree of indirect, layered sovereignty. In the late
sixteenth century, the mostly mestiço inhabitants of São Paulo, called Paulistas, began entering
the interior on long, devastating indigenous slaving expeditions. In an effort to protect native
communities and serve as a buffer against Portuguese movements into territory claimed by
Spain, Spanish officials sanctioned the establishment of Jesuit missions east of the Paraná
and Uruguay rivers. In response to official crown prohibitions of indigenous slavery, the
Paulistas mounted a series of sophisticated legal defenses of the practice through their
municipal council, citing the principles of customary law, just war, as well as their
jurisdictional autonomy as residents of a seigniorial captaincy. The crown was effectively
powerless to curb the Paulistas, became increasingly resigned to their activities, and
eventually even came to view them as a key vanguard in advancing its own sovereignty in the
region. Unlike in Southeast Africa or the Philippines, the general Iberian presence in the Río
de la Plata did steadily increase over the period, without receding. But as in those regions,
the crown’s direct, formal presence was limited to handful of isolated royal officials. It was
only in 1750 that the Treaty of Madrid enshrined, at least in theory, a more precise line of
territorial division between the two respective spheres of Spanish and Portuguese
sovereignty. Even then, however, royal authority over much of the interior remained far
from complete. Despite being in perpetual conflict, the missionaries and Paulistas remained
the prime representatives of Iberian power in the region until well into the mid-eighteenth
century and beyond.
In my Conclusions, I close the study with an integrated analysis of the three case
studies, reflecting on the re-articulation of Iberian imperial discourses at the edges of empire.
I describe and compare the effective reach and limits of colonial authority in those regions.
And I assess the implications of such a focus for scholarly understandings of how colonial
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authority was constructed, represented, and reinforced, but also how it was circumscribed
and undermined. By the mid-seventeenth century, the cumulative challenges to Iberian
global hegemony had significantly tempered Spanish and Portuguese imperial ambition as
well as its discourse. The limits of Iberian sovereignty, having long been visible in practice,
were now increasingly challenged in theory as well. Yet despite having lost global
preeminence, the Iberians had nonetheless laid the ideological and structural foundations for
the expansion of later European empires across the four parts of the world.
Fashioned over the course of the sixteenth century, the discourse of Iberian empire
was sophisticated and wide-ranging and its influence was manifest clearly in subsequent
efforts to justify the expansionary rights of competing empires like those of England,
France, and the Dutch Republic, mostly through private, chartered companies. Jurists like
Hugo Grotius and John Selden drew not only on pan-European theories of natural law and
the stylistic precedent of Iberian chroniclers before them. They also mobilized, reinterpreted,
or subverted specific arguments of earlier writers who debated the legitimacy of Iberian
empire several decades prior. By that time, however, the discourse of empire was evolving.
Defenders of Dutch and English expansion tended to advance more secular arguments.
Unsurprisingly, the Catholic mission, an institution central to both the practice and theory of
Iberian empire, was jettisoned. And by the mid-seventeenth century imperial supremacy and
its dominant discourses were moving from Iberia to northern Europe.

34
CHAPTER 1
GLOBAL EXPANSION

As Christian forces pushed south across Iberia in the late middle ages, consolidating
control over the lingering remnants of the former Islamic caliphate that had once reigned
supreme over most of the peninsula, Spaniards and Portuguese began looking to new
frontiers of expansion overseas, beyond the horizon.51 Although impelled by a similar
combination of commercial and religious motives, and united in the quest to extend the
reach of Christendom, early Spanish and Portuguese expansion was halting, incremental, and
defined by violent competition at the outset.52 Well before the Iberians’ arrival in the New
World, Portugal and Castile clashed over possessions in the Canaries, Morocco, the Azores,
and Cape Verde. These early forays were not the result of a systematic, long-term policy of
imperial expansion, but rather of attempts by the Portuguese first, followed by the Castilians,
to find new commercial opportunities and trade routes to replace those monopolized or
closed by the Ottomans in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and overland across parts of
western and central Asia.
The Portuguese took first initiative. By the early fifteenth century they had already
expressed their conviction that the best alternative route was that which, beginning in the

51 Alexander Ponsen and Antonio Feros, “The Early Modern Iberian Empires: Emulation, Alliance,
Competition,” in The Routledge Companion to Iberian Studies, eds. Javier Muñoz-Basols, Laura Lonsdale, and
Manuel Delgado (London: Routledge, 2017), 139-151.
52 Historians have long recognized the joint religious and commercial motives behind Castile’s early expansion
under Ferdinand and Isabel, but have, until recently, portrayed Portugal’s initial forays into the Atlantic and
Indian oceans overwhelmingly commercial in orientation, with their religious missionary element as secondary
to what was first and foremost a profit-driven enterprise. For an account of the religious inspiration driving the
Spanish conquest of Peru, for instance, see Marcel Bataillon, Le lien religieux des conquérants du Pérou (London:
Hispanic & Luso-Brazilian Councils, 1956); and for an analysis of Iberian conquests more broadly, see Pierre
Chaunu, Conquête et Exploitation des Nouveaux Mondes, XVIe siècle (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969).
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Atlantic, would eventually round Africa and entered into the vast world of spices in the
Indian Ocean and East Asia. As they went, they established an array of strategic strongholds
to secure their commercial monopoly over the spice trade. Steeped in the juridicaltheological culture of fifteenth century Christian Europe, the rulers of Portugal and Castile
shared a common worldview and both sought Papal endorsement of their claims beyond
Europe. Portugal’s primacy in the fifteenth century was enshrined in the Papal bulls Dum
Diversas and Romanus Pontifex, of 1452 and 1455, which granted Portugal full secular and
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the lands and seas from northwest Africa all the way to India.
The monarchs of Portugal and Castile then ratified the main conditions of those bulls with
the signing of the Treaty of Alcaçovas in 1479, which established the first Portuguese mare
clausum in African and Asian waters.
Within a matter of decades the expansion of each kingdom achieved results viewed
by many as nothing short of miraculous. After extending its gold- and slave-trading presence
along the west coast of Africa in the late fifteenth century, Portugal established trade links
with India in 1498 and laid claim to Brazil with Pedro Álvares Cabral’s landing there in 1500.
Over the next half century, the Portuguese attacked and occupied Goa, Colombo in Sri
Lanka, and several southeast Asian islands. In addition, they expanded their foothold in
Brazil, and established an informal trading presence in both East Africa and Macao. Already
by 1501, King Manuel I had adopted the title, “Lord of the Conquest, Navigation, and Trade
of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India,” which, although exaggerating the extent of his
effective authority, nonetheless indicated his global ambitions.53
The expansion of the Spanish Monarchy was no less impressive. Although not
without setbacks along the way, beginning in 1493 the Spanish Monarchy had sponsored,
Anthony Disney, A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 127.
53
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organized, or facilitated numerous voyages of exploration, as well as the occupation and
exploitation of several Caribbean islands. The pace of expansion accelerated following the
victory over the Mexica in 1521, secured by Hernán Cortés with the aid of a large native
army, and the conquest of the powerful Inca empire by Pizarro and his companions in the
1530s. As a result of these campaigns, by 1560 the most populous regions and cities in the
Americas had been occupied and claimed for the Spanish Monarchy, and virtually all of the
future colonial centers or capitals had been founded, or re-founded, including Santo
Domingo, Havana, Mexico City, and Lima. Not until the 1620s would other European
powers begin to threaten Spanish hegemony in the Indies, and even then only in the
Caribbean and the regions that would later form part of the United States and Canada.
Like the Portuguese, the Spaniards also tried their luck on other continents. Between
1519 and 1521 Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese in the service of the Spanish monarch
Charles I, attempted the first successful circumnavigation of the globe, a feat eventually
completed by Juan Sebastián Elcano, a Spanish sailor, and the remaining crew following
Magellan’s death in combat. Subsequent explorations led the Spanish Monarchy to claim
sovereignty over the Philippines in the 1560s, the Moluccas, to attempt the conquest of the
isle of Formosa (Taiwan), to draw up plans for the exploration and conquest of Australia,
and even for the invasion of China itself—a proposal mooted in the 1580s, criticized as a
chimerical adventure by some Jesuits, and finally rejected by Philip II. Alongside these
possessions were the Canary Islands and various territories in North Africa—Ceuta (after
1640, having previously belonged to the crown of Portugal), Melilla in what is today
Morocco, and Oran, a city under Spanish sovereignty from 1509 until the end of the
eighteenth century, and part of modern Algeria.
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In the wake of Columbus’ voyage to the Americas, the comparative power of the
two Iberian monarchies began to level off as evidenced in the Pope’s 1493 Inter cætera bull of
donation, which divided the entire globe into two separate spheres of “full and free”
Castilian and Portuguese jurisdiction, including monopolies on navigation. The bull
legitimized violent conquest in the name of Christianization by granting such jurisdiction on
the condition that the “barbarous nations” discovered “be overthrown and brought to the
faith.” The Holy See conceded not only territorial, political, and commercial rights to the
monarchs, but also imposed on them an unambiguously colonial agenda or ideology: the
obligation to convert all of the non-Christian peoples they encountered, to provide sufficient
education for them to become good Christians, and to care for and protect them against the
aggression of rapacious colonizers.
With the exception of their early clashes in North Africa and the Atlantic Islands,
there were relatively few conflicts between the Portuguese and Spanish prior to the second
quarter of the seventeenth century. The primary reason was that, from the beginning of
Spanish expansion, both monarchies agreed to a pact creating two separate spheres for
jurisdiction and navigation, confirmed in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas and the 1529 Treaty
of Zaragoza. This is not to say that there were no conflicts or misunderstandings. The
Segovian jurist and governor Alonso de Zuazo referred to these when he wrote from Santo
Domingo to Charles I in 1518 reflecting on “the division of the world as an orange between
the King of Portugal and the grandparents of Your Majesty.”54 Zuazo went on to argue that

54 Alonso de Zuazo, “Capítulos de carta del licenciado Alonso de Zuazo,” in Colección de documentos inéditos
relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y colonización de las posesiones españolas, vol. 1 (Madrid: Manuel B. de Quirós,
1864), 296-297.
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the Portuguese had appropriated lands of the New World (in Brazil) and the “Orient,” which
corresponded to Spain, and that Charles should take them by armed force.55
While Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy competed to consolidate imperial
authority within their respective spheres, the two empires became increasingly interlinked.
Many Portuguese, including Magellan, were essential to the early phase of Spanish
discoveries and conquests. And while many Spaniards were at the forefront of the expansion
of the Portuguese empire in Brazil, Portuguese settlers usually constituted by far the largest
group of foreigners in the cities and towns of early Spanish America.

Integrating New Worlds

Among the monarchies’ chief concerns in the process of expansion was to resolve
the juridical status of newly claimed territories and delineate with clarity how they would be
legally integrated within polities that had been exclusively European until almost the end of
the fifteenth century. Both the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies had centuries of
experience with territorial aggregation and had developed sophisticated frameworks to
ensure the legal and political cohesion of their respective polities. Both were “composite
monarchies” during the early modern period, the result of the incorporation of diverse
territories, first in Europe, and from the mid sixteenth century with extended dominions in
Africa, Asia, and America.56 As such, new territories became united to the principal part
through various means – dynastic marriage, conquest, the voluntary cession of sovereignty –

Ibid.
Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies;” and Xavier Gil Pujol, “Integrar un mundo: Dinámicas de
agregación y de cohesión en la Monarquía de España,” in Las Indias Occidentales: Procesos de incorporación a las
Monarquías Ibéricas, siglos XVI a XVIII, eds. O. Mazín and J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez (México, DF: El Colegio de México,
2012), 69-108.
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and their juridical status was determined by their means of aggregation, the geographic
situation of the territory, and the ethnic composition of the population.57
In legal terms, the overseas territories were considered to have been acquired by
“conquest” or cession of sovereignty, regardless of their true manner of incorporation, and
all were considered to be inhabited by populations in a state of civilization inferior to that of
Europeans. The Spanish case was in many ways simpler than that of the Portuguese. From
the beginning, all the American territories over which Spain claimed sovereignty were in
theory incorporated within the Kingdom of Castile, as Granada and the Canaries had been.
Isabel confirmed this in her will, declaring explicitly that the Indies, “must remain
incorporated within these realms of Castile and León, according to the Apostolic Bull.”58 In
1571, Philip II reiterated this, decreeing that the “States [of the Indies] be governed
according to the style and regime prevailing in the Kingdoms of Castile and León.” “Because
the kingdoms of Castile and the Indies belong to one Crown,” he continued:
their laws and government system ought therefore to be as alike as possible.
The members of the Council [of Indies] shall try, in the laws and institutions
which they may establish for those States, to reduce the form and manner of
their government to the style and order by which the kingdoms of Castile
and León are ruled to the extent allowed by the diversity and difference of
lands and peoples.59
The final line is significant. Although the intention was to reproduce Castilian legal and
governmental frameworks, the king recognized that the Americas’ distinctive social and
geographical characteristics could result in adaptations to those frameworks when
transferred across the ocean. One such adaptation regarded social hierarchy.
57 Pedro Cardim and Susana Münch Miranda, “La expansión de la Corona Portuguesa y el estatuto político de
los territorios,” in Las Indias Occidentales: Procesos de incorporación a las Monarquías Ibéricas, siglos XVI a XVIII, eds.
O. Mazín and J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez (México, DF: El Colegio de México, 2012): 181-240.
58 Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, Las indias en la monarquía católica: Imágenes e ideas políticas (Valladolid:
Universidad de Valladolid, 1997), 32.
59 Ordenanzas del Consejo de Indias, book 2, title 2, law 13, ordinance 14 (1571), quoted in Rafael D. García Perez,
“Revisiting the Americas’ Colonial Status under the Spanish Monarchy,” in New Horizons in Spanish Colonial Law,
eds. Duve and Pihlajamäki, 47.
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As a result of the penetrating early sixteenth century critiques and debates
surrounding the morality and legality of Spanish imperium in the New World, which I
discuss in Chapter Two, in American territories controlled by Spain, the so-called indios,
although considered vassals of the king, came to be regarded as part of the República de indios,
a separate juridico-political body within the monarchy which maintained certain local
indigenous laws and institutions. Whereas the República de españoles came to encompass the
population of Spaniards, Africans, mulattoes, and those mestizos recognized by their
Spanish fathers, the República de indios included the entire Native American population. The
reality, however, was far more complex. There were, we will see, several key exceptions. But
from a legal perspective the institution blurred the distinctions between the thousands of
indigenous groups and polities, creating a single overarching category of indios, which in
theory encompassed all the diverse native peoples from northern California to Patagonia—
as well as the Philippines.60 According to Castilian law, indios were viewed as minors, as gente
sin razon (people without reason), subjugated in theory therefore to a relationship of legal and
political dependence on the Castilian crown, and forced to provide tribute, when possible,
often in the form of labor.
The situation in the Portuguese empire was distinct, and in some ways, more
complex. The Portuguese imperial bureaucracy was smaller, and there were fewer central
institutions of imperial government in the Portuguese case than in its Spanish counterpart.
As a result, many of Portugal’s overseas territories remained relatively autonomous,
especially those in Africa and Asia, as well as Brazil, at least until the seventeenth century.
This was not simply a sign of the weakness of the Portuguese crown, however. It was in part

60 In reality this distinction meant little to most Spaniards with firsthand experience in the New World, who
recognized that understanding the complexity of indigenous politics and society was integral to any hope of
successful settlement in the Americas.
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by design and in part by necessity, a result of the dizzying range of the Portuguese territories
overseas and of the diverse juridical statuses they came to possess. As Luis Filipe Thomaz
stated, “when confronted with the current notion of empire, the Portuguese State of India
[Estado da Índia] presents us with something original and, at times, baffling. More than its
spatial discontinuity is the heterogeneity of its institutions and the imprecision of their limits,
as much geographical as juridical, which make it unusual.”61 According to Susana Münch
Miranda, what characterized the Portuguese empire was, “decentralization, physical distance,
and the jurisdictional autonomy” of each and every one of the officials and institutions.62
Distinct from Spain’s practice of treating its overseas territories as part of one whole,
Portugal maintained, or was forced to maintain, the differences and idiosyncracies of each of
its component parts.63 In its African “possessions,” such as Angola for example, the
Portuguese were a minority in relation to the native peoples, the vast majority of which were
not under Portuguese jurisdiction. In many territories, the Portuguese permitted varying
degrees of religious liberty, especially in African and Asian territories, and were also often
forced to accommodate the persistence of native political institutions.64 In others, they were
even forced to make voluntary pacts of vassalage with the indigenous populations, subjecting
themselves to the will of native rulers in exchange for the right to stay, trade, or evangelize in
a given area.

Luís Filipe Reis Thomaz, “A estructura política e administrative do Estado da Índia no século XVI,” in De
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62 Susana Münch Miranda, “Organización financiera y práctica política en el Estado de la India durante la
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(Rome: Viella, 2010), 276.
63 Portuguese settlers overseas had a relation with the metropole similar to that which the Spaniards had with
their monarchy, the difference being that the Portuguese in these territories gained the right of representation
in the meetings of Portugal’s Cortes. See, Pedro Cardim, “The Representatives of Asian and American Cities at
the Cortes of Portugal,” in Polycentric Monarchies, 43-53.
64 Antonio Manuel Hespanha, “A constituição do império português: Revisão da alguns enviesamentos
correntes,” in O Antigo Regime nos Trópicos, ed. João Fragoso et. al. (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001),
163-188.
61

42

Union

Perhaps the most momentous example of territorial aggegration in the history of the
early modern Iberian world was the incorporation of Portugal and its extended possessions
Spanish Monarchy in 1580. In the late sixteenth-century, the Iberian Peninsula was
composed of three general political-territorial groupings: Castile-León in the center, the
kingdom of Portugal in the west, and the kingdom of Aragon (including Aragon, Valencia,
the Balearic Islands, and the Principality of Catalonia) to the east. Throughout the preceding
century, countless dynastic alliances were proposed between the three territories, some of
which materialized. The most prominent was that between Isabella I of Castile and
Ferdinand II of Aragon in 1469. John Elliott has reminded us how the fateful decision that
united Castile and Aragon was by no means a foregone conclusion, and that a Castilian
union with Portugal, was, until the last moment, a distinct possibility.65 Had Isabella
succumbed to pressure to marry Alfonso V of Portugal, instead of Ferdinand, the
subsequent course of Iberian and world history would have been drastically altered and the
long-sought Portugal-Castile union would have been achieved a century earlier. But although
official Iberian unification under a single sovereign did not materialize until 1580, the
peninsular kingdoms were already closely linked through a complex series of intermarriages
among the royalty and high nobility.66

65 J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (London: Penguin Books, 1963), 23; and J. H. Elliott, “The Spanish
Monarchy and the Kingdom of Portugal, 1580-1640,” in Conquest and Coalescence, ed. Mark Greengrass (London:
Edward Arnold, 1991), 48-67.
66 For a description of these complex dynastic relationships, see Fernando Bouza, “La relación de la nobleza
portuguesa con la Monarquía española,” in Las relaciones entre Portugal y Castilla en la época de los descubrimientos y la
expansión colonial, ed. Ana María Carabias Torres (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1994), 337344; and Roger Bigelow Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and in the New, vol. 4 (New
York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1962), 333-34.
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Aside from the dynastic alliances that linked the Iberian kingdoms, there also existed
an impressive degree of cultural and intellectual interaction. To be sure, Castilian culture
during its “golden age” in the sixteenth century was more vigorous and influential beyond its
borders, but Portuguese culture, especially through literature, also left its mark throughout
Iberia and beyond.67 A number of leading Portuguese authors found literary success in
Castile in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, published in Castilian, and virtually the
entire Portuguese elite was either fluent or conversant in the language of their neighbors.68 In
addition, students and professors circulated frequently throughout universities across the
Iberian peninsula, further enhancing the degree of intellectual cross-fertilization between
Portuguese, Castilians, Aragonese, and others.69
Equally significant as the political and cultural ties linking Portugal and the Spanish
Monarchy was the extent of economic integration, especially between the overseas empires.
From the end of the fifteenth century, writes John Lynch:
Portugal whose empire was essentially a commercial one, needed Spanish
American gold and silver for exchange purposes, while Spain had to buy the
pepper, spices, and silks from the Portuguese East Indies which her own
empire lacked. From then onwards they had a common interest in preserving
their colonial monopoly against incursions from the powers of northern
Europe, and Portugal collaborated with her neighbor in protecting the
Atlantic crossing.70

For a discussion of the widespread diffusion of Spanish literary culture throughout Europe before and during
the period of union see Roger Chartier, “La Europa castellana durante el tiempo del Quijote,” in España en
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But the exchange of Spanish American bullion for Portuguese India products did not only
take place in Seville or Lisbon, as official institutional organization may have intended.71
Even before 1580, boundaries of the two empires were extremely porous. Smugglers in the
Philippines redirected copious amounts of Potosí silver intended for the Japan and China
trades into the hands of Portuguese India merchants. The illicit trade along the Rio de la
Plata, in present day Argentina, was yet another open vein – in the carnal prose of Eduardo
Galeano – through which copious amounts of Spanish American silver was bled.72 As Stuart
Schwartz reminds us, the integration between Portuguese and Spanish America long
preceded the official union in 1580: “there had always been Spaniards in the Brazilian
enterprise just as Portuguese had participated in Spain’s colonization of America.”73 And
already by the second half of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese had established their
primacy in the trafficking of African slaves to the Spanish Indies.74
Beyond the mere complementarity of their economic systems, moreover, the two
empires also experienced a process of convergence in institutional and economic structures
decades before their official union. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam has explained, during the
1560s and 1570s, the policies of Portuguese imperial expansion came to resemble those of
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Castile in three fundamental ways.75 First, in 1562-63, the Portuguese crown abandoned its
strict monopoly on trade along the Cape route to India and introduced a contract system,
more akin to the Spanish model. Second, the crown implemented a concession-system
further regulating trade within the Estado da Índia. Finally, crown-sanctioned adventurers
began a vigorous new phase of territorial expansion in the 1570s, drastically transforming
what was once a diffuse maritime system of far-flung trading posts into a system in direct
control of large swaths of territory and local populations. As such, in addition to being
complementary, the two empires also bore an increasing resemblance.
From an ideological perspective the two empires shared much as well, and as joint
defenders of the Catholic faith, in the late 1570s Habsburg statesmen could justify the
impending union of Portugal and Spain on the basis of a common historical destiny. This
fact runs counter to traditional portrayals of Portuguese expansion as overwhelmingly
commercial in orientation, with the religious missionary element presented as secondary to
what was first and foremost a profit-driven enterprise. But in addition to the search for
profit, defense and propagation of the faith played as central a role in the early expansion of
Portugal as it did for Castile.76 This was true from the beginning, and the rulers and officials
of both monarchies shared a worldview steeped in the juridical-theological of culture
fifteenth century Christian Europe, a culture shaped fundamentally by their similar yet not
always parallel experiences of “reconquering” the Iberian peninsula from Muslim rule.
By 1580, the devout monarchs of both Portugal and Spain had become convinced of
the divine mission of their respective empires. The previous decade had seen the dramatic
Spanish-led naval victory of a Christian coalition over the Ottomans at Lepanto in 1571,
75 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History (London:
Longman Group, 1993), 112-115.
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considerable Portuguese territorial expansion into Angola and the Zambezi Valley, and the
consolidation of the plantation economy in Brazil.77 In 1578, inspired by these developments
and thirsty for military glory, the young king, Sebastian I of Portugal, led an ill-conceived
campaign to establish an “Algarve beyond the sea” in Morocco by overthrowing its
Ottoman-backed sultan, Abd al-Malik. Sebastian disappeared in battle, presumably killed,
and when his successor, the childless Henry I, fell ill just two years later, the Spanish
Habsburg king, Philip II, began advancing his legal claim as rightful heir to the Portuguese
throne.
The surging flow of Spanish American bullion to Seville at that moment combined
with the prospect of Iberian union to inflate the confidence of several Habsburg advisers,
producing a heightened discourse calling for an aggressive new phase of militant imperialism
and even rekindled the crusaders’ dream of re-conquering the Holy Land. An anonymous
letter from late 1578 advised Philip that union with Portugal would enable him to, “wage war
against the Turk through the Red Sea and to enter the provinces of Egypt and Jerusalem.”78
Stressing in ever-greater terms the geo-strategic importance of the Portuguese empire to the
future of Habsburg Spain, Fray Hernando del Castillo proclaimed that Portugal’s “loss or
gain would be to win or lose the world.”79 Juan de Silva, a key adviser and ambassador of
Philip II, echoed these bombastic claims, proclaiming that as king of Portugal, Philip would
surpass the Ottoman Sultan to become the world’s undisputed pre-eminent ruler.80
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Philip himself was well aware of the implications of his accession, and, in a letter to
Cardinal Henry, the ailing interim ruler, he enumerated in marvelous language the benefits
that both Iberian nations would accrue once united:
[T]his union brings to the church and to all of Christianity in general one of
the greatest benefits and comforts that could ever be offered […] that joining
the forces of my states with those of the Portuguese nation, so valiant and
highly esteemed in the world for its military capabilities and conquests by sea
and land, and for its industriousness in navigation, will raise Spain’s
reputation to such a point that all other nations will recognize and respect it
as the most thriving and prosperous province of Christendom.81
Philip’s argument could hardly have been more forceful. In a discourse of fraternity he
reiterated the universal advantages that Iberian union promised for the future of Christianity,
and fused them with more pragmatic geo-strategic ones, framed in truly global terms.
Military integration would enable the Iberians to eliminate the threat of corsairs in the
Mediterranean and Atlantic and to challenge the Ottomans on a second front through
Portuguese strongholds in India and the Arabian Gulf. He lauded the “valiant and highly
esteemed” Portuguese nation for its expansionary prowess and argued that, united, the
Iberian nations would be respected worldwide as the “most thriving and prosperous” in all
of Christendom.
As the son of Portuguese Princess Isabella and grandson of Portuguese King Manuel
I, Philip’s claim was strong and he viewed it as his divine destiny to unite the entire peninsula
under one Christian sovereign. The death of Henry in 1580 and the attempts of Dom
António to declare himself king of Portugal compelled Philip to order an invasion, but only
after having placated most of the Portuguese nobility with bribes as well as informal
promises of autonomy and patronage in return for political support. Despite ultimately using
force to secure his succession, Philip rejected the advice of his trusted adviser, Cardinal
Philip II [1579], in Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España [CODOIN hereafter], vol. 6 (Madrid:
Academia de la Historia, 1845), 652-653.
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Granvelle, to treat Portugal as a conquest, abolish its autonomous laws, and subsume it as a
province within the jurisdiction of Castile.
Although by May 1579, Philip was fully determined to add Portugal and its empire to
his dominions, he remained adamant that it should be done without war or bloodshed, and
that the Lusitanian kingdom remain autonomous and governed by its own laws and
customs.82 Philip ruled over what was perhaps the quintessential “composite monarchy” as
defined by John Elliott, listing his titles in one instance as, “King of Castile, of León, of
Aragón, of Naples, Sicily, Jerusalem etc., of the Indies and Mainland [America] of the Ocean
Sea, etc., Archduke of Austria, Duke of Burgundy, of Brabant and of Milan etc., Count of
Abspurg, of Flanders and of Tyrol etc.”83 Each of his distant possessions from Sicily to
Aragon, Flanders to the Indies enjoyed varying degrees of local autonomy and, far from
exercising absolute sovereignty over each, Philip was usually forced to respect the dictates of
local law and custom. As Elliott has described, there were two methods that monarchs like
Philip might use in joining new territories to existing domains. Accessory union, which
usually occurred as a result of conquest, meant that newly acquired territory was fully
subsumed within the legal framework of an existing domain, as when the Spanish Indies
became part of the Kingdom of Castile. Aeque principaliter unions, on the other hand, allowed
newly acquired territories to maintain their own systems of law, custom, and privilege, these
territories being administered as separate kingdoms. The latter arrangement defined the
manner in which Philip sought to acquire the Kingdom of Portugal.
Accordingly, under the terms agreed upon at the Cortes of Tomar in 1581, the
Habsburg monarch was acclaimed King Philip I of Portugal promising to respect the newlyincorporated kingdom’s existing customs, laws, and privileges. Portuguese officials would
82
83

CODOIN, vol. 6, 417-419.
Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies.” For Philip’s list of titles, see CODOIN vol. 6, 376.

49
continue to administer the kingdom and its overseas possessions, Portuguese would remain
the official language in all matters of state, and a permanent Council of Portugal would be
established, composed solely of Portuguese councilors, to advise the king on all matters
relating to Portugal and its empire.84
While Spain promised not to intervene in the administration of the Portuguese
empire, Portuguese subjects would now be officially granted permission to move freely
throughout the Spanish Indies, a concession of particular significance given the already
increasing if unauthorized degree of commercial integration between the two empires. In
addition, throughout the period of union Spanish colonial administrators largely eschewed
enforcement of prohibitions on the forbidden traffic of silver and other goods between
Brazil and Peru along the Río de la Plata.85 Philip promised to remain in Portugal for as long
as possible and, in the event he had to leave, his governor would, by law, be either
Portuguese or a member of the Habsburg royal family.86 Finally, although military and
foreign policy with respect to rival states became in effect joint Iberian initiatives for the
most part, the terms agreed upon at the Cortes of Tomar guaranteed the Portuguese
continued control of the commercial and ecclesiastical administration of their empire.87
Despite Philip’s final decision to use forceful means to secure his succession, his conduct
before, during and after the military invasion suggests he was keenly eager to win the good
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graces of the Portuguese public, especially the nobility and urban commercial elite. Rejecting
the advice of Granvelle – one of his most trusted and influential ministers – to abolish the
autonomous laws of Portugal and subsume the territory within the Castilian kingdom, Philip
insisted instead on a highly conciliatory alternative course.88 With the aeque principaliter
incorporation of Portugal into the Spanish Monarchy, Philip went from ruling a vast and
disparate composite monarchy to become leader of one of the largest empires the world had
ever known.89
Although tensions between the two empires grew from the 1620s forward, the
Portuguese benefited greatly during the first four decades of union. Lusophone slave traders
in West Africa gained access to both the enormous Spanish American market as well as to
Vizcayan iron, one of the chief items of exchange for the slaves in their African ports of
origin. Access to Spanish American silver was perhaps the major draw, both through legal
trade conducted on the peninsula, as well as through the largely illicit trade in East Asia and
the Rio de la Plata.90 Beyond that, a military alliance with Spain was a tantalizing prospect in
the effort to stamp out the rise of northern European privateering everywhere from the
South Atlantic to the Malacca Straits. Finally, the series of steps taken by Spain to facilitate
inter-peninsular commerce by abolishing customs duties on the Spanish-Portuguese border
and improving navigation on the Tagus River also proved beneficial to both sides.91

Elliott, Imperial Spain, 273.
On the concept of “composite monarchies,” see Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies.”
90 Schwartz, “Luso-Spanish Relations in Habsburg Brazil,” 44.
91 Bustos, “Los historiadores españoles y portugueses ante de la unidad peninsular de 1580 a 1640,” 172.
88
89

51
Two Empires

Throughout the period of union, however, Portuguese writers also continued to pen
celebratory tracts in the tradition of Zurara, Camões, and Barros. In his 1627, Memorial de la
preferencia, que haze el Reyno de Portugal, y su Consejo, al de Aragon, y de las dos Sicilias, for instance,
Pedro Barbosa de Luna argued that, given the breadth of its overseas jurisdiction and
conquests in the name of Christ, Portugal deserved a more dignified status than Aragon or
Sicily within the composite Spanish Monarchy.92 Four years later, by which time SpanishPortuguese relations had already shown significant strain, António de Sousa de Macedo
raised the patriotic rhetoric further still, describing Portugal as an “independent sovereign
Monarchy”, which within its borders recognized neither the authority of the [Holy Roman]
Emperor nor the superiority of the kingdom of Castile.93
These defenses of Portugal and its empire, especially during the first decades of the
seventeenth century, came largely in response to Castilian attempts to consolidate control
over the kingdom and its possessions. They were decades of constant debate about the
possibility of abolishing the agreements of Tomar. There were also attempts to introduce
Castilian officials into the government of the Portuguese empire and centralize it according
to the Spanish model with the creation of a Council of India (Conselho da Índia), which existed
from 1604 to 1614.94 Some of the most serious reforms were undertaken under the CountDuke of Olivares, who served Philip IV as royal favorite from 1622 to 1643. In his 1624,
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Gran Memorial, Olivares suggested: “Looking at the way they are nowadays governed, many
people would rightly say that Your Majesty’s power would be larger with less lordships.”95
With respect to the relationship between the Spanish and Portuguese overseas empires,
Olivares had in mind both an economic integration of the two empires and a union of
arms.96 As a consequence of these reforms, besides bringing prestige to the Spanish
Monarchy by vastly expanding its imperial holdings, the incorporation of Portugal and its
overseas possessions also brought a number of material benefits. Spain gained a number of
Portuguese Atlantic ports, including Lisbon, direct access to spices from Portuguese India
and slaves from Portuguese possessions in Africa.97 In addition, its colonists at the distant
edges of the empire in the Río de la Plata and Philippines benefitted handsomely through
intense yet mostly illicit trade in silver, slaves, and spices with their Portuguese counterparts
in Brazil and Macao.
However, the period of union was also characterized by the increase of international
conflict, or to put it in other words, by the growing expansion of other European
competitors, a process which questioned and challenged Iberian imperium worldwide. By
the mid-1620s, the Dutch and English had long since broken Portugal’s maritime monopoly
in Asia. Beyond the rapid rise of Dutch and English power in the East, the Dutch also
occupied Pernambuco from 1630 to 1654 and Angola from 1641 to 1648.
As frustrations mounted in both the Spanish and Portuguese empires, due in large
part to the incursions of the Dutch, English, and French, many Spaniards and Portuguese
alike came to view each other, and the union in general, as a major cause of their respective
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woes. The consulado merchants of Seville and their partners in Peru spearheaded the rising
anti-Portuguese sentiment by protesting the impressive economic power of the Portuguese.98
At the same time, anti-Spanish feeling had gathered force among the Portuguese, due to
their sense of being undervalued within the broader body politic of the Spanish Monarchy,
and of the many injuries Portugal had suffered in recent years.99
Tensions finally came to a head on 1 December 1640 when a group of Portuguese
elites seized a well-chosen moment to assassinate the Portuguese Secretary of State Miguel
de Vasconcelos and imprison Margaret of Savoy, Portugal’s vicereine under Philip IV. Faced
simultaneously with another revolt in Catalonia and a war with France and the Protestant
powers, Castilian forces were unable to respond adequately after the Duke of Bragança was
proclaimed King John IV of Portugal the following day. Despite the persistence of antiCastilian sentiment among the popular classes throughout much of the period of union, the
formal rebellion itself was only made possible once the monarchy had threatened the
collective power of the Portuguese nobility, thereby violating the terms of their informal
pact.100
Responses to Portuguese Restoration in the overseas territories were less
straighforward. Although in Portugal and its colonial capitals of Goa and Salvador, the lower
and ruling classes alike were quick to support the Restoration, colonists in Macao and
southern Brazil, at the distant edges of the empire on the border with Spanish realms, were
remarkably ambivalent. Macao’s commercial life, if not also its naval protection, had grown
far more linked to Manila than to the Portuguese Estado da Índia. In 1642, Macao’s municipal
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council entered into negotiations with Philip IV to rejoin the Spanish Monarchy on the
condition that Castile send a permanent garrison to defend the port and that Macanese be
permitted to travel freely to Manila. Likewise, as I discuss in Chapter Five, a faction of proCastilian colonists in São Paulo, many of which were of Spanish descent, also offered their
allegiance to Philip IV in return for two concessions: first, that they be permitted to continue
capturing and trading indigenous slaves, which they viewed as their legal right through
immemorial custom; and second, that he approve their 1640 expulsion of the Jesuits, who
had vigorously opposed their indigenous slaving activities. Philip ultimately declined the
proposals from both São Paulo and Macao, wary of the lack of guarantees and hopeful that
he would soon quell the ongoing Portuguese “rebellion” and thereby return the entire
Portuguese empire to his dominion without undermining the process through subagreements with individual colonies.101
The conflict between Portugal and Castile lingered on through the mid-1660s, with
intermittent fighting along the border. But due to the Spanish Monarchy’s weakened
financial position and its various military entanglements elsewhere, its hope of reconquering
Portugal never came to pass. Portugal’s patriotic identity and pride, fashioned through the
history of expansion and the writings of its great poets and chroniclers, remained latent but
never faded during the union, and re-emerged with the writings of António Vieira and others
who hailed Portugal as a resurrected “Quinto Imperio.”102
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Ruling the Empires

Long before the six-decade union of Portugal and Spain, in the early phase of
expansion the two polities had experienced enormous, rapid growths in the size of their
subject populations and territorial domains. Beyond defining the political status of those
newly claimed possessions, the Iberian monarchies’ most pressing objective was to
consolidate control over them. To that end, they developed complex institutional
frameworks designed to extend and maintain relations of vassalage over both European
colonists as well as local indigenous groups.103 The institutions had initially taken shape in
the preceding centuries as Iberian Christians re-conquered territories from Muslim rule, but
evolved significantly during the process of expansion overseas. Although Spanish and
Portuguese frameworks of imperial administration eventually came to resemble each other,
they followed distinct trajectories, and continued to evolve throughout the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.
In both the Spanish and Portuguese empires, institutional frameworks of colonial
government saw substantial variance across space and time, the result of debates, policies,
and objectives emanating from Europe, as well in response to the contingencies and
particularities of local colonial contexts and conditions.104 Spanish expansion in the
Americas, for instance, was driven initially by private initiative as the monarchs sponsored
expedition leaders, called adelantados, to lead the process on their behalf. The terms of the
103 On the need to re-emphasize the importance of political culture and institutions in the history of Spanish
colonial America, see Cañeque, “The Political and Institutional History of Colonial Spanish America.” See also,
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crown’s so-called “capitulations” entitled the adelantado to a portion of the bounty accrued
through his efforts and delegated him broad jurisdiction and authority over newly conquered
territories and subject populations. Beginning in the mid sixteenth century, however, the
crown attempted to impose more direct monarchical control throughout the empire, not
only by taking an active role in the organizing and dispatching of expeditions of conquest (or
“pacification”), but also by establishing a vast institutional bureaucracy of colonial
administration. The Portuguese empire was, broadly speaking, less centralized than its
Spanish counterpart and defined generally by a diffuse, dispersed structure of colonial
authority. Paradoxically, however, Lisbon was arguably more directly involved in the early
phase of Portuguese expansion to the east than the Castilian crown was in Spanish
movements west. While the Portuguese empire’s far-flung, discontinuous geography
provided local colonial officials in Africa and Asia substantial autonomy, the crown
nonetheless took significant steps to maintain control over the flows and profits of trade in
those regions, and was relatively swift in establishing institutions and offices of colonial
administration. In Brazil, on the other hand, Lisbon initially entrusted the task of conquest
and colonization to lord proprietors, or “donatory-captains,” with wide seigniorial dominion,
only introducing direct crown rule in the territory in 1549.
As in the process of expansion itself, Portugal took the lead in developing the first
central institutions of imperial administration. Already in the mid fifteenth century, as
Portuguese sailors plied the waters south along the west coast of Africa, Lisbon established
the House of Guinea (c.1460) to regulate the crown’s monopoly contracts on commerce in
the region, collect the royal share of imported merchandise, and serve as a maritime court
and warehouse for trade goods, including slaves. The House of India, formed roughly four
decades later (c.1500), served a similar purpose, but its jurisdiction covered the Indian Ocean

57
world. Whereas throughout the sixteenth century the majority of Spanish crown revenue
derived from taxes levied on Castile, already by the 1510s, thirty-nine percent of the
Portuguese crown’s total income derived from the Asian spice trade alone, making the
House of India the kingdom’s single most important economic institution by far.105
In the political hierarchy of both Portugal and Spain, directly below the king was a
polisynodial system of councils. The Spanish Monarchy, a composite polity, possessed one
such council for each of its constituent kingdoms. As a result, the establishment of its
independent Council of Indies in 1524 had both symbolic and practical significance as it
acknowledged the prominence of those territories in relation to the monarchy’s various
kingdoms in Europe. The Council advised the monarch on everything related to the
administration of his American possessions and became the highest authority on all
legislative, executive, and judicial matters concerning those territories, subject only to the
orders of the king. But because the Indies were considered to have been “conquered,”
members of the Council of Indies were not required to be natives of those territories, as they
tended to be in realms incorporated aeque principaliter.
The Council of Indies gained jurisdiction over the House of Trade (Casa de
Contratación), the first Spanish institution of imperial government founded in 1503 on the
model of the Portuguese Houses of Guinea and India. It set and collected taxes and duties,
licensed voyages, protected cartographic and commercial intelligence, and served as a court
of maritime law. A century on, in 1629, the Spanish jurist, Juan de Solórzano Pereira,
defended the existence of a separate council for the Indies with such broad powers,
exclaiming in grandiose terms that it was charged not only with “the government of a
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County or Kingdom, but that of an Empire which embraces so many Kingdoms and such
rich and powerful Provinces, or, in better words, the broadest and most extended Monarchy
the world has ever known, as it actually comprises another world.”106
In the early seventeenth century, while under Spanish Habsburg rule, the Portuguese
crown established the short-lived Council of India (1604-1614), modeled, in turn, on its
Castilian counterpart, the Council of Indies, which in theory held supreme jurisdiction over
all political, military, judicial, and commercial affairs throughout the colonial world.107 In
addition, another key central institution of Portuguese imperial government was the
Overseas Council (1642). Established after Portugal’s separation from Spain, it possessed the
same mandate as the Council of India, but was more powerful than its predecessor and
survived into the nineteenth century given its legitimacy as a purely Portuguese creation.
In addition to these central institutions of imperial government located in the
peninsula, the Portuguese and Spanish likewise established institutions overseas. The
Portuguese again took the lead. Whereas Brazil languished initially as a backwater, providing
only modest commercial promise for much of the early sixteenth century, Portugal’s
burgeoning commercial empire in the east yielded windfall profits almost immediately. As a
result, soon after Da Gama’s voyage to India in 1498, the crown placed a viceroy there with
broad jurisdiction over the political, military, judicial, and fiscal administration of the still
modest collection of Portuguese footholds across the circum-Indian Ocean.108 As expansion
continued, the crown established governorships in East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and
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Southeast Asia headed by autonomous governors and captains responsible for political and
military administration. The crown also created provincial judgeships and a high court, or
Relação, in Goa in 1544 to hear appeals from across Portuguese Asia, as well as a similarly
structured fiscal administration that reached from the viceregal capital down to the myriad
customs houses and trade posts.109 Treasury officials managed crown revenues and spending,
monopoly contracts, and customs duties and taxation for the entire viceroyalty. In addition,
they supervised the cartaz system through which Portugal sought to enforce its monopoly on
navigation and trade by regulating the inter-Asian commerce of Hindu, Muslim, and Malay
merchants across the Indian Ocean. Beyond these civil institutions, the crown also created a
system of bishoprics to care for the spiritual welfare of its overseas subjects, a Goan office
of the Inquisition (1560) to ensure purity of faith, and a branch of the Lisbon-based Board
of Conscience (1570), also in Goa, to provide moral theological guidance to the viceregal
administration.110
The first Spanish imperial viceroyalty was not established until 1535, in Mexico City,
followed by another in Lima in 1543, signaling the first territorialization of Spanish imperial
sovereignty in the New World by defining precise areas over which the crown claimed
jurisdiction. Appointed to serve “in the king’s living image,” viceroys, according to the
Compilation of Laws of the Indies, “had and exercise the same power, mandate, and jurisdiction
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as the King.”111 They were the chief political, military, and treasury authority within their
territory, and they confirmed ecclesiastical posts.112
High Courts, known as audiencias, represented the second major institution of
Spanish colonial government. The monarchy established its first American high court in
Santo Domingo in 1511, followed by another in New Spain in 1527, one in Lima in 1543,
and several others throughout the rest of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Audiencia
judges maintained direct correspondence with the king through the Council of Indies and
thus provided an independent check on viceregal power. In addition to being high courts of
appeal for all legal disputes within their jurisdiction, hearing cases presented by both
Spaniards and Native Americans, audiencias served a legislative role in issuing laws and local
ordinances, as well as a consultative one in advising viceroys and governors.
The royal treasury was another key institution of Spanish colonial control. Prominent
cities and every important port and mining town had a treasury office staffed by crownappointed officials responsible for managing all royal payments and income, including
tribute and spoils of conquest. The fact that their appointments came directly from Spain
gave them a degree of autonomy from the viceroys, provincial governors, and audiencia
judges, and further diffused power among the various colonial institutions, each of which
reported directly to the Council of Indies.
Despite Portugal’s early start in Asia, Lisbon waited half a century after Cabral’s first
landing in Brazil before establishing direct crown rule in the New World. Bereft of the spices
of the great Asian emporia and the silver of Mexico and Peru, the Portuguese crown
nonetheless recognized Brazil’s strategic importance with the rise of French incursions. In
Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias (1681), book 3, title 3, law 2.
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1534, Lisbon delegated Brazil’s early occupation to fifteen donatory-captains who, in return
for financing and executing the conquest, settlement, and defense of their assigned
territories, enjoyed wide political, military, and judicial authority and a major portion of the
profits from all economic production and trade. After fifteen years, however, only two of the
original captaincies had become profitable. Several remained as undeveloped and
unconquered as when Cabral first landed in the territory in 1500. One contemporary
observer warned in a letter to the king: “If Your Majesty does not succor these captaincies
soon, not only will we lose our lives and goods but Your Majesty will lose the land.”113
To reinforce Portugal’s sovereign claim to the territory the king sent the first
governor-general to Bahia in 1549 to found a capital and implement royal authority
throughout Brazil.114 Given their relative success, Pernambuco and São Vicente were the
only captaincies to remain hereditary and governed by their original donatories. The rest
were converted to royal captaincies, subject in theory to viceregal rule from Bahia. Although
the Portuguese king did not appoint corregidores to oversee Brazil’s municipal councils, as
Spain had in its dominions, he did send a single superior magistrate to oversee the locally
elected judges.115 He also sent a royal treasurer with broad authorities in fiscal administration.
Local institutions including the Misericórdia confraternities, municipal councils, craft
guilds and even families, the base unit of colonial society, all had their own rules, customs,
and leaders. This integrated network of smaller powers was fundamental in determining the
Luis de Góes, “Luis de Góes to D. João III, May 12, 1548,” in História da colonização portuguesa do Brasil, vol. 3
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português, eds. Stuart Schwartz and Erik Myrup (Bauru, São Paulo: EDUSC, 2009), 39-74; and O Estado do Brasil:
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legal and normative frameworks governing everyday life in colonial society. The Misericórdias,
for instance, confraternities devoted to charitable works, although protected by the king,
were local in origin. In addition to facilitating social cohesion among Brazil’s settler elite,
they also served an important administrative function in processing and executing wills.116
The other key pillar of local society, the municipal council, enjoyed similar powers.117 The
lack of corregidores to supervise their activities, however, gave Brazilian municipal councils
even more independence with respect to royal authority than those in Spanish America and
peninsular Portugal. And their right to correspond directly with Lisbon gave municipal
councils a degree of autonomy from the crown’s central colonial institutions. Unlike in
Spanish America, there existed no Portuguese equivalent to the República de indios in Brazil
and therefore no separate indigenous municipal councils. The Portuguese crown did
promote the conversion, and at least in theory the protection, of indigenous communities
through the creation of Jesuit-run settlements. But since the indigenous populations
surrounding Portuguese settlements in Brazil were smaller, less centralized, less sedentary,
and relatively less integral to Brazil’s export economy (soon dominated by African slave
labor), the Portuguese never created a separate, official juridico-political body for the
Amerindian population as the Spanish had.
Only in the early seventeenth century, under Habsburg rule, did Brazil experience a
further expansion of its colonial bureaucracy. The process extended crown rule throughout
the territory while simultaneously diffusing the governor-general’s power by creating new
levels of judicial and fiscal administration that reported directly to Lisbon (and Madrid
Francisco Bethencourt, “Political Configurations and Local Power,” in Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 14001800, eds. Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
200.
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1510-1800 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); Maria Fernanda Bicalho, “As câmaras ultramarinas
e o governo do império,” in O antigo regime nos trópicos: A dinâmica imperial portuguesa, séculos XVI-XVIII, eds. J.
Fragoso, M. F. Bicalho and M. F. Gouvêa (Rio de Janeiro: Civilizaçào Brasileira, 2001), 189-221.
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during the period of Iberian Union) rather than to Bahia. Above all, this was an attempt to
transform the colony’s government and administration from an operation led by individuals
into a more robust and effective hierarchical bureaucracy. To alleviate the judicial demands
on Brazil’s sole superior magistrate, the crown created its first and only Brazilian high court
(Relação), in Bahia in 1609, roughly a century after Madrid had established its first of many in
Spanish America.118 Bahia’s Relação was subject only to the oversight of the king and his
supreme court in Lisbon, rather than to the governor-general. At roughly the same time, the
crown established a network of provincial judges as an intermediary level between the locally
elected judges of municipal councils and the high court. The crown also finally opened a
central Bahia office of the royal treasury in 1614. Its officials supported the royal treasurer
and oversaw an expanded bureaucracy of intermediate and lower level treasury officers of
the captaincies and municipalities.119
As in other Christian monarchies of the time, royal authority in Portugal and its
empire possessed both temporal and spiritual dimensions. Highlighting this duality, Diogo
do Couto, the eminent chronicler of Portuguese imperium in Asia, remarked in the early
seventeenth century that, “the Kings of Portugal always aimed in their conquest of the East
at so uniting the two powers, spiritual and temporal, so that one should never be exercised
without the other.”120 The king was regarded as God’s representative within his realm and
was charged above all with ensuring justice and preserving the ecclesia, or community of
believers.121 Although lacking the power to determine matters of theology, which remained
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the authority of the Pope in Rome, the king was nonetheless responsible for facilitating the
expansion of the faith worldwide and for defending Christendom against threats from
infidels and heretics. This sacred duty encouraged a mutually supportive relationship
between Lisbon and Rome, and ultimately enhanced the king’s aura of power by imbuing it
divine legitimacy.
In recognition of Portuguese exploits in propagating the faith beyond Europe, the
papacy institutionalized the king’s ecclesiastical power through a series of concordats in the
mid fifteenth century, establishing the Padroado Real, the Portuguese version of the Spanish
Patronato Real, which granted the Portuguese crown expanded powers to appoint bishops and
establish new bishoprics and dioceses throughout its dominions. Although Bahia was named
a bishopric in 1551, it was the only one in Brazil for over a century. It was not until the
1670s that Bahia was raised to an archbishopric, that new bishoprics were created in
Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, and Maranhão, and that the first convent (or monastery, for
that matter) opened in Brazil. Unlike Spanish America and Portuguese Asia, Brazil never had
its own Holy Office of the Inquisition.

Conquest?

Despite the globe-girdling expansion of Spaniards and Portuguese across the world
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and despite the vast institutional apparatuses which
arose in their wake, the Iberians’ so-called “conquests” in various parts of Africa, Asia, and
America were not as rapid, linear, or comprehensive as once thought. Classical
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historiography on the conquests of the Aztec and Inca empires, for instance, even if
recognizing the violence of events, has often emphasized the heroism of missionaries, or of
vastly outnumbered conquistadors who by their faith and grit managed to defeat and subject
America’s two preeminent native polities with miraculous speed.122 Interestingly, many of
these nineteenth and early twentieth century histories were based on less than critical
readings of writers like Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, Bernal Díaz del Castillo,
and other authors discussed in the following chapter, demonstrating the enduring ideological
power of early modern Spain’s celebratory discourse of empire. In recent decades, however,
scholars have increasingly demonstrated the effective resistance, adaptation, and even
collaboration of native peoples. In addition, this “New Conquest History” has underlined
the need to conceive of the “conquests” as processes, rather than discrete events, which
often played out over decades if not centuries and in many cases never reached
completion.123
We now know in more concrete terms the fundamental role of native allies in
virtually every major “Spanish” victory over indigenous polities in mainland America. In
Mexico, for instance, hundreds of thousands of Tlaxcalans, longtime enemies of the Aztecs,
seized the opportunity to ally with the Spanish and were instrumental in the series of battles
which led to the fall of Tenochtitlan in 1521. From there, many more thousands of
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indigenous allies, including but not limited to Tlaxcalans, Cholulans, and even defeated
Nahua groups from central Mexico joined the Spanish in their expeditions south and east
into Yucatán, Guatemala, and Honduras, northwest against the Cazcanes and Zacatecas, and
later against a diverse confederation of Chichimeca peoples in the region of Bajío, in which
Cazcanes fought alongside Spaniards.124 Likewise, in their various campaigns in South
America the Spanish relied on support from Nahuas, Mayas, Nicaraguans of various groups,
as well as Cañaris and other local South American societies who had long resented and
resisted Inca domination.125
African, Asian, and Native American auxiliaries were critical to Portuguese military
success as well. In southern Brazil, for instance, the early residents of São Paulo, discussed in
Chapter Five, forged alliances with native groups and intermixed with them, a practice which
soon became ubiquitous. Already by the late sixteenth century, the population of the town
was heavily mestizo. At around that time, local captains from São Paulo began leading
massive so-called bandeiras of hundreds of Tupi and mestizo troops deep into the hinterland
of southern Brazil and the Río de la Plata. Laying waste to Jesuit missions and Spanish settler
towns alike, such bandeiras frequently brought back hundreds and sometimes thousands of
slaves in a single expedition, extending Portugal’s sphere of influence in the region, in this
case at the expense of that of Spain.
Despite the Iberians’ technological superiority, the support of so many thousands of
Native American allies, and the rapidity with which they deposed the titular heads of the
Incas and Aztecs, for instance, it took many decades to consolidate rule over America’s preColumbian polities. Soon after the indigenous ruler Atahualpa was captured in 1532, for
instance, a large Inca force rebelled, harassed Spanish positions, and eventually established a
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neo-Inca state based in the mountains in Vilcabamba, which successully resisted Spanish
domination for nearly four decades. The effort to subjugate the Maya peoples of Yucatán
was an even more complicated affair. Beginning in 1517 the Spanish began sending
expeditions into the pensinsula, faced pitched resistance, and after a series of violent clashes
in the 1520s and 1530s only managed their first permanent settlements there in 1542. Still,
Spanish control remained restricted to the northwest part of the peninsula, and was
dependent on a fragile alliance with local Maya groups and other indigenous allies from
central Mexico.126 Mexico City too, the ostensible heart of Spanish imperial sovereignty in
the New World, remained unstable well into the seventeenth century when two major Native
American rebellions rocked the city, one as late as 1692.127
In addition to the clear limits of Spanish military power, the empire’s hegemony
remained far from complete in other ways as well. Even in central Mexico the Nahua altepetl
(city-state), the basis of indigenous socio-political organization, survived well into the postconquest period, as did traditional kinship and inheritance patterns.128 Indigenous peoples
across much of Spanish America continued residing in their traditional towns and villages
where they maintained local leaders, customs, and legal norms. Although in reality derived
from pre-Hispanic forms of socio-political organization like the altepetl, the semi-autonomy
these units maintained were reminiscent of the fueros (local laws and privileges) granted to
cities and lordships back in Spain, and were thus intelligible within Castilian legal frameworks
as well.
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Despite being regarded in juridico-political terms as a single homogenous population
comprising the República de indios, whose institutional origins I discuss in Chapter Two,
Native Americans maintained many of their diverse customs, languages, and beliefs,
sometimes covertly, and often in the face of systematic attempts to eradicate them. Although
in theory claiming the authority to abolish all indigenous laws and customs, the monarchy
acquiesced – or was forced to acquiesce – to preserve certain aspects of pre-Hispanic
political and social organization. The intention was to provide continuity to facilitate the
transition from indigenous to Spanish rule, making the latter more intelligible and legitimate
in the eyes of Native Americans. But it was also a response to the reality, of which the
monarchy was well aware, that it simply did not possess sufficient power to fully impose its
cultural and institutional rule over such vast, varied and complex indigenous societies.
To the extent that Nahuas, for instance, incorporated Spanish social and cultural
forms, they did so through a gradual process of selective acculturation throughout the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at least.129 Like the Nahua, the Maya also retained many
of their traditions, especially in religion, despite sustained Spanish efforts to impose
Christianity.130 They adopted certain Christian religious practices but imbued them with
Mayan meaning, and they maintained their traditional vision of the universe and concept of
cyclical time. Similar processes played out across the empire, where indigenous peoples
incorporated varying degrees of Spanish influence, but always maintained certain elements
from the pre-Hispanic past.131
As part of the República de indios, indigenous peoples throughout the Americas and
Philippines, in addition to maintaing certain forms of traditional legal culture at the local
129 Lockhart, The Nahuas after the Conquest (1992); see also Horn, Postconquest Coyoacan; Gruzinski, La colonisation de
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level, also had access to Castilian law. Native Americans often utilized this access to protest
abusive encomenderos or protect their communities’ local autonomy and customs. The General
Indian Court, for instance, founded in Mexico City in 1592 served as a forum for complaints
against abusive Spanish settlers, priests, and even royal officials, and, if only in its early
phase, dealt with a combination of both Castilian and Native American law.132
In practice, there were key exceptions to the legal theory which subsumed Native
Americans into the single juridico-political category of the República de indios. Particular
indigenous nations, like the Tlaxcala, for instance, secured special status in recognition of
their collaboration in military campaigns against other native groups. That status exempted
Tlaxcalans from certain tribute payments and enabled them to maintain their traditional
culture relatively unmolested. Some members of the former indigenous elite also retained
their elevated status under the new Spanish political regime. This was a prudent if necessary
concession from the monarchy, designed to legitimate its transition to power among native
peoples by preserving some of the traditional indigenous hierarchy. These individuals,
although in theory prohibited from performing traditional religious functions, maintained
their status, property, and power in the native community, and the hereditary nature of their
titles, offices, and wealth.
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Diffusion of Authority

Even during the height of Iberian hegemony in the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, a range of factors coalesced to circumscribe the Iberian crowns’ effective power to
exercise control over and within the territories they claimed to possess.133 To some extent,
this fact is hardly surprising, a result in part of the distance which separated the metropole
from the colonies as well as of the dispersed structures of power integral to the institutional
and political culture of both Portugal and Spain, which diffused political authority by
checking the jurisdiction of specific institutions or offices against that of others.134 At the
same time, however, the Iberian crowns faced more direct forms of opposition in the
colonies, ranging in nature from overt ones, including legal protest and even direct violent
action against royal authority, to subtle, passive forms, like refusing to enact certain decrees
or legislation. Collectively, these centrigual forces helped check the expansionary impulse of
crown power, defining the limits of imperial sovereignty in both the centers and peripheries
across the Iberian colonial world.
Both Lisbon and Madrid organized their imperial administration in such a way that,
as their institutional frameworks grew so too did the jurisdictional conflicts between various
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competing offices. Within the political, judicial, fiscal, and ecclesiastical institutions of
colonial authority, including the bishoprics and missionary orders, there existed more or less
clear orders of hierarchy. All, with the exception of the regular clergy, were subject to the
ultimate authority of the monarch. Between them, however, relations of hierarchy were not
always clear. Disputes erupted frequently between the viceroy (or governor-general) and high
court, for instance, over the scope of their respective jurisdictions since both reported
directly to the king. Even municipal councils could appeal directly to the king to seek
redress, including on behalf of individuals, which they often did successfully, if they felt that
the viceroy, governor-general, or another central colonial authority had violated their rights,
privileges, or jurisdictions.
To be sure, such jurisdictional layering, alongside factors like physical distance,
communication lags, and respect for local custom and privilege, all converged to diffuse the
monarch’s effective power and ability to influence everyday decision-making in the local
colonial context. While provoking a degree of conflict at the local level and affording
overseas institutions of empire substantial autonomy, however, John Leddy Phelan has
demonstrated that this complex political structure actually produced a degree of cohesion
and stability in the Iberian empires.135 In addition, the checking of certain colonial
institutions by the power of others helped ensure that no single office or individual was able
to amass too much power or threaten the king’s position atop the monarchy’s political
hierarchy.
Nevertheless, long after Portugal and Spain had proclaimed victory in conquering
various non-European polities and had created their central institutions of imperial
administration, political authority overseas remained surprisingly diffuse including among the
135
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European settler population. The monarchs’ power to determine basic decision-making, for
instance, was not absolute, nor was it expected to be. Even the highest crown officials,
including viceroys, governors-general, and high court judges in the colonial centers, had wide
power to interpret royal decrees as they saw fit and were not always required to execute them
to the letter. Famous in the Hispanic world, the legal device captured in the phrase, obedezco
pero no cumplo (“I obey but do not comply”), permitted officials to refuse to implement
certain decrees while simultaneously affirming their obedience to the monarch’s supreme
authority.136 According to the 1681 Compilation of Laws of the Indies, “Ministers and judges
should obey, but not comply with our decrees and orders” if given local circumstances they
seemed imprudent.137 Such legal devices combined with jurisdictional overlapping between
various institutions and the myriad customary privileges and exemptions of indigenous and
local settler communities to limit the king’s absolute sovereignty in overseas territories.138
Practical, tangible forces like physical distance and limited and overstretched resources
further diffused that control.139
Another key institution among the constellation of colonial authority was the
municipal council, referred to by Spaniards as the cabildo and by Portuguese as the senado da
câmara. Although crucial in institutionalizing Iberian authority and influence in a given locale,
municipal councils were notable for the jurisdictional privilege and political autonomy they
enjoyed from other institutions of colonial government. As Spaniards and Portuguese
occupied new colonial spaces, they founded new towns and cities with municipal councils,
136 Colin MacLachlan, Spain’s Empire in the New World: The Role of Ideas in Institutional and Social Change (Berkeley:
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which provided the settlers limited self-government at the local level. Towns served the same
symbolic and administrative functions they had in the peninsula. They were centers of
commerce, culture, and power.140 Even seigniorial lords with vast rural landholdings often
resided in towns, their prestige reflected in the proximity of their residences to the central
plaza with its church and municipal buildings, including the town council. Built on grid
systems, Spanish American towns in particular held great significance as symbols of
European civilization and rational order. And as during reconquista, newly founded towns in
America served as bases for further invasions as Spaniards and Portuguese pushed deeper
into native-controlled territory. Cortés, in the most famous example, founded Veracruz in
Mexico, along with a cabildo, as a means to free himself from the authority of his rival, the
governor of Cuba, place himself under direct royal order, and create the legal basis for a new,
independent mandate to conquer the Aztec empire. According to Cortés:
[…] it seemed best to all of us in the name of your Royal Highnesses to
populate and found there a town in which there were justice, so that there
were lordship in that land, as in your kingdoms and lordships [in Europe];
because being this land populated with Spaniards, in addition to increasing
the kingdoms and lordships of your majesties and your revenues, you might
bestow Graces and favors upon us and to the settlers that come from here
forward.141
The founding of Veracruz provided a bastion of Castilian law and jurisdiction and an early
symbol of Spanish permanence on the American mainland.
Importantly, however, Iberian colonial municipalities and their representative
councils enjoyed substantial legal, political, and economic autonomy from the crown and
from its high institutions of colonial government. Municipal councils held jurisdiction over
both the town or city itself as well as the surrounding countryside, and served as bastions for
Ángel Rama, La ciudad letrada (Hanover, N.H.: Ediciones del Norte, 1984).
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the protection of local customary law, as in Europe. Describing the wide-ranging authority
of the institution, the municipal councilors of Buenos Aires explained in 1674 that:
Cabildos […], under their royal laws and ius commune, are vested with
the power to rule the city and hear matters pertaining to it, by
governing each and every part of it, paying attention to the protection
of its fruits and crop fields, its sustenance and that of its people,
peacefulness, price, amounts, and better distribution, in such a way as
they may agree at any time, and deciding whatever they may deem
convenient.142
Beyond the council existed a range of other small yet no less important institutions as well.
Convents, monasteries, confraternities, unions, schools, universities, and even families – the
base unit of colonial society – all had their own rules, customs and leaders. Collectively, this
integrated constellation of local and regional powers was fundamental in determining the
legal and normative frameworks governing everyday life among settler communities across
the Spanish and Portuguese empires.143
Iberian royal authority remained relatively entrenched in centers of colonial power
like Goa, Mexico City, Lima, Bahia, and Manila. Even these cities came frequently under
threat, however, and were never completely secure. Throughout the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, they were the target of numerous riots, revolts, and attacks by settlers
of Iberian extraction seeking autonomy, by indigenous peoples hoping to reshape or
overthrow the colonial order, as well as by competing empires or corsairs, in particular from
northwest Europe.
Moving outward from the cities and towns that served as islands of Iberian law and
government, imperial sovereignty grew increasingly circumscribed. If throughout the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Iberian crown rule was fragile and circumscribed within
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the core regions of central Mexico, Peru, and the areas around Goa and Salvador da Bahia, it
was even more so on the margins of empire. Beyond the confines of fortified enclaves of
Iberian authority, the crowns’ claim to sovereignty grew increasingly tenuous and diffuse.
Vast seas of indigenous territory often surrounded them. In many cases, armed expeditions
of conquest – or “pacification” as Philip II decreed they be called from late sixteenth century
– often succeeded in compelling the nominal or temporary submission of a given indigenous
group. Despite then claiming such peoples as subjects of the Spanish or Portuguese crowns,
however, Iberian colonial authorities often struggled to exercise effective rule over them
after their troops had withdrawn.
In these remote regions, like Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la
Plata, all territories the Iberian monarchies claimed within their extended imperium (and the
subjects of Chapters Three, Four, and Five), isolated settlers, missionaries, or itinerant
soldier-adventurers often represented the sole Spanish presence beyond fortified enclaves.
All these individuals maintained their own unique relationships to the monarchy, and often
served as intermediaries in the extension of Iberian cultural and political influence.144
Missionaries represented the sole sustained European presence in many areas.
Representatives of leading orders like the Dominicans and Jesuits, for example, were often
fierce critics of empire and defended indigenous communities against the encroachments
and depredations of both royal authorities as well as independent settlers. The Orders were
also often notoriously independent, and went to great lengths to protect their autonomy
against the pretensions of domineering governors or other civil authorities.
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At the same time, however, missionaries also represented a key face of Iberian
empire, albeit an alternative one that was ostensibly more benign. Moreover, despite looking
to Rome and the Pope as the ultimate spiritual authority on earth, the Iberian monarchs also
exercised a significant degree of power over the church within their dominions, by virtue of
the Patronato or Padroado Real.145 As a result, although autonomous from the secular church
and crown, missionary orders nevertheless depended on the king’s mandate, goodwill, and to
some degree his financial support to sustain their efforts. They served as a key force in
facilitating social and religious cohesion among Spanish and Portuguese settlers. Most
importantly, they were fundamental in extending the influence of Iberian civilization and
Catholic religion among non-European peoples, including in hinterland regions beyond the
reach of civil authority.
In addition to the argument for missionary evangelization as the preferable means by
which to bring indigenous peoples under the sway of Iberian cultural and political
organization, the lack of sufficient military resources and manpower was the primary factor
that explains the Orders’ prominent role in this process. Of course, Iberian-led forces were
known for their prowess in battle and, in the case of the prominent conquistadors, for their
defeats of native armies that dramatically outsized them. However, the effective subjugation
of new territories and subjects required not simply the ability to wage initial armed
expeditions of conquest, but also to leave behind sufficient forces and institutions to
consolidate and maintain Iberian rule after the clashes of war had ceased. Despite possessing
two of the most advanced militaries of their day, however, neither Spain nor Portugal had
sufficient manpower or resources to sustain the long-term costs of conflict on so many
fronts in Europe and overseas.
According to this arrangement, in addition to powers over the secular church, the crown also gained the
monopoly over evangelization in its territories.
145
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Brazil, for instance, like Spanish America, had no regular, centralized military
organization. Although a royal defense fleet plied the long Brazilian coast intermittently and
modest retinues of trained soldiers guarded the governor-general and certain coastal
fortifications, the ground forces protecting the colony were, for the most part, irregular,
untrained militias of private settlers raised by municipal councils or provincial governors. It
was not until the late seventeenth century in fact that the crown created the first permanent
garrisons in Bahia, Pernambuco, and eventually throughout the other captaincies.
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CHAPTER 2
DISCOURSES OF EMPIRE

As Portuguese and Spaniards expanded across the globe in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, a range of writers, cartographers, and artists dedicated themselves to
documenting the numerous new sea routes and territories they “discovered” and charted, the
kaleidoscopic diversity of flora, fauna, and peoples they encountered, and their exploits in
extending Iberian influence throughout much of Africa, Asia, and America. Many authors
set out simply to glorify that expansion. Others questioned specific aspects of its morality
and legality. Even the strongest critics, however, sought to influence imperial law and
administration with the ultimate goal of improving the conduct of settlers and officials, and
of ensuring that the Spanish and Portuguese crowns maintained their claim to moral
authority both among their royal subjects and in relation to competing powers like the
Dutch, French, and English. Collectively, these texts came to form a discourse that aimed
not only to reinforce the crown’s aura of power, but also to demonstrate the globality of that
power for having unlocked so many mysteries of cosmography and geography, and for
having brought countless new territories and peoples under Iberian imperial rule.
Importantly, despite the tendency of historians to treat the Spanish and Portuguese
empires in separation, the two empires shared much in common and were deeply interlinked.
This was true not only in terms of their institutions of imperial rule and administration, but
also in terms of the impulses that drove them, and the ideologies that afforded them
meaning. Despite the clear degree of competition that defined relations between Portugal
and Spain throughout the early modern period, champions of Portuguese and Spanish
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imperium developed similar discourses of glorification and legitimation. Even before the
union of the Iberian crowns in 1580, several prominent observers on both sides of the
peninsular divide portrayed Iberian expansion as a singular process, united by the joint
mission of spreading the holy gospel and European civilization to the earth’s most distant
corners. In terms of official history, Philip II of Spain’s decision to create the position of
“chronicler of the Indies” in 1571 marked the institutionalization of historical research and
writing as a tool of Spanish imperium. Less than a decade later, when the Spanish Monarchy
incorporated the Kingdom of Portugal with the accession of the Philip II of Spain to the
Portuguese throne, the Iberian discourse of empire reached its highest level of articulation.
Authors and artists made the point of conveying not only Philip’s valor and magnanimity as
ruler, but also, quite explicitly, the global dimensions of his imperium for having secured
singular sovereignty over two of the most extended empires the world had ever known.
Contemporary discourses celebrating and debating Iberian imperium took a number
of forms, both verbal and visual. Chronicles were particularly prominent in representing
Iberian imperial power and in impressing a sense of its global dimensions. Natural histories
and ethnographies, geographical treatises, and navigation guides and reports were crucial too,
as was iconography and other visual imagery, including engravings in printed texts, public
monuments, commemorative medallions, and cartography on maps, globes, and nautical
charts. Given the tendency among historians, noted by Hayden White, “to treat the imagistic
evidence as if it were at best a complement of verbal evidence, rather than as a supplement,
which is to say, a discourse in its own right,” it is worth emphasizing the crucial role of visual
imagery as well in the construction of Spanish and Portuguese ideological power.146 As Roger
Chartier has discussed regarding early modern Spain in particular, the verbal text and visual
Hayden White, “Historiography and Historiophoty,” American Historical Review 93, no. 5 (December 1988):
1193.
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image “were thought of as two languages using the same grammar, if not the same lexicon,
all the while being granted their own specific powers, thus justifying their juxtaposition,
imbrications, or exchanges.”147 These two discursive forms – the verbal and visual – not to
mention that of the spoken word, were mutually constitutive in the representation of Iberian
power in general, and in particular that of the ruler.148
While some authors, particularly those under crown commission, aimed explicitly to
glorify and amplify perceptions of Iberian imperium, others did so with more subtlety and
less overt intention. Certain ethnographies and natural histories, for instance, although
focused primarily on the native peoples and natural features of specific parts of the world
beyond Europe, nonetheless made clear, if only implicitly, that these new troves of
knowledge had been uncovered thanks to the efforts of the Iberian crowns in sanctioning
and facilitating long-distance voyages of discovery, conquest, and occupation. Moreover,
they conveyed the globality of Iberian expansion.149 The same was true of cartography,
despite the fact that much of it remained secret and guarded by the crown for fear of it being
used by imperial competitors to challenge Iberian claims overseas. But the seemingly simple
act of naming places on a map, of documenting the creation of new nautical routes, or of
charting the contours of lands and seas previously unknown to Europe, reinforced Iberian
claims of first “discovery” and “occupation,” key prerequisite pillars in the development of
titles of dominion and sovereignty.

147 Roger Chartier, “Foreword,” in, Fernando Bouza, Communication, Knowledge, and Memory in Early Modern Spain
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), xv.
148 In, Portrait of the King, Louis Marin wrote that “the king is only truly king, that is, monarch, in images. They
are his real presence. A belief in the effectiveness and operativeness of his iconic signs is obligatory, or else the
monarch is emptied of all his substance through lack of transubstantiation, and only simulacrum is left.” See
Louis Marin, Portrait of the King, trans. Martha M. Houle (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1988).
149 For an essay distinguishing “world histories” from “universal histories,” and demonstrating that world
histories of the sixteenth century were written not only by Spaniards or Portuguese, but also by Arab, Mughal,
Chinese, and Polish authors, see Subrahmanyam, “On World Historians in the Sixteenth Century,” 26-57.
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Legal and Ideological Foundations of Iberian Empire

Long before the famous 1493 Inter cætera bull of donation, Pope Eugene IV issued a
series of lesser-known bulls in 1436-37, which recognized Portuguese claims to the recently
discovered territories in the Atlantic (except the Canaries which he awarded to Castile), on
the condition that the Portuguese convert the native peoples they encountered to
Christianity.150 Portugal, which unlike Castile was no longer encumbered by its own war of
peninsular reconquest, seized the opportunity to extend its presence along the West African
coast at Arguim and Upper Guinea, where it began an infamous tradition of slave-raiding
and -trading which came to dominate Portuguese activities in Africa for the next four
centuries. Portuguese diplomats then successfully lobbied Rome to issue the bulls Dum
Diversas and Romanus Pontifex, of 1452 and 1455, which granted Portugal full secular and
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the lands and seas from northwest Africa all the way to India.
Subsequently, the main conditions of the Dum Diversas and Romanus Pontifex bulls were
ratified when the two kingdoms signed the Treaty of Alcaçovas in 1479, establishing the first
Portuguese mare clausum in African and Asian waters, an event that had far reaching
consequences on the subsequent course of global history.
As Portugal extended its military and commercial reach in North and Atlantic Africa
in the 1460s, Spain was eager to catch up. Between 1475 and 1478, Castile launched a flurry
of ultimately failed campaigns against Portuguese targets in Cape Verde, Ceuta, the Azores,
and Gran Canaria. And even before any Spaniard had knowledge of the “New World,” let
alone set foot there, and before the Inter cætera bulls of donation, Isabel and Ferdinand began

150 Antonio García y García, “Las donaciones pontificias de territorios y su repercusión en las relaciones entre
Castilla y Portugal,” in Las relaciones entre Portugal y Castilla en la época de los descubrimientos y la expansión colonial, ed.
Ana María Carabias Torres (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1994), 298-299.
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laying the basic institutional and ideological foundations of their imperium over those distant
lands and peoples. According to the “Capitulations” agreed upon with Columbus at Santa
Fé, the monarchs named him “Viceroy,” “Governor General,” and “Admiral,” in all the
“islands and mainlands” which, “by the help of God, […] will be discovered and acquired by
[his] pains and industry” during the voyage west toward Asia.151 The terms entitled
Columbus to a tenth of all merchandise accrued in “pearls, precious stones, gold, silver,
spices, and other things whatsoever,” and delegated him broad jurisdiction “to hear and
determine all the suits and causes civil and criminal.”152 In the Capitulations, the monarchs
made explicit their intention to settle, govern and exploit the lands economically, and
provided a clear articulation of the religious political philosophy underpinning their
sovereignty in the possessions they already ruled. The monarchs explained that they derived
their sovereignty from God who, as “King over all Kings,” “governs and maintains them.”153
Kings serve as God’s “viceregents,” “set upon earth in the place of God to fulfill justice. So
great is the authority of the power of kings, that all laws and rights are subject to their power,
for they do not derive it from men, but from God, whose place they occupy in matters
temporal.”154
When news of Columbus’ “discovery” of Caribbean islands reached Europe, official
legitimation followed swiftly. In May 1493 the Valencia-born Pope Alexander VI issued the
Inter cætera bulls of donation, which legitimized Spain’s conquest of the Americas in the name
of Christianization and granted jurisdiction on the condition that the “barbarous nations”
discovered “be overthrown and brought to the faith.” The bulls granted the “kings of Castile

151 Ferdinand and Isabella, “Capitulations with Columbus: Agreement of April 30, 1492,” in The Spanish
Tradition in America, ed. Charles Gibson (New York: Harper & Row, 1968): 28 and 32.
152 Ferdinand and Isabella, “Capitulations with Columbus,” 32.
153 Ibid. 29.
154 Ibid. 30.
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and León” and their “heirs and successors,” “forever, […] full and free power, authority, and
jurisdiction of every kind.”155 They linked Spain’s overseas expansion to “the honor of God
himself and the spread of Christian rule,” and thereby endowed it with a sacred mission “to
instruct the [native] inhabitants and residents in the Catholic faith and train them in good
morals.”156 The Papal donation provided the first foundation of Spain’s claim to legitimate
sovereignty in the New World, and imbued Spain’s imperial enterprise with divine
ideological meaning.
In 1496, the same pope bestowed upon Ferdinand and Isabel the title, “the Most
Catholic Monarchs,” in recognition of what many saw as their miraculous achievements in
overthrowing Spain’s last Muslim dynasty, expelling the Jews, and opening up a new frontier
for evangelization in America. His confidence inflated by these events, Ferdinand dispatched
a letter with Columbus on his return voyage, addressed to the Taíno-Arawak Indians of
Hispaniola which articulated in clear and aggressive terms the aims and justifications of
Spain’s presence there. In a few succinct lines, it explained the basis of the Pope’s authority
as a successor of St. Peter, God’s appointed leader on earth, and cited the Papal donation,
which “gave these islands and mainland” to the Castilian monarchs, making them “lords and
master of this land.”157 Committed to affirming the legality of its sovereignty in the New
World, the crown experimented with various drafts of this declaration to be read to newly
encountered natives. The conquistador Alonso de Ojeda is reported to have read a similar
document to indigenous peoples on the coast of present day Colombia in 1509, and three
years later the eminent Spanish jurist, Juan de Palacios Rubios, penned a refined version,

155 Pope Alexander VI, “Papal Bull Inter cætera of May 4, 1493,” in The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803, vol. I, 14931529, eds. Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson (Cleveland, OH: The Arthur H. Clark Company,
1903), 100-101.
156 Ibid. 101.
157 “King Ferdinand’s Letter to the Arawaks” (ca. 1490).
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known as the Requirement (Requerimiento).158 The Requirement reiterated the bases of
Spanish dominion in the New World, citing the Papal donation, “required” that natives
submit peacefully to Spanish political rule and religious instruction, and threatened extreme
force should they refuse to comply. Its key effect was to provide Spaniards with a legal cover
for just war by classifying any natives who rejected Spanish rule as rebellious vassals.

Celebration

By the early sixteenth century, authors across Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy,
many under crown commission, were already developing a triumphalist discourse that hailed
the exploits of their crown and country beyond Europe.159 Examples of this imperialist
celebration took a range of forms from chronicles and treatises to epic poetry and visual
iconography, including monuments and engravings in texts, as well as maps, globes and
nautical charts and reports. All these discursive forms helped shape and substantiate visions
of Iberia’s global imperium.
The genre of the imperial chronicle, while refashioned in the sixteenth century to hail
the exploits of Iberian conquests overseas, did not arise as such sui generis. By the sixteenth
century, there already existed in both Portugal and Spain established historiographical
traditions of virtually hagiographic chronicling aimed at glorifying the character and deeds of
their sovereign rulers both past and present. The Portuguese chronicler Fernão Lopes’ 1443,

MacLachlan, Spain’s Empire in the New World, 31.
Several contemporaries, including some very influential authors, critiqued “official history” for its bias and
distortion. The Genoese scholar, Girolamo Franchi di Conestaggio, for instance, described official historians
as “commissioned to lie.” And the eminent sixteenth century Spanish humanist, Juan Luis Vives, compared
official histories to legal briefs advocating a particular case, which, while not necessarily untruthful, presented a
selective interpretation of facts and evidence. See Kagan, Clio and the Crown, 4-6. See also Hernando Sánchez,
Las indias en la monarquía católica; and Diogo Ramada Curto, “A literatura e o império,” in História da expansão
portuguesa, eds. Francisco Bethencourt and Kirti Chaudhuri, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1998), 434-454.
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Crónica d’El Rei D. João I, was one such example, as was João Alvares’, Crónica do Infante Santo
D. Fernando, written the following decade.160 In 1450, Gomes Eanes de Zurara, who
succeeded Lopes as official chronicler after his appointment by King Alfonso V of Portugal
and soon emerged as the pioneering defender of Portuguese expansion in Africa, wrote his
own, Chronica del Rei D. Joam I, the third part of which recounted the Portuguese conquest of
Ceuta.161 Both Lopes and Zurara portrayed João as a messianic figure, seeking to endow his
kingship with divine legitimacy.162
Chronicle writing on the great deeds of Iberian kings and princes persisted well into
the sixteenth century and beyond. In 1505, Duarte Galvão completed his, Crónica del rei D.
Afonso Henriques primeiro rei destes reinos de Portugal, and several decades on, in the mid-sixteenth
century, Afonso Brás de Albuquerque published his Comentários do grande Afonso de
Albuquerque, Capitão Geral que foi das Indias Orientais em tempo do muito poderoso rey D. Manuel.163
In it, Brás de Albuquerque adapted the style to the overseas imperial context, and extended
his praise from the king to that of the king’s highest direct representative in India, who, not
coincidentally, happened to be the author’s father, Afonso de Albuquerque, the governorand captain-general of India from 1509 to 1515. Not only was it the hagiographic eulogy of a
man, but also of the Portuguese nation as a whole for its expanionary successes across
maritime Asia in the early sixteenth century.

João Álvares, Crónica do Infante Santo D. Fernando, que morreo em Fez … (Lisboa Occidental: Officina de Miguel
Rodrigues, 1730), available at the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal [BNP hereafter]. The manuscript was
completed in 1451.
161 Gomes Eanes de Zurara, Chronica del Rei D. Joam I de boa memória. Terceira parte em que se contém a Tomada de
Ceuta (Lisbon: Antonio Álvares, 1644), available at the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP). The manuscript
was completed in 1450.
162 Luis de Sousa Rebelo, “Language and Literature in the Portuguese Empire,” in Portuguese Oceanic Expansion,
1400-1800, eds. Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 358.
163 Afonso Brás de Albuquerque, Comentários do grande Afonso de Albuquerque, Capitão Geral que foi das Indias
Orientais em tempo do muito poderoso rey D. Manuel, edited by António Baião (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade,
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Spanish writers had their own tradition of royal chronicling. Alonso de Santa Cruz
completed his Crónica del emperador Carlos V in 1552.164 A few years prior, in 1545, the current
crown-appointed official chronicler at the court of Charles V, Pedro de Mexía, published his
Historia imperial y cesarea, which recounted the lives of various Roman – and Holy Roman –
Emperors from Julius Caesar to Maximilian I, Charles’ grandfather and direct predecessor to
the Holy Roman Imperial throne.165 More than simply eulogizing these rulers, in his note to
the reader with which he opened the work, Mexía provided an eloquent epistemological
justification of the philospohy and value of history. “The major part of our holy law and
sacred scripture is history. […] [History] is the basis and foundation upon which everything
else is sustained,” he wrote.166 “Because as Solomon says, there is no longer anything new
under the sun, and all that is, has been, and what will be, will be, as in the past.” In
trumpeting the preeminence of history over “the other arts and sciences,” Mexía claimed
that “history comprehends all, and is practical,” that “only she [history] can live without the
others, and none of them without her.”167 In more practical terms, he argued for the utility
of recourse to history, including ancient history, in promoting good government: “Aristotle
affirmed it to be very helpful to the public senates and municipalities, which […] in
deliberating great issues and acts of war, primarily called on and consulted those men who
were well-read and wise in the ancient histories.”168

While tales of the valor and virtue of Iberian rulers enhanced perceptions of their
persona, nautical charts and reports, geographical treatises, and maps and globes helped
Alonso de Santa Cruz, Crónica del emperador Carlos V (Madrid: Impr. del Patronato de Huérfanos de
Intendencia é Intervención Militares, 1920), originally completed in 1550-52, but was only published
posthumously.
165 Pedro de Mexía, Historia imperial y cesarea (Antwerp: Martin Nutius, 1552), manuscript completed in 1545.
166 Mexía, Historia imperial y cesarea, from “Note to Reader.”
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convey the vast spatial dimensions of their imperium. Álvaro Velho’s, Roteiro da viagem que em
descobrimento da India pelo Cabo da Boa Esperança fez dom Vasco da Gama em 1497, combined
geographical and nautical description of maritime Africa and Asia with a laudatory account
of Da Gama’s exploits as the first European to reach India by sea.169 Written in 1538, João
de Castro’s manuscript, the Primeiro roteiro da costa da India, desde Goa ate Dio, provided a
similar treatment of the voyage of the Viceroy of India, Garcia de Noronha, and of
Portuguese valor in the victory at Diu.170 And in his, Roteiro em que se contem a viagem que fizeram
os Portuguezes no anno de 1541, partindo da nobre cidade de Goa atee Soez, although devoted
primarily to “winds, seas, and ports,” the same author opened the work with exaggerated
praise of Portuguese triumphs in the region, having won “so many cities there, [and]
defeating the Ethiopian, Egyptian, and Arab peoples.”171
If navigation guides as a particular genre were less popular in Spain, Spanish authors
were nonetheless committed to documenting the rapidly accumulating geographical
knowledge made possible by Iberian expansion. Two central texts in this tradition, and in the
nascent discipline of geography, were Alonso de Santa Cruz’s, Islario general de todas las islas del
mundo, and Juan López de Velasco’s, Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias, both written in
the mid-sixteenth century.172 Although holding official positions as “cosmographers,” each
was keenly aware that, in the wake of the first circumnavigation of the globe by Magellan’s
169 Álvaro Velho, Roteiro da viagem que em descobrimento da India pelo Cabo da Boa Esperança fez dom Vasco da Gama em
1497 (Porto: Typographia commercial portuense, 1838).
170 João de Castro, Primeiro roteiro da costa da India, desde Goa ate Dio, narrando a viagem que fez o Vice-Rei D. Garcia de
Noronha, em socorro desta ultima cidade, 1538-1539 (Porto: Typographia commercial portuense, 1843).
171 João de Castro, Roteiro em que se contem a viagem que fizeram os Portuguezes no anno de 1541, partindo da nobre cidade
de Goa atee Soez, no anno de 1541 (Paris: Baudry, 1833). Later in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,
Portuguese authors including Luís Teixeira, Aleixo da Mota, and António de Mariz Carneiro penned similar
texts, but which also covered coastal Brazil and more easterly reaches of maritime Asia. See Luis Teixeira’s,
Roteiro de todos os sinais, conhecimentos, fundos, baixos, alturas, e derrotas que ha na costa do Brasil… (1582-85); Aleixo da
Mota’s, Roteiro da nauegação da careira [sic] da India (c.1621); and Antonio de Mariz Carneiro’s, Regimento de pilotos, e
roteiro das navegaçoens da India Oriental (1642).
172 Alonso de Santa Cruz’s, Islario general de todas las islas del mundo (Madrid: Impr. del Patronato de Huérfanos de
Intendencia é Intervención Militares, 1918 [1560]), and Juan López de Velasco’s, Geografía y descripción universal de
las Indias (Madrid: Fortanet, 1894 [completed 1571]).
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crew in 1522, the world was now a finite space, as distinct from the broader universe, which
had previously fallen within the domain of cosmography.

Figure 1
Battista Agnese, Atlas (Mss., 1544), fols. 13v-14r, Biblioteca Nacional de España
The study of the earth as a finite, bounded unit required its own science, “geography,” to
properly comprehend its limits and complexity.173 While Santa Cruz’s work was ambitious in
its attempt to cover all the islands of the world, Velasco’s was perhaps even more so, as it
provided a geographical synthesis of “both Indies,” including the New World and Pacific as
well as East Asia, the knowledge of which, it was clear, had been made possible in large part
thanks to the efforts of Iberian explorers and missionaries.174 Velasco not only provided a
detailed geographic and ethnographic description of the many lands and peoples beyond
Europe over which the Spanish crown claimed sovereignty. He also, interestingly, discussed
at length the government of those diverse possessions, known collectively as “the Indies.”
With chapters on the Caribbean and mainland Spanish America, the book also contains
sections on the Philippines, and territories beyond Spanish control, like Brazil, China, and
even New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Unfortunately for Velasco, however, the crown
173 John M. Headley, “Geography and Empire in the Late Renaissance: Botero’s Assignment, Western
Universalism, and the Civilizing Process,” Renaissance Quarterly 53, no. 4 (Winter, 2000): 1128-1129.
174 Headley, “Geography and Empire in the Late Renaissance,” 1128-1129.
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deemed the work to contain sensitive and strategic information, blocked its publication, and
reserved it for the exclusive use of the Council of Indies, “on account of the inconveniences
that might arise,” wrote Philip II, “if the work circulates among many hands.”175

Alongside navigation guides and geographical treatises, maps and globes also
provided representations of the extent of Iberian expansion and, in many cases, of the spatial
dimensions of Iberian imperium. Maps and nautical charts, although mostly guarded by the
Spanish and Portuguese crowns to prevent them from being used by imperial competitors,
were occasionally leaked or published in atlases and other works, making their way into the
public sphere.176 The accumulation of knowledge contained in maps and charts was evidence
of the Iberians’ voyages of “discovery” and conquest. And the practice of naming particular
lands and seas was more than purely symbolic. It often expressed claims to territorial
dominion, to one’s right as first discoverer, and bestowed maps and globes with very
tangible legal and political power. In the 1570, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, for instance,
commonly regarded as the first modern world atlas, its creator, Abraham Ortelius, argued
that there is no nation in all the world, “that has navigated more its seas, nor traversed its
lands, than the natives of Spain.”177

175 Cited in Kagan, Clio and the Crown, 167. As a result, Velasco’s, Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias, was
not published until 1894.
176 For an analysis that focuses on the centrality of cartography in Dutch expansion with attention to Iberian
influences as well, see Kees Zandvliet, Mapping for Money: Maps, Plans, and Topographic Paintings and their Role in
Dutch Overseas Expansion during the 16th and 17th Centuries (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1998).
177 Abraham Ortelius, from the dedication to the 1588 Spanish edition, Theatro de la tierra universal (Amberes:
Christoval Plantino, 1588), originally published as Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Antwerp: Gilles Coppens de Diest,
1570).
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Figure 2
Abraham Ortelius, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Antwerp: Gilles Coppens de Diest, 1570)
Ortelius, a Flemish cartographer and subject of the Spanish crown had provided visual
evidence not only of the vastness of the globe but also of the unprecedented reach of
Spanish sovereignty. His 1588 Spanish edition of the work was dedicated to Philip II, “in
whose dominion and government God [had] put the major part of all that inhabits the
continents and islands of the earth.”178
Globes represented the prime visual representation of Iberian claims to imperium
and hegemony, this despite the fact that they did not possess the detail or accuracy of
navigational charts or other more focused maps found in atlases. Coincidentally, the German
geographer Martin Behaim produced the first known globe on the eve of Columbus’ voyage
in 1492. And although not depicting the New World, it did contain representations of Asia
and Africa, and notes on the Indian spice trade, one of the prime motivating factors behind
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both Spanish and Portuguese expansion.179 In negotiations over Spain and Portugal’s
competing claims to the Moluccas, agents from both sides preferred the globe to twodimensional maps as a means of better representing “the shape of the world” and of settling
their dispute over the precise location of the anti-meridian separating the two Iberian
hemispheres of conquest and navigation.180 Engravers and artists increasingly included
globes in symbolic representations of Spain’s unprecedented power, and as early as 1495 the
Portuguese king, Manuel I, incorporated the armillary sphere into his kingdom’s official royal
iconography in order to convey the globality of Portuguese imperium as well.181

But as Iberians moved out into the Atlantic, Indian, and eventually Pacific ocean
worlds, as they discovered lands and peoples previously unknown to Europe, subjugated
some and entered into relations of alliance or exchange with others, there soon emerged a
new genre of historical writing which complemented the more traditional chronicle and the
recent developments in cartography and nautical literature. And like the new works in
geography, it also often reflected a profound curiosity in the rich tapestries of flora, fauna,
and peoples that inhabited those newly encountered lands, which slowly yet profoundly
challenged traditional, classical knowledge of cosmography, history, and other forms of
human and natural science.182 Above all, this new literature contributed to enhancing the
aura and prestige of the Iberian sovereigns. If at the turn of the fifteenth century Portugal

179 Jerry Brotton, “Terrestrial Globalism: Mapping the Globe in Early Modern Europe,” in Mappings, ed.
Dennis Cosgrove (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), 75-76.
180 Brotton, “Terrestrial Globalism,” 83-84.
181 Ibid. 77.
182 Francisco Bethencourt, “European Expansion and the New Order of Knowledge,” in The Renaissance World,
ed. John Jeffries Martin (London: Routledge, 2007), 118-139. For works that argue instead for the delayed
impact of the “discoveries” on knowledge of the world in Europe, see J. H. Elliott, The Old World and the New:
1492-1650 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Anthony Grafton, New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The
Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1992); and G. V. Scammel, “The
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and Spain were considered internally divided, relatively isolated kingdoms at the edge of
Europe, by the sixteenth century each of their respective rulers were increasingly seen as
reigning over composite empires that far outstretched the great empires of ancient Eurasia
and had, for the first time in history, achieved truly global dimensions. Even if the authors of
each individual work did not make this point explicit, the vast and ever growing body of
Iberian literature on Africa, Asia and America, and on Spanish and Portuguese activities
there, nonetheless came collectively to convey a sense that the Iberians were the undoubted
pioneers in the fashioning of a truly global world and in the effort to bring that world under
the cultural, religious, and political sway of Christian Europe.
Again, and due to the fact that they took first systematic initiative in overseas
expansion, it was the Portuguese who gave birth to the narrative literature dedicated
specifically to Iberian expansion beyond Europe. As was common, many of these works
circulated as manuscripts only, some not published until centuries later, due to the fact that
authorities often deemed them too controversial in their criticism of particular royal officials
or members of the settler elite, for example. Authorities may also have suppressed their
publication if judged to contain informative sensitive for strategic reasons. The first of these
published works was Gomes Eanes de Zurara’s, Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné,
completed in 1453.183 It remains one of the earliest and most detailed accounts of various
sub-Saharan African societies inhabiting the westernmost region of the continent. Beyond
simply providing ethnographic description, Zurara’s main objective was to justify and indeed
exalt Portuguese claims and activities there, including the trade in gold and especially in
slaves, as well as slave-raiding, an issue to which we return later. Duarte Pacheco Pereira’s,

183 Gomes Eanes de Zurara, Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné (Paris: J. P. Aillaud, 1841 [originally
published in 1453]). For an English translation see, Gomes Eanes de Zurara, The Chronicle of the Discovery and
Conquest of Guinea, edited by Edgar Prestage (London: Hakluyt Society, 1896).
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Esmeraldo de situ orbis, was another.184 Although not published until 1892, Pereira composed
the work between 1505 and 1508, recounting his voyages along coastal Brazil, West Africa,
and India, where he captained a ship in the fleet of Afonso de Albuquerque. Pereira
emphasized his own religiosity and praised the heroism of the Portuguese in battle, such as
that of the 1504 “defense of Cochin.” And in his detailed descriptions of diverse territories
in Africa, Asia and Brazil, and of the sea routes which connected them, he lent eye-witness
support to the priority of Portuguese navigators in the definitive “discovery of the
Roundness of the earth, and of the sea,” as he wrote. Pereira referred to his sovereign as
“Caesar Manuel,” in a rhetorical nod to the greatness of Portuguese power after the
“discovery” and domination of so many distant lands and seas.185 Tomé Pires’, Suma Oriental,
written between 1512 and 1515, extended the description of the world and of Portuguese
expansion even further to encompass the Far East, including both the Spice Islands and
China, where he led the first official European embassy, to the Ming Dynasty.186 In addition,
in 1526, Antonio Pigafetta, a Venetian writer and explorer and member of Magellan’s crew,
completed his, Relazione del Primo Viaggio Intorno Al Mondo, which provided the earliest
firsthand account of the roundness of the world, made known through the efforts of a
Portuguese navigator and his crew sailing for the Spanish crown.187
Although the Portuguese took the lead in developing this literature, Spanish writers
were not far behind. Curiously enough, the first such work by a Spaniard was not written in
praise of his own countrymen’s efforts in Spanish-claimed territories, but instead in
recognition of Portuguese successes in Asia. In 1512, Juan Agüero de Trasmiera, edited the
Sometimes translated as “On the places of the world.” See, Duarte Pacheco Pereira, Esmeraldo de situ orbis
(London: Hakluyt Society, 1892).
185 Marcocci, A consciência de um império, 94.
186 Tomé Pires’, Suma Oriental was not published until 1944 in the English translation of Armando Cortesão.
See The Suma oriental of Tomé Pires: An account of the East, from the Red Sea to Japan, written in Malacca and India in
1512-1515, edited and translated by Armando Cortesão (London: Haluyt Society, 1944).
187 Antonio Pigafetta, Relazione del Primo Viaggio Intorno Al Mondo (Venice: 1536).
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eyewitness account of Martín Fernández de Figueroa, a fellow Spaniard, entitled, Conquista de
las Indias de Persia e Arabia que hizo la armada del rey don Manuel de Portugal.188 As firsthand
testimony, Férnandez de Figueroa’s account necessarily did not reach the broadness of
knowledge or scope of synthesis of later historians, but is nonetheless significant as it
anticipated by some four decades or more the famous works of Fernão Lopes Castanheda
and João de Barros, as well as that of Brás de Albuquerque, mentioned above, all of which
aimed specifically to praise Portuguese conquests in Asia. Equally significant, if Pigafetta’s
work chronicled the efforts of a Portuguese (Magellan) in the service of Spain, Férnandez de
Figueroa’s provided further evidence of the unofficial integration of the Iberian empires, as
he dedicated nearly a third of his work to the toils of Pedro de Añaya, a fellow Castilian, in
establishing and securing the Portuguese presence in Sofala, a key entrepot of gold trade in
southeast Africa.
Then, between 1516 and 1530, the Milanese historian and official royal chronicler of
Charles V, Pietro Martire d’Anghiera, debuted the first Spanish imperial history, his Decadas
de Orbe Novo, in which he recounted Spaniards’ early explorations and conquests throughout
the circum-Caribbean and Pacific coasts of America, and Magellan’s global circumnavigation
under Spanish authority.189 Anghiera marveled at the great potential of this process and its
implications for the faith: “Oh God: how large and far shall our posterity see the Christian
Religion extended?” Anghiera appealed to his young prince, the soon-to-be Charles V, that
he “embrace this new world,” so that, “all the world shall be under your obeyance.”190 “The
divine providence, from the time He first created the world,” wrote Anghiera in the most

188 Martín Fernández de Figueroa, Conquista de las Indias de Persia e Arabia que hizo la armada del rey don Manuel de
Portugal, edited by L. Gil (Valladolid: Universidad De Valladolid, 1999).
189 Petri Martyris ab Anglería, Decadas de Orbe Novo (Alcalá de Henares: Michaele[m] d[e] Eguia, 1530).
190 Anglería, Decadas de Orbe Novo, 105 and 63, respectively.
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providential terms, “has reserved unto this day the knowledge of the great and large Ocean
sea […] unto you (most mighty Prince).”191
Around the same time Anghiera was at work, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y
Valdés composed his own comprehensive, Historia general y natural de las Indias, which
presented a providential vision Spain’s mission in the New World.192 “It was not without
cause that Jesus Christ illuminated the heart of Caesar to entrust his occidental empire of the
Indies to Your Revered Lordship,” wrote Oviedo, where “[Your Majesty] commands and
governs with such broad power and integrity.”193 Having claimed sovereignty over the
“strange and remote regions” of the New World, he saw Spain’s sixteenth century empire as
far surpassing that of the ancient Greeks, having expanded “so many thousands of leagues
farther than ever did Hercules.”194 In his 1534, Verdadera relación de la conquista del Perú,
Francisco de Jerez praised the great heroism of his countrymen in the conquest of South
America and, like Oviedo, thought his nation deserved a place among, and indeed ahead, of
all the great empires of antiquity. “Because if the Romans subjugated so many provinces, it
was […] in lands known, and well-supplied [with] paid captains and armies,” wrote Jerez.195
But “our Spaniards,” he continued, were “few in number, [and] never went together but with
200 or 300, and sometimes 100 and even less.”196
At the same time, Portuguese writers were developing their own proud tradition of
imperial chronicling, which mirrored that of the Spaniards. Damião de Góis’ 1539, Comentarii
Anglería, Decadas de Orbe Novo, 63.
Published in parts in the sixteenth century, the complete work was not published until the nineteenth
century: Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, Historia general y natural de las Indias, ed. José Amador de los
Rios (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1851-1855).
193 Oviedo y Valdés, Historia general y natural de las Indias, cx-cxi.
194 Oviedo y Valdés, from p.236 of the 1885 Eng. Edition. Oviedo, although covetous of the office of royal
chronicler, never obtained it. He did, however, gain a small subsidy for the completion of his history of the
world, evidence that he enjoyed at least modest crown sponsorship from the crown. See Kagan, Clio and the
Crown, 69-70.
195 Francisco de Jerez, Verdadera relación de la conquista del Perú (Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2003 [1534]): 3.
196 Ibid.
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rerum gestarum in India citra Gangem a Lusitanis anno 1538, for instance, written in Latin, praised
the Portuguese for spreading Christianity in Asia.197 And the 1550s saw the beginning and
partial publication of masterpieces by three foundational chroniclers of Portuguese Asian
imperium: Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, Gaspar Correia, and João de Barros. In his, História
do descobrimento e conquista da Índia pelos Portugueses, written from 1551 to 1561, Castanheda
documented Portuguese conquests all the way from southeast Africa across the Indian
Ocean world to the Spice Islands and China. The frontispiece to the first volume of
Castanheda’s work lists several of the “miraculous feats” of the Portuguese across Africa and
Asia in order to convey a sense of the globality of those deeds. And in his prologue to
volume eight he repeated his sovereign’s rhetorical title: “King of Portugal and of the
Algarves, of the Sea near and far in Africa, Lord of Guinea, and of the Conquest, Navigation
and Commerce of Ethiopia, Persia, Arabia and India.”198

197 Damião de Góis, Comentarii rerum gestarum in India citra Gangem a Lusitanis anno 1538 (Louvain: Rutgerus
Rescius, 1539).
198 Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, História do descobrimento e conquista da Índia pelos Portugueses (Coimbra: 1552):
book 1, prologue: “Rey de Portugal, & dos Algarues, Daquem, e Dale’ mar, em Africa, senhor de Guinê, da
cõquista, nauegação, & comercio de Etyopia, Arabia, Persia, & da India.”
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Figures 3 and 4
Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, História do descobrimento e conquista da Índia pelos Portugueses
(Coimbra: 1552), frontispiece to book 1 and prologue to book 8
Castanheda further emphasized the global, maritime orientation of Portugal’s Asian
imperium, distinguishing it from the more terrestrial empires of the Greeks and Romans.
“India was made by sea and by our captain[s],” he wrote, “[who] beginning from the end of
the Occident [i.e. Portugal] and sailing to the Orient without seeing more than water and sky,
[circled] all of the sphere, something never done by mortals, nor imagined to be done.”
Having braved the “fury and impetuosity of the winds” and seas, “they saw in India and
other places amazing and cruel battles with the most ferocious people.”199 Beyond praising
the divine aura of the king himself, Castanheda portrayed Da Gama’s voyage as providential
in order to convey the early idea that Portugal’s burgeoning overseas empire was part of
God’s will as well.200
199
200
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If Gaspar Correia’s work, Lendas da Índia, was seemingly more factual and
straightforward, its sweeping descriptions of Portuguese successes and tribulations across the
Indian Ocean world nonetheless contributed to an impressive view of the breadth of
Portugal’s Asian imperium.201 João de Barros’ work, however, while similarly wide-ranging in
its factual description, also contained numerous examples of explicit praise of the empire.202
For Barros, who began publishing his multivolume work, Décadas da Asia, in 1552, Portugal,
in its Asian enterprise, had taken upon “its shoulders […] a world […] that could make it
bow with the great weight of the land, the sea, the wind, and the ardor of Sun […] and, […]
more significant than these elements, the variety of the many people that inhabit it.”203 He
presented Portuguese expansion within a larger, longer-term historical drama dominated by
the struggle against Islam, and thereby justified Portuguese conquests in the East in the
name of the broader crusade against the infidel.204 Barros went on to suggest that even if
Portuguese power might slowly erode over time given the enormous challenge of
maintaining such a vast Asian imperium, certain key Portuguese cultural elements would
persist. Echoing the maxim that “language [was] the companion of empire,” articulated over
half a century earlier by the eminent Spanish scholar and grammarian, Antonio de Nebrija,
Barros exclaimed that, no glory in history could compare to the fact that “Ethiopians,
Persians, Indians […] are now learning our [Portuguese] language.”205 And in dividing the
work into ten-year periods, or décadas, Barros mimicked the Roman historian Livy in order to
Gaspar Correia, Lendas da Índia, edited by Rodrigo José de Lima Felner (Lisbon: Typographia da Academia
Real das Sciencias, 1858-1866 [1556]).
202 João de Barros, Década Primeira da Asia (Lisbon: Iorge Rodriguez, 1628 [1552]).
203 Quoted in Marcocci, A consciência de um império,” 15. See João de Barros, Década Primeira da Asia (Lisbon:
Iorge Rodriguez, 1628 [1552]).
204 Rebelo, “Language and Literature in the Portuguese Empire,” 370-371.
205 Quoted in Gil Pujol, “Spain and Portugal,” 423. Nebrija had earlier been named by King Ferdinand to the
lucrative, increasingly prestigious office of royal chronicler and was charged with writing “the history of Spain
and of the Spanish people.” See Kagan, Clio and the Crown, 17-18. For an analysis of the significance of Nebrija’s idea in
the context of early modern Spain and Portugal, see Eugenio Asensio, “La lengua compañera del imperio: Historia de
una idea de Nebrija en España y Portugal,” Revista de Filología Española 43 (1960): 399-416.
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convey a sense of the Portuguese as heirs to a glorious tradition stretching back to ancient
Rome.206
Then, in 1572, the great Portuguese poet, Luís Vaz de Camões, who had served as a
soldier in both Africa and Asia, further amplified these sentiments by celebrating the
explorations, voyages, and conquests of his compatriots in one of the most influential texts
of the early modern period, Os Lusíadas [the Lusiads].207 In the form of epic poetry, it was an
ode to the history of his Portuguese homeland, to the discoveries, the expansion of
Christianity, and the actions of Vasco de Gama and Magellan, all of which portrayed
Portugal as predestined to accomplish great deeds and impose its law throughout the
world.208 Although not withholding certain critiques and preoccupations about the present
and future state of the empire, Camões nonetheless rhapsodized that, “Heaven is determined
to make Lisbon a new Rome,” reinforcing the idea that Portugal’s ever expanding imperium
was a reflection of divine providence and heir to that of the Romans.209
Those decades, the 1550s to the 1570s, saw the steady maturation of Spanish
imperial chronicling as well. Francisco López de Gómara, commissioned by Hernán Cortés
to write his own, Historia General de las Indias, opened his work with the grandiose
exclamation that, “the greatest event since the creation of the world, apart from the
incarnation and death of the creator himself, is the discovery of the Indies.”210 Gómara
lauded his countrymen for undertaking the duties of preaching and converting with as much

206 C. R. Boxer, Three Historians of Portuguese Asia: Barros, Couto, Bocarro (Macau: Imprensa Nacional, 1948), 7; and
Rebelo, “Language and Literature in the Portuguese Empire,” 367.
207 Luis de Camões, Os Lusíadas (Lisbon: Antonio Gonçalvez, 1572).
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid., canto vi, 7.
210 Francisco López de Gómara, Hispania Victrix: Primera y Segunda Parte de la Historia General de las Indias, co[n]
todo el descubrimiento, y cosas notables que han acaescido dende que se ganaron hasta el año de 1551, con la conquista de Mexico,
y de la nueua España (Medina del Campo: Guillermo de Millis, 1553), quoted in Ponsen and Feros, “The Early
Modern Iberian Empires.”
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zeal as in “discovering and conquering.”211 Alluding to the combination of temporal and
ecclesiastical power that the king held over the Indies, he referred to his sovereign as
“absolute lord” there.212 Thanks to the collective efforts of Spaniards across the empire,
Gómara claimed that, “no nation has extended as much as the Spanish its customs, its
language, and its weapons, nor ventured as far by sea and by land.”213 The frontispiece to
Gómara’s work displayed the Pillars of Hercules bearing the words “Plus Ultra,” (“Farther
Beyond”), symbolizing the expansionary ambition of Charles V.214

Figure 5
Francisco López de Gómara, Hispania Victrix (Medina del Campo, 1553), frontispiece
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214 Spain’s Habsburg rulers subsequently adopted this motto from Charles and it remains on Spain’s modern
national flag.
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Finally, two works of particular significance were Antonio Galvão’s 1563, Tratado dos
Descobrimentos, antigos, e modernos, feitos até a Era de 1550, and Bernardino de Escalante’s 1577,
Discurso de la navegación que los portugueses hazen a los reinos y provincias del oriente, y de la noticia que se
tiene del reino de China.215 Alongside the work of Fernández de Figueroa, these were
noteworthy as early exceptions to the dominant focus of authors on the discoveries and
conquests of their own countrymen, reflecting the interest of readers in the global
expansions of their Iberian neighbors across the peninsular divide. Escalante, from the
northern Spanish region of Cantabria, opened his book praising the “valor and
determination” of his fellow Spaniards for having traversed virtually all of the “seas, islands
and kingdoms,” in all the “entire roundness of the world.” The prime focus of the work,
however, was the exploits of Portuguese expansion in North and West Africa, India, Brazil,
Southeast Asia, and China. Galvão, for his part, produced the first integrated history of
Spanish and Portuguese conquest and imperium. Within the context of a broader history of
imperial expansion over the longue durée, beginning with the ancient Greeks and Phoenicians,
he brought the story up to the sixteenth century, presenting “the discoveries of the Spaniards
in the Antilles and Indies” as a continuation of those of the Portuguese in maritime Africa
and Asia.216

215 António Galvão, Tratado dos Descobrimentos, antigos, e modernos, feitos até a Era de 1550 (Lisbon: João da Barreira,
1563); and Bernardo de Escalante, Discurso de la navegación que los portugueses hazen a los reinos y provincias del oriente, y
de la noticia que se tiene del reino de China (Sevilla, 1577).
216 António Galvão, Tratado dos Descobrimentos, antigos, e modernos, feitos até a Era de 1550 (Lisbon: João da Barreira,
1563), 29.
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Controversy

Yet despite the celebratory literary trends in Portugal and Spain, already in the first
years of expansion this triumphalism was accompanied by sharp debates about the justness
of the expansion, about the institutions of imperial rule and subjugation of native peoples,
and about the titles by which both monarchies justified their dominion beyond Europe.217
The main issues under scrutiny also reflected the general models the two respective empires
came to adopt. While Spanish debates revolved around territorial title to the Americas and
the abuse of subjected indigenous populations, debates over Portuguese imperium centered
primarily on the African slave trade and on exclusive control over navigation routes and the
distribution of Asian spices. Nevertheless, Portuguese and Spanish jurists, humanists and
theologians all drew from a common juridical-theological discourse in justifying their
imperial enterprises.
The controversy was perhaps most intense when its focus was the abuse of the
natives.218 In 1501, in an effort to consolidate control over the burgeoning colony of
Hispaniola, the crown dispatched a new governor, Nicolás de Ovando, whose main priority
was to introduce a system of forced indigenous labor to sustain the colony and make it
profitable. The system soon became known as encomienda, after a similarly named institution
from the reconquista, which assigned newly conquered Muslim villages to Spanish Military
Orders. It differed in its New World adaptation in that it referred not to grants of lands or
villages as it had in Spain, but to the crown’s allocation of forced native labor to Spanish
settlers, in recognition of their efforts in bringing new indigenous societies and territories
Ponsen and Feros, “The Early Modern Iberian Empires.”
Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America, trans. Richard
Howard (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
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under Spanish control. In return, the encomendero (the recipient of encomienda) was charged
with defending the land and instructing his native charges in Catholicism and the ways of
Spanish civilization. The encomienda became one of the most important institutions of
Spanish imperial rule, especially when transferred to mainland America. But, as James
Lockhart has explained, it also became the focus of intense scrutiny as recipients of these
grants, “leaping over technicalities, made their encomiendas the bases of great estates even if
they did not legally own the land,” and thereby slowly came to threaten royal sovereignty in
the New World with the rise of a local elite that was dangerously autonomous from the
crown’s point of view.219 More immediately, the institution provoked penetrating criticism
since many viewed abusive encomenderos as the main cause of the alarmingly precipitous
decline of native populations across the New World.
In 1511, Antonio de Montesinos, a Dominican priest in Hispaniola, was the first to
publicly denounce the natives’ harsh treatment at the hands of rapacious settlers. “Tell me,
what right have you to enslave them?” he decried in a fiery sermon. “What authority did you
use to make war against them who lived at peace on their territories? […] And why don’t
you look after their spiritual health, so that they should come to know God? […] Aren’t they
human beings? Have they no rational soul?”220 In these brief lines, Montesinos defined the
basic terms of a debate that would rattle Spain’s imperial conscience for the next four
decades.
Bartolomé de las Casas, also a Dominican, a former encomendero himself who had
been converted by Montesinos, soon catalogued the numerous crimes committed against
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Native Americans. His, Brevíssima Relación de la Destruyción de las Indias, written in the 1540s
and first published in 1552 although without license, provided the first systematic account of
the horrors of the conquest, and of the exploitative colonial regime which arose in its
wake.221 In it, Las Casas catalogued the crimes committed by Spaniards in each of the regions
conquered until that time: “On the mainland, we know for sure that our fellow-countrymen
have, through their cruelty and wickedness, depopulated and laid waste an area which once
boasted more than ten kingdoms. The whole region, once teeming with human beings, is
now deserted. […] Among these gentle sheep,” he wrote, “the Spaniards appeared […] like
famished wolves, and tigers, and lions,” killing everybody and destroying everything.222
In 1536 Pope Paul III declared that the Indians were fully human, and in 1542 the
Spanish ruler officially rescinded all previous decrees that allowed the enslavement of
Indians. Henceforth only specific Indian populations could be legitimately enslaved—those
designated as savages or barbarians, but in reality all those who resisted Spanish
domination—and in later decades even these distinctions were abolished in favor of full
freedom for all natives. That same year the movement spearheaded by Las Casas succeeded
in pressuring the crown to issue the so-called “New Laws,” a sweeping set of reforms aimed
at protecting the natives from abusive settlers and abolishing the encomienda altogether within
a generation. Several authors did rise to support the encomenderos, however. The most
prominent was Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.223 Drawing primarily on Aristotelian philosophy, in
his 1547 Demócrates Alter, written in Latin, Sepúlveda argued that Spaniards were “natural
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masters,” whereas the natives, as subhuman “barbarians,” were “natural slaves.”224 And in
1550 Charles V convened a public debate on the issue between Las Casas and Sepúlveda,
and decreed that all conquests cease until a ruling was made on the justness of Spanish
conduct in America. Both Las Casas and Sepúlveda were forbidden from publishing or
voicing their arguments, but the fact that the 1573, Ordenanzas de descubrimientos, nueva población
y pacificación de las Indias, upheld the crown’s long-professed intention to protect Native
Americans shows that Las Casas and his camp had effectively prevailed. The 1573
Ordenanzas, like the 1513 Leyes de Burgos and the 1542 Leyes Nuevas, while aiming to shield
Native Americans from mistreatment and thereby bolster the monarchy’s claim to moral
authority, also sought to curb the rise of an autonomous settler elite, which threatened the
primacy of crown power in the New World. Settler abuse of Native Americans persisted
across space and time, however. Intense, often violent opposition from settlers in Peru and
Mexico compelled royal officials to rescind, delay or soften several of these laws’ key
provisions. The series of laws and decrees failed to effectively eliminate such abuse, but it
did represent a systematic effort by the crown to consolidate its position as a benevolent
moral authority among both its own subjects and imperial competitors.225

If Portuguese expansion elicited less controversy in the beginning, part of the reason
was that, unlike in Spanish America, many Portuguese conquests in Africa and Asia were
directed against local peoples that were either Muslim or were considered so barbarous that,
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as Zurara first argued, their conquest and enslavement was easily justified in the name of
conversion and civilization. Zurara began his, Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné,
completed in 1453, with a description of the motivations compelling Prince Henry the
Navigator to sponsor Portugal’s early expansion.226 First was Henry’s “zeal for the service of
God,” which he sought to achieve through “increasing the faith” through conversion and
establishing contact with lost Christian princes in Africa.227 In addition, there were more
material inspirations, including the search for commercial opportunities on the continent,
and more strategic ones, like the goal of ascertaining the reach and strength of Muslim
power in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, Zurara listed above all the merit of discovery for its
own sake, guided by “heavenly” forces in “seeking out things that were hidden by other men
and secret.”228
Among Portugal’s chief activities in Africa, however, was the procurement of slaves.
Despite seeing these Africans as living in a state of barbarism, Zurara understood this as
temporary, and moved beyond the Aristotelian theory of natural slavery in implicitly
acknowledging their humanity and arguing that through baptism and conversion their souls
might be saved.229 He provided a vivid if wrenching account of the sale of African slaves
upon disembarkation in Portugal, describing the captives with “faces bathed in tears, […]
groaning dolorously,” being torn apart “parents from children, husbands from wives,
siblings from siblings,” making “lamentations in the manner of a dirge.” “And though we
could not understand the words of their language,” he continued, “the sounds of it right well
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accorded with the measure of their sadness.”230 Yet, despite these tragic scenes, and the
regrettable horrors of slavery that Zurara acknowledged, he nonetheless accepted,
foreshadowing the arguments of apologists of African slavery for centuries to come, that for
these “innocent souls” the punishment of slavery while on earth was nonetheless justified by
their baptism and conversion, which ensured the liberation of their souls in the afterlife.231
Zurara’s views were widely shared among contemporaries, and despite the
persistence of Portuguese slaving activities in Africa and the expansion of that traffic to
America, Asia, and Europe, roughly a century passed before the publication of works openly
critical of the practice, all of which couched the question of slavery within larger discussions
about just war and commerce.232 Even Bartolomé de las Casas, so renowned for his tireless
advocacy against the plight of Native Americans, continued to sanction African slavery as a
necessary evil until relatively late in his life. The first work directly critical of the practice
appeared in 1555, with publication of the Arte da Guerra no Mar, by the Portuguese
Dominican, grammarian, and prolific author on range of subjects, Fernão de Oliveira. If
Oliveira’s prime focus in the work was naval warfare, he nonetheless dedicated substantial
discussion to African slavery, which he saw as not only immoral but also illicit. Although
accepting the legality of enslaving Muslims (who by nature of their religion in theory had
knowledge of and therefore had rejected Christianity), he nonetheless decried African
slavery, tying it to the question of just war. For this reason, he wrote, “taking lands, [and]
capturing peoples that did not even blaspheme Christ, is manifest tyranny.”233 Even more
scathing was that, as Oliveira saw it, the Portuguese were the very “inventors of such bad
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trade,” and had created a demand for it on an unprecedented scale. “If there were no buyers
[a reference to the Portuguese],” he reasoned, “there would be no sellers, no thieves that
robbed to sell.” Moreover, he decried as tragically disingenuous the argument of Zurara and
others that maintaining them in slavery was justified by the act of “making them Christians,
and […] delivering them from savagery” with the claim that “their souls are worth more than
their service.”234
A decade and a half later, in his 1571, Summa de Tratos y Contratos, the Andalucian
Dominican Tomás de Mercado criticized the unjust violence through which the Portuguese
crown obtained its “lordship, empire, and authority” in West Africa, and protested uniquely
that the Iberians’ slaving activities contributed gravely to the social and political instability in
the African regions where the slaves were procured.235 He concluded by censuring the
hypocrisy of his co-religionists for their own barbarity toward enslaved Africans. “After
frightening ourselves with the cruelty the Turks use with Christian captives, putting them by
night in their dungeons,” he wrote, Christian merchants “treat these blacks much worse,
who are already among the faithful, because they were already baptized on the shore at the
time of their embarkation.”236
Just two years later, the Spanish historian and jurist of the School of Salamanca,
Bartolomé Albornoz, published his, Arte de los contratos, which presented one of the toughest
attacks yet on how Europeans obtained slaves.237 He censured as “manifest robbery,” against
“conscience” and “all natural and divine law,” the practice of slave raiding undertaken by
certain Portuguese in West Africa since it was a violation of the principles of just war “to
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enter into the land of another kingdom without authority [and] anger those who had not
angered one first, and even more so to deprive them of their liberty and place them in
servitude, which is equal to death.”238
Although the debates among the Portuguese over expansion were not as intense or
public, and in general did not provoke an institutional response as profound as that in the
Spanish case, they did elicit the creation in 1532 of the Mesa da Consciência, its aim being “to
resolve and settle any possible conflict between secular power and moral theology.”239 In his
recent work on the Portuguese imperial conscience, Giuseppe Marcocci has demonstrated
how, alongside references to the papal donation and legitimations of just war against infidels,
the theologians assembled in the Mesa da Consciência came to play the important role of
substantiating Portuguese claims to dominion beyond Europe, in particular by supporting
the crown in jurisdictional and theological disputes with the papacy in Rome.240 This
continued until the Spanish Habsburgs stripped the effective power and influence of that
body after the incorporation of Portugal within the monarchy in the late sixteenth century.

The most prominent of all the debates over Iberian imperium was the so-called
“Controversy of the Indies,” centered on Spain’s lawful title to the Americas. Throughout
the sixteenth century humanists writing in the celebratory tradition had frequently justified
Spanish sovereignty in America on religious and historical grounds. Oviedo, for instance,
cited the papal donation and, in an effort to provide a longer term historical basis for Spain’s
claim on the basis of first discovery, claimed that mythical sailors had reached the Caribbean
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Antilles from ancient pre-Roman Hispania.241 Gómara, commissioned by Hernán Cortés to
write his own, Historia general de las Indias, cited the more recent past in glorifying Spain’s
religious imperial mission and portrayed Spaniards’ efforts in the New World as a
continuation of those in the Old.242 They “began the conquest of the Indies having
completed that of the Moors,” he wrote, “because the Spaniards always warred against
infidels.”243 Gómara, like Oviedo, also invoked papal donation as a basis of legitimacy, and in
his recounting of the invasion of Mexico told of miraculous interventions by Spain’s patron
saint Santiago in the battles of Cintla and Tabasco to convey the sense that God had
preordained the “conquest.”244 The idea of willful translatio imperii of indigenous empires to
Spanish rule was another motif mobilized with increasing regularity to complement claims
based on papal donation and divine providence.245 Gómara, for instance, echoed Cortés in
describing the voluntary relinquishing of the Aztec throne by Montezuma in favor of
Charles V.246 In America itself, municipal and royal officials in the third quarter of the
sixteenth century also sought to substantiate Spain’s claim to lawful dominion in the Indies
by sponsoring early histories of the conquest. Francisco Cervantes de Salazar’s, Crónica de la
Nueva España, and Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa’s, Historia de los Incas, commissioned
respectively by the City of Mexico and the Viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo, both
supported Spain’s claim to legitimate dominion of the Amerindians, citing the tyranny and
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barbarity of the native rulers and the alleged original consent of those newly conquered
peoples.247
When tackled by theologians, however, the question of Spain’s title to the Indies
enjoyed a raised level of sophistication, and of polemic. In 1534, in a famous lecture at the
University of Salamanca, the eminent theologian, Domingo de Soto, when asking himself by
what right Spain held such title, answered flatly: “In truth, I do not know.”248 That same
year, Francisco de Vitoria, another leading theologian and colleague of De Soto’s at
Salamanca, forcefully denied the Pope’s authority in secular affairs. Although possessing
authority in the spiritual world, he argued, “the Pope is not civil or temporal master of the
whole world in the proper meaning of ‘dominion’ and ‘civil power,’” so the rights he
awarded Castile in the Inter cætera bull were null and void.249 He argued further that Castile’s
seizure of American territory was unlawful because the natives, as rational beings by nature,
had held it as legitimate owners. “Even if the Emperor [Charles V] were the lord of the
world,” which he was not, Vitoria asserted, “he could not on that account occupy the lands
of the barbarians, or depose their masters and set up new ones, or impose taxes on them.”250
Yet, despite his penetrating critique of the prevailing theories of Spain’s title to the
Americas, Vitoria did not categorically reject such a title. Drawing on theories from natural
law he argued that Spanish war against Native Americans and the seizure of their territory
would be considered just and legitimate if the natives’ had impeded Spaniards’ natural right
to travel, trade and preach the gospel in their lands. He also recognized that “Indian
247 Both circulated as manuscripts only throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Francisco
Cervantes de Salazar’s, Crónica de la Nueva España (Madrid: Hispanic Society of America, 1914), although written
in the 1560s or 1570s, was not published until the nineteenth century. Likewise, Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa’s,
Historia de los Incas (Barcelona: Miraguano, 2001), although completed and first read publicly in early 1572,
remained unpublished for centuries. See MacLachlan, Spain’s Empire in the New World, xii.
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aborigines could have come under the sway of the Spaniards through true and voluntary
election [choice],” or by a title of alliance or friendship.251 On this point, however, Vitoria
forcefully denounced as legal fiction the claims of Cortés, Pizarro and several humanists,
including López de Gómara, that the Aztec and Inca empires were transferred to Charles V
through wilfull acts of translatio imperii.
Melchor Cano, also a Dominican theologian and a student of Vitoria, took the
argument a step further. Although according to the law of nations, travelers and traders were
permitted free passage in foreign lands, the Spaniards had arrived to the New World as
neither, but instead as conquerors. He accepted Spanish claims based on the right to preach
and defend the innocent, but argued that these were not sufficient to confer property rights.
Therefore, as Anthony Pagden has explained, Cano stressed that even if the Spanish crown
could claim political sovereignty in America, it did not possess dominion over the land or
subsoil any more than it did in any of the monarchy’s constituent kingdoms in Europe, like
Naples or Aragon.252
Just one year after the early lectures of De Soto and Vitoria, however, the Franciscan
bishop of Michoacán in New Spain, Vasco de Quiroga, produced his treatise, Información en
Derecho, which addressed the question in remarkably similar terms but arrived at an altogether
distinct conclusion.253 Laying the groundwork for the pro-encomendero discourses that
Sepúlveda and Toribio de Motolinía would articulate in subsequent decades, Quiroga argued
that because Indians were not civilized, their polities were not legitimate and thus could not
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hold legal dominion over the land. When the Spaniards arrived in America, therefore,
regardless of whether they had arrived there initially as conquerors or as innocuous traders
and travelers, that land was, according to Quiroga, legally unoccupied and therefore justly
seized by Spain, the first civil polity to claim legitimate dominion there.
Even Las Casas, the sensational yet emiently influential critic of encomendero abuse, did
not categorically reject Spain’s right to rule the New World. He did warn that the crown
could lose its legitimate title to sovereignty should abuses persist. But his enduring,
underlying faith in the monarchy’s ability to curb settlers’ violent exploitation of the native
population ultimately served to legitimize Spanish royal authority in America.
The first three quarters of the sixteenth century saw the development of a range of
discourses aimed at celebrating and debating Iberian imperium. Despite fraught controversy
over particular issues, chronicles, natural and ethnographical histories, geographical, legal and
political treatises, and a range of visual iconography coalesced to define an increasingly
specific set of theories and practices to document discoveries, legitimate methods of
expansion and conquest, justify titles to sovereignty, and defend claims to territorial
dominion and occupation. The period also saw the consolidation of the idea of the Iberians
as the joint defenders of Christendom and the prime agents in the common mission of
spreading the gospel beyond Europe. Importantly, the frontiers for evangelization and for
the expansion of temporal imperial rule, while still vast, were no longer infinite or universal.
For the first time, the limits of the earth had been established and, having divided the globe
into two separate but complementary hemispheres of exploration and conquest, the Iberians
now set to the task of consolidating civil and ecclesiastical rule within their respective
dominions.
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Union

Alongside debates over the legality and morality of Iberian imperium, which
persisted well into the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the purely celebratory
discourse of empire continued to develop as well. This imperial celebration reached a new
level of sophistication and clarity when the Iberian crowns and their empires were united,
from 1580 to 1640, under the singular sovereignty of Philip II.254 This resulted both from the
fact that during those six decades Iberian explorers discovered numerous new territories and
peoples, bringing several under their rule, as well as from the heightened integration of the
two empires, a phenomenon reflected clearly in the writings and representations of a range
of Iberian authors and artists of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
Enthusiasm for Iberian imperium reached crescendo in the immediate wake of Iberian
union. Hardly a coincidence, two separate Spanish translations of Os Lusíadas were published
that same year, 1580.255 Camões’ work enjoyed rapid popularity among Spaniards as well,
many of which viewed it as a celebration not only of Portuguese, but of broader Iberian
accomplishments in extending Christendom.256
The famous 1583 medallion emblazoned with the phrase, Non Sufficit Orbis (“The
World is not Enough”), was another example of this imperial celebration.
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Figure 6
“Non Sufficit Orbis” Medallion, in Geoffrey Parker, The World is Not Enough: The Imperial
Vision of Phillip II of Spain (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2000): frontispiece
It memorialized the events of 1580, showing Philip “on one side and a globe surmounted by
a horse on the other [over the year, 1580], together with the boast—originally dedicated to
Alexander the Great—Non Sufficit Orbis (The World is Not Enough).”257 Such medals were
often minted to commemorate important events in the history of a kingdom or nation and
were generally not intended to be a medium of payment, meaning that their circulation
tended to be limited to the nobility and moneyed merchant elite.258 For Louis Marin, perhaps
more potent than any other visual or verbal-textual form, “the medal is perfect
representation.”259 Its imprint – the monarch’s effigy or emblem, and his name and title – is,
for him, not only a trace or sign, but “an index that gives to the marked object its own
potential, that makes of it an efficacious sign, and very precisely a power.”260 It is “a
representation-power in the primitive sense that—carrying in its matter (and not on its surface
Geoffrey Parker, The World is Not Enough: The Imperial Vision of Phillip II of Spain (Waco, Texas: Baylor
University Press, 2000), frontispiece.
258 The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 11 (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1913), 156.
259 Louis Marin, Portrait of the King, translated by Martha M. Houle (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis
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like layers of paint or traces of ink) by imprint, engraving, and inscription the mark of a
sovereign authority, indicating by that the legitimate presence of that authority and
authorizing that authority— […] it is in itself truth and law.”261
In addition to projecting a discourse of global power, the medal is unique among
contemporary representations of 1580 in that it contained no reference to religion and thus
ought not be misconstrued as promoting a “messianic” vision. Rather than referencing
religion, the medal’s prominent text was an adoption of Alexander the Great’s famous
shibboleth, Non Sufficit Orbis, which, since antiquity, defined the imperial quest for universal
government under a single ruler. Even if the medal did not see wide circulation, its
inscription did nonetheless become incorporated within the official heraldry of Philip II after
his accession to the Portuguese throne.262

Figure 7
Símbolos de España, edited by Faustino Menéndez Pidal y Navascués, Hugo O´Donnell, and
Begoña Lolo, (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1999): 94
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Philip’s official coat of arms now included the royal seals of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal –
representing the entire Iberian Peninsula – all above the motto, Non Sufficit Orbis.
Fused to the idea of expanding the reach of Christendom and of Habsburg territorial
sovereignty in Asia was a fixation on the access that the Portuguese empire would provide to
the exotic goods of the Orient. Considering the high prices fetched for such imports
throughout Europe, many considered East Asian spices and silks as comparable in value to
Spanish American silver. Juan de Silva waxed eloquent about these “precious riches […]
which provide splendor, health, authority and also [income] to the state treasury, these
stones and pearls, amber and other aromatic things, drugs and spices, and the other
curiosities brought from Persia and China.”263
Support for unification, however, did not emanate solely from the Iberian Peninsula.
In the early years of union, several colonial officials in Portuguese Asia also stressed the great
gains to be made through closer cooperation overseas. In 1584, the Portuguese Bishop of
Malacca, Dom João Ribeiro Gaio, presented a detailed plan stressing the ease with which a
joint Iberian force could conquer and become lords of all the lands from India to Japan.264
The following year, another Portuguese India official, Jorge de Lemos, echoed the militant
discourse of Castillo, Silva and Gaio in claiming “that the conquest of Atjeh [in present-day
Indonesia] would give the dual Iberian crown the economic resources for a war […] to
recover all Christian territory lost to the Muslims (including Jerusalem), and to overthrow the
Ottoman empire.”265 Regardless of their plausibility, these designs are central in highlighting
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the emergence of a militant imperialist discourse promising to elevate Spain to a level of
global hegemony the world had not yet known.
In a striking visual example of the persistence of the celebratory discourse on union
nearly four decades later, royal authorities commissioned the construction of a grand
monument in 1619, the “Arco de los orifices y lapidarios” (Arch of the Goldsmiths and
Stonecutters), to commemorate the arrival in Lisbon of Philip’s son – Philip III of Castile
(Philip II of Portugal).266

Figure 8
João Baptista Lavanha, “Arco de los orifices y lapidarios,” in
Viagem da catholica real magestade del Rey D. Filipe II (Madrid: Thomas Junti, 1622): 48a

“Arch of the Goldsmiths and Stonecutters,” or “Arco de los orifices y lapidarios,” in Spanish, in João
Baptista Lavanha, Viagem da catholica real magestade del Rey D. Filipe II (Madrid: Thomas Junti, 1622), 48a.
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In the Arch’s center, Philip was depicted standing before the same ceremonial brocade with
which he first entered the city in 1581.267 An elaborate representation of his royal elegance
and authority, Philip held the royal scepter in his left hand and, in his right, two bejeweled
crowns symbolizing the equality of the two kingdoms within his composite monarchy. Over
his left and right shoulders, respectively, were the Castilian and Portuguese royal arms,
suspended at equal height.
Beyond these more traditional representations of European dynastic authority,
references to the global dimensions of Iberian power abounded. Echoing the same laudatory
discourse Philip employed in his praise of the Lusitanian kingdom’s expansionary
achievements in his final plea to Cardinal Henry, Philip is depicted here as flanked to his
right by the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama, and, to his left, by Christopher Columbus.
More than simply recognizing their exploits in navigation and conquest, the Arch depicts
each explorer lifting a cloak from over the eyes of a native, an extraordinary visual reference
to the joint Iberian mission to spread civilization (and Catholicism) to benighted peoples
worldwide.
Moving appropriately upward, a last detail worth mentioning is the female
representation of Catholicism at the monument’s apex. Undergirding the similarly gendered
reference below, the woman is depicted in a flowing gown holding the Holy Grail in one
hand and, in the other, a human-size cross, while standing atop a globe supported in turn by
what appear to be ancient kings of Portugal and Castile. If the depictions below of the
explorers allude to the temporal, global dimensions of Iberian power, the monument’s apex
makes explicit reference to the spiritual, universal dimensions of that power. As in the earlier
discourse employed by Philip and his ministers, neither he nor the Iberian kings of antiquity
267
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are shown here to possess God-like qualities themselves, but rather, in a particularly
gendered portrayal, they are represented as the chief protectors and advocates of the true
faith in the secular world. Antonio Feros has made the subtle yet crucial distinction that even
discourses “that described the monarch as God’s representative on earth,” were interpreted
by many, “not as proof of the sacred nature of majesty but rather as proof that the king’s
legitimacy was based on his ability to protect the Church and his kingdoms.”268
The Arch’s imagery could hardly be more explicit as it elaborately combined all
central aspects of the Habsburg discourse on Iberian union that had emerged in the wake of
Sebastian’s death in August 1578. It represented a crystallization of four decades of
discursive posturing. When Philip III (Philip II of Portugal) entered Lisbon in 1619, it served
as a potent reminder, both to himself and the broader Lisbon public, that he had inherited
from his father the largest empire the world had ever known.

In Praise of Iberian Imperium

In addition to the discursive celebration around the promise of peninsular union
itself, Spanish and Portuguese authors throughout the Iberian world continued to pen the
chronicles, treatises and a range of other texts, which collectively reinforced notions of the
globality of Iberian power and expansion. In the case of Spain, the separation of the Holy
Roman Empire from the Spanish monarchy with the abdication of Charles V in 1556 gave
Spaniards the chance to define their own identity as a European power.269 Spain’s new ruler,
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Philip II, despite not inheriting the title of Emperor, nonetheless inherited what several
observers regarded as an unofficial empire, the gravitational center of which was not in
central Europe but extended across the Atlantic, uniting Spain and America. Proclaiming
Spain “an empire in itself,” Gregorio López Madera argued that the Spanish monarchy had
in effect eclipsed the nearly powerless Holy Roman Empire as the preeminent power in
Europe.270 And in a rhetorical nod to their vast American empire, he called the Spanish
monarchs, “Emperors of the New World,” a symbolic, not official title. The overseas
possessions became increasingly prominent in a variety of representations of Spanish
imperium, including those in Africa and Asia after Philip’s succession to the Portuguese
throne.
Although by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Iberian authors
increasingly embraced a new style of chronicle that lauded the exploits of their countrymen
beyond Europe, more traditional chronicles praising the character and deeds of the king
himself did persist. The 1586, De rebus Emmanuelis, Lusitaniae Regis, by the Portuguese
humanist and theologian Jerónimo Osório was one example of this persistence, and Philip II
showed a particular interest in his Lusitanian dominions by appointing a series of historians
to write chronicles of the kings of Portugal. Duarte Núñes de Lião’s, Primeira Parte das
Chronicas dos Reis de Portugal, which legitimated Philip’s actions in securing the Portuguese
throne, was one example, as was Bernardo de Brito’s, Monarchia Lusitana, although it was not
published until 1609, during the reign of Philip III.271
There are also several examples of this persistence of royal chronicling in Spain,
most prominent among them Prudencio de Sandoval’s, Historia de la vida y hechos del emperador
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Carlos V, published in 1614, and Luís Cabrera de Córdoba’s, Historia de Felipe II, published a
decade and a half later.272 If Osório’s 1586 chronicle was for the most part simply a Latin
translation of Damião de Góis’ earlier work on the reign of Manuel I, Cabrera de Córdoba’s
history of Philip II proved more innovative. The frontispiece introduced the work with a
visual representation, now common, reinforcing a sense of the ruler’s divine legitimacy.

Figure 9
Luís Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe II (Madrid: Luís Sánchez, 1619), frontispiece
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Philip II was represented, sword drawn, defending the holy faith, which was in turn
symbolized visually through female personification. As stated in the introduction, Cabrera
aimed to provide an exemplary history for prince Philip (the future Philip IV) to learn from
the behavior, methods, and policies of his grandfather.273 Interestingly for a book purporting
to examine the state of the world and of the Spanish monarchy when Philip II took power,
aside from brief discussions of the Pizarrista rebellion in Peru and the pacification of Chile,
the Indies remain virtually absent from this otherwise ambitious history of the reign of Philip
II.274
The Indies (both East and West) increasingly formed part of histories of Portugal
and the Spanish monarchy, and during the period of Iberian union a substantial number of
works appeared which recounted the action and presence of Iberians beyond Europe, or
surveyed the natural or ethnographic history of those distant lands. In the nearly two
centuries since Zurara’s pioneering chronicle on Portuguese navigation and slaving in coastal
Guinea, sailors, missionaries and adventurers under the Portuguese banner had charted and
explored much of the rest of the West and East African coasts, and in the roughly half
century from the 1590s to the 1640s Portuguese authors set to documenting those
“discoveries.” Filippo Pigafetta’s 1591, Relatione del reame di Congo, et delle circonvicine contrade,
although written in his native Italian, drew on the writings of Duarte Lopes and provided a
sweeping history of the native peoples, politics, and natural features of the region, as well as
of Portuguese crown and missionary efforts to spread commercial, political, and religious
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avoid reflecting on matters of the present day, the discovery and conquest of the Indies did not form part of
his grand narrative. For discussion of Mariana’s work, see Kagan, Clio and the Crown, 117-123.
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influence there.275 Works by André Álvares d’Almada and André Donelha, published in 1594
and 1625 respectively, provided natural and ethnographic histories of Cape Verde and Sierra
Leone.276 Domingos de Abreu e Brito published his, Sumário e Descrição do Reino de Angola, e do
Descobrimento da ilha de Loanda, e da Grandeza das Capitanias do Estado do Brasil, in 1592,
covering the broader Portuguese South Atlantic, and Antonio do Couto devoted his 1642
work to praising the success of the Portuguese missionary efforts Angola.277 In their separate
works on East Africa, from 1609 and 1633, João dos Santos and António Durão provided
detailed surveys of the missionary and military history of the Portuguese, especially around
the island of Mozambique and the Zambezi Valley, as well as of the cultural traditions of the
region’s native peoples.278
Already from the 1590s there appeared two more detailed descriptions on Brazil, by
Francisco Soares and the German-born mercenary and adventurer Hans Staden. The latter,
taken captive by the local Tupinambá people in São Vicente, served as an early intermediary
between those native peoples and the Portuguese before escaping and returning to Europe
in 1555.279 Ceylon and the Moluccas also received exclusive coverage, in the writings of

Filippo Pigafetta, Relatione del reame di Congo, et delle circonvicine contrade (Rome: Bartolomeo Grassi, 1591).
André Álvares d’Almada, Tradado breve dos rios de Guiné do Cabo-Verde (Porto, Typographia commercial
portuense, 1841 [1594]); and André Donelha, Descrição da Serra Leoa e dos rios de Guiné do Cabo Verde (Lisbon:
Junta de investigações do ultramar, 1977 [1625]).
277 Domingos de Abreu de Brito, Sumário e Descrição do Reino de Angola, e do Descobrimento da ilha de Loanda, e da
Grandeza das Capitanias do Estado do Brasil [1592], Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa (BNL), Manuscrito 294; and
Antonio do Couto, Gentio de Angola sufficientemente instruido nos mysterios de nossa sancta Fé (Lisbon: Domingos
Lopes, 1642).
278 João dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental e varia historia de cousas notaveis do Oriente (Évora: Convento de S. Domingos
de Évora, 1609); and António Durão, Cercos de Moçambique defendidos por Don Estevan de Atayde (Madrid: Por la
viuda de Alonso Martín de Balboa, 1633).
279 Francisco Soares, Coisas notáveis do Brasil (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1904), written
between 1590 and 1596; and Hans Staden, Americae tertia pars: memorabilem provinciae Brasiliae historiam continens
germanico primum sermone scriptam a Ioanne Stadio (Francofurti ad Moenum: De Bry, 1592). See also, Alida Metcalf,
Go-betweens and the colonization of Brazil, 1500-1600 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005).
275
276

125
Constantino de Sá Miranda and Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola.280 And China proved
another key site of interest, and not only among Portuguese writers, but also and indeed
especially among Spaniards. These histories of China focused on the cultural and political
history of the Chinese peoples themselves, reflecting a remarkable degree of respect on the
part of the European authors for the state of Chinese civilization and political and economic
organization. The histories also focused in large part on the (often exaggerated) efforts of
Jesuit missionaries in spreading the holy gospel throughout those sprawling territories,
frequently within the same volume.281 In his 1586, Historia de las cosas mas notables, ritos y
costumbres, del gran reyno dela China, for instance, the Spanish Augustinian, Juan González de
Mendoza, marveled at the vast imperium of China’s emperor and the absolute power he
held. González de Mendoza estimated the total number of tributaries in China at some 35
million and expressed a millenarian desire, encouraged by the Jesuits’ early if limited
successes, for “the reduction of the entire Kingdom of China to the Catholic Church,” and
to remove its inhabitants “from the tyranny of the Devil in which they are.”282
If territories across Portuguese Africa, Asia and Brazil received their fair treatment,
so too did specific ones in Spanish America. Late sixteenth and early seventeenth century
texts by Spanish and Native American historians and epic poets, including Bernardino de
Sahagún, Bernardo de Balbuena, Enrico Martínez, and Domingo Francisco de San Antón
280 Constantino de Sá Miranda’s 1624, Os olhos do rei. Desenhos e descrições portuguesas da Ilha de Ceilão (Lisbon:
Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 2001 [1624, 1638]; and
Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, Conquista de las islas Malucas (Madrid, Alonso Martín, 1609).
281 Juan Gónzalez de Mendoza, Historia de las cosas mas notables, ritos y costumbres, del gran reyno dela China …: Con un
itinerario del nuevo Mundo [del padre custadio Fray Martín Ignacio ... que paso ala China] (Barcelona: Joan Pablo
Manescal, 1586); Padre Duarte Sande and Padre Alessandro Valignano, Um tratado sobre o Reino da China (Macau,
1590); Francisco de Herrera Maldonado, Epitome Historial del Reyno de la China (Madrid: Tomás de Junta, 1620);
Pedro Morejón, Historia y relación de lo sucedido en los reinos de Iapon y China...desde 1615 hasta 1619 (Lisbon: Iuan
Rodríguez, 1621); Adriano de las Cortes, Viaje de la China (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1991 [1625]); and Álvaro
de Semedo, Imperio de la China i cultura evangelica en él, por los religiosos de la Compañia de IESVS (Madrid: por Iuan
Sánchez, a costa de Pedro Coello, 1642).
282 Juan Gónzalez de Mendoza, Historia de las cosas mas notables, ritos y costumbres, del gran reyno dela China …: Con un
itinerario del nuevo Mundo [del padre custadio Fray Martín Ignacio ... que paso ala China] (Barcelona: Joan Pablo
Manescal, 1586): at beginning, after prologue, before table of contents.
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Muñón Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin described in mellifluous prose (and rhyme) the
beauty and diversity of New Spain.283 Balbuena, as Serge Gruzinski has shown, presented
New Spain not simply as a dependent possession of the Spanish monarchy but as a dynamic
center in its own right, especially in a commercial sense, within an increasingly globalized
world.284 “With Peru, Maluco and with China, the Persian, the Scythian, the Moor, and
others farther and closer; with France, with Italy and its treasure, with Egypt, the great
Cairo,” wrote Balbuena, “with Spain, Germany, Barbary, Asia, Ethiopia, Africa, Guinea,
Brittany, Greece, Flanders and Turkey; [New Spain] trades with everyone.”285
Several other authors devoted their efforts to South America, either by documenting
for posterity Spanish military and spiritual conquests there, or by preserving knowledge of
the histories of the continent’s indigenous peoples. The Inca Garcilaso de la Vega achieved
both these objectives in his two-volume, Comentarios reales que tratan del origen de los yncas,
published in 1609 and 1617, respectively.286 In the first volume he examines Inca culture, and
in the second, the Spanish “conquest” of Peru. And although publishing the first two parts
of his three-part epic poem before the union of the Iberian crowns, Alonso de Ercilla
published the third and final part of his La Araucana – on Spain’s largely frustrated efforts to
conquer the autonomous native Mapuche people in southern Chile – in 1589.287 In this last
section of his work, Ercilla justified Spain’s “just war” against these “rebellious infidels” and,
in inserting stanzas on the victory at Lepanto and the “conquest” of Portugal, raised the
Bernardino de Sahagun’s 1585 Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España; also known as the Florentine Codex,
available at: <<https://www.wdl.org/en/item/10096/>>; Bernardo de Balbuena, Grandeza Mexicana (Mexico:
Melchior Ocharte, 1604); Enrico Martínez, Reportorio de los tiempos y historia natural desta Nueva España (Mexico
City: Enrico Martínez, 1606); and Domingo Francisco de San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin,
Las ocho relaciones y el memorial de Colhuacan (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, 2010 [16071637]).
284 Gruzinski, Les quatre parties du monde.
285 Bernardo de Balbuena, Grandeza Mexicana (Mexico: Melchior Ocharte, 1604), quoted in Gruzinski, Les quatre
parties du monde, 50.
286 Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Comentarios reales que tratan del origen de los yncas (Lisbon: Pedro Crasbeeck, 1609).
287 Alonso de Ercilla, La Araucana, tercera parte (Madrid: Pedro Madrigal, 1589).
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significance of Spanish efforts in this remote corner of South America to that of some of the
more famous campaigns in Europe and the Mediterranean, including against Spain’s prime
enemy of the era, the Ottoman Empire.288 In addition to the monumental works of Ercilla
and Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, we also have less known texts by authors like Alonso de
Ovalle on Jesuit evangelization in Chile, and Martín del Barco Centenera on the Spanish
military efforts to subjugate the native peoples and territories of the Río de la Plata.289

Alongside these histories of particular locales in the overseas colonial world, Iberian
authors also expanded on the approach fashioned earlier in the sixteenth century by
chroniclers like Oviedo and Barros, which surveyed the exploits of their countrymen across
the entirety of Portuguese “India” (including East Africa and places as far afield as Macao),
or of the broader Spanish Indies (which from the 1560s included the Philippines). More
importantly still, it was no coincidence that, during the union of Portugal and the Spanish
monarchy, Iberian authors also began writing histories of their empires on a planetary scale.
Although broad in their geographic frame, some of these works did have a specific
thematic focus. Those by Aleixo da Mota and António de Mariz Carneiro, focused on
navigational routes and techniques, for instance, or, in the case of António Bocarro, on
presenting a comprehensive view of the myriad fortresses and settlements that formed the
backbone of the Portuguese Estado da Índia.290 Other texts, including those of João de
Lucena, Luís de Guzmán, and Fernão Guerreiro and Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa, focused

Hernando Sánchez, Las indias en la monarquía católica, (1996), 100.
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Chile y de las missiones y ministerios que exercita en él la Compañía de Jesús (Roma: Francisco Caballo, 1646).
290 Aleixo da Mota, Roteiro da nauegação da careira [sic] da India, Mss. c.1621, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal;
António de Mariz Carneiro’s 1642, Regimento de pilotos, e roteiro das navegaçoens da India Oriental (Lisbon: Lourenço
de Anveres, 1642); António Bocarro and Pedro de Resende, Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e
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on the efforts of the Jesuits, or even more specifically that of their co-founder, Francis
Xavier, to spread the gospel throughout Asia.291 The works of Guzmán and Suárez de
Figueroa are particularly notable since, written by Spaniards on the history of the Jesuits in
Portuguese Asia, they demonstrate the globality of the Jesuit order and its mission in
extending beyond the limits of Iberian imperial sovereignty and thereby transcending the
boundaries of temporal empire. Again, it is no accident that such histories appeared during
the union of the Iberian crowns when, despite the legal and theoretical separation of the two
empires, their boundaries were increasingly blurred in practice.
There were also, however, a series of authors in the period, some under crown
commission, who presented more comprehensive histories of the commercial, spiritual and
military expansion of the Portuguese empire, either within certain pre-defined periods or
over the long term.292 Diogo do Couto, for instance, was tasked with continuing the Décadas
da Ásia, begun by his predecessor, João de Barros. Década Quinta da Ásia, published in 1612,
contains a revealing representation of Couto himself, plume in hand and sword in sheath, a
reference to his dual career as soldier and historian, and symbolizing, more subtly, the
inseparability of the pen and sword in the defense of Iberian imperium.

João de Lucena, História da Vida do padre Francisco Xavier do que Fizeram na Índia os Mais Religiosos da Companhia
de Jesus (Lisbon: Pedro Crasbeeck, 1600); Luís de Guzmán’s 1601, Historia de las missiones que han hecho los religiosos
de la Compania de Jesus [...] en la India oriental (Alcalá de Henares: La viuda de Juan Gracián, 1601); and Fernão
Guerreiro and Christóbal Suárez de Figueroa, Historia y relacion annual de las cosas que fizieram los padres de la
Companhia de Jesus por las partes de Oriente y obras en la propagacion del santo evangelio los años de 607 y 608 (Madrid:
Imprenta Real, 1609).
292 Diogo do Couto, Décadas da Ásia, 4-8 (Lisbon: Regia officina typografica, 1778-88 [1602-]); Antonio
Bocarro’s Década XIII da História da Índia (Lisbon: Typographia da Academia Real das Sciencias, 1876 [c.16251635]); and Manuel de Faria e Sousa’s, Asia portuguesa, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Officina de Henrique Valente de Oliveira,
1666), vol. 2 (Lisbon: Officina de Antonio Craesbeeck de Mello, 1674), and vol. 3 (Lisbon: officina de
Henrique Valente de Oliveira, 1675); and África portuguesa (Lisbon: Antonio Craesbeeck de Mello, 1681).
Although written earlier, most likely in the 1640s, both of Faria e Sousa’s works were published posthumously.
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Figure 10
Diogo do Couto, Década Quinta da Ásia (Lisbon: 1612)
In the epistle dedicated to his patron, the “Invictíssimo Monarch of Spain Don
Philip, King of Portugal,” Couto explained with great clarity his mission as author. “I desire
[…] more than anything,” he wrote, “the conservation of your own name,” and “to leave for
eternal memory the heroic deeds and works” of the Portuguese across Asia.293 He also
sought to substantiate the idea, already cultivated by earlier writers like Barros and Camões,
that the Portuguese (and Spanish) were heirs to the Greeks, Romans, and other great
polities, not only in terms of their temporal power, but also in their efforts to record their
achievements for posterity. The “glory of statues, and of […] coats-of-arms was passed later
by the Athenians into writing, because they saw that images and paintings were mute,” he
wrote. “From here the Romans and all other nations of the world understood, so desirous of
Diogo do Couto, Década Quarta da Ásia, Parte Primeira (Lisbon: Regia officina typografica, 1778 [1602]),
xxvii-xviii.
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perpetual fame,” that they ought to record history in writing. “Only our Portuguese lacked
this glory,” he continued, “the loss of which we are so much ashamed.” And “your
commanding me to bring the deeds [of the Portuguese] to light, [an act] which seems to
imitate God, resuscitates the dead and brings them to life.”294
Two of Manuel de Faria e Sousa’s most famous works, Asia Portuguesa and África
Portuguesa, although published posthumously several decades later, appear to have been
written – or at least completed – in the 1640s, in the immediate wake of the separation of
Portugal from the Spanish monarchy.295 Despite the circumstances, Sousa continued to
display his great respect for Spain, composing these two works (among others) in Castilian.
In the third of his three-volume work, Asia Portuguesa, Sousa reflected with pride on the
global dimensions of Portuguese sovereignty in its own right:
Fortune […] found it necessary to increase their Dominions by adding to
them at one time great part of Mauritania; then a greater part of Ethiopia; at
another time that vast extent of Asia, and lastly that not inconsiderable
Region of America, called Brazil or New Lusitania. Having conquered the
West, they passed to the South, and having subdued this they went on to the
East. […] At length these Great [Portuguese] Spirits spread themselves over
all the Land and Seas, and to make the whole circumference of them their
bounds, overrunning that vast distance that is from the Coasts of Spain to
those of China, and filling both the Hemispheres with the Glory of their
Name.296
Evoking the now famous trope of the empire on which the sun never set, Sousa proclaimed
in the preface that the Portuguese “followed the Sun from its Setting to its Rising, and
equaled its Course.”297 More importantly, in an attempt to justify the acquisition of Portugal’s
vast overseas imperium, he explained that the Portuguese considered it “a greater happiness
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to gain voluntary Friends, than to make forced Slaves. “By express Orders from our Kings,”
he wrote, the Portuguese “endeavored to heap great Riches, extend our Dominions, and
acquire Glory rather with Politick Reason than Odious Violence.”298 Yet, beyond simply
praising Portuguese achievements, in his examination of the period of Iberian union from
1580 to 1640, Sousa marveled at what he saw as the unmistakably global dominion of Philip
II. “The Kingdom of Portugal,” wrote Sousa in his description of the process of unification,
“now bringing that Precious Scepter from the East [a reference to Portugal’s Asian
imperium], puts it into the Hands of Philip in Spain, who had the Fortune to be the great
Ocean to which run all the great […] and small Rivers of so many Empires, Kingdoms, and
Sovereignties, spread over the whole Face of the Terrestrial Globe.”299
The decade or so around the turn of the seventeenth century also saw the
publication of a series of monumental histories of Spain’s expansion, which intended to
demonstrate the global dimensions of Spanish imperium as well as to justify it. Gregorio
López Madera, for instance, in his 1597, Excelencias de la monarquia y reyno de España, was
innovative in presenting an integrated history of Spanish expansion both in Europe and
overseas. Arguing that Spain constituted an “empire in itself,” he proclaimed that, “one
cannot compare the Kings of Spain to any others in the world” given the fact that, in
addition to their European dominions, as “Emperors of the New World [a rhetorical not
official title], they possess more lands and kingdoms than any past monarchs.”300 Not
satisfied with portraying the Spanish simply as heirs to the Romans or any other great empire
of antiquity, for that matter, López Madera insisted that Spain was without doubt the most
powerful in history. “The Romans were never lords of all the world,” he wrote. It was no
Ibid.
Ibid.
300 Gregorio López Madera, Excelencias de la monarquia y reyno de España (Valladolid: Diego Fernández de
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more than vanity and arrogance, he decried, “with which the Persians attributed lordship to
their Kings, the Greeks to their Princes, the Tartars and Turks to their lords, and the
Romans principally to their Emperors.”301 Moreover, and in direct counter to what he
identified as “the calumny of Jean Bodin, who affirms that our Kings are not Sovereign
Princes,” López Madera cited the gospel alongside theories of Roman jurists and political
philosophers, Ulpian and Cicero, to insist that as “kings,” “majesties,” and “sovereign lords”
the Spanish rulers were “Gods on earth,” or at least his “Vicars,” and that their power was
“absolute,” “supreme,” and “superior” to all others “in the temporal.”302 He also noted, in an
attempt to legitimize such sovereignty, that the kings were “not absolute to destroy justice,
but rather to govern according to it.”303
Over the first decade of the seventeenth century, Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas
and Giovanni Botero each published multi-volume works, which together represented the
culmination of nearly a century of chronicle writing on Iberian imperium. Both, although
presented as world histories and being indeed global in their geographic scope, nonetheless
placed Spain, very intentionally, at front and center. Herrera’s appointment as royal
chronicler marked the true apex of the monarchy’s effort to shape and control its historical
image, and in his celebration of Spanish greatness, which then included all of Portugal’s
extended possessions, he emphasized the significance of the overseas imperium. Between
1601 and 1612, Herrera, who had gained notoriety in Spain for his translation of Botero’s,
Della ragion di Stato, published a three-volume global history of the Spanish monarchy
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entitled, the Historia general del mundo del tiempo del Rey Felipe II, el prudente.304 Without naming
these authors specifically, Herrera wrote that one of his primary goals was to counter the
writings of “foreign historians,” who treat “the Spaniards only half-heartedly, highlighting
their failures,” and he opened the work with a comprehensive list of officials and
institutions, civil and ecclesiastical, that the crown had established in the Indies, and
highlighted its dual commitment to the temporal and spiritual welfare of Amerindians
(despite acknowledging encomenderos’ early abuses) in order to impress upon readers the
monarchy’s success in promoting good governance there as well as the fundamental morality
and legality of its title to sovereignty in the New World.305
In addition, Herrera echoed López Madera in arguing for Spain’s global
preeminence. Spain’s power was, he asserted, “the greatest any Prince ever had in the
world.”306 And he stressed the providential nature of this preeminence, noting that, “for
some great mystery,” “God had given the Indies to the Kings of Castile before others.”307
Equally notable, Herrera set his history of the reign of Philip II across a broad geographical
canvas and examined in meticulous (if occasionally exaggerated) detail not only Spanish
conquests and setbacks in Chile and the Philippines, but also the Portuguese king Sebastian’s
ill-fated invasion of Morocco, the altogether unconnected war between the Polish and
Muscovites, as well as that between the Persians and Turks. Herrera’s was a truly global
history, remarkable for its time in that sense, and in it, Spain remained the central
protagonist.
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177-178.
306 Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia general del mundo, vol. 1, ch. 8, 476.
307 Ibid.
304

134
Botero, an Italian priest and political philosopher perhaps most famous for his 1589
treatise, Della ragion di Stato, also composed an influential work of history, his Relaciones
universales del mundo, which appeared in 1603.308 The latter work was foundational as the first
integrated history of Spanish and Portuguese expansion on a global scale. Within this single
text, Botero traced the parallel expansions of the two Iberian nations across Africa, Asia, and
the Americas. While also providing detailed discussions of indigenous empires and societies
throughout the non-European world, including those of China and East Africa, Botero was
mainly interested in celebrating and explaining the rise of Iberian power globally. In praising
the grandeur of Spain’s imperium at that moment, he stressed the importance of the
incorporation of Portugal and its possessions in augmenting Spanish hegemony. “Since the
world was created until today there has never been a larger Empire nor Monarchy than that
which God our Lord has given to the Catholic King [Philip III], principally after the union
of the Kingdom of Portugal to the Crown of Castile.” According to Botero, Spain’s
unprecedented power was demonstrated by the fact that “it embraces extremely wide
provinces in Europe, extremely noble states of Africa, and extremely wealthy Kingdoms in
Asia, in addition to being lord without any contradiction in the New World.”309 He then
went on to list the myriad polities and territories the Iberians claimed throughout these
regions. But Botero did more than simply proclaim Spain as the largest monarchy in history
by virtue of its seemingly countless possessions throughout the four parts of the world. He
also described Spanish squadrons as “invincible,” and attributed Castilians’ military success
to the protection of their patron saint, Santiago, reinforcing the idea of Spanish imperium as

308 Giovanni Botero, Relaciones universales del mundo (Valladolid: Diego Fernández de Cordova, 1603). A first
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divinely ordained, and providing it therefore with, as he saw it, an indisputable
justification.310
By the second quarter of the seventeenth century, the Iberian discourse of empire
had reached such an extent in its volume and sophistication that the renowned Spanish
American jurist and historian, Antonio de León Pinelo, produced a comprehensive
bibliography of historical, geographical, and nautical works on the “Oriental” and
“Occidental” Indies of Portugal and Spain. In his, Epitome de la Biblioteca Oriental i Occidental,
Nautica i Geographica, published in 1629, Pinelo compiled a list of hundreds of published and
unpublished works, several of which have not survived to the present day, proof that the
production of and interest in texts on the non-European world was even more substantial
than the existing record suggests.311 He organized his work by region and theme, with
separate sections on works devoted to “general histories” of the east and west Indies, to the
Indians themselves, to their conversion, to collections of laws, political and moraltheological treatises, to surveys of particular regions of the Iberian colonial world including
New Spain, East Asia, Peru, Chile, and the Río de la Plata, among other places.
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Figure 11
Antonio de León Pinelo, Epitome de la Biblioteca Oriental i Occidental, Nautica i Geographica
(Madrid: 1629), frontispiece
Pinelo, although born in Spanish Peru, was of Portuguese judeo-converso descent, and
maintained an integrated view of Iberia’s global imperium. The frontispiece engraving made
this abundantly clear, containing human representations of the East and West Indies,
collectively termed “India Ibérica,” over smaller such symbols of “Geography” and
“Navigation” – both sciences integral to Iberia’s overseas conquests and discoveries – the
former holding a geographer’s geometry set-square over a globe, and the latter a navigator’s
compass above a celestial sphere.
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Maturation of the Debate

By the turn of the seventeenth century, the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588,
the ongoing Dutch Revolt, and increasing challenges from northern European competitors
to Iberian claims beyond Europe combined with mounting economic troubles in the
peninsula to provoke serious internal reflections on the state of the monarchy. At the same
time as the crisis produced a heightened sense of self-doubt and calls for reform, however, it
also compelled many Iberian authors to take up the pen in defense of their empire and its
claims to sovereignty beyond Europe. The debates that took place during the period of
Iberian union were more than simply a continuation of those begun the previous century. In
many ways they represented a crystallization of those earlier discussions. Iberian authors
continued to debate key issues of conscience including slavery, conversion, monopolies on
commerce and navigation, and the subjugation of non-European peoples and the legal title
to their ancestral lands. And as they did so they built upon, synthesized, and to a certain
degree resolved several of the main controversies that had preoccupied their sixteenth
century predecessors.
Some authors, like Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, continued to promote the
aggressive, Aristotelian arguments of Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. Machuca justified Spanish
domination of Amerindian peoples – and implicitly of their territories too – by what he
regarded as their condition as sub-humans, as “brute animals.”312 He lauded the superiority
and virtue of Spanish culture and conquest, blamed Amerindians’ “aggressions” and
“betrayals” for their ultimate subjugation, and denounced “the discourse” of Las Casas in

312 Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, The Indian Militia and Description of the Indies, eds. Kris Lane and translated by
Timothy F. Johnson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 247. Originally published as, Milicia y
descripción de las Indias (Madrid: Pedro Madrigal, 1599).
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particular for fueling anti-Spanish rhetoric throughout Europe, which described “the Indies
with various forms of cruelties, citing the Bishop of Chiapa[s].”313

Figure 12
Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, Milicia y descripción de las Indias
(Madrid: Pedro Madrigal, 1599), frontispiece
On the frontispiece of his work, Machuca portrayed Philip II with one hand on his sword,
and the other with a compass atop a globe, with the phrase, “To the sword and the compass,
More and more and more and more.” This combined montage of image and text
represented the relation between discovery and conquest, between arms and the science of
navigation and exploration, as well as Spain’s insatiable ambition for further expansion.
Other authors, however, although equally effusive in their praise of Spanish
imperium, were less interested in denigrating the nature and condition of indigenous
peoples. Tomás Cerdán de Tallada and Tomasso Campanella, for instance, in addition to
313
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lauding and legitimizing Spain’s imperial greatness, also offered strategies for its conservation
in the face of mounting threats from northern Europe. In his 1604, Veriloquium en reglas de
estado, the Valencian jurist, Cerdán de Tallada, explained how, guided by the precepts of
“divine, natural, canonical, civil law, and the laws of Castile,” Philip III could set about
ensuring the “conservation […] and increase of the Royal State,” and the “tranquility of
Spain and […] the rest of Christianity.”314 Among the series of general strategies Cerdán de
Tallada proposed was to enhance the power of viceroys and limit that of titled lords.315 The
latter approach was intended to avoid the potential that powerful elites might “disturb the
authority, and greatness of the Royal dignity, or put the said State […] in turmoil.” Cerdán
pointed to “the case in Portugal of don Antonio,” the Prior of Crato, who had resisted
Philip II’s claim to the Portuguese throne in 1580. He might also have cited the New World
revolts of encomenderos who, while not officially titled for the most part, did nonetheless amass
sufficient power to oppose and occasionally reverse royal decree. All this was aimed at
reinforcing “the authority and jurisdiction” of the king, and ensuring that he remain
“absolute and powerful over his vassals, without exception.”316
Perhaps the most famous of these treatises was, De Monarchia Hispanica: Discursus, by
the Calabrese Dominican theologian and political philosopher, Tommasso Campanella.317
Campanella opened his tour de force by referring to Spain as the “Universal Monarchy of
the World, […] having passed through the hands of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Greeks
and Romans.”318 In justifying his use of the term, “Universal,” Campanella cited “the

Tomás Cerdán de Tallada, Veriloquium en reglas de estado (Valencia: Juan Chrysostomo Garriz, 1604).
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Discovery of the New World,” and emphasized in particular the significance of “the joining
of the Kingdom of Portugal [and its possessions] to Spain, all of which rendered the
[Spanish] Monarchy both Illustrious and Admirable, and also […] made Her Lady of the
Seas.”319 Drawing a subtle if no less significant distinction, however, between the universality
of Spanish power in an abstract, rhetorical sense and its still incomplete reach in practical
terms, he explained that “the King of Spain might grow more Powerful yet, and might attain
to the Dominion of the Whole World, if he would but endeavor in the Overthrow of the
Turkish Empire; as Alexander […] did of the Persian, and the Romans of the
Carthaginian.”320
In addition to defeating the Ottomans, and after defining the fundamental
prerequisite that the Spanish king declare his dependence on the ultimate authority of the
Pope, Campanella laid out a series of ten guiding principles to help Spain become “the
Empire of the whole World.”321 First, the king must remain virtuous and prudent. Second,
his laws must remain fair and just. Third, councilors must be wise. Fourth, officers of the
state must promote justice. Fifth, the Barons [nobles] must be obedient. Sixth, soldiers and
commanders must be many and disciplined. Seventh, the treasury must remain full. Eighth,
the People must maintain a mutual love among themselves and toward their king. Ninth,
preachers must promote obedience to the king in their sermons. Tenth, the monarchy’s
constituent kingdoms must remain in mutual accord, and its neighbors in discord. According
to Campanella, “the present Disagreement among the Enemies of Spain, and [the king’s]
Power at Sea all over the World [made possible by the union with Portugal], have rendered

translation, see: Thomas Campanella, an Italian friar and second Machiavel, his advice to the King of Spain for attaining the
universal monarchy of the world, edited by Edmund Chilmead (London: Philemon Stephens, 1660).
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141
very feasible the attempt not only of maintaining, but of enlarging, this so great a
Monarchy.”322
Anticipating the Count-Duke of Olivares’ suggested reforms by some two decades,
Campanella also urged further Spanish crown control over Portuguese realms, a shift in
policy that would clearly violate the terms agreed upon at the Cortes of Tomar. “Over such
Countries as have been conquered by Portugals,” he wrote, including those overseas, there
should be placed Spanish Governors.” Thus uniting the two Kingdoms the more, […] the
Kingdom will be the more happily and the more safely administered.”323 Outlining a truly
integrated, global approach to maritime defense, Campanella advocated for a more robust
navy to protect Iberian shipping and promote commerce between Spain and America, as
well as to enforce Portugal’s monopoly on navigation and trade throughout maritime Africa
and Asia.324 Finally, he also suggested a multipronged approach to reinforcing Spain’s
sovereign rule over the peoples and territories of the New World as well. This consisted of
curbing the rise of a settler elite, of maintaining checks and balances between viceroys and
captains, of promoting occupation of the land and the expansion of agriculture, and of
erecting fortifications in all harbors and at the mouths of rivers.325

In addition to increasing concerns about the monarchy’s conservation, the period of
Iberian union also saw important developments in debates over issues of conscience,
including African slavery. Interestingly, despite clear interest among Spaniards in the subject,
no Portuguese author devoted a theological or legal treatise specifically to the issue of
Ibid. ch. 8.
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African slavery until the eighteenth century.326 In a section of his wide-ranging treatise,
Tractatus de iustitia et de jure, the Spanish Jesuit, Luis de Molina, echoed Oliveira, Mercado and
Albornoz in his critiques of the unjust manner by which the Portuguese acquired slaves in
West Africa.327 Molina, the famous defender of human liberty who had spent two decades as
professor at the Portuguese universities of Coimbra and Évora, censured Portugal’s royal
Mesa da Consciência for what he saw as its moral laxity on the issue of slavery. Like Oliveira,
he denounced the widely held view, first advanced by Zurara, that regardless of the legality
of their initial procurement, Africans’ enslavement was ultimately justified by their
conversion.328 And he chastised earlier Portuguese kings for failing to convoke debates on
African slavery similar to those facilitated by Spanish rulers around the treatment of
Amerindians.329
Alonso de Sandoval, for his part, also a Spanish Jesuit, despite reflecting on the
diverse arguments of Molina, Mercado, José de Acosta, and Juan de Solórzano Pereira, and
despite recognizing the slaves’ condition as “miserable,” never quite rejected the morality or
legality of African – or any other form of – slavery outright. On the contrary, his De
instauranda Aethiopum salute contains detailed chapters on the ancient origins of the institution
and its justifications in the Bible and in natural law. “There is no doubt that in Christian
Republics slaves are permitted,” he wrote. “What should be attempted, however, is to treat
them with good government, [and to ensure] that their number does not grow too large.”
This concern with limiting the population of slaves in society was not so much due to moral
concerns but rather to pragmatic ones, in order to prevent their uprising, “as happened to
A. J. R. Russell-Wood, “Iberian Expansion and the Issue of Black Slavery: Changing Portuguese Attitudes,
1440-1770,” American Historical Review 83, no. 1 (February 1978): 16-42.
327 Luis de Molina’s, Tractatus de iustitia et de jure, was published in six volumes from 1593 to 1609: Cuenca 1593
(vol. 1), Cuenca 1597 (vol. 2), Cuenca 1600 (vol. 3), Amberes 1609 (vols. 4, 5, and 6). See, António Manuel
Hespanha, “Luís de Molina e a escravização dos negros,” Análise Social 35, no. 157 (2001): 937-960.
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329 Russell-Wood, “Iberian Expansion and the Issue of Black Slavery,” 35.
326

143
the Romans […] under the dominion of Spartacus.”330 Sandoval did nonetheless agree with
Molina, quoting him directly, on the need to improve methods of ascertaining the true
manner in which Portuguese merchants obtained captives on the African coast. This was in
order to establish the status of those individuals as free or enslaved.331 His prime motive
behind the work, however, was “to ignite the fire in the hearts of the Ministers of the
Church so that they communicate” to slaves the holy gospel, and thereby to ameliorate
slaves’ condition, especially in the afterlife.332

Alongside the debate over slavery, the most intense controversy surrounding
Portuguese imperium in particular concerned the issue of monopolies on trade and
navigation, broadly speaking. On the one hand this consisted of internal Iberian debates over
commercial monopolies, free trade, and the economic integration of the Portuguese and
Spanish empires. On the other hand, although not unconnected, it consisted of the wellpublicized international dispute between defenders of mare clausum and those advocating
freedom of the seas. These questions were most hotly debated during the period of Iberian
union, and were in large part provoked by the rise of naval and maritime commercial
competition from the Dutch, French, and English.
Perhaps the most emblematic figure in public discussions over the state of the
Iberian imperial economy and its future was Duarte Gomes Solis. After an early career as a
Alonso de Sandoval, Tomo I. De instauranda Aethiopum salute. Historia de Aethiopa, naturaleza, policia sagrada y
profana, costumbres, ritos y cathechismo evangelico de todos los Aethiopes conque se restaura la salud de sus almas.Dividida en dos
tomos: illustrados de nuevo en esta segunda impresion con cosas curiosas y Indice muy copioso por el P. Alonso de Sandoval, de la
Compañia de Jesus, natural de Toledo (Madrid: Alonso de Paredes, 1647): book 1, ch. 27, 118. A first version of this
work was published in 1627 as, De instauranda Aethiopum salute: Naturaleza, policia sagrada i profana, costumbres i ritos,
disciplina i catechismo evangelico de todos etiopes (Seville: Francisco de Lira, 1627). The work has been frequently
translated and reprinted into Spanish and English with the inadequate title, Un tratado sobre la esclavitud, and,
Treatise on Slavery.
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332 Sandoval, Tomo I. De instauranda Aethiopum salute, from the penultimate paragraph in the Note to Reader.
330

144
merchant in Portuguese India and later as royal administrator there of the pepper trade (an
important crown monopoly), Solis subsequently relocated to Madrid where he began a new
career as an arbitrista in the early seventeenth century.333 Considered a pioneering theorist of
mercantilism, his writings cannot be dissociated from those of his reformist predecessors
and contemporaries, including, for example, more widely known figures like the Spaniards
Martín de Azpilcueta and Sancho de Moncada.334 Solis, however, who had spent a significant
amount of time in Asia and Africa, distinguished himself by presenting a truly global plan for
economic reform that encompassed both the Spanish and Portuguese empires and which
aimed, by extension, to rejuvenate the peninsular economy as well. Writing in Spanish, the
Lisbon-born Solis directed his works at the king and his prime minister, the Count-Duke of
Olivares, and demonstrated his erudition through numerous references to the great
chroniclers of Portuguese expansion, like João de Barros and Damião de Góis, as well to
Roman and Greek authors of antiquity, including Cicero, Aristotle, Plato, and Tacitus.335
Arguing that, as a major oceanic port, Lisbon was better situated than Madrid for the
management of the two empires, he advocated the transfer of the royal court there.
Regarding the Portuguese empire in Asia in particular, he urged royal authorities to focus
less on territorial dominion, conquest and the costly maintenance of forts, and to
concentrate instead on control of the sea, which would, in turn, more effectively protect
Portuguese maritime commerce against increasing threats from northern European corsairs
and chartered companies.336 In terms of global imperial commerce, he urged the king to

333 Nathan Wachtel, “The ‘Marrano’ Mercantilist Theory of Duarte Gomes Solis,” Jewish Quarterly Review 101,
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Compañía de la India oriental (dedicated to the Count-Duke of Olivares) (1628). There is no mentioned publisher
of Solis’ Discursos, nor publisher or publication place of his Alegación.
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prohibit the export of silver from Mexico to China via the Philippines for two inter-related
reasons.337 First, according to Solis, the plan would ensure that more silver flow back to
Spain itself and therefore increase Castile’s royal coffers.338 Second, it would limit the adverse
effects that Spain’s increasing share of the China trade had on the economic health of the
Portuguese Estado da Índia, which was increasingly threatened by the rise of northern
European competition as well.339 Finally, in a bold, pioneering critique of the purity of blood
statutes, Solis lauded the contributions of both New Christians and Jews to Portugal’s rise as
a global imperial power, and argued as well that the distinction between New and Old
Christians should be abolished since the former proved so fundamental to the Portuguese
imperial economy in particular.340
In addition to these internal discussions over the present and future state of the
monarchy, Iberian authors were also increasingly compelled to confront the challenges of
outsiders. In response to northern European threats to Spanish and Portuguese maritime
dominion beyond Europe, the Spanish jurist Juan de Hevia Bolaños, composed his Curia
Filípica, which, although less known today, was reprinted numerous times in the seventeenth,
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Drawing on the theories of Vázquez de Menchaca,
Bolaños acknowledged that “the use of the Sea is a natural right and is common to all the
world, and as such everyone can use it, fishing, sailing, and making use in every other
way.”341 For Bolaños, however, common use of the sea could be restricted by the first who
occupies it. That first occupier, he wrote, is considered in quasi-possession of it, according to
Ibid. 41v.
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natural law and the law of nations. Moreover, “although navigation cannot be prohibited by
any private person, it can be prohibited by the Prince.”342 In fact, “the Prince has the
obligation to defend the Sea from corsairs that infest it, both within his district and on its
edges, and outside it, by reason of the royal rights he holds.”343 Finally, in defense of Iberian
claims to territorial sovereignty, Bolaños proclaimed that any land within that sea “belongs
to the first who populates it.”344 And in reiterating the validity of the papal donation, the
original justification of Iberian imperium beyond Europe, he explained that “the Catholic
Kings of Spain” held “the dominion of that territory” since it was “included in the
concession made by the high Pontiff Alexander VI.”345
More famously, in 1625, the Portuguese jurist Seraphim de Freitas published his, De
iusto imperio lusitanorum Asiatico, in direct response to Hugo Grotius’ penetrating critique of
Portugal’s monopoly on maritime trade and navigation in Asia.346 Grotius, in his famous,
Mare Liberum, made copious use of the theories of sixteenth century Spanish theologians,
including Vitoria and Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca.347 Following Vázquez, Grotius
argued that property rights are acquired by prescription, or in other words, by sustained
occupation over time. But in a direct critique of Iberian claims to dominion over the sea, he
contended that acts of navigation did not constitute occupation, writing famously that, “a
ship sailing over the sea no more leaves behind itself a legal right than it leaves a permanent
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track.”348 Grotius also denied the validity of the Papal donation, arguing that the Pope was
not temporal lord of the whole world. And he claimed, moreover, that even if the donation
were valid, the Portuguese had failed to confirm that title through de facto possession.
Countering Grotius point by point, Freitas too drew heavily on the arguments of
Vitoria and Vázquez de Menchaca, as well as on those of Luis de Molina. Regardless of their
fundamental disagreement over the validity of the papal donation, Freitas argued that
Portugal had indeed fulfilled the requirements for exclusive dominion of the sea.349 Not only
were the Portuguese the first to open the maritime route to Asia, he wrote, but they had
maintained control of that route and its commerce for over a century, which is to say,
through cumulative prescription.350 If the 1417 papal grant of Martin V marked the
beginning of that process, wrote Freitas, the 1493 Inter cætera bull and the voyages of
“discovery” of Bartolomeu Dias and Vasco da Gama represented its confirmation and
maturation.351
While Freitas’ treatise represented the most forceful, sophisticated response to the
legal-theoretical challenge to Iberian dominion of the sea, other authors, including Spanish
ones, lent further support to his argument. For instance, just four years later, Juan de
Solórzano Pereira completed a wide-ranging juridical treatise, which addressed, among other
topics, Portugal’s claims to maritime dominion in Asia. Solórzano, in the first of his twovolume, De Indiarum Jure, affirmed several points set out four years earlier by Freitas.352
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Solórzano argued that, regardless of the validity of the Inter cætera bulls of donation,
Portugal’s proven, long-term occupation of lands and seas in the East meant that, according
to the legal requirements for prescription, it could claim legitimate territorial and maritime
dominion across its Asian imperium.

If the issues of slavery and monopolies on trade and navigation dominated debates
over Portuguese imperium, the Castilian crown’s rights to dominion in the Indies proved the
most intense in the Spanish case. As for the question of maritime monopoly and dominion,
although a range of Spanish theologians, jurists and humanists continued to discuss Spain’s
American imperium, they came into increasing agreement about its basic legitimacy. By the
late sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century the monarchy and its advocates drew
upon a diversified range of arguments in support of Spain’s empire, including the papal bulls,
the voluntary vassalage of native peoples, the right of just conquest, and the right to occupy
unclaimed or uncultivated lands.353
In his, Monarquía de España – completed in the early seventeenth century but
circulating in manuscript only until its first publication 1770-71 – Pedro Salazar Mendoza
began by extolling the power of the “Catholic King” as “the largest ever seen, that the world
has ever had since its creation,” and proclaimed its “Empire” to be “more extended and
large than all the Universal Monarchies” of antiquity, including that of the Assyrians,
Chaldeans, Persians, Greeks and Romans.354 The sun “is always shining without losing sight
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of [the monarchy’s] Lordships,” he wrote, and he described its total dominion in more
precise terms as “twenty times larger than was the Roman.”355 More than simply describing
the unprecedented reach of Spanish imperium, Salazar also aimed to justify the bases of the
titles by which both the Spanish and Portuguese held their overseas imperium. As for the
Portuguese, he devoted a chapter precisely to the bases upon which “the King [of Portugal]
titles himself ‘Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia
and India’,” which was itself, Salazar notes, “an imitation of that which his predecessor, King
John [the third] titled himself, ‘Lord of Guinea’.”356 “The title of ‘Conquest’,” he wrote,
corresponded to “the stone markers [padrões] and forts they had on the Coast; [and] that of
‘Navigation’ to the unknown Seas that they made known” and over which “He [the King]
became such owner […] that neither the Gentiles nor the Moors dared to navigate them
without his safe-conduct.”357 He further argued that the Common Law principle of the sea as
common to everyone applied only to Europe, and that “the Gentiles and Moors for their
infidelity cannot take advantage of it.”358 On the dominion over India itself, Salazar claimed
that the Portuguese King held it undisputedly through the right of first occupation, since
“neither by inheritance, nor by conquest, did the property of the Province belong to any
one.”359 Portugal’s dominion in India must be respected not only by “Gentiles and Moors”
but also by any persons who recognize the “Holy Catholic Church” or govern “themselves
by its political laws.”360 Finally, the title of ‘Commerce,’ wrote Salazar, derived from the fact
that Portuguese armadas returned “loaded from those parts of all the things the land
produces,” mentioning “Goa, Ormuz, Malacca, and other [places],” where they treat “the
Ibid. xxvi.
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natives as […] vassals of a Lord; paying the King duties on the entry and exit from those
ports,” on the merchandise traded, and on the contracts agreed upon with “the Kings and
Lords” of those “provinces.”361 “This way of doing business,” he noted, “is maintained with
friendly and tributary Kings, like those of Cananor, Cochin, Ceylon, and others.”362
On Spain’s right to sovereignty in the “West Indies” Salazar cited the arguments of a
range of theologians, jurists, and other authors, including Francisco de Vitoria, Gregorio
López Madera, Alonso de Castro, and Juan Mayor. He also cited the Inter cætera bull of Pope
Alexander VI, which entrusted to the “Spaniards the reduction of the idolatry [of the
Amerindians],” and prohibited it “to any other Nation,” this having come, Salazar Mendoza
did not fail to note, “after the resistance of the Princes and Lords of this New World.”363
Synthesizing these diverse arguments, he described the war against “rebellious Indians” in
particular as “very just,” since Spaniards waged it “in favor of the oppressed Indians,” those
“that were already members of the Church, friends and companions of the Spaniards.” For
the injury that these “rebellious Indians” committed, Spaniards were fully justified in their
efforts to “occupy those lands and Provinces, and make themselves Lords of them, altering
the government; […] maintaining in everything the laws and conditions of just war, as the
Kings have always maintained.”364
Placing particular emphasis on the arguments of Vitoria and citing various precepts
of natural law and the law of nations, Salazar Mendoza justified the Spanish conquest of
America based on the failure of certain Amerindian groups to reciprocate Spaniards’
overtures of companionship and friendship, to have commerce, trade, and communication
with them, to allow them to pass freely through their lands, and to provide the Spaniards
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“hospitality with good courtesy” as “messengers and ambassadors of Kings.”365 Moreover,
he cited the voluntary cession of sovereignty on the part of certain indigenous lords and
caciques, the alleged cannibalism and general brutality of others, and explained that on these
bases the Spanish “Kings could legitimately make themselves Lords of these Provinces, and
they can enjoy and possess them with much security of conscience.”366 Lastly, and most
importantly of all, Salazar Mendoza cited St. Augustine, St. Isidro and St. Thomas in arguing
that, having “no superior in the temporal,” and regardless of the numerous legitimating
reasons listed above, “the Sovereign […] Kings of Castile” were under no obligation “to
authorize war,” and could simply “have moved by their authority.”367
Even more famously, the Jesuit ethnographer, José de Acosta, had first argued in the
late 1580s that despite valid critiques of the conquest’s initial legitimacy, Spanish claims in
the Indies had become legally prescribed through their long, continuous occupation of the
land. In his, De procuranda indorum salute, Acosta melded the diverse, often explicitly opposed,
theories and arguments of Las Casas and Vitoria with those of Sepúlveda and others in
censuring the abuse and excessively violent tactics of the early settlers in the subjugation and
conversion of Amerindians while at the same insisting on the Indians’ fundamental barbarity.
He lamented that the “Christian religion” the Amerindians displayed was “pure appearance
and varnish,” but blamed the Spaniards for this since they “attempted to persuade [the
natives] more with the sword than with the word, not with the innocence and doctrine of the
preachers, but with the cruelty and fear of the soldiers.”368 Nevertheless, he held that “it is
not licit to make war on the barbarians for infidelity however obstinate” they may have
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been.369 But, in a subtle defense of the initial phase of conquest, he argued that all empires,
beginning with Rome itself, had origins in violence.370 Most importantly, regardless of the
violence through which the initial phase of conquest had been carried out, the Spanish had
come to occupy the Indies in good faith, he argued. The Spaniards’ prescriptive right had the
“confirmation of at least sixty years,” and any restitution of the territory “would lead
necessarily to universal chaos.”371 Moreover, now that so many Indians had become
Christians (even if just by name), the duty to protect the faith “and the eternal salvation of
the Indians themselves provide[d] the Christian princes with the strict and just right to
govern the [Indian] Christian community.”372 “This alone is enough,” proclaimed Acosta,
“and more than enough,” to justify Spanish sovereignty over America and its native
inhabitants.373
The controversy culminated with the publication of the two-volume, De Indiarum Jure
(1629 and 1639), by the jurist-bureaucrat Juan de Solórzano Pereira.374 In addition to his
defense of Portuguese maritime dominion in Asia, Solórzano synthesized over a century of
theological and juridical debate on the validity of Spain’s American imperium, recognizing all
the above titles as legitimate, although acknowledging their varying degrees of force. More
than simply an impartial jurist, Solórzano was also a royal official, and the monarchy’s
objectives therefore were also his own. “With the approval and support of God,” he wrote,
“I am going to speak of the justice and right of our […] Catholic monarchs of the Spains

Ibid. book 2, ch. 2, 253.
Hernando Sánchez, Las indias en la monarquía católica, 103.
371 Acosta, De procuranda indorum salute, book 3, ch. 3, 397.
372 Ibid..
373 Ibid.
374 Juan de Solórzano Pereira, De Indiarum Jure sive de justa Indiarum Occidentalium Inquisitione, Acquisitione, &
Retentione, 2 vols. (Madrid: Ex Typographia Francisci Martínez, 1629-1639). The second book of this work was
subsequently published in Spanish as Política Indiana (Madrid: Diego Díaz de la Carrera) in 1647. Solórzano’s
work provided the foundation of the first comprehensive corpus of Spanish American law, the 1681 Recopilación
de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, which he co-wrote with Antonio de León Pinelo.
369
370

153
[…] to discover, […] acquire and […] retain the Western and Southern provinces of this socalled New World.”375 Moreover, recognizing that while the debate was largely settled among
Spaniards, it was his “obligation to take the plume, like the men of arms the lance and
shield,” to dispel the arguments of the many foreign “Heretics and Authors ill-disposed to
our Nation, […] who spread their infesting treatises” and who attempted to degrade Spain’s
moral and legal authority in the Indies.376 Solórzano reaffirmed the Pope’s supreme authority
in the spiritual world, including over non-Christians. He cited the royal chronicler, Antonio
de Herrera y Tordesillas, for proof that, from the beginning, Spaniards had carried out the
conquest in good faith and with “loyalty and love […] for their Kings.”377 He also referred to
the arguments of Vitoria, Luis de Molina, and even the Portuguese Seraphim de Freitas on
the sea, to demonstrate that “deserted, uncultured places” are considered in “natural liberty,”
and belong to the first who occupy them.378
Importantly, Solórzano assessed multiple perspectives in debates on specific points.
He made implicit reference to Sepúlveda, Vargas Machuca and others of “the opinion of
Aristotle,” who argued that as “brutish, and barbarous,” the Indians were “taken to be
beasts,” regarded as servants, and therefore justly enslaved and warred against for refusing to
“obey” and “submit to human customs.”379 But Solórzano himself explained that despite not
possessing the same level of culture and civilization as Spaniards, in no part of the Indies
“have there been found such brutes that do not have some use of natural and intellectual
reason, and are capable of enjoying the right of nations.” He cited Vitoria and Acosta at

Juan de Solórzano y Pereira, De Indiarum Iure, edited by C. Baciero, L. Baciero, A. M. Barrero, J. M. García
Añoveros, and J. M. Soto, book 1 (Madrid: CSIC, 2001 [1629]).
376 Juan de Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana (Madrid: Matheo Sacristan, 1736 [1647]), part 1, book 1, ch. 9, 33.
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length in arguing for Native Americans’ true humanity.380 “Therefore,” he wrote, the Indians
“cannot be warred against and have their land taken or possessed,” except by the series of
legitimating titles Vitoria presented in his mid-sixteenth century Relecciones.381 He also drew
on Giovanni Botero, a “foreign author,” who, “in his Relaciones Universales,” argued that “our
Kings can not only retain the Indies, but can make open war on the Indians that rebel
against them, or,” in a thinly veiled reference to northern Europeans, “against others that
invade or perturb them.”382
As for the Papal bulls of donation, Solórzano acknowledged that although some
“authors say it only gave the Catholic Kings and their successors […] the right of the
evangelization, conversion and General protection of the Indians,” the majority “are of the
opinion that the dominion and jurisdiction that [the pope] wanted to give […] was general,
absolute.”383 Solórzano opined that this latter “interpretation seems to conform to the very
words of the bull itself.”384 And in his conclusions, he identified the whole debate of Vitoria
and his pupils as of mere “antiquarian interest,” raised only by “certain heretics out of envy
of our nation.”385 With that, Solórzano concluded the legal debate within Spain over the
monarchy’s claim to sovereignty in the New World, but not before attempting to
demonstrate for posterity what he saw as the global, indeed providential, character of Iberian
imperium.
Solórzano saw the civilizing and evangelizing actions of the Iberians as the highest
and purest legitimation of their overseas empires. In addition to the various missionary

380 James Muldoon, The Americas in the Spanish World Order: The Justification for Conquest in the Seventeenth Century
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
381 Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, part 1, book 1, ch. 9, 33. Here Solórzano cites Vitoria’s Relecciones again
382 Ibid. part 1, book 1, ch. 11, 43.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias (1681). See Pagden, “Dispossessing the Barbarian,” in The Languages
of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe, 97-98.
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exploits of Spaniards in America, he also lauded those of the Portuguese in Asia.386 He
asserted that “God Our Lord […] gave this New World to the Kings of Spain,” attributed
God to inspiring both the Spanish and Portuguese to such expansionary endeavors, and
placed their achivements on an equal plane.387 “Castilians, like Portuguese,” wrote Solórzano,
“have surpassed Hercules, Bacho, Osiris, Alexander, Tirios, and Carthaginensis, and all
others who were celebrated and venerated in antiquity.”388 Stressing the globality of joint
Spanish-Portuguese imperium, he proclaimed that, “earlier having and enjoying the best of
Europe, […] the great part they occupied of Africa, and even more of Asia with the
domination of East India, now is added the fourth part of the World,” America.389 And
echoing the mellifluous praise of Botero, Salazar Mendoza, and many others, Solórzano
wrote that the Spanish monarchy, including Portugal’s multicontinental possessions, was
“twenty times greater” than that of the Romans, was greater even than that of China, and
“almost girdles the entire globe, extending from the Orient to the Occident. […] One can
sail around the world without touching any lands other than those of Spain.”390

Conclusions

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, defenders of Spanish and
Portuguese imperium were confronted by heightened threats from abroad, including armed
attacks and commercial competition, as well as legal challenges that disputed the
fundamental bases by which the Iberian rulers claimed sovereignty beyond Europe.
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Although debates over particular aspects of the moral and legal bases of Iberian imperium
persisted, they arose increasingly in response to the critiques of foreigners, rather than from
questions and qualms raised from within. If Spaniards and Portuguese continued to debate
African and Amerindian slavery, they showed increasing accord over the issue of maritime
monopolies on trade and navigation. Likewise, the “Controversy of the Indies,” over Spain’s
right to dominion in the Americas, was finally resolved, at least within Iberia itself, with the
sophisticated syntheses of José de Acosta and Juan de Solórzano Pereira. By the early
seventeenth century, Iberian jurists, theologians, humanists, and bureaucrats, were largely in
agreement on a range of issues including the necessary conditions for waging of just wars of
conquest (or “pacification”), for the subjugation of native peoples, for exclusive rights to
maritime monopoly, and for legitimate claims to territorial sovereignty beyond Europe. As a
result, internal Iberian debates over the legal and moral foundations of overseas imperium
began dissipating, especially amidst the celebratory frenzy surrounding peninsular union in
1580.
Despite receiving the fitting moniker “prudent,” in recognition of his pragmatism in
matters of state, many contemporaries viewed the reign of Philip II in messianic terms. With
the union of Portugal and the Spanish monarchy, Philip had achieved the ever elusive goal
of uniting the entire Iberian peninsula under his singular sovereignty. Even more significant
was that, with the agreggation of Portugal’s myriad possessions across Africa, Asia, and
Brazil, he now laid claim to one of the largest, most extended monarchies the world had ever
known. Philip’s composite monarchy constituted what was, according to several observers,
the first truly global empire in history. A range of humanists and cartographers, engravers
and sculptors, theologians and jurists, devoted themselves to substantiating and amplifying
this point.
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Importantly, however, the triumphalist vision of the breadth and depth of Iberian
imperial power stood in sharp contrast to the reality of crown rule in many areas claimed by
the monarchy. Despite globalized claims to dominium over seemingly endless territories
throughout “the four parts of the world,” Iberian imperial sovereignty remained diffuse,
contested, and uneven across space and time.391 This was true to a certain degree in the main
centers of colonial authority, not to mention in the peninsula itself. It was even more so the
case in remote regions on the distant edges of empire, including in places like Southeast
Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la Plata.
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CHAPTER 3
SOUTHEAST AFRICA

Southeast Africa offers a prime regional case study for demonstrating the diffuse,
fluid nature of Iberian imperial sovereignty, and for assessing the various strategies the
Portuguese crown used to extend, justify, and maintain its influence in the region both
directly and indirectly. The region was significant not only as home to one of the continent’s
largest and most powerful African polities in the sixteenth century – the so-called
“kingdom” or “empire” of Monomotapa – but also because it soon became a major – if
often overlooked – center of gravity within Portugal’s vast extended empire.392 According to
the terms agreed upon in the Treaty of Tordesillas, Southeast Africa lay squarely within the
Portuguese-claimed hemisphere of conquest and jurisdiction. Yet, despite this, and despite
the region’s key strategic and commercial value to the broader Portuguese empire, royal
officials encountered great difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective authority there.
In addition to the harshness of the climate and the susceptibility of the Portuguese to disease
in the region, their frustrations were due in large part to the overwhelming power of local
indigenous groups, as well as to the general military and political volatility of the interior,
which saw constantly shifting relations of alliance and conflict between declining and
For the most comprehensive study that native polity, see, S. I. G. Mudenge, A Political History of
Munhumutapa, c.1400-1902 (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988). See also, D. N. Beach, The Shona and
Zimbabwe, 900-1850 (London: Heinemann, 1980); and William G. L. Randles, L’empire du Monomotapa du XVe au
XIXe siècle (Paris: Mouton, 1975); and, most recently, Gai Roufe, “Local Perceptions of Political Entities along
the Southern Bank of the Zambezi in the 16th and 17th Centuries,” International Journal of African Historical Studies
49, no. 1 (2016): 53-75. The Mocaranga heartland was located just south of the Zambezi in the modern nationstate of Zimbabwe. The Ottomans and the Dutch also coveted the territory, particularly the coastal regions,
leading to periodic conflicts with the Portuguese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For a study
emphasizing the maritime orientation of Ottoman expansion, and Ottoman struggles with the Portuguese for
hegemony along the East African littoral, see Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
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emerging polities. In this tumultuous context, the Portuguese crown represented but one of
a range of forces vying for hegemony and survival.393
In examining the strategies the crown mobilized to extend its direct control and
indirect influence in the region, it is worth noting that beyond formal territorial sovereignty,

393 In addition to the detailed descriptions of contemporaries, much of what we know about Southeast Africa in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we owe to an early generation of modern scholars, including Eric
Axelson, D. N. Beach, Alexandre Lobato, and William Francis Rea. Their works primed the field, raising
questions and opening space for further investigations in the past three decades by other researchers such as
Allen Isaacman, S. I. G. Mudenge, Malyn Newitt, Michael Pearson, William Randles, Eugénia Rodrigues, Ana
Cristina Roque, and Gai Roufe, among others. Thanks to their groundbreaking research, we have a solid
understanding of the political and social history of local African societies in the period, and we are beginning to
learn more about their cultural history as well. We also have an impressive knowledge of how politics and trade
in the region were integrated within larger networks extending along the East African coast and throughout the
broader Indian Ocean world, and of the role of both Portuguese and earlier Muslim merchants in articulating
those networks. For a survey of this literature, see: Eric Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1488-1600 (Cape
Town: C. Struik, 1973), and Eric Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700 (Johannesburg:
Witwaterstrand University Press, 1969); Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe; Alexandre Lobato, A Expansão
Portuguêsa em Moçambique de 1498 a 1530, 3 vols. (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1954),
Alexandre Lobato, Colonização senhorial da Zambézia (Lisboa: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, 1962); and
Mudenge, A Political History of Munhumutapa; William Francis Rea, The Economics of the Zambezi Missions, 15801759 (Rome: Institutum Historicum S.I., 1976); Allen Isaacman’s, Mozambique: The Africanization of a European
Institution: The Zambesi Prazos, 1750-1902 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), which focuses on
the nineteenth century, but contains useful introductory information on the earlier period; Allen Isaacman and
Barbara Isaacman’s, “The Prazeros as Transfrontiersmen: A Study in Social and Cultural Change,” The
International Journal of African Historical Studies 8, no. 1 (1975): 1-39; S. I. G. Mudenge, A Political History of
Munhumutapa; and S. I. G. Mudenge, Christian Education at the Mutapa Court: A Portuguese Strategy to Influence Events
in the Empire of Munhumutapa (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986); Malyn Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on
the Zambesi: Exploration, Land Tenure, and Colonial Rule in East Africa (London: Longman, 1973), Malyn Newitt, A
History of Mozambique (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), and Malyn Newitt, “Formal and Informal
Empire in the History of Portuguese Expansion,” Portuguese Studies 17 (2001): 1-21; Michael N. Pearson, Port
Cities and Intruders: The Swahili Coast, India, and Portugal in the Early Modern Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998); Randles, L’empire du Monomotapa du XVe au XIXe siècle; Eugénia Rodrigues,
“Embaixadas portuguesas à corte dos mutapa,” in D. João III e o Imperio: Actas do Congresso Internacional comemorativo
do seu nascimento. Lisboa e Tomar, 4 a 8 de Junho de 2002, eds. Roberto Carneiro and Artur Teodoro de Matos
(Lisbon: CHAM, 2004), 753-779; Eugénia Rodrigues, “Mercadores, Conquistadores e Foreiros: A construção
dos prazos dos Rios de Cuama na primeira metade do século XVII,” in Vasco da Gama. Homens, Viagens e
Culturas, eds. Joaquim Romero Magalhães and Jorge Manuel Flores, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Comissão Nacional para as
Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portuguese, 2001), 443-480; Eugénia Rodrigues, Portugueses e Africanos nos
Rios de Sena: Os Prazos da Coroa nos Séculos XVII e XVIII (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, Casa da Moeda, 2013);
Ana Cristina Roque, “A costa oriental de África na primeira metade do século XVI segundo João de Barros ou
do lugar da costa oriental africana na historiografia imperial,” in D. João III e o Imperio: Actas do Congresso
Internacional comemorativo do seu nascimento. Lisboa e Tomar, 4 a 8 de Junho de 2002, eds. Roberto Carneiro and Artur
Teodoro de Matos (Lisbon: CHAM, 2004), 121-137; Ana Cristina Roque, “Jogos de poder e emergência de
novas unidades politicas regionais versus presença portuguesa em terras de Sofala, no século XVI,” Anais de
História de Além-Mar 5 (2004): 185-252; and Ana Cristina Roque, Terras de Sofala: Persistências e mudança.
Contribuições para a História da Costa Sul Oriental de África, nos séculos XVI-XVIII (Lisbon: Fundação Calouste
Gulbenkian, 2012); and Gai Roufe, “The Reasons for a Murder: Local Cultural Conceptualizations of the
Martyrdom of Gonçalo da Silveira in 1561,” Cahiers d’Études africaines LV, 3, no. 219 (2015): 467-487, and
Roufe, “Local Perceptions of Political Entities along the Southern Bank of the Zambezi in the 16th and 17th
Centuries.”
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Lisbon also aimed to expand and consolidate various other forms of authority. For instance,
Portuguese rulers throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sought continuously to
reinforce their claim to be “lord of the sea” and secure exclusive control over the navigation
of the entire East African coast. Through the Padroado Real, the crown also claimed supreme
power over the church in Africa and prime jurisdiction over all Christians within its
dominions. In addition, it declared a monopoly on trade in the region to cover not only
maritime commerce, but also that conducted on land. In fact, the effort to extend territorial
sovereignty seems to have been driven as much by the king’s desire to control the region’s
trade, in order to tax it, as by any direct interest in the land for its own sake, which, with the
exception of the mine fields, held little intrinsic value in itself. In any case, unlike in other
parts of its empire, in Southeast Africa the Portuguese crown did nonetheless develop a
significant territorial footprint. The limits of that footprint were vague, however, in
continuous flux, and contracted substantially by the close of the seventeenth century.
The fluid instability of Portuguese colonial authority in the region was in large part a
consequence of the crown’s reliance on intermediaries. Aside from sponsoring a failed
military expedition to the interior in the late sixteenth century and establishing a handful of
forts and a small bureaucracy of colonial officials, the crown exerted its power for the most
part indirectly. Many of the most influential intermediaries were either native-born
Portuguese or mestiços – often referred to alternatively as “mistiços” or simply “sons of
Portuguese” – engaged in the gold trade who had risen to positions of power in local society
by adapting to indigenous forms of social, political, and economic organization.394 As a

394 Contemporary authors often referred to these people using the Mokaranga term, “muzungos,” although in
many cases they used instead, “sons of Portuguese,” or “Portuguese,” the latter of which could refer either to
settlers of full Portuguese extraction or to mixed-race persons who had at least some Portuguese blood. For
examples of the use of the words “mestiço” or “mistiço,” see “Carta de P. João Baptista de Ribeira (de Goa)
para Alfonso de Zárate, Reitor do collegio de Córdova, 27 de Outubro de 1565,” in Documenta Indica (DI
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result, the legitimacy local peoples afforded them derived less from their status as
representatives or subjects of the Portuguese crown than from the prestige they enjoyed as
heirs to earlier ancestral chiefs. Likewise, despite having the advantage of European firearms,
their military power derived not from any innate Portuguese strength or superiority. After all,
although there did emerge a substantial “mestiço” population in the region, the total number
of settlers of full Portuguese extraction seems not to have exceeded 300 at any point in
sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. As a result, their most important assets were the massive
armies of native soldiers on which they depended.395 More than agents of an “informal” or
“shadow” empire, these persons navigated deftly back and forth within and beyond the orbit
of crown power.396 At times they operated in the name of the crown as its direct
representatives, often holding official positions in the colonial administration. At other
times, however, when their interests diverged from those of Lisbon, they resisted the
encroachment of imperial rule and demonstrated their own exclusive authority over both
local indigenous peoples as well as less powerful Portuguese and mestiço settlers in their
midst.
In an effort to establish its own exclusive sphere of sovereignty in the region, in the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the crown fortified and garrisoned several of
the main trade fairs. It also formally recognized the territorial domains of several prominent
hereafter), ed. Joseph Wicki, vol. 6, 1563-1566 (Rome: Monumenta Historia Soc. Iesu, 1960), 536; and António
da Conceição, [Tratado dos Rios de Cuama] Treatise on the Rivers of Cuama, ed. Malyn Newitt (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 8-9.
395 As in Southeast Africa, scholars of the so-called “New Conquest History,” have likewise highlighted the
dependence Spanish conquistadors in America on the armies of indigenous allies and vassals. See, Restall, “The
New Conquest History;” Restall, Maya Conquistador; and Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest; Matthew and
Oudijk, eds., Indian Conquistadors; and Altman, The War for Mexico’s West, among other works.
396 For a critical essay on the conceptual distinction of “formal” and “informal empire,” see Malyn Newitt,
“Formal and Informal Empire in the History of Portuguese Expansion,” Portuguese Studies 17 (2001): 1-21. And
on the notion of “shadow empire,” see George Winius, “The ‘Shadow Empire’ of Goa in the Bay of Bengal,”
Itinerario 7, no. 2 (July 1983): 83-101. For a sample of the literature on “go-betweens,” see Metcalf, Go-betweens
and the colonization of Brazil; Yannakakis, The Art of Being In-Between; and, for an historiographical overview, Kapil
Raj, “Go-Betweens, Travelers, and Cultural Translators,” in A Companion to the History of Science, ed. Bernard
Lightman (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016), 39-57.
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Portuguese and mestiço intermediaries who had initially received those lands in grant from
local rulers. When a series of internecine dynastic disputes weakened the Monomotapa’s grip
on power in the early seventeenth century, several of these settlers intervened on his behalf,
defended him with their own private armies, and eventually subjugated him to a relationship
of vassalage to the crown of Portugal.
Portuguese crown power in the region reached its apex in the early 1630s. Over the
second half of that century, however, several indigenous groups emerged to challenge and
undermine Portuguese hegemony. Ultimately, the crown’s effective sovereignty was confined
to a handful of isolated enclaves along the coast and the lower reaches of the Zambezi River,
in the area referred to broadly as the Rios de Cuama (“Rivers of Cuama”). Within the
Portuguese population, power reverted in large part to the most prominent settlers, but by
the mid 1690s, their authority was reduced as well. Local polities eclipsed the Portuguese as
the preeminent force on the interior plateau, and much of the area formerly controlled by
the Portuguese crown remained beyond its effective reach until well into the eighteenth
century and beyond.

Portuguese interest in Southeast Africa first piqued in the early sixteenth century
when colonial officials recognized its strategic value on the carreira da Índia shipping lane
connecting Lisbon and Goa. They also noted its commercial promise given the bustling
coastal trade that had long linked the East African hinterland to distant markets in the
Middle East and South Asia.397 By the mid sixteenth century, Portuguese merchants had
established themselves at coastal trade fairs running all the way from Malindi to Sofala.
397 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia; and, by the same author, “The Trading World of the Western
Indian Ocean, 1546-1565: A Political Interpretation,” in A Carreira da Índia e as rotas dos estreitos: Actas do VIII
Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa, ed. Artur Teodoro de Matos and Luís Filipe Thomaz (Angra do
Heroísmo, 1998), 207-29.
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Through force, and the threat of force, they eventually eclipsed the long-dominant Swahilispeaking Muslim merchants as the leading importers of South Asian textiles, the primary
commodity exchanged for Mocaranga gold, ivory, and slaves.398
Yet despite their naval power and success in wresting the bulk of that trade from
local sheiks or fumos (literally meaning, “brother,” fumo was the Mocaranga term for a “chief”
or “governor” whose legitimacy derived from his inheritance of an ancestral position of
authority), Portuguese crown forces had substantially less success on land. This was partly a
result of the harsh climate and disease that crippled Portuguese armies.399 The Dominican,
João dos Santos, who spent several years in the region, reported in his Ethiopia Oriental, that,
“the country is very hot, unhealthy, and prejudicial to foreigners, especially the Portuguese,
who fall ill and die of fever.”400 Francisco de Monclaro, a Jesuit, made a similar attestation,
noting with marked contempt for the indigenous peoples that the land and climate was so
difficult that only “barbarians” like the cafres [ie. Africans] could live there.401 Despite his
disdainful views of the region’s climate and inhabitants, Monclaro did nonetheless note the
“Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de
Monomotapa no anno de 1569, feita pello P. Monclaro da mesma companhia,” in Documenta Indica (DI
hereafter), edited by Joseph Wicki, vol. 8: 1569-1573 (Rome: Monumenta Historia Soc. Iesu, 1964), 698 and
702. Thanks to their overwhelming advantage at sea, the Portuguese supplanted their Muslim competitors with
relative speed, becoming the preeminent traders on the Southeast African littoral. The Jesuit Francisco de
Monclaro observed in 1569 that the headmen encountered along the coast, although “wealthy and powerful,
[…] might better be labeled sheiks rather than kings,” and not simply because they were mostly Muslim. The
implication was also that they lacked the power and station required for the title of “kings,” and that instead
they were just sheiks or fumos, the local term for “chief or governor.”
399 “Carta de P. Stephanus Lopes a P. Everardo Mercuriano, Moçambique, 4 de Agosto de 1574,” DI, vol. 9:
1573-1575, 384. In his report from Mozambique Island in 1574, Estevão Lopes describes the difficult climatic
conditions, how it was oppressively hot, except in June and July, and laments the lacks of bread, wine and oil –
“which the Portuguese are raised on,” and were accustomed to – except that which arrived by trade at very
high prices. And he added, specifically, that the lack of fresh water and made people sick.
400 João dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in Records of South-Eastern Africa: Collected in Various
Libraries and Archive Departments in Europe [RSEA hereafter], ed. and trans. George McCall Theal (London:
William Clowes and Sons Ltd., 1901), vol. 7, ch. 1, 183.
401 Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na
conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” DI, vol. 8, 692. The term, cafre, which contemporary Portuguese
used to refer to Africans, connoted infidelity, lack of civilization, and persons who were neither Christian nor
Muslim. Therefore, following Newitt, even when citing translated works, I have preferred to maintain the
original term, cafre, for its linguistic specificity, rather than using “Kaffir” as it is often translated into English,
or the more general, less nuanced term, “African.” See Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, 5.
398
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sheer beauty of the mountains along the coast, which he believed to hold behind them a
terrestrial paradise replete with some of the world’s richest deposits of gold and silver. But
more than climate or disease, the most important factor impeding Portuguese expansion in
the hinterland was the opposition posed by a multiplicity of local polities to Portugal’s
attempts to expand its influence at the expense of their own.

Local Politics and Society

As Santos explained in the late sixteenth century, the indigenous inhabitants of the
interior spoke Mocaranga. Contemporaries often referred to the region itself and its
inhabitants using that same term: Mocaranga.402 The only the exceptions, wrote Santos, were
areas on along the southern bank of the lower Zambezi and “along the seacoast, where other
languages are spoken, particularly the Botonga [or Tonga] tongue, for which reason these
lands are called Botonga and their inhabitants Botongas [or Tongas].”403
As Gai Roufe recently demonstrated, Mocaranga was also the name of the region’s
pre-eminent native polity, which throughout the sixteenth century and early years of the
seventeenth consisted of four major constituent kingdoms united through relations of affinal
and consanguineous kinship.404 Although several contemporaries used the term,
“Mocaranga,” the majority erroneously conflated the ruler’s title with that of the political
unit itself and referred to that larger polity as “the Monomotapa.” In addition, several
contemporary Portuguese characterized it as an “empire,” or described its imperial qualities.
According to Mudenge, the category, “Shona,” was not used to describe the people of this region until the
nineteenth century. See Mudenge, A Political History of Munhumutapa, 21.
403 Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 10, 273-275.
404 Roufe, “Local Perceptions of Political Entities along the Southern Bank of the Zambezi in the 16th and 17th
Centuries.” Affinal relations refer to those established through “in-law” or through various forms of
“marriage,” whereas consanguinity refers to common ancestry or descent, which is to say, to be related by
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This reflected both their own Eurocentric paradigms of political organization as well as their
desire to emphasize the vastness of that polity and its power in order to justify their
subservience to it and place it on the same plane as the Aztecs and Incas. While the smaller
constituent polities were in theory vassals of the Mocaranga ruler, as were the Portuguese,
and paid him an annual tribute, he had relatively little influence in their internal affairs.405 It is
perhaps most apt then to describe Mocaranga power over its constituent kingdoms as
denoting a relation of suzerainty rather than full sovereignty, keeping in mind the limitations
of these concepts in the African context given their origins in European legal and political
theory.
Santos referred to the larger polity as “Monomotapa” and distinguished between its
past status as an “empire” and its current one as a “kingdom.”406 For Santos, the distinction
was meaningful, and he employed it to reflect the gradual weakening of that polity prior to
Portuguese arrival. The “kingdom of Monomotapa is situated in the lands called Mocaranga,”
he explained, all of which “formerly belonged to the empire of Monomotapa, and [is] at
present, […] divided into four kingdoms.”407 These kingdoms, he wrote, were the Quiteve,
the Sedanda, the Tshikanga [ie. Chicanga], and “the kingdom which at present belongs to
Monomotapa.” According to Santos, at some unspecified moment, an earlier Mocaranga
ruler appointed three of his sons as governors of Quiteve, Sedanda, Chicanga. “As soon as
their father died,” however, “and another son who was at court succeeded to the empire,”
the three “rose in arms” against their brother, and “were never again willing to obey the
Monomotapa or his successors,” each one claiming sovereignty within his respective
That tribute was called a curva. Local subjects typically paid curva in the form of labor and grain, whereas the
Portuguese paid it in cloth.
406 In surveying a range of contemporary writings on the Monomotapa, however, we see authors vacillating
frequently between the terms “empire,” “kingdom,” and “state,” reflecting a general lack of precision – and in
some cases a lack of interest in precision – in defining its status.
407 My emphasis. See Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 10, 273-275.
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domain.408 “The kingdom” of Monomotapa, he wrote, nonetheless remained “very much
more extensive than the three others combined,” and he saw that earlier violent splintering
as the cause of the seemingly perpetual conflict that characterized relations between them.
According to Santos, the “vast kingdom of Monomotapa is more than two hundred
leagues in length and almost as much in breadth.”409 It was bounded in the east by the
Zambezi, in the southeast by the Indian Ocean, “where it forms a tongue of land only ten or
twelve leagues in breadth between the rivers Luabo and Tendanculo,” and in the west by
“the lands of another very powerful” kingdom called “Abutua” (or Butua) whose reach was
believed to extend all the way to the limits of the kingdom of Angola in the west.410 The
kingdom of Quiteve extended from the coastal region around Sofala toward the interior
along the Buzi River, eventually reaching the southeastern edge of the Monomotapa. That of
Sedanda (which some authors referred to as Madanda) controlled “the lands traversed by the
river Sabi,” farther south. And the last of the former Monomotapa vassal kingdoms,
Chicanga (in the region of Manica), governed the lands lying roughly between those of
Quiteve, Butua, and the Monomotapa heartlands. In Manica there were alleged to be “very
extensive gold mines,” which, in addition to those reported in other parts of Southeast

408 Monclaro, in one account, however, writing several decades earlier, claimed that both the ‘Butoa’ [Butua]
and Manica were tribute-paying vassals of the Monomotapa. See, “Relação da Viagem que Fizerão os Padres da
Companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barreto na Conquista de Monomotapa no Anno de 1569” (“Account of
the journey made by Fathers of the Company of Jesus with Francisco Barreto in the conquest of Monomotapa
in the Year 1569, by Father Monclaro, of the said Company”), in RSEA, vol. 3, 226-.
409 Malyn Newitt, however, has argued that even at its height the territory controlled by the Monomotapa was
actually rather modest, measuring some one hundred and fifty miles by fifty miles. See Malyn Newitt,
“Introduction,” in António da Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, xxi. There is some dissension among
scholars as to its actual size, however. Eric Axelson, for instance, described the Monomotapa’s “empire” as
significantly larger, dominating a territory some four hundred miles long by two hundred miles wide. See,
Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 7. As to the nature of its political structure itself, Michael
Pearson characterized it as “a greatly attenuated congery of loosely controlled tribal groupings.” See Pearson,
Port Cities and Intruders, 23.
410 Santos located the kingdom of Butua northwest of the Monomotapa, but most modern historians locate it
more directly west, if not southwest. See, Isaacman, Mozambique, 6.
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Africa, proved a persistent if elusive obsession of the Portuguese throughout the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.411
Sixteenth century observers, like Santos, despite their condescending, denigrating
portrayals of Mocaranga civilization nonetheless acknowledged the domineering power of
several indigenous rulers even in their relations with Portuguese settlers and colonial
officials. Santos noted that all three of the “rebel kings” (ie. the Quiteve, Sedanda, and
Chicanga) were “great lords,” but that the “Quiteve is the most powerful and richest.” The
bulk of that wealth, he claimed, came from the “extensive commerce” the Quiteve
conducted with the Portuguese, who brought him “great quantities of cloth and beads,”
which “form the wealth of the cafres.”412 Diogo do Couto, the influential chronicler and
author of several volumes of the well-known, Décadas da Ásia, remarked that such cloths
were “much esteemed by the cafres, who divide them into pieces, […] wear them round their
loins,” and “look upon them as the greatest finery in the world.”413
In addition to the wealth the Quiteve acquired through trade with the Portuguese, he
also enjoyed that which he amassed through tribute. Throughout most of the sixteenth
century, Portugal was officially considered a vassal of both the Quiteve and the
Monomotapa. The Portuguese captain at Sofala paid an annual tribute, or curva, of more than
two hundred cruzados worth of textiles to that native ruler in exchange for the right to reside
and trade in his kingdom.414 Independent Portuguese merchants were likewise required to
pay a duty of “one piece of cloth in twenty, and the same for beads” in order to pass “in
safety” through the Quiteve’s lands “to the mountains of Manica, where the gold mines”

Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 10, 273-275.
Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 10, 273-275.
413 Diogo do Couto, Década IX da Ásia [Decade IX of Asia], in RSEA, vol. 6, ch. 22, 366-369.
414 Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 1, ch. 28, 220.
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were thought to be located.415 The Quiteve also demonstrated his dominance by imposing
strict diplomatic protocol on the envoys to which he gave audience. He required them,
Portuguese envoys included, to enter his chamber barefoot and “throw themselves on the
ground sideways […] and so speak without looking at him, clapping their hands after every
four words, as is the custom.”416
Similar to the Quiteve, the Monomotapa ruler required his own strict protocol in
such meetings and demanded a tri-annual curva from the Portuguese Captain of Mozambique
of more than three thousand cruzados worth of cloth and beads for the captain’s three-year
term of office.417 Having paid this tribute, all Portuguese merchants and other Christian
subjects of Portugal – including local converts and a substantial population of settlers from
India – could, according to Santos, pass through the lands of the Monomotapa “with their
bags of gold much more securely than if they were in Portugal.”418 If the Portuguese refused
or delayed in paying the tribute, the Monomotapa could impose an empata, which he did on
occasion, sanctioning the seizure of all Portuguese merchandise within his dominions.419
Once the tribute was paid in full, the Monomotapa would reopen his lands to the Portuguese
“and establish peace there” by royal decree.420
Mocaranga power and wealth was not only represented by textiles and beads,
however. Even more important, in fact, was the number of “wives” a ruler possessed. In
addition to the women the Monomotapa married, the title of “wife” was used as a symbolic

Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 1, ch. 28, 220-222.
Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 1, ch. 7, 194.
417 Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 9, p.270-273. For a more
detailed description of this tribute arrangement, see Mudenge, A Political History of Munhumutapa.
418 Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 9, 270-273.
419 Captain Pedro Barreto de Rezende, Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India], in RSEA, vol. 2, part 2, 413419~. Writing in 1635, Rezende claimed that an empata implied not only the seizure of Portuguese property, but
also “that all Portuguese in his [ie. the Monomotapa’s] territory were to be killed.” Not all contemporary
descriptions of the empata included this important detail, however.
420 Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 9, 270-273.
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designation to refer other female relatives as well as to prominent male vassals, including
several Portuguese “whom he esteems and holds in great respect.”421 According to Santos,
the title signified his “love” for those persons, and symbolized his desire “to show them as
much love as he shows his wife.”422 Thus, when in 1569 Monclaro relayed reports that the
Monomotapa had some three thousand wives, he was referring – knowingly or not – to the
many women and men which comprised the vast kinship-based polity of Mocaranga.423

Portuguese and Mestiços at the Vanguard of Empire

Despite the crown’s limited direct institutional presence, Portuguese merchants and
adventurers spread throughout the region in the sixteenth century. This included a number
of deserters from the Portuguese military and numerous degredado convicts sent to Southeast
Africa to serve out their sentences. These persons existed for the most part beyond the reach
of the Portuguese imperial bureaucracy, having integrated within local systems of political,
cultural, and economic organization. Several amassed great landholdings, also engaging in
trade and functioning as middlemen between local societies and agents of the Captain of
Mozambique in the enclaves of crown power on the coast and main rivers.
Several of these settler-merchants held great power and influence in local society.
The vast majority of these “Portuguese” married native women and had mixed-race mulatto
children, which Portuguese officials and missionaries often referred to disparagingly as

Roufe, “Local Perceptions of Political Entities along the Southern Bank of the Zambezi in the 16th and 17th
Centuries,” 63, quoting Santos, Ethiopia Oriental, part 1, book 2, ch. 9.
422 Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 1, ch. 20, 224.
423 Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na
conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” in DI, vol. 8, 714. Also, in highlighting that ruler’s barbaric
despotism in order to justify war against him, Monclaro claimed that the Monomotapa once had hundred of
these “wives” executed for allegedly practicing witchcraft.
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“mestiços,” “mistiços,” or “sons of Portuguese.”424 Some had multiple wives in accordance
with local custom, a practice which local missionaries looked upon with great disdain. And
having embraced the social and cultural norms of local society, many became powerful fumos
with all the customary privileges and duties that role entailed. This interracial mixing was not
simply restricted to the hinterland. As the Jesuit João Baptista de Ribeira reported already in
1565, even the population of Mozambique Island, the official center of Portuguese authority
in the region, was composed of both “Portuguese casados [married settlers] and others,
mestiços.”425
Given the autonomy of these persons from colonial authorities in Mozambique
Island, not to mention in Goa or Lisbon, and since many were either illiterate or had little to
no formal education, they left scant direct documentary evidence of their existence and
activities. However, close readings of the notes and correspondence of missionaries and
royal officials reveal the remarkable ubiquity of such people throughout the region, even well
before the Portuguese crown extended its effective authority there in the first half of the
seventeenth century. Importantly, however, although they enjoyed substantial autonomy
from the Portuguese crown in many cases, they ought not be understood as existing
independent of larger frameworks of power. As mentioned, most of these early settlerintermediaries derived their authority from indigenous groups and headmen, and were
deeply enmeshed within preexisting, pre-European systems of political, cultural, and
economic organization.426

424 “Carta de P. João Baptista de Ribeira (de Goa) para Alfonso de Zárate, Reitor do collegio de Córdova, 27 de
Outubro de 1565,” DI, vol. 6, 1563-1566 (1960), 536; and Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, 8-9.
425 “Carta de P. João Baptista de Ribeira (de Goa) para Alfonso de Zárate, Reitor do collegio de Córdova, 27 de
Outubro de 1565,” DI, vol. 6, 1563-1566 (1960), 536. The term, casado, or “married man,” referred specifically
to soldiers who had completed their military duties and received the right to marry. But the term was also
commonly used as a synonym for morador, or resident, with all the municipal rights and duties that status
entailed: see Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, 7.
426 Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi, 57.
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One example was Rodrigo Lobo, a Portuguese who by the late sixteenth century had
established a personal fiefdom on the island of Maroupe, in the middle of the Buzi River.427
Santos described Lobo as “lord of the greater part of the island,” mentioning that he
possessed many cafre slaves there, and that “all the other inhabitants were his vassals,” as
well, meaning presumably that they either paid him tribute, could be called upon for military
assistance, or both.428 The king of Quiteve, wrote Santos, granted the island to Lobo, “who
was a great friend of his.” The Quiteve reportedly also conferred on Lobo the title of “wife,”
which he and the Monomotapa alike bestowed “on the Captains of Mozambique and Sofala
[and] upon all those Portuguese whom he greatly esteems.”
Another example was Antonio Caiado, an independent settler who had established
himself in the very heart of Mocaranga, at the Monomotapa’s zimbabwe (his residence and
court). When the Jesuit Gonçalo de Silveira reached that court in 1561 as an official envoy of
the Portuguese crown, Caiado served as his interpreter. Caiado was reportedly a “great
friend” of the Monomotapa, “on familiar terms” with him. We do not know the precise
number of Portuguese living at the Monomotapa court in this early period, but Caiado was
apparently not alone. The Jesuit Luis Fróis referred to some “Portuguese,” perhaps mestiços,
alongside certain “Christians from this side of India” [ie. the west coast of India], and “slaves
of the Portuguese,” who were most certainly indigenous.429 And although we have no direct
evidence of it, Charles Boxer has suggested that in the early seventeenth century there may

Santos describes this island, Maroupe, as “situated in the middle of the river of Sofala,” but he must have
meant the Buzi River. See Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 1, ch. 20, 224.
428 Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 1, ch. 20, 224.
429 “Carta do Padre Luis Fróis, Goa,” 15 December 1561, in Documentos sobre os Portuguese em Moçambique e na
África Central (DPMAC hereafter), (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos da Junta de
Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, 1975), vol. 8, 40.
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have even been a few isolated settlers as far as the Kariba gorge on the present day border of
Zambia and Zimbabwe.430
Several of the region’s most powerful Portuguese came to rule over vast militaristic
chiefdoms with control over large swathes of territory and groups of slaves and dependents.
And beyond the symbolic prestige they enjoyed as heirs to earlier indigenous fumos, their
authority derived principally from the hundreds and sometimes thousands of soldiers in their
retinue, whose collective military power vastly exceeded that of the Portuguese and mestiço
settlers alone. In 1613, Diogo Simões Madeira alluded explicitly to the importance (and
loyalty) of his enslaved soldiers, “who always accompany me on these occasions,” and who
set aside all their own concerns “in order to secure completely these lands and preserve the
forts.”431 The settler-intermediaries depended on the “formal empire,” to borrow Malyn
Newitt’s term, in order to secure access to cloth and firearms, which were central to their
own wealth and power, as well as to that of local kings and headmen, and which were
procured most easily through agents of the Captain of Mozambique, who administered the
crown’s monopoly on trade in the region.432 But the relationship was mutual. In the late
sixteenth century and first half of the seventeenth, the crown, in turn, also relied heavily on
these people in extending its authority throughout the hinterland.
Beyond Mozambique Island – which after the 1560s had a population of roughly a
hundred Portuguese in addition to another two hundred or so natives and Indians – other
significant concentrations of Portuguese settlers could be found at Sena and Tete, on the

C. R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire: 1415-1825 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 49.
“Carta de Diogo Simões Madeira para el-rei,” Sena, 11 July 1613, in DPMAC, vol. 9, 313. For original
source, see Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino [AHU hereafter], Mozambique, caixa 1.
432 Newitt, “Formal and Informal Empire in the History of Portuguese Expansion,” 17.
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southern bank of the Zambezi, located 60 and 120 leagues [about 160 and 320 miles]
respectively, from the mouth of that river, where it empties into the sea.433

Figure 13
Map of Southeast Africa
Small numbers of Portugueses had settled in these two riverine enclaves in the decades prior
to the first crown-sponsored expedition to conquer the interior in 1569. Earlier that decade,
the Jesuit Luis Fróis estimated the Portuguese population at Sena to be some “ten or

433 “Relação da Viagem que Fizerão os Padres da Companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barreto na Conquista de
Monomotapa no Anno de 1569” (“Account of the journey made by Fathers of the Company of Jesus with
Francisco Barreto in the conquest of Monomotapa in the Year 1569, by Father Monclaro, of the said
Company”), in RSEA, vol. 3, 202. In a separate letter, written in Mozambique Island in 1570, Monclaro says
that the population of Mozambique, in addition to an unnamed number of native peoples, consisted of some
seventy Portuguese casados, six hundred Indians, and seventy Muslims from Mucigate; see, “Carta de P.
Francisco de Monclaro a P. Leoni Henriques,” Mozambique, 1 August 1570, in DI, vol. 8, 295. Michael N.
Pearson cites the distances in kilometers, at about 260 and 515 kilometers, see Port Cities and Intruders, 39. One
league translated to roughly four kilometers.
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fifteen,” in addition to “some Christians” from western India.434 The Portuguese settlement
at Tete, sixty leagues upriver, was no doubt even smaller.
Despite the occasional conflicts between Portuguese and Muslims in Southeast
Africa, and despite the official position of the Portuguese crown and missionaries, which
regarded Muslims as enemies of the kingdom who could be justly conquered and enslaved,
the two groups seem to have lived for the most part in peace and symbiosis. In one early
sixteenth century missive the king of Portugal even instructed his captain at Sofala that he
“shall not interfere in the disputes and contentions that there may be between the Moors
and cafres,” and that he should “leave them to follow their own customs” so that both “the
cafres be well treated and the Moors be not offended.”435 Nearly four decades later, in 1569,
Monclaro reported that along the Zambezi there were “in different places about twenty
turbaned Moors, men of position and rich, who traded with our people at the station of
Sena.”436 “Christians and Moors went about so much mixed together as if they belonged to
the same sect,” he wrote, adding that, “Moors were not always evil.”437 And the famed
chronicler Diogo do Couto wrote of a “village of friendly Moors” near Sena in 1571, where
“those Moors, owing to their exchange with the Portuguese with whom they had, for the
most part, grown up together, spoke and wrote our language very well.”438
As Michael Pearson has argued, both Sena and Tete functioned as “inland port
cities,” which is to say that they developed as points of purchase, sale, or barter of a variety
of goods not only between the hinterlands immediately adjacent and Portuguese factories on
“Carta do Padre Luis Fróis,” Goa, 15 December 1561, in DPMAC, vol. 8, 40.
Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1488-1600, 126.
436 “Relação da Viagem que Fizerão os Padres da Companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barreto na Conquista de
Monomotapa no Anno de 1569” (“Account of the journey made by Fathers of the Company of Jesus with
Francisco Barreto in the conquest of Monomotapa in the Year 1569, by Father Monclaro, of the said
Company”), in RSEA, vol. 3, 235-236.
437 Monclaro, “Relação feita pelo Padre Francisco de Monclaro, da Companhia de Jesus, da Expedição ao
Monomotapa, Comandada por Francisco Barreto,” in DPMAC, vol. 8, 393.
438 Couto, Da Ásia, DPMAC, vol. 8, 275.
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the coast, but also with other smaller fairs farther inland in the direction of the
Monomotapa’s court and along the network of rivers that flowed into the Zambezi from the
west.439 Both Santos and Couto described this commercial system in detail. While Sena
functioned as a center of trade in itself, its primary function was as a staging point for goods
traveling to and from Tete and beyond.
From Tete, “there are three market places where the Portuguese go to […] sell their
merchandise [mostly textiles and beads] or exchange it for gold.”440 The first of those inland
fairs was Luanhe [Luanze], about thirty-five leagues southwest from Tete, along the river
Mazouvo.441 The second, which Couto called Bucoto (and which Santos called Manzovo,
since it was located on that river), was some thirteen leagues northwest from Luanze. The
third, Massapa, was located fifty leagues from Tete, roughly west of the fair at Bucoto. In all
three of the fairs, the Portuguese “residents of Sena and Tete have warehouses called churros,
where they store their merchandise, and from which they sell it and send it to be sold”
elsewhere.442 Massapa was the most important of the three since it was located at the edge of
the Monomotapa’s realms and since the majority of trade between the Portuguese and
Monomotapa had to pass through it. Beyond the presence of traders, wrote Couto, by the
late sixteenth century, the Dominicans had even established “churches at all these places,
where the sacraments are administered to the resident Christians” and to those itinerant
merchants and others who passed through there.443
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Missionaries

In addition to settlers, missionaries also played a significant albeit less transformative
role in extending Portuguese influence throughout Southeast Africa. Bereft of a robust
ecclesiastical administration under the direct crown control of the Padroado Real, the regular
clergy, in particular Jesuits and Dominicans, were at the forefront in this process. As Eugénia
Rodrigues has shown, missionaries often served as interpreters and representatives of the
Portuguese crown in its early dealings with local indigenous kingdoms.444 This was in part to
convey Portugal’s supposedly benign intentions, its hope for peaceful coexistence, and to
demonstrate its joint desire to bring local peoples “to the light of the true religion” and
extend Portuguese political and economic interests in the region. But priests also
accompanied armed expeditions to the interior, providing spiritual inspiration and protection
to troops in battle, and solace at the side of the wounded and dying. In addition, they were
tasked with ensuring that wars of conquest were conducted legally, and that the proper
ceremonies and declarations accompanied the subjugation of defeated rulers and peoples.
Beyond the work they carried out as advisers, preachers, and confessors to
Portuguese settlers and members of the civil administration, the Jesuits and Dominicans also
endeavored to extend the spiritual and political influence of Christian Portugal throughout
the various societies across Mocaranga. As the Spanish had done in America, the
missionaries in Africa often focused their efforts on converting local rulers in the hopes that
their conversion would facilitate the widespread conversion of their subjects.445 While by the
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early seventeenth century it became custom for newly crowned Monomotapa rulers to
accept baptism in return for Portuguese military alliance, several contemporaries noted that
their identity as Christians was essentially nominal since they continued to live more
according to traditional social and spiritual norms and customs than European ones.
In the 1560s, the Dominicans established a presence in Sena, Tete, and Mozambique
Island, and in the following two decades, in the wake of the Barreto-Homem expedition,
founded missionary outposts in the kingdoms of Quiteve and Chicanga, in Butua, Chicova,
Massapa, Mashona, Macequeque, Zumbo, and along much of the coast including Sofala.446
By the 1630s, they had expended their presence to places like Amiza, Chipiriviri, Luanze, and
Quebrabrasa, with twenty-five missionaries in a total of thirteen missions.447
The Jesuits, although important as envoys to native rulers, arrived to the interior later
and had a less substantial presence. By 1611, they had colleges in Sena, Tete, and
Mozambique Island, as well as a residence in Quelimane.448 In theory, the colleges of Sena
and Tete held spiritual jurisdiction over their own vast mission territory, which largely
overlapped with that of the Dominicans and encompassed all of Baroe, Quiteve, Manica,
and Mocaranga in general.
Yet, although the missionaries claimed a vast geographical footprint, their impact
was evidently quite limited. Contemporaries throughout the seventeenth century reflected
with general disappointment at their lack of progress. In 1605, Philip III himself lamented
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reports of “a decrease in Christianity in […] Mozambique and the Rivers of Cuama.”449 The
king ascribed this decrease to the lack of “diligent ministers,” arguing that those there
presently “occupy themselves with worldly matters rather than their duty,” and were more
interested in “acquiring merchandise” than in carrying out their sacred duty. In the 1630s,
one official urged the king to send Franciscans to supplement the largely ineffective Jesuits
and Dominicans arguing that even those native peoples who had converted seemed still to
live according to their ancestral cultural and spiritual conventions and traditions.450 To the
same effect, describing the area of Sofala, another official proclaimed flatly that, “there are
no Christians, […] or at least they are very few.”451 “And if those who are our captives
become Christians for that reason,” he continued, “their Christianity only lasts as long as
their captivity.”452

Justifying War and Conquest

When compared to Spanish conquests in the Americas, Portuguese expansion in
Africa elicited far less controversy. Part of the reason was that, unlike in Spanish America,
many Portuguese conquests in Africa and Asia were directed against local peoples that were
either Muslim or which Europeans considered so barbarous that, as Gomes Eanes de Zurara
first argued, their conquest and enslavement was easily justified in the name of conversion
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and civilization.453 A range of Portuguese authors, including several with firsthand experience
in Southeast Africa itself, echoed Zurara and the aggressive discourses of Juan Ginés de
Sepúlveda, stressing the natives’ barbarity and animalistic nature in order to provide implicit
justification of their subjugation and domination by the crown of Portugal.
In the mid 1560s, for example, frustrated by the lack of progress in converting local
peoples, the Jesuit João Baptista de Ribeira described them as “extremely barbarous and
bestial.”454 Monclaro likewise compared the “negros of this land” to animals and claimed that
they lacked any “form of justice.” “They kill easily,” he wrote, “have no religious
ceremonies, nor any interest in them, nor any mechanized production of any kind.”455 He
concluded pessimistically that there was little hope for the spread of Christianity since the
Mocaranga were “not interested in spiritual matters, only in pleasures of the flesh.” “They
have many women,” he wrote, “are all thieves, and do not even trust their own children.”456
Estevão Lopes, another Jesuit, called the local inhabitants “brute animals” and “thieves,” and
likewise surmised that it was not worth the effort of attempting to make them Christians or
subjugate them to Portuguese colonial rule.457 Given their barbarism and thievery, he argued,
their conversions were only superficial; they reverted to infidelity after a certain period of
time or upon reaching a certain age.458 Displaying his view of the complementary roles of

453 Gomes Eanes de Zurara Chronica del Rei D. Joam I de boa memória. Terceira parte em que se contém a Tomada de
Ceuta (Lisbon: Antonio Álvares, 1644), available at the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP). The manuscript
was completed in 1450. See also Ponsen and Feros, “The Early Modern Iberian Empires.”
454 “Carta de P. João Baptista de Ribeira (de Goa) para Alfonso de Zárate, Reitor do collegio de Córdova, 27 de
Outubro de 1565,” DI, vol. 6, 1563-1566 (1960), 536.
455 Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na
conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” DI, vol. 8, 701-702. Monclaro even reported a rumor, perhaps a
myth, of the Monomotapa punishing people by making them walk through a crocodile infested river. See
Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na
conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” DI, vol. 8, 706.
456 Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na
conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” DI, vol. 8, 709.
457 “Carta de P. Stephanus Lopes a P. Everardo Mercuriano,” Moçambique, 4 de Agosto de 1574,” DI, vol. 9,
383.
458 Ibid. 384.
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spiritual and political conquest, Lopes concluded that the natives of Southeast Africa were
incapable of becoming good subjects and conquered peoples.459
Beyond the fact that most Europeans portrayed the cafres as barbarians unfit for the
exercise of formal sovereignty and jurisdiction, however, the relative lack of controversy
surrounding Portugal’s expansion was also due in part to the fact that, until the late sixteenth
century, the Portuguese had not actually conquered much territory, nor attempted to for that
matter. But when the empire’s maritime orientation took a “terrestrial turn” in the late
sixteenth century, theologians and jurists across the Lusophone world, like their counterparts
in Castilian realms, felt nonetheless compelled to justify that shift, and articulated
sophisticated defenses of Portugal’s right to territorial conquest beyond Europe.460
In the late 1560s, Jesuits in Southeast Africa advanced perhaps the most striking
example of such a defense. Their immediate objective was to justify a punitive conquest of
Mocaranga for the murder of Gonçalo de Silveira, the Jesuit envoy of the Portuguese crown.
As a fellow Jesuit attested from Goa in 1561, Silveira’s objective had been “the conversion
of […] the king of Monomotapa,” believing “that the conversion of this kingdom would be
easy after the [king] had been converted too.”461 Silveira was initially met with warmth and
success. The Monomotapa showed him “the greatest honor […] he had ever done to any
other living man: he took him to a room where no one ever enters,” and asked if he desired
459 Ibid. In further denigration of the local indigenous peoples, Santos proclaimed that, “the cafre nation is the
most barbarous and brutal in the world, for they adore no God and have neither idols, images, nor temples, nor
do they make use of sacrifices, and have no ministers consecrated to the divine worship such as almost all
heathen nations have.” “They can neither read nor write,” he continued, and they “have no books, and all
ancient history and other things which they know they learn by tradition from their ancestors.”459 See Santos,
Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 1, ch. 9, 199 and 201. Diogo do Couto too
labeled the native subjects of Monomotapa “barbarians,” in part for their lack of written history, a true sign of
civilization as he saw it. He admitted that through their oral history tradition the cafres “can tell us how many
kings they have had,” but that they “cannot say for how many years they reigned nor what their origin was.”
See Couto, Década IX da Ásia [Decade IX of Asia], in RSEA, vol. 6, ch. 25, 390.
460 Sanjay Subrahmanyam described this “terrestrial turn” in his, “Holding the World in Balance,” 1372.
461 “Carta do Padre Luis Fróis, Goa,” 15 December 1561, in DPMAC, vol. 8, 38. Fróis, importantly, was not
actually present to witness these events, but instead relied on, and distorted, information he received from
Caiado’s report.
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any women, gold, land, or cows.462 In less than a month, having learned more from Silveira
about the “tenets of the faith,” the Monomotapa “revealed his willingness to become a
Christian.”463 According to Fróis, however, in the following weeks, a group of influential
Muslims convinced the Monomotapa that Silveira was “a great sorcerer and evil man,” that
he had actually been sent by the Mongazes (with whom the Monomotapa was currently
feuding), and that he represented not spiritual salvation but a threat to the kingdom’s very
existence.464 As a result, the Mocaranga king ordered Silveira’s execution, a move he came
almost immediately to regret, showing, “signs of sorrow for the priest’s death,” and casting
“the blame on the instigation of the Moors,” whose own execution he ordered subsequently.
While the circumstances and motivations behind Silveira’s execution remain murky,
its implications were clear.465 As the Portuguese saw it, the event provided sufficient
justification for a full military invasion. In 1569, king Sebastian I convened his Mesa da
Consciência to obtain their legal and moral endorsement of such the enterprise. Eager to
avenge the death of their fellow Jesuit, the board members issued a detailed decision,
outlining the necessary conditions for the waging of a just war to conquer Mocaranga.466
The report cited “the great offences and injuries done to” the king of Portugal and
“his subjects,” and “the violence shown to his delegates,” in particular with “the unjust death
of Father Dom Gonçalo [de Silveira],” the “ambassador” of “our lord the king,” “sent by
the viceroy of India to preach the faith of Christ, which he did peaceably and without
offence.” In the same breath, the authors denounced “the shelter and favor bestowed by the
“Carta do Padre Luis Fróis, Goa,” 15 December 1561, in DPMAC, vol. 8, 40.
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464 Ibid. 49.
465 For a study of the motives behind Silveira’s execution from a local perspective, see Roufe, “The Reasons for
a Murder,” 467-487.
466 “Determinação dos Letrados: Com que Condiçõens se podia fazer Guerra aos Reys da Conquista de
Portugal, fala em especial do Monomotapa” (“Decision of the Lawyers: With the Conditions on which War
may be made upon Kings the Conquests Portugal, especially upon the Monomotapa”), Almeyrim, 23 January
1569, in RSEA, vol. 3, 153-156.
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said king in his ports and territories upon the Moors, the enemies of our holy faith and the
instigators of all the evils and offences.” Beyond the execution of Silveira, the report decried
“the death of other Portuguese [traders], and the robbery of their property.” Moreover, it
also condemned the Monomotapa’s alleged despotism toward other indigenous peoples.
Having supposedly “seen and examined [the] documents and reports of many persons,” the
authors determined that “the emperors of Monomotapa frequently command their innocent
subjects to be killed and robbed, and are guilty of many other wrongs and tyrannies for slight
causes.”
Regarding the legality of Portugal’s presence in the region, the board cited the Papal
bulls, which conceded “to our lord the king alone […] the commerce of all the kingdoms,
islands, and provinces lying between the capes Não and Bojador and India, upon condition
that the said king our Lord should cause the gospel to be preached in the said kingdoms and
provinces.” According to the authors, Silveira’s mission intended precisely to satisfy that
condition. In an implicit allusion to natural law and the law of nations, the authors also
echoed the legitimate titles of Francisco de Vitoria, asserting that “in case the cafres or any
other people of the conquest refuse to admit the said ministers, or to allow them to preach
the gospel with the said caution, or obstruct with violence the hospitality and commerce
which are the common right of nations,” the Portuguese may build fortresses and send
soldiers there. “The captains and subjects of his Majesty [the king of Portugal] may justly
stand upon the defensive; and should it be necessary for the safety of their persons and
property,” the Portuguese “may make war, laying waste, making prisoners, taking places, and
proceeding in all things according to the rights of lawful warfare.” “For all these reasons,”
the report concluded, “our lord the king may command war to be made upon the said king
of Monomotapa.” In order for that war to be considered lawful and “without sin,” however,
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the authors qualified that its primary intention must not be “the increase of empire [imperio],
or the personal glory and profit of the prince, or other private interests,” but “to spread the
gospel.”

The Barreto-Homem Expedition and its Impact

Thus confident in the legal cover for intervention, Sebastian commissioned
Francisco Barreto, his former viceroy of India, to lead an expedition in 1569 aimed at
punishing the Monomotapa and seizing the mines in his territory.467 Barreto initially planned
to disembark his forces at Sofala and then head overland conquering the kingdoms of
Quiteve and Chicanga en route to the ultimate target, the Monomotapa. Vasco Fernandes
Homem, Barreto’s deputy, explained that with the riches seized in those initial conquests, the
expedition “would be able to bring together more people and horses” in order to “conquer
the Monomotapa.”468 But Monclaro and the Jesuits in Mozambique were interested solely in
punishing the Monomotapa and avenging their brother, Silveira. With this in mind, they
persuaded Barreto to bypass the Quiteve and Chicanga, and instead to head straight for the
Mocaranga zimbabwe approaching from the Zambezi via Sena.

According to Monclaro, Sebastian held broader dreams of conquering the entirety of Africa and spreading
the faith across that vast continent. See Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de
Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” DI, vol. 8, 684. There were
also plans to conquer and fortify the Comoros Islands, whose population of Christians was being “converted to
Islam by Arabian traders,” who, according to Monclaro, had killed many Portuguese. Francisco Barreto shelved
this proposal, but did stop at Zanzibar, entering seven to eight leagues inland, expelling the locals with ease,
and securing from the local king the official donation of Zanzibar to the crown of Portugal. See, “Carta de P.
Francisco de Monclaro a P. Leoni Henriques, Mozambique, 1 de agosto de 1570, DI, vol. 8, 294; and Monclaro,
“Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de
Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” DI, vol. 8, 694.
468 “Carta de Vasco Fernandes Homem para Luis da Silva,” Sena, 15 February 1576, DPMAC, vol. 8, 448.
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467

184
The decision proved a fatal mistake for the Portuguese. The harsh, humid climate of
the rivers crippled Portuguese soldiers, many of whom perished or became so ill they could
not continue beyond that point. When the already depleted army reached the territory of the
Mongazes, just beyond Sena, those rebellious vassals of the Monomotapa, known for their
martial prowess in war, fell upon the Portuguese and their Tonga allies, inflicting significant
losses on them, and crippling their forces further still.469 Monclaro described in vivid detail
the intensity of that battle, and how the “lack of wind in the valley” combined with the
smoke from Portuguese firearms to “turn the day to night.”470
Surveying the dire state of his army, Barreto decided to withdraw to Sena, where he
became ill and died soon thereafter.471 Homem took over Barreto’s office and steeled himself
for a second effort, this time following the original overland route through the Quiteve and
Chicanga. Homem disembarked at Sofala later that summer with a force of five hundred
men and several pieces of artillery.472 As he explained in his letter to Luis da Silva, before
heading forth to the interior, he set “on fire the entire place where he had dwelt, and also the
dhows,” the boats on which he and his army had arrived to Sofala.473 He did this “so that the
soldiers might finally understand that God and their muskets alone would save them.”474 The
act, designed to discourage deserters, was reminiscent of that performed by Hernán Cortés
at Veracruz before proceeding to the conquest of Mexico.
Homem and his forces engaged those of the Quiteve in battle, ultimately defeating
them and forcing their ruler to flee with his wives, children, and small armed guard to an

The Mongazes eventually became part of the Tongas.
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isolated, mountainous region where, because of its sacred significance, the Portuguese-allied
soldiers would not pursue him.475 But the mines the Portuguese found in the lands of the
both the Quiteve and Manica were a far cry from those of Potosí. Homem soon concluded
that there was little left to conquer, that the potential resources garnered there, both in
wealth and manpower, would be insufficient to proceed toward Mocaranga without refitting
yet again, and thus he withdrew his men to Sofala. When two hundred of Homem’s men,
sent to prospect for silver above the Zambezi’s Cabora Bassa rapids, were massacred by
local forces, the dreams of conquering Mocaranga were shelved, at least for a time.476
Monclaro reflected in defeat that, “there is much potential wealth in this region, but it is
largely out of reach of the Portuguese.”477 “To endeavor to conquer these territories is to
waste money and Portuguese [lives],” he noted with resignation. “He who would have all,
loses all.”478
Overall, the Barreto-Homem expedition was a failure. Due to a combination of
disease and the force of the Mongazes, the Portuguese fell well short of their ultimate
objective of conquering the mines of the interior, expelling the Muslims, and punishing the
Monomotapa for Silveira’s execution. Moreover, the mines that were found were far less rich
than imagined, leading the settlers who remained there to revert from mining to “the trade in

Couto, Década IX da Ásia [Decade IX of Asia], in RSEA, vol. 6: ch. 24, 389-390. On the sacred meaning of
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cloth,” which, they ultimately deemed “more profitable” since local peoples valued cloth so
highly.479
The expedition did result in certain successes for the Portuguese, however. Barreto
and Homem managed to fortify Sena and Tete with artillery and walls of stone and mortar.480
The two fortresses now housed Portuguese crown-appointed captains with small garrisons
of royal troops, and soon arose as the central nodes of Portuguese crown power on the
rivers. In addition, the Monomotapa offered three concessions in order to avoid war with
the Portuguese, laying the groundwork for their future alliance. First, he promised to expel
the Muslims from his territory; second, to guarantee the unmolested activity of missionaries
throughout his dominions; and third, to cede the gold mines in his territory as well.481 In
addition, the second phase of the expedition, under Homem’s leadership, impressed
Portuguese power on the Quiteve, forced the royal family to flee, and secured Portuguese
access to the gold mines of that kingdom as well as those of Manica.482
Although the Barreto-Homem expedition failed to achieve the crown’s overarching
objective of extending formal sovereignty over the gold fields of the interior, in subsequent
decades Portuguese traders and adventurers spread throughout the region. As the
Mocaranga polity weakened in the late sixteenth century, it began ceding territories to
competing groups, like the Quiteve and Chicanga, as well as to powerful Portuguese. As
these figures rose in power, Lisbon sought to extend its official sovereignty over the region
through a variety of means. The first means of doing so was by appointing captains at the
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main trade fairs. And since the fairs were so lightly guarded by royal soldiers, local settlerlandholders were the only ones powerful enough to serve as captains and protect the forts.483
Sena and Tete emerged as the undisputed centers of Portuguese power on the
Zambezi after their fortification and establishment as captaincies.484 The captain was almost
always a prominent settler appointed by the Captain of Mozambique. In addition to the fort,
Sena, the larger of the two towns, also had a church and “factory,” or warehouse, “to which
are brought all the cloth, beads.”485 If in 1561 there were only ten to fifteen “Portuguese”
resident in Sena, by the 1590s Santos estimated that total at around fifty, alongside several
hundred converted local peoples and Indians, bringing the total population of Christians to
around two thousand.486 Tete, slightly smaller, was home to some “six hundred Christians
[…], of whom about forty were Portuguese and the others Indians and cafres.”487 This meant
that already by the second half of the sixteenth century, Tete had a population of Christians
roughly comparable to that of Sofala.
The settlers had initially gained civil and criminal jurisdiction over the areas around
Sena and Tete when the Monomotapa granted it to them in the mid-sixteenth century.488 As
a result, the newly appointed Captain of Tete became lord over an area of two to three
leagues around the town. The area encompassed eleven native villages each headed by “a
cafre captain or governor, […] called an encosse. All these cafres are subjects and vassals of the
Captain of Tete, to whom they refer their suits and quarrels, in which he judges and gives
sentence when the encosse is unable to decide and settle them.”489 “The jurisdiction of the
Captain of Tete over these cafres is so complete,” wrote Santos, “that he even has authority
Lobato, Colonização senhorial da Zambézia, 82.
Santos, Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia], 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 8, 267-.
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over the chiefs themselves.”490 In times of war, or even simply when in need labor to
maintain the fort or for other public works, the captain could call on his eleven encosses, “who
come forthwith with their men armed with bows, arrows, spears, hoes, axes, and everything
else that is required, according to the service for which they are summoned.”491 In short
order, wrote Santos, the Captain of Tete could command some two thousand of the “most
valiant” “cafre warriors.”492
Of all the Portuguese fairs and settlements of the interior, Massapa was the most
important since it served as the official center for Portuguese trade with Mocaranga. Given
that Mocaranga power outstripped that of the Portuguese throughout most of the sixteenth
century, the captain there derived his authority and legitimacy first from the Monomotapa
and only second from the king of Portugal and his agents in Goa and Mozambique Island.
Local settlers elected the captain, who was then confirmed by the Monomotapa. According
to Santos, as in Tete, the Monomotapa gave the Captain of Massapa, “jurisdiction and
supreme judicial authority over all the cafres who come to [that fair] and those who live on his
lands or within his borders. He has power to give verbal sentence in all cases, and he can
even condemn the guilty to be hanged, without appeal against his sentence.”493
In turn, the Portuguese crown then confirmed the Captain of Massapa as well.
Beyond his authority over local Mocaranga peoples, “the viceroys of India” granted him
“power to act as judge and chief of all the Portuguese who frequent these kingdoms.” The
Captains of Sofala, Sena, Tete, and Massapa all had “similar jurisdiction and authority […] to
pass sentence on the Christians in the country, and carry such sentences into execution”
without appeal. In addition, the Captain of Massapa served in effect as the ambassador of
Ibid. 291-292~.
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the crown of Portugal, and as “agent in all matters between the Portuguese and
Monomotapa; he acts here also as factor of Monomotapa to receive all the duties paid to
him by the merchants, both Christians and Moors, which are one piece of cloth in every
twenty brought into these lands to be sold.” In return, the Monomotapa guaranteed “the
secure passage of traders through” his land “to sell their merchandise,” ensuring that no one
would impede them.494 Perhaps most importantly, noted Santos, no person was allowed to
“enter the territory between Massapa and the residence of the king [ie. the Monomotapa]
without the license of the king or the captain, for which reason this place is called the Gates
of Massapa, and the captain the Captain of the Gates.”495 Moreover, the captaincy was a
lifetime post, and no captain could resign from it, or leave Massapa without the
Monomotapa’s permission.

From Vassals to Lords

While the Portuguese never forcibly “conquered” the Mocaranga polity or its mines,
the progressive splintering of that once dominant power created a unique opportunity for
the Portuguese crown to establish its supremacy in the region in the early seventeenth
century. Internecine conflicts of succession and threats from rebellious vassals and hostile
neighboring polities compelled the Monomotapa to appeal increasingly to powerful settlerintermediaries for military assistance to defend his dominium. The first such example of this
partnership came in 1597, when the Monomotapa requested Portuguese aid in driving out
the forces of Chunzo, a neighboring kingdom that had invaded from the west.496 “The
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Portuguese agreed very willingly,” wrote the chronicler, António Bocarro, “because of the
advantage they would derive from the land being free of robbers,” whose presence was
known to suppress trade. The Portuguese “immediately set out to accompany the army of
Monomotapa,” defeating one of Chunzo’s captains and securing the peaceful surrender and
vassalage of another. Although the Monomotapa was spared defeat, the event marked a
significant shift in the region’s balance of power. “From that time forth,” in gratitude for
their aid, he “allowed the Portuguese to enter his country with guns, a thing which was
strictly forbidden by him before.”497
In addition to external threats like that of the Chunzo, the Monomotapa Gatsi
Lusere, was increasingly faced with internal ones as well. When Matuzianhe, a pretender to
the throne, rose in rebellion, and proclaimed himself “King of Mocaranga,” he divided the
territory among four rebel headmen, each of which opened a separate front in the war,
“wasting and ravaging the surrounding lands and obstructing the roads so that the
Portuguese and their traders could not come or go in safety with their merchandise.”498 In
this case, the settlers were spurred into action not at the Monomotapa’s request, but to
protect their own interests. In 1607, the preeminent settler-headman, Diogo Simões Madeira,
led a force out of Tete that “attacked and defeated the enemies” on three of the four fronts,
and compelled the fourth rebel headman to offer peace and obedience to Madeira in order
to avoid the slaughter of his men.499 With that, and with the Monomotapa’s confirmation,
Madeira became lord of twenty-five villages around Tete and of another two thousand
soldiers.500
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Recognizing that “the Portuguese were the principal cause of his success,” the
Monomotapa summoned Madeira, expressed profound gratitude, and promised to “give him
the silver mines in his kingdom.”501 Madeira subsequently “induced the emperor” to expand
that donation to include not only the silver mines, but also those “of gold and other metals
[…] in the whole of his kingdom” and to assign that grant to the Portuguese crown, rather
than to Madeira personally.502 In the donation, the Mocaranga ruler thanked Madeira for his
services, asked “his Majesty [of Portugal] to accept him as his brother in arms,” and pledged
“to give to his Majesty all the mines of gold, copper, iron, lead, and pewter which may be in
my empire.”503 He offered these grants, however, on the crucial condition that “the king of
Portugal […] shall maintain me in my position […] and shall give me forces with which to
go and take possession of my court and destroy [the] rebellious thief, […] Matuzianhe.”504
A contemporary Jesuit report reflected on the impact of those events in which “one
Diogo Simões [Madeira], who is very rich and a friend of the King [of Monomotapa], […]
helped and assisted him greatly in the war against his rebels.”505 The report went on to
explain that the Monomotapa “so highly esteems the Portuguese for his safeguarding,” that
in addition to allowing them to go about armed throughout his territory, “he beseeches and
implores them to build their fortresses where they wish, […] even near his Court.”506 The
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Portuguese obliged, assigning a force consisting of Portuguese, “sons of Portuguese” [ie.
mestiços], and Tonga soldiers, to serve as a permanent bodyguard of the Monomotapa
accompanying him everywhere throughout the rest of the seventeenth century.507 As a result,
the report continued, the Portuguese were “so feared and respected,” it was “as if they
wielded much more power than they do.”508 Although accompanied by “slaves with bows
and arrows, and a few guns for their protection,” the Portuguese “go peacefully throughout
the interior of that great Empire and are given shelter and food as if they were born there
and were lords of that land.”509
Given the general freedom with which the Portuguese could now traverse
Mocaranga, in 1608 King Philip II of Portugal [Philip III of Spain] issued instructions to his
viceroy in Goa, João Frojas Pereira, for the comprehensive fortification of the Zambezi.
Noting that the Monomotapa was “very weak at present because the neighboring kings are
fighting him and his subjects have risen up against him,” Philip saw a prime opportunity to
extend his influence – if not formal dominion – across the Zambezi Valley and beyond.510
He ordered that Sofala, Sena, and Tete all be provided additional garrisons and ammunition,
both “for the continuation of the commerce and trade, and because they are necessary for
the conquest of the silver mines.”511 In addition to those at Sena and Tete, he also ordered
the construction of four other fortresses: at the Lupata Gorge, Massapa, Bucoto, and
Luanze.
In 1696, the Augustinian administrator of the Church of Mozambique and the Rivers, António da
Conceição, mentioned the existence of such a force in his, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama. For a published version
translated into English, see Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama.
508 “Relaçam Annal das cousas que fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus,” book 1, ch. 2, in DPMAC, vol.
9 (1989): 165. Original manuscript found in the Biblioteca Pública de Évora, Res. 794, fls. 1-6.
509 Ibid.
510 “Regimento dado ao Vice-Rei da Índia, D. João Forjaz Pereira, para a conquista do Monomotapa; Lisbon,
21 March 1608,” Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo [ANTT hereafter], Documentos Remetidos da Índia ou Livros
das Monções [DRILM hereafter], vol. 2, fls. 14. See also, DPMAC, vol. 9, 118-120.
511 “Regimento dado ao Vice-Rei da Índia, D. João Forjaz Pereira,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, fls. 14. See also,
DPMAC, vol. 9, 125-127.
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Philip instructed his viceroy to proceed with tact, however, so as not to offend the
Monomotapa, and if possible, to obtain his consent in constructing those forts so as to avoid
any potential “waste and damage a war would bring.”512 The viceroy, through his local
captains, was to send the Monomotapa “gifts of cloth and other goods which he values,”
and to convey to him that in the construction of those forts, the Portuguese were not
“taking his land from him, nor his government, nor are we fighting for possession of his
pastures and cultivated lands, which are his means of subsistence and which he values above
all.”513 Instead, Portuguese officials were to impress upon the Monomotapa that their “only
interest is in the metals,” which, according to Philip, were “not important to him and do not
constitute his wealth.”514
In addition, in his official letter of acceptance of the Monomotapa’s donation of the
mines the previous year, in 1608 Philip proclaimed that his Mocaranga counterpart “shall
enjoy all the honors, blessings and privileges of my brother kings.”515 As a “brother-inarms,” all Portuguese India officials, including the viceroy and various captains “shall assist,
defend and support him with my fleets and soldiers, protecting him from any harm.”516
Finally, Philip reaffirmed that, above and beyond the search for gold and silver, his supreme
objective remained to convert “the said Emperor and his vassals to our Holy Catholic

512 “Regimento dado ao Vice-Rei da Índia, D. João Forjaz Pereira,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, fls. 14. See also,
DPMAC, vol. 9, 125-127.
513 Ibid.
514 Ibid.
515 “‘Carta de Imãos em Armas’ do Rei de Portugal a favor do Imperador do Monomotapa, em reposta à carta
desta de 4-8-1607; Lisboa, 27 Setembro 1608,” Biblioteca da Ajuda, SI-VIl-44, fls.118v-120v. Also available in
DPMAC, vol. 9: 135.
516 Ibid. On Portuguese agreements of “brotherhood” or “friendship” with local polities across the Indian
Ocean world, see António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, Iustum Imperium: Dos tratados como fundamento do império dos
portugueses no Oriente. Estudo de história do direito internacional e do direito português (Lisbon/Macao: Fundação Oriente,
Instituto Português do Oriente, 1997), 356-366, 394-395; João Paulo Oliveira e Costa and Vítor Luís Gaspar
Rodrigues, Portugal y Oriente: El proyecto indiano del Rey Juan (Madrid: Colecciones MAPFRE, 1992), 51-53; and
Zoltán Biedermann, “The Matrioshka Principle and How it was Overcome: Portuguese and Habsburg Imperial
Attitudes in Sri Lanka and the Responses of the Rulers of Kotte (1506-1598),” Journal of Early Modern History 13
(2009): 265-310.
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Faith,” and “bring about the spread and increase of [that] Faith in all the kingdoms, lands
and provinces of trade and conquest belonging to the Crown of Portugal.”517 With that in
mind, he enjoined the Monomotapa to “permit the Holy Gospel to be preached in all the
lands and kingdoms” within his jurisdiction, and proclaimed that “churches and crosses may
be set up in those parts and places ordained by the ministers of the Church, who shall not be
harmed or troubled, neither shall those who have been converted to our Holy Faith.”518
Even after the formalization of this brotherhood-in-arms with the Portuguese
crown, the Monomotapa’s effective power continued to decline. According to Bocarro,
when he launched a premature punitive expedition against his former vassals in the kingdom
of Baroe, they “defended themselves valiantly, […] killed many of his Mocarangas, and
reduced him to such extremity by warfare and hunger that he was exposed to total ruin.”519
At the same time, a weakened but not defeated Matuzianhe seized the opportunity to
continue his conquest of Mocaranga dominions elsewhere. But Madeira, “who was then
Captain of Tete,” attacked Matuzianhe with a force of “fifty guns and four thousand very
valiant cafres, who are the vassals and friends of Tete, […] routed him, and dispossessed him”
of his many lands and vassals.520 On the spot where the battle took place,” wrote Bocarro,
Madeira “built a wooden fort, in which he placed twenty guns and three hundred cafres, thus
rendering those lands secure.”521 Madeira then provided the Monomotapa with twenty guns
and a thousand soldiers, vassals of Tete, who accompanied him to Chidima, where he
remained for the rest of that year.522 The result of all this was to increase the Monomotapa’s

517 “‘Carta de Imãos em Armas’ do Rei de Portugal a favor do Imperador do Monomotapa, em reposta à carta
desta de 4-8-1607; Lisboa, 27 Setembro 1608,” Biblioteca da Ajuda (BA), SI-VIl-44, fls.118v-120v. Also
available in DPMAC, vol. 9: 135.
518 Ibid.
519 Bocarro, Década XIII da Ásia, in RSEA, vol. 3: ch. 129, 372-373.
520 Ibid.
521 Ibid.
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dependence on the Portuguese further still and to strengthen Portuguese control over even
more of Mocaranga.
Despite their official alliance as “brothers-in-arms,” and despite the rising power of
the Portuguese, throughout the first quarter of the seventeenth century the Captain of
Mozambique continued to pay the curva to the Monomotapa throne, in symbolic recognition
of Portugal’s vassalage to the Mocaranga ruler. In 1627, however, the relationship was
reversed. The event leading to this inversion was the execution of the Portuguese envoy,
Jerónimo de Barros, by Caprasine, the then-reigning Monomotapa.523 The particular reasons
behind Barros’ execution remain unclear. But whatever the cause, the event had profound
repercussions.524
In retribution, the powerful settler, Diogo de Sousa de Meneses, led a combined
force of some two hundred and fifty Portuguese and thirty thousand of their vassals in war
against Caprasine, defeated him, and “proclaimed as emperor” his brother, “a Christian
whom the friars of St. Dominic had converted and baptized, calling him Dom Philip
Mavura.”525 Marking the Portuguese crown’s official transition to lord of Mocaranga, Mavura
“submitted himself and became a vassal of his Majesty, with all his empire, promising to pay
every year as tribute three pastos [a measure of gold far smaller than which the Portuguese
had previously paid to the Monomotapa] to the Captain of Mozambique.”526 By this act,

“Caprasine” is referred to in several texts as “Kaparidze.”
Pedro Barreto de Rezende – secretary to the Count of Linhares, the viceroy of India – asserted that
Caprasine had simply ordered Barros’ execution “for no other reason than his wickedness,” although there
were more complex reasons. Rezende, Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India], in RSEA, vol. 2, part 2,
413-419~.
525 Rezende, Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India], in RSEA, vol. 2, part 2, 413-419~. In one instance,
Rezende refers to him as D. Philip Marcara, and in another, as D. Philip Mavura. The figure Rezende refers to
as “Marcara,” appears in the official treaty he signed with the Portuguese as “Manuza.” See, “Treslado das
Capitulações que fizeram os Portugueses com El Rey de Monomotapa,” Tete, 28 June 1629, in RSEA, vol. 5,
287-290. For an account of the battle, and of the troop numbers, see, “Letter from Friar Louis, of the Order of
Preachers, to his Provincial; 3 February 1630,” in RSEA, vol. 2, 427-428.
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wrote Pedro Barreto de Rezende, the “great empire” of Mocaranga, including all of its
“dependent kingdoms,” was “thus rightfully acquired and added to the crown of his
Majesty.”527
The 1629 treaty, in addition to formalizing the transfer of power to the crown of
Portugal, stipulated a new diplomatic protocol in which, from then forward, on entering the
Monomotapa’s zimbabwe, the Portuguese could remain “shod and covered, with their arms in
their belts, as they speak to the king of Portugal, and he shall give them a chair on which to
seat themselves without clapping their hands.”528 Highlighting the relations of power in
which the Portuguese now held prominent position, from thence forward the Monomotapa
was required to “consult” the Portuguese-crown appointed Captain of Massapa “concerning
war and any other novel events which arise.”529 To reinforce the crown’s monopoly on trade
and mining in the region, the treaty stipulated that the Monomotapa “shall not give land
containing gold to any person of whatever rank, this being very prejudicial to the barter and
commerce [of the Captain] of Mozambique.”530 The conditions also formalized the
Portuguese crown’s territorial dominion in and around the numerous trade fairs and
settlements of the interior, including not only Massapa and Luanze, but also the lands
surrounding Tete, which the Portuguese had conquered in the recent war, and which the
agreement officially “annexed thereto.”531
To placate the Monomotapa, the treaty ensured that in return for sending those
“three pastas of Botonga” every three years to the newly arrived Captain of Mozambique, the

527 Ibid. For another account of these events and the treaty that followed, see “Treslado da carta de Antonio
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Monomotapa would continue receiving the customary, albeit by now purely symbolic,
satisfaction of his tri-annual “gift,” from the Portuguese crown.532 By the 1630s, however, as
crown control in the region reached its apex, the Portuguese king was no longer comfortable
providing such “gifts,” explaining that, as he saw it, “it is not proper that being my vassal the
Captains of Mozambique should pay tribute” to the Monomotapa.533 As an alternative, the
viceroy of India “should grant him license to trade with a certain number of pieces of cloth
in the rivers of Cuama, in such quantity and in such manner as appeared fitting, that might
satisfy him, and might not be prejudicial to the monopoly of the cloth.”534 In addition, he
should send to the Monomotapa a compilation of the laws of Portugal, “for the government
and good administration of his kingdoms, with the necessary declarations in accordance with
his usages and customs.”535 This last point was crucial since it meant that local Mocaranga
custom maintained a degree of power vis-à-vis royal law even after the subjugation of the
Monomotapa to the Portuguese crown.

Extending Crown Control

Throughout most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese crown
headquartered its Southeast African operations on Mozambique Island, which they had

A pasta was a measure of gold worth eight hundred Portuguese cruzados. This “gift,” or sagoate, was a
synonym of curva, or tribute.
533 “Carta régia para o vice-rei da Índia,” Lisbon, 5 March 1634, in RSEA, vol. 4, 240.
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fortified in the early sixteenth century.536 As the king’s highest representative in the region,
the Captain of Mozambique held wide-ranging authority with delegated jurisdiction over
both civil and criminal cases. The captain also enjoyed a monopoly on all trade there. When
in 1562 the queen regent Catherine appointed Fernão Martins Freire d’Andrade as Captain
of the fortress of Sofala and Mozambique, she explained to her viceroy in Goa that she
“thought fit to entrust to d’Andrade all the business, trade, and barter of the river of Cuama
[ie. the Zambezi] and of the other rivers of Sofala, on behalf of my treasury.”537 In no
“goods can anyone but the captain trade, and he makes himself quite rich from it in very
little time,” wrote João Baptista de Ribeira three years later.”538 According to Ribeira, the
captaincy of Mozambique was “the most lucrative Fort in all of India, […] because in three
years they [the captains] make 100,000 ducados.”539 As a result, for most of the sixteenth
century, the captain focused primarily on controlling the region’s coastal trade and
navigation for his own personal financial benefit, and largely eschewed expanding the
Estado’s territorial footprint on the East African mainland.
In addition to the captain, a modest garrison of troops and a handful of
administrative and treasury officers constituted the entire formal presence of the Portuguese
crown on Mozambique Island. Other officials occasionally wintered there en route to
Portuguese India stations further east, but their presence on the island was temporary,
usually not lasting more than a few months at a time. Even at the height of Portuguese
power in Southeast Africa, beyond Mozambique Island, the official Portuguese presence in

536 See Malyn Newitt, “Mozambique Island: The Rise and Decline of an East African Coastal City, 1500-1700,”
Portuguese Studies 20, no. 1 (2004): 21-37; and C. R. Boxer, “Moçambique Island as a Way-station for Portuguese
Indiamen,” The Mariner’s Mirror 48 (1962): 3-18.
537 “Alvará d’El Rey sobre o trato dos Rios de Cuama e Sofalla correr por conta de sua fazenda,” Lisbon, 13
March 1562, in RSEA, vol. 5, 254-255.
538 “Carta de P. João Baptista de Ribeira (de Goa) para Alfonso de Zárate, Reitor do collegio de Córdova, 27 de
Outubro de 1565,” DI, vol. 6, 1563-1566, 536.
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the region consisted of only a handful of captains and their ill-equipped garrisons at isolated,
lightly fortified trade posts along the coast (in Sofala and Quelimane, for instance), the
Zambezi (at Sena and Tete), and in the interior, at the trade fair at Massapa. The crown also
appointed a series of “Captains of the Conquest of the Mines,” and “of the Rivers,” referring
to the so-called rivers of Cuama. But these were not permanent posts, and their occupants
often also functioned simultaneously as captains of Mozambique.
As the Monomotapa’s hegemony waned in the early seventeenth century, the
Portuguese crown arose as the preeminent power in the region. Importantly, colonists and
their private armies, rather than crown agents, were the primary actors responsible for
affecting that rise. As a result, the Portuguese crown advanced a series of plans and
proposals to consolidate its control and ensure that sovereignty remained in the hands of the
king, rather than the settlers. These efforts, which reached their climax in the 1630s and
1640s, included the extension of royal land grants, continued calls for the construction and
bolstering of fortifications, the dispatching of professional miners, and even comprehensive
plans to further colonize the Zambezi and interior.
The first lands secured by Portuguese and mestiço settlers in the region had not been
granted by the Portuguese crown, but by local kings and fumos who held sway over the region
before Lisbon achieved any significant degree of territorial dominion there. It was early land
grants like these that formed the foundation of what eventually became known as the prazo
system in the eighteenth century. In 1612, for instance, Philip instructed his viceroy that
although “the said lands have indeed been given to [Madeira] by the Monomotapa, you
should send him grant in my name” as well.540 The king provided the two key caveats,
however. First, in confirming that grant to Madeira, the king reserved for himself “the mines
“Carta régia para o vice-rei da Índia, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo,” Lisbon, 24th March 1612, in RSEA, vol.
4, 86.
540
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of gold, silver, or other metals which there may be in the said lands.”541 In addition, he
required that Madeira subject himself to the “orders and commands of the generals of the
conquest, or in default thereof, of the Captain of Mozambique.”542 As such, the king sought
to satisfy Madeira’s desire for formal authority and lordship, while at the same time reserving
the mineral wealth for himself, and bringing Madeira more firmly under Portuguese crown
control.
At around the same moment, as Portuguese power was on the rise in the region, the
crown began also allocating its own original land grants directly. In 1618, Philip ordered his
Captain of Mozambique, Nuno Álvares Pereira, to provide “the new settlers,” with lands and
“to distribute them in such a manner that […] there shall be in each part the people
necessary for the increase of the settlements and cultivation of the lands.”543 But the
recipients of such grants were not free to do completely as they pleased. They also incurred
certain obligations, at least in theory. They were expected “to live in the said lands
themselves and with their families, […] to cultivate them,” to defend them, and to pay a
small quit-rent to the crown.544 If in 1618 the king sought to facilitate the widespread
occupation of the territory through land grants, in the following decade crown officials in
Goa favored a more targeted approach. To facilitate “the conservation of the Rivers [of
Cuama],” the lands were to be located “nearby our settlements” in order to subdue the local
peoples who inhabited them.545 And in places with few Portuguese settlers, like the island of
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Luabo, the Captain of Mozambique began delegating authority over the land and its peoples
to local fumos.546
In addition to submitting local indigenous groups to Portuguese colonial rule, crown
officials also used lands grants as a means of reining in settlers. In 1629, Gaspar Barbosa, the
newly appointed ouvidor-geral, provedor dos defuntos, and vedor da fazenda, was tasked with
“wresting the lands from the jurisdiction of the powerful [settlers],” and reapportioning
them to other persons as he saw fit. This was intended to enhance the crown’s “jurisdiction,
command, and power” so that all these “newly conquered” lands would be brought more
firmly under the control of the royal “treasury of his Majesty.”547
By the mid 1630s, the crown had apportioned grants throughout large swathes of
territory south and west of the Zambezi. In 1635, Rezende explained that all the lands
around Sena and Tete had been divided among Portuguese settlers, “some by gift of the
Captains of Mozambique, others by grant from his Majesty.”548 In the following decade, after
Portugal’s “restoration” of independence from the Spanish Monarchy, the crown continued
granting lands with the aim of expanding its effective jurisdiction.549 In 1646, King John IV
instructed his Captain of Mozambique to “distribute the lands of the Rivers of Cuama
equally among the cazados who are sent there, so that they may sustain themselves from those
same lands.”550 In addition to providing each settler their sustenance, the instruction to
546 Rezende, Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India], in RSEA, vol. 2, part 2, 407-408. Luabo was at the
southern mouth of the Zambezi delta.
547 “Carta do vice-rei conde de Linhares para o rei, 15 de Janeiro de 1630,” Arquivo Portugues Oriental, tomo 4,
vol. 2 (1937), 111, quoted in Rodrigues, “Mercadores, Conquistadores e Foreiros,” 456-457.
548 Rezende, Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India], in RSEA, vol. 2 (1898): part 2, 413-419. But, he
lamented, despite the vast dimensions of those lands “they yield very little” either in terms of agricultural
produce or precious metals.
549 “Carta Régia sobre o provimento de Justica, que necessitavao os Rios de Cuama, pela falta de vassallage de
seus moradores. Feita a 15 de Dezembro de 1646,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, book 57, fol. 51; and “Sua Reposta;
15 Dezembro 1647,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, book 57, fols. 387-387v.
550 “Carta Régia, Para o cap’am da fortaleza de Moçãobique o a sere partirem igualmente as terras dos Rios da
Cuama pellos cazados q la se inviore; Lisboa, 15 de dez’ro de 646,” Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino [AHU
hereafter], códice 208, Cartas Régias, 1643-1678, fol. 95v.
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distribute such lands “equally” was also a potential means of curbing the rise of excessively
powerful settlers with disproportionate territorial domain. Moreover, in order to ensure the
diffusion of such territorial dominium among an increasing number of settlers, the king
decreed that, on the death of the grantee, only a third of their land “shall […] go to their
heirs,” while the remaining “two thirds […] shall be divided among” newly arrived casados
“sent to that conquest.”551
The policy of apportioning lands to settlers coincided with roughly simultaneous
efforts to fortify Portuguese territories in Southeast Africa while at the same promoting
colonization to further populate the region with settlers loyal to the Portuguese crown.
When a Dutch fleet attacked Mozambique Island in 1607 and again in 1608, destroying
much of the town and pillaging the churches and warehouses, the Portuguese king and
viceroy made the fortification of that island a priority.552 Sofala, although long since eclipsed
by Mozambique as the official center of colonial administration and trade in the region,
nonetheless remained of strategic concern for the Portuguese since it offered a potential
disembarkation point for enemies to approach the mines overland from the south. As a
result, throughout the 1630s and 1640s several contemporaries advanced plans to reinforce
Sofala’s defense.553 Quelimane, Luabo, and other coastal points on the Zambezi delta were
the focus of fortification efforts as well.554
551 “Carta Régia sobre o provimento de Justica, que necessitavao os Rios de Cuama, pela falta de vassallage de
seus moradores. Feita a 15 de Dezembro de 1646,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, book 57, fol. 51; and “Sua Reposta;
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552 For a contemporary account of the August 1607 Dutch attack on Mozambique Island, see “Carta que a
cidade de Goa escreveo a Sua Magestade o anno de 1607,” in RSEA, vol.5, fols. 284-285. On another plan a
decade later to prevent another Dutch attack on Mozambique, see Biblioteca da Ajuda, Códice 51-VIII-8, 31
Janeiro 1612: “Carta régia de D. Filipe II, sobre se enviar a Moçambique munições para se defender, para o
caso de os holandeses, que têm naus aparelhadas para Maluco e Pérsia, atacarem a fortaleza.” For continued
efforts in the 1630s, see “Carta sobre as prevencoens para a defensa de Mocambique, 27 Janeiro 1633,” ANTT,
DRILM, vol. 1, book 30, fol. 254; and for the 1640s, see “Para o capitão da fortaleza de moçaobique, 22
Fevereiro 1644,” AHU, Códice 208, Cartas Régias, 1643-1678, fol. 1v.
553 For efforts to strengthen Sofala’s fortifications in 1633, see, “Carta sobre a conquista das Minas de
Monomotapa, fortifiaçõens do Porto de Sofala, e Bocas do Rio de Cuama, Quilimane, Luabo; 3 Abril 1632,” in
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The push to fortify the interior and formalize settlers’ possession of the territory was
meant to benefit the royal treasury in three fundamental ways. On the one hand, the crown
received a quit-rent (albeit a small one) from the settler-grantee for each land granted. More
importantly, in expanding Portuguese occupation in the region and reinforcing that
occupation with increased military power, the crown sought to more firmly control
commerce and ensure that it channeled a larger portion of the profits of such commerce into
the royal treasury. In addition, rather than continuing to suppress independent trade in the
region, in the mid 1630s the king sent repeated instructions to his officials on the ground to
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king ordered the establishment of a permanent garrison there of thirty men. This measure was a means not
only of repelling any potential attacks from the Dutch or neighboring native indigenous polities. It was also, the
king made clear, intended “limit the killings” and combat the general “oppression to which the powerful there
submit the poor,” in reference to the leading independent settlers who often exercised their power violently
over their slaves and dependents and all others who threatened their interests and hegemony in the Southeast
African hinterland. See, “Letter from the King to the Viceroy of India, Joaõ Nunes da Cunha; Lisbon, 8
January 1666,” in RSEA, vol.4, 341; and “Carta R sobre ser conveniente fazer-se hum prezidio com trinta
homens, e hum Capitão em Sena, para acautellar as mortes, e oppressaão que ali fazião os poderozos aos
pobres, e sobre executar o que ja lhe tinha determinado acerca da entrada de Quilimane, Porto dos Rios de
Cuama. Feita 25 Janeiro 1647,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, book 57, fols. 71-73; and “Sua reposta, de 15
Dezembro 1647,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, book 57, fol. 388.
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encourage all commerce between Portuguese settlers and local peoples, including with
members of polities, like the Maravi, that were not subjected to Portuguese imperial rule.555
Noting that such trade was “of no damage to my service or treasury,” he argued that, “on
the contrary, many evils might result from their not holding this commerce.”556
While Philip was willing to recognize as licit the omnipresent trade between settlers
and local peoples, he commanded his officials to “show great care and vigilance in
preventing any communication or trade between the cafres of the coast and the Dutch and
other European nations.”557 Such exchange, he warned, “would lead to very serious evil,” as
“it might facilitate their designs on the mines of Monomotapa.”558 This effort to exclude
European competitors from the Southeast Africa trade was consistent with broader efforts
at establishing and maintaining Portugal’s mare clausum across the Indian Ocean world, but in
this case, its specific inspiration highlighted the crown’s primary material objective in the
region: to secure exclusive access to the region’s mineral wealth.
Despite never encountering mines anywhere near the magnitude of those the
Spanish found in the New World, the Portuguese remained convinced that Southeast Africa
might one day become their own Mexico or Peru. This was because local traders brought
substantial quantities of precious metals to the various fairs for exchange, and because local

555 “Carta régia para o vice-rei da Índia,” Lisbon, 28 March 1635, in RSEA, vol. 4, 266; “Carta para permittir
aos Moradores de Moçambique o Commercio com os Cafres, e Negros Maraves, e que houvesse vigilancia em
impedir qualquer communicação que os Negros, Cafres da Costa de Moçambique, tivessem com os
Hollandezes, e outros Europeos, 28 Março 1635,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, book 32, fols. 144-146; “Carta para
que se permittisse aos Moradores de Mocambique, o commercio com os Cafres Maravez. Que senão
proseguisse na devassa a este respeito. Que se impedisse aos ditos Cafres todo o trato com Hollandezes, e
outros Estrangeiros da Europa, pelo damno que se seguia. 12 Fevereiro 1636,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, book
36, fols. 189-191. The Maravi kingdom held a vast swathe of territory stretching north some fifty leagues from
the Zambezi all the way Mozambique Island.
556 “Carta régia para o vice-rei da Índia,” Lisbon, 28 March 1635, in RSEA, vol. 4, 266; “Carta para permittir
aos Moradores de Moçambique o Commercio com os Cafres, e Negros Maraves, e que houvesse vigilancia em
impedir qualquer communicação que os Negros, Cafres da Costa de Moçambique, tivessem com os
Hollandezes, e outros Europeos, 28 Março 1635,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, book 32, fols. 144-146.
557 Ibid.
558 Ibid.
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rulers continually promised the existence of vast mineral deposits in the interior in order to
gain or maintain Portuguese favor.559 The majority of locally sourced metals were procured
through the labor-intensive process of sifting sediment in the rivers, or through the mining
of superficial deposits. The mythical mountains of gold simply did not exist on the scale the
Portuguese hoped.
Nevertheless, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese
continued to search. In 1632, Philip dispatched to the Zambezi two professional miners,
Martim de Souto and Andrés de Vides y Albarado, with extensive experience in Spanish
America.560 After interviewing several locals in the area of Sena, Albarado remained
convinced that such mines existed after all, and promised the king that, if located, “Your
Majesty can have more profit than from all the Indies of Castile.”561 Albarado outlined a
comprehensive, three-part plan to facilitate the discovery and exploitation of those mines.562
First, the crown should open up trade to all settlers, not just the agents of the Captain of
Mozambique. Second, he should expand the bureaucracy of local treasury offices and
customs houses to ensure that settlers paid full duties on the metals they procured. Finally,
he urged Philip to send at least a thousand Portuguese casados to the region, along with their
families, and fifty or sixty missionaries in order to achieve the effective occupation of the

559 Expecting to find gold “in the streets and forests” of Manica, in 1570 the Portuguese were disappointed to
find that “it was extracted only with great difficulty.” Ever hopeful, in 1608 king Philip II of Portugal
mentioned to his viceroy the latest reports of “gold and silver mines [in] the kingdoms of Monomotapa.” See
Documenta Malucensia, 9: 119-21; cited in Pearson Port Cities and Intruders, 144. And in 1635, the viceroy, Miguel
de Noronha, relayed news he received from the region claiming that it contained “the greatest mines of all
metals which have not yet been discovered in the world.” Quoted in Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa,
1600-1700, 101.
560 “Sobre os Minejros que han de ir a Monomotapa, a fim de reconhecerem as minas; foram nomeados Martim
de Souto, ensaidor de minas castelhano, e D. Andrés de Vides e Alvaro…, que já servia nas Índias com o
mesmo ofício,” Biblioteca da Ajuda, Códice 51-X-4: 24 Dezembro 1632; and Rezende, Livro do Estado da India
[Of the State of India], in RSEA, vol. 2, part 2, 413-419.
561 “D. Andres de Vides y Albarado to Rei; Sena, 22 de julho de 1633,” Arquivo Histórico do Estado da Índia
(AHEI) 49, LM 41, fols. 13-14, quoted in Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 99.
562 Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 99.
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region, and to cultivate a cohesive colonial society obedient to Portuguese crown rule.563
“With this,” wrote Albarado, “your Majesty will be lord of the world as you deserve to
be.”564
No doubt thrilled at the prospect of such riches, beginning in 1635 Philip issued a
series of decrees to bring Albarado’s proposals into effect. As mentioned, he instructed his
viceroy to permit free trade between settlers and local peoples. And, in addition to
commanding his viceroy to send “factors, collectors, and secretaries in the customs houses,
for the security and good administration of the mines,” he decreed that, “all the gold and
silver extracted from the mines shall be stamped with the royal seal of this crown, in the
same manner as in the Spanish Indies, to prevent any misappropriation of it which might
otherwise occur.”565 He ordered his viceroy to send “a chief judge and a guardian of the
property of deceased persons” for “the administration of justice,” as well as additional
troops and horses, “to be divided among each of the settlements.”566 Perhaps most
importantly, he endorsed the plan to send “every year as many men and married couples as
possible, and given that “there is a greater scarcity of women for the residents to marry,” he
ordered “several women from the Casa-Pia” in Lisbon to be sent, along with “several young
girls.”567
But despite firm intentions, and despite repeated royal decrees to carry out such
plans, the colonization schemes never materialized. Malyn Newitt has ascribed this to the

563 For another proposal, from the previous year, to create a colony in the rivers of Cuama, which gave as the
underlying impetus behind such an enterprise to reverse the general “decline of the Estado da India,” see
“Apresentação do declínio do Estado da Índia, e do poder dos inimigos, e da conveniência, para se aumentar
aquele Estado, em se fazer colónia nos rios de Cuama,” Biblioteca da Ajuda (BA), Manuscrito Avulso, códice 54X-19, no. 38; 1632.
564 “D. Andres de Vides y Albarado to Rei; Sena, 22 de julho de 1633,” Arquivo Histórico do Estado da Índia
[AHEI] 49, LM 41, fols. 13-14, quoted in Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 99.
565 “Carta régia para o vice-rei da India,” Lisbon, 24 February 1635, RSEA, vol.4, 260-261.
566 Ibid. 257.
567 Ibid.
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crown’s lack of resources during the ongoing struggle with the Dutch, as well as to “vested
interests,” like the Captain of Mozambique, missionaries, and competing factions of settlers
and merchants, who opposed potential encroachments on their power and prosperity.568
Additional colonization schemes were proposed in the 1670s and 1690s. But like their earlier
iterations, they came into fruition.

Decline

The Portuguese crown’s effective jurisdiction in the interior of Southeast Africa
reached its apex in the 1630s. By that point, it had formalized some eighty-one land grants in
the Zambezi Valley, seventy-two of which were held by private settlers (fifty-nine by men
and thirteen by women), seven by the Dominicans and Jesuits, and the remaining two by
local fumos in the region of Tete subject to Portuguese colonial rule.569 Despite the failure to
carry out the proposed colonization scheme, Portuguese dominium in the region had
nonetheless reached such an extent that in 1634 the Portuguese chronicler, António Bocarro,
stated quite plainly that, “the lands are all ours […] not only along the river but thirty or
forty leagues back from it, and extending more than one hundred leagues in length from the
mouth at the bar of Quellimane up the stream.” “All these lands are given to Portugal,” he
continued, some “subject to the Captain of Sena and some to the Captain of Tete.”
However, even at the height of its hegemony, the crown’s effective authority
remained fragile and dependent on the collaboration of local groups, including both mestiço
Newitt, A History of Mozambique, 221-222.
Rodrigues, “Mercadores, Conquistadores e Foreiros,” 466. Rodrigues’s numbers are based on the 1634-1637
registry of Figueira de Almeida. We do not know the precise dimensions of most of these seventeenth century
land grants, but Alexandre Lobato has argued that in the mid eighteenth century, prazos ranged in size from
those which could be crossed in one day to those which it took eight days to cross on horseback. See Lobato,
Colonização senhorial da Zambézia, 114.
568
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settlers and indigenous vassals and allies. Remarking on the current balance of power,
Rezende admitted in 1635 that despite recent successes, “the power of the natives” remained
“vastly greater than that of the few Portuguese who are found in the country.”570 Moreover,
exposing the limits of crown control over the European settler population as well, António
Bocarro argued at almost exactly the same moment that although the territories claimed by
the crown of Portugal “are so extensive, they yield but little,” because the settlers and their
retainers “do not render us obedience in all things.”571
After the 1630s, Portuguese crown power in the region began fading with the
reconsolidation of several local polities. As a result, authority reverted primarily to the
leading settlers and their private armies. Already in the mid 1640s, the recently crowned king,
John IV, lamented to his viceroy “the lack of vassalage of the residents” of “the Rivers of
Cuama,” and called for the re-establishment of “justice” in the region.572 Proposals
throughout the 1640s and 1650s to ensure settlers’ obedience to Portuguese colonial
authority consistently failed to materialize, however. These included plans to garrison royal
troops at the strongholds of prominent settlers and to support those garrisons by imposing
rents on settlers’ surrounding estates.573 But the crown simply did not have the leverage or
resources to do so and was thus unable to reverse these centrifugal tendencies.

570 Captain Pedro Barreto de Rezende, Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India], in RSEA vol. 2, part 2, 418419. Beyond this military dependence, the Portuguese were likewise reliant on natives in conducting the very
trade that had brought them such wealth. Noting their loyalty and valor, Rezende’s portrayal ran counter to the
more derisive portrayals of native barbarity and moral corruption. “All the trade and merchandise of the
Portuguese in these extensive territories passes through the hands of cafres,” he wrote, “either their captives or
individuals known to them.” The Portuguese “entrust large quantities of the goods most esteemed and
valuable among them, which they carry for many leagues into the interior and barter for gold and ivory,
returning punctually with all the gain with so much truth and loyalty.”
571 António Bocarro, “Livro do Estado da Índia,” [1634], in RSEA, vol. 2, 409.
572 See “Para o VRey da India, sobre o stado em q le achão as cousas dos Rios de Cuama e pouca obediencia de
seus m’res, e lhe enviar algua g’te, Lisboa, 18 de fevereiro de 649,” AHU, Códice 208, fol. 124v; “Carta Régia
sobre o provimento de Justiça, que necessitavão os Rios de Cuama, pela falta de vassallage de seus moradores.
Feita a 15 de Dezembro de 1646,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 2, fol. 51; and “Sua Reposta,” 15 Dezembro 1647, fols.
387-387v.
573 Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi, 63.
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In his 1667, Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama, Vulgar e Verdadeiramente
chamados Rios do Ouro, the Jesuit Manuel Barreto reflected at length and with remarkable
frankness on the expansions and recessions of Portuguese power in the Southeast African
hinterland. Barreto noted the presence of crown-appointed captains at Quelimane, Sofala,
Sena, Tete, and the Monomotapa’s zimbabwe, and of several “minor captains” at Dambarare,
Ongoe, Luazi, Chipiriviri, and Manica. However, despite the geographic reach of crown
control, Barreto made quite clear his impression of the crown’s limited effective authority. In
reality, “his Majesty only possesses a triangle” of territory, he wrote, between Quelimane,
Chicova, and Sofala.574 Moreover, even in “those [Zambezi towns] which [he] saw,” and
where a captain resided, Barreto “noticed nothing to represent a captaincy beyond a wooden
stockade.” But, he wrote sardonically, he did observe, “several iron guns lying on the shore
full of sand, in proof of which an ear of green millet was growing from the touch-hole of
one of them, showing the great fertility of the soil and the great care which is taken of the
king’s property.”575
According to Barreto, true power was in the hands of leading settlers, rather than
with the crown itself. All the lands within that triangle of Portuguese dominium, he
explained, had “been gradually acquired” by the settlers through their own means and
efforts, and through their relationships with local polities and rulers. He mentioned António
Lobo da Silva, Manuel Foz de Abreu, and Manuel Paez de Pinho as among the leading
settlers of the period, and marveled at their wide-ranging authority and effective jurisdiction:
“the holders of these lands have the same power and jurisdiction as the cafre fumos [traditional
As Barreto wrote, that triangle extended from Quelimane, following one hundred and twenty six leagues to
the northwest along the Zambezi to Chicova, from there along “an imaginary line drawn from Chicova to the
port of Sofala,” a distance of roughly a hundred and leagues, and from there, along some sixty leagues of sea
coast back to Quelimane.” See, the Manuel Barreto, “Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama,
Vulgar e Verdadeiramente chamados Rios do Ouro. Ao Conde V. Rey João Nunez da Cunha, ” 11 December,
1667, in RSEA, vol. 3, 466.
575 Barreto, “Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama,” in RSEA, vol. 3, 506.
574
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chiefs] from whom they were conquered, for the deeds of lease were passed in that form,
and therefore they are like the potentates of Germany, and can pronounce sentence in all
cases, put to death, declare war, and impose tribute.” 576
In Tonga and Mocaranga culture, a headman’s power derived less from his material
wealth than from his ability to wield social influence over dependents and competitors
through violence or the threat of violence. In appointing a captain to guard the
Monomotapa’s zimbabwe, royal officials always selected “one of the settlers of the Rivers who
has his own cafre following, which makes him respected,” wrote another observer in the late
seventeenth century.577 Barreto himself explained that in order to dominate, it was necessary
that one have force and the willingness to apply it, “because the cafres will only fear and
respect those who have […] power.”578 Moreover, in joining a fumo’s ranks as soldiers, local
peoples were “much more interested in the spoils of war than in any payment.” In this way,
the leading settlers derived their legitimacy among local peoples as heirs to traditional kings
and chiefs, and adopted the local style of rule. This was crucial. The landholders, he wrote,
“would not be duly respected by their vassals if they did not hold the same powers as the
fumos whom they succeeded.”579
As Portuguese crown power in the interior waned, so too did the Portuguese and
mestiço population in general. In 1667, Barreto noted that whereas “about thirty years ago
there were more than sixty married Portuguese” in Sena, there were currently “not more
than thirty Portuguese houses, with […] others,” belonging to “mocoques [non-Portuguese
Indians and Africans] and manumuzungos [mestiços].”580 Tete, he wrote, which “in times past

Ibid. 466-468.
Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, 33.
578 Barreto, “Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama,” in RSEA, vol. 3, 471.
579 Ibid. 468.
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was very rich and much frequented,” by then contained “not more than forty houses of
Portuguese and mocoques” combined.581
The Portuguese crown likewise saw great fluctuations in its control over local
groups. Although the peoples of Botonga [ie. the land of the Tonga] had long been loyal
vassals, Barreto noted that “a great part of Botonga […] has rebelled against us,” as well as
much of Baroe and Manica, all of which once again pledged primary allegiance to the
Monomotapa, rather than to the crown of Portugal.582 Barreto did not attribute these
defections to Portuguese weakness, however. Instead, he argued that, “the principal cause
[was] the bad conduct of the Portuguese, from whose violence the cafres flee to other
lands.”583 In any case, despite the renewed support it received from certain local groups,
Barreto still viewed the Monomotapa’s power as far outstripped by that of the leading
settlers.584 These figures, like Madeira, Lobo da Silva, and Paez da Pinho, could call hundreds
and sometimes thousands of enslaved soldiers into armed action on their behalf.585
Around Mozambique Island, the crown’s effective authority had long remained
limited to the island itself and to the farms lining the bay.586 “Old men,” wrote Barreto,
“remember a time when the two chief villages of the mainland opposite supplied the island
[with enough] meat and vegetables [to provision] whole fleets from the kingdom which put
in to that port.”587 But he noted that in recent years it had become even more isolated and
virtually cut off from the mainland. Although he ascribed this to “the plague of lions and
elephants,” which had turned the adjacent mainland into “wild forests,” it might just as well
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586 Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1488-1600, 233.
587 Barreto, “Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama,” in RSEA, vol.3, 502.
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have resulted from the rise of the Maravi kingdom in that territory, which was fiercely
independent of Portuguese power.588
In order to address this general recession of the crown’s effective authority, Barreto
offered two main solutions. First, he proposed that any person who “penetrates into the
interior to trade should be bound to remain there without remission.” “Many estates and
conquests are weakened,” he continued, “when men of capital leave them, by whom [other
settlers] were animated and under whose protection many lived and grew rich.”589 In
addition, Barreto argued that the crown should continue to rely on the settlers in advancing
its claims to sovereignty in the region, but warned that the current generation should not be
given the same free rein as the previous. “In the present state of things,” he advised, “it is
necessary to push forward by means of Manuel Paes de Pinho in the lands of Tete, and of
Antonio Lobo da Silva in those of Sena, as being the most powerful in estates.”590 But, he
warned, “it should be done with caution, that they may not conquer simply for
themselves.”591 This was to prevent any one settler from getting “such power that his
obedience [to the crown] becomes a matter of courtesy.”592
Barreto’s proposal proved easier said than done, however. Beyond offering symbolic
titles to prestigious military orders or the nobility, the crown had little leverage in curbing
these tendencies or incentivizing settlers to respect royal law and recognize the supreme
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592 Ibid. In the full passage, Barreto cited the case of, “Lourenço de Mattos, or Maponda, who going to war
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authority of the Portuguese crown, let alone that of the Monomotapa. Conflict and disorder
persisted, and despite the apparent dominance of the Portuguese crown throughout much of
the interior, divisions within the settler population and their general lack obedience to royal
officials meant that its position was far more fragile than it appeared.
That fragility was made painfully clear in the following decades. In his, Tratado dos
Rios de Cuama, the Augustinian António da Conceição described the diminishing power of
the Portuguese there, and, like Manuel Barreto three decades prior, provided a detailed
proposal for how best to reverse that trend.593 Conceição nonetheless viewed the King of
Portugal and his proxy, the Monomotapa, as the region’s “rightful” rulers.594 And despite the
dramatic setbacks of recent years, he maintained hope that the Portuguese might one day
discover and conquer the fabled silver mines, which, he rhapsodized, would enable them to
achieve an eventual political and spiritual conquest of the entire globe.595
First, he argued that the Portuguese must re-establish their preeminence throughout
the Zambezi, “so that the Cafres who reside there will not recognize any overlord nor be
subject to anyone, except the governor and our lord the King of Portugal.”596 To achieve
this, he advised the Captain of Mozambique to station himself in Sena or Tete and, with a
force of around a hundred soldiers, reconquer the adjacent lands, which for years prior had
been under firm Portuguese dominion but had recently broken away.597 Conceição also

Conceição’s 1696, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, is without doubt the most comprehensive contemporary
account of the region in the late seventeenth century.
594 Conceição argued that the Monomotapa’s legitimacy derived from that fact that “his ancestors conquered
them and ruled over” “all these lands of Cafraria.” The king of Portugal’s “dominion in those lands and
especially over the silver mines,” he argued, stemmed “from treaties which the Portuguese made on 24 May
1629 with the emperor Mavura, which he accepted when they delivered the kingdom to him after they had
conquered it with their arms.” See, Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, 37.
595 Conceição fantasized that the windfall from such mines would, “be sufficient to restore India and subjugate
the heathen, and indeed the whole world, bringing it all to the true law of Jesus Christ.” See, Conceição, Tratado
dos Rios de Cuama, 49.
596 Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, 43.
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proposed a colonization scheme, in this case not of Portuguese casados, however, but instead
of “clean and honorable Indian families who have the disposition for trade, as they usually
have.” He also proposed specifically to send young girls, “less than ten years old, the
orphans of honest parents, with the recommendation to whoever is governing that they
should give them and their husbands preference in the award of Crown lands and
government appointments.”598
Yet despite maintaining an optimistic view to the future, Conceição was frank about
the political instability of late, the general recession of Portuguese power, and the fierce
rebelliousness of local groups both on the Zambezi and in the interior. Explaining how
Portuguese power depended on violence, he opined that those local groups, which remained
“friendly toward us,” like the kingdom of Baroe, did so more “through fear than good
will.”599 But certain of them, especially those “upstream of Sena,” he continued, “are
bellicose, and the further inland, the stronger they are and less obedient to Portuguese
authority, still less to that of the emperor [ie. the Monomotapa].”600 He described them as
“usually in a state of rebellion,” “not willing to pay the customary tribute.”601
However, the most transformative event in Conceição’s day was without doubt the
rise of Changamira Dombo, a sorcerer and guardian of the herds of the Monomotapa who
gathered a large following of soldiers and rose up against his lord in 1692. In the offensive,
Changamira and his forces stripped the Monomotapa of many of his remaining possessions
and seized virtually all the Portuguese fairs and estates in the interior.602 After the assault, the
only subjects of the Portuguese crown that remained in that region were “some natives of
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India.”603 Then, in 1695, “news reached Sena that Changamira had razed the fair of Masekesa
and in consequence had taken over the lands of Manica,” thereby depriving the Portuguese
and mestiço settlers of access to the coveted gold and silver trade.604 Conceição ascribed the
recent losses to “our lack of peoples and arms and the superabundance of those of the
natives.”605 And he reported that, in another of the main trade fairs, Dambarare, “the enemy
eventually killed everyone without a single Portuguese or Indian being able to escape from
the whole fair.”
But Changamira died shortly after Conceição completed his treatise, and subsequent
rulers of that dynasty, the Rozvi, were less hostile to the Portuguese. Had Changamira
survived, he may well have expelled the Portuguese from the Zambezi altogether. In any
case, given the weakened position of the Portuguese, and the inability of Goa to send
sufficient support, they never attempted the reconquest Conceição so longingly sought. As
Mocaranga power diminished over the course of the seventeenth century, so too did that of
the Portuguese. As a result, by 1700, few Portuguese remained on the interior plateau, their
presence mostly confined to Sena, Tete, and narrow tracts along the lower Zambezi.

Conclusions

The initial arrival of the Portuguese to Southeast Africa in the early sixteenth century
did not mark the beginning of a progressive, linear process of extension and imposition of
Portuguese colonial rule. Portuguese sovereignty was fragile and imprecisely defined. During
most of the period from 1500 to 1700, Portugal was not even the hegemonic power in the
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region. Throughout the sixteenth century and the early years of the seventeenth, the king of
Portugal was a vassal of the Monomotapa and paid a tri-annual tribute for the right to trade
in that kingdom.606 Despite eventually subjecting the Monomotapa to Portuguese lordship
and exercising nominal sovereignty over most of his former territory in the mid 1630s, by
the close of that century, Lisbon’s effective sovereignty in the region was greatly reduced.
This resulted in large part from the rise of powerful indigenous groups, like the Rozvi
dynasty of Changamira, as well as from the constant threat of the Dutch, which diverted
Lisbon’s attention to the coast, to Brazil, and to elsewhere across Portuguese India.
Even at the height of Iberian power in the region, Lisbon’s sovereignty was limited
to a handful of isolated fortresses at Mozambique Island, Sofala, and the main trade fairs of
the Zambezi Valley and Mocaranga hinterland. Within the Portuguese population, which
included a large number of mestiços, prominent settlers held the true balance of power.
Their authority in turn depended on the military support they received from local Tonga and
other native soldiers, many of whom were enslaved, as well as from the alliance of other
neighboring groups whose interests occasionally converged with those of the Portuguese
against competing indigenous polities.
Settlers often operated on behalf of the crown, and served at the vanguard in
extending the Lisbon’s effective authority by subjecting local groups and polities to
Portuguese colonial rule. But these persons also expressed their allegiance to local native
rulers, and proved deft in adapting to shifts in the regional balance of power. As a result, the
effective reach of Portuguese colonial authority depended in large part on Lisbon’s ability to
ingratiate these settlers and secure their loyalty in order to enforce royal trade monopolies
and check the power of indigenous groups. When the interests of prominent settlers like
606
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Diogo Simões Madeira or Diogo de Sousa de Meneses aligned with those of the crown,
Lisbon’s effective authority was greatly expanded and enhanced. But when those interests
diverged, the crown had little means of enforcing its claims.
The limits of imperial sovereignty in the region were vague and fluctuated constantly
as alliances formed and faded away. Despite possessing European firearms, neither royal
authorities nor the most powerful settlers were ever able to firmly or permanently subject the
interior to Portuguese rule. The dominance Lisbon achieved over the Upper Zambezi and
parts of Mocaranga proved cursory. Native peoples continued to be the prime determinants
of power relations in the region throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PHILIPPINES

Champions of Iberian expansion waxed lyrical about the unprecedented power and
scope of the Spanish and Portuguese empires at the turn of the seventeenth century. In
addition to recounting the famous campaigns in Mexico, Peru, and across the Indian Ocean
world, a number of chroniclers also turned their attention to East Asia. In his global history
of Spanish expansion in the age of Philip II, for instance, Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas
claimed that Spaniards in the Philippines had “pacified a million people” and “baptized
300,000” over a space of “more than 300 leagues.”607 Giovanni Botero likewise rhapsodized
about Spanish achievements in the archipelago, claiming that, “until now, the Spanish have
pacified more than forty islands,” including Mindanao, Negros, Panay, Gigantes, Cebu,
Mindoro, Luzon, and some thirty-three others, large and small.608 Presenting the Spanish as
heroes overcoming enormous odds, Botero wrote that, “the number of Spaniards that have
conquered and defended these islands is not more than 1,200,” of which a mere 500 were
soldiers.609
Although presented by Botero as a virtue, from the perspective of Spanish officials,
the small number of Spaniards in the archipelago was in fact a major problem. Colonial
authorities faced tremendous challenges in extending Spanish rule in the Philippines, despite
the bombastic claims of influential authors back in Europe. After over a century in the

607 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia general del mundo del tiempo del Rey Felipe II, el prudente, desde el año de
1554 hasta el de 1598 (Madrid, 1601-1612), vol. 2 of 3, ch. 20, 454. Herrera mentioned in particular the
“Augustinian, Dominican, and Franciscan fathers,” as well as “the Fathers of the Company of Jesus.”
608 Giovanni Botero, Relaciones universales del mundo (Valladolid: Diego Fernández de Cordova, 1603), part 1, 167.
609 Botero, Relaciones universales del mundo (1603), part 1, 167.
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archipelago and countless expeditions of conquest, by the late seventeenth century the
geographic scope of Spanish colonial rule remained limited mostly to Manila and its environs
plus a few remote outposts, none of which included towns with populations of more than
2,000, including their indigenous inhabitants.
A variety of factors converged to circumscribe Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippines. Some emerged from rifts within the resident European population, while others
developed from without as a range of local groups leveraged their own unique positions to
influence or oppose the extension of Spanish colonialism in a number of ways. Jurisdictional
disputes between the municipal council and high court (Audiencia), for instance, represent
one example, as did the protracted conflict between religious authorities and members of the
Spanish settler community over the administration and treatment of Philippine indios. These
internal tensions surrounding Spanish rule, and the challenges they provoked, undermined
the cohesion of settler society and the capacity of Spanish authorities to reinforce colonial
governance across the archipelago. They even generated intense debates that echoed those in
the New World by exposing Spanish abuse of native peoples and calling into question the
Castilian crown’s fundamental right to sovereignty in the islands.
The vast distances separating the Philippines from the centers of metropolitan and
viceregal power, and the communication lags those distances entailed, endowed colonial
officials with substantial authority.610 As a result, local contexts and concerns heavily
mediated the Spanish colonial project in the Philippines. While the king, his Council of
Indies, and his viceroy in New Spain issued frequent instructions to their subordinates in the
Although mostly in vain, the king and viceroy in New Spain did nonetheless attempt to overcome the
challenges posed by distance, by providing, for instance, detailed instructions on how the governor or captaingeneral’s duties should be delegated and executed in the event of his death before the arrival of a crownappointed replacement. See, “Instrucción para la forma en que se deben usar los cargos de gobernador y
capitan general remitidos a las islas Filipinas en caso de muerte de alguno de ellos,” Luis Enrique de Guzmán,
Virrey, México, 12 February 1653, in Archivo General de la Nación, México [AGN-México hereafter], General
de Parte, vol. 10, expediente 350.
610
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islands, the crown-appointed governor enjoyed wide authority to execute those instructions
as he saw fit. Such delegation of powers extended throughout Spain’s colonial administration
in the Philippines as well, providing local and provincial officials broad authority in their
own right, and occasionally leading to significant conflicts within the Spanish colonial
population and administration.
To be sure, the numerous legal and political disputes that erupted among Spaniards
in the Philippines were not unique to the archipelago. On the contrary, they were integral to
the institutional culture that governed political relations across the early modern Iberian
world, and ought not be viewed simply as symptomatic of a failure on the part of the
Spanish crown to establish itself as the preeminent power among the resident European
population.611 However, such tensions did limit the efficacy of royal officials in advancing
their own individual pretensions, or those of their factions and the offices they represented.
In the process, they forged significant divisions between sectors of settler society, each of
which espoused a distinct vision of how the Spanish colonial project in the islands should
take shape.
Even more importantly, in addition to fueling moral and jurisdictional disputes
between royal officials, settlers, and the local clergy, tensions surrounding Spanish
colonialism also spurred many indigenous groups into direct action to oppose it. As in the
Americas, while some created short- or long-term alliances with Spanish authorities in order
to further their own specific objectives, others resented Spanish demands and

611 Regarding the Spanish American context, Alejandro Cañeque explains this process well in his essay,
“Governance,” 145-149 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013). For a concise analysis of these dynamics in
peninsular Spain, Antonio Feros’ short essay, also entitled, “Governance,” in the same volume, on pages 141144. And for a comprehensive study of these questions regarding early modern Portugal, but with implications
for the broader Iberian world see Hespanha, As Vésperas do Leviathan.
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encroachments, and resisted Spanish rule, often quite successfully.612 Spanish hegemony even
came under threat in areas like Pampanga, whose population was generally considered the
most loyal to Spain. Manila too, the ostensible stronghold of Spanish power in the
Philippines, was, by the seventeenth century, in many ways as much a Chinese city as a
Spanish one. Disputes between Spaniards and Chinese produced numerous flare-ups in
violence, often with devastating consequences, making even the seat of Spanish authority in
the archipelago perpetually unstable. Beyond Manila, despite the periodic dispatching of
Spanish expeditions of conquest or “pacification,” the vast majority of territory remained
under the effective authority of native groups throughout the period in question. Whether
migrating beyond the sphere of Spanish influence, opposing Spanish rule outright, or allying
with the Spaniards to advance their own distinct interests, Philippine indios and other nonEuropean groups played instrumental roles in shaping the scope and nature of Spanish
colonialism in the archipelago throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

612 Herrera himself, while impressing upon readers the prowess of “Spaniards, [who] protect this island [ie.
Luzon],” nonetheless betrayed the broad range of opposition they faced from “Rebels, Moors, and Gentiles,”
thereby lumping, in the language of the colonizer, myriad forms of resistance and a range of groups with vastly
different and often conflicting aims. See Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia general del mundo del tiempo del
Rey Felipe II, el prudente, desde el año de 1554 hasta el de 1598 (Madrid, 1601-1612), vol. 2 of 3, ch. 20, 454.
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Figure 14
Map of the Philippines
Early Encounters

Over 11,000 kilometers east of Madrid as the crow flies, and some 14,000 from
Mexico City due west, the Philippines were among Spain’s most remote colonies. Spanish
objectives in the islands were hardly static, and were the subject of continuous debate during
the first century of colonial occupation.613 Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, however, trade remained first and foremost among those objectives. Spaniards
were particularly interested in silks and spices, and saw the Philippines as an ideal station
613 John M. Headley, “Spain’s Asian Presence, 1565-1590: Structures and Aspirations,” Hispanic American
Historical Review 75, no. 4 (November 1995): 623-646. For longue dureé history of the Iberian presence in the
Philippines and East Asia more broadly, see Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques: XVIe,
XVIIe, XVIIIe siècles (Paris, SEVPEN, 1966).
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from which to access the fabled markets of China, Southeast Asia, and the broader Indian
Ocean world. But the colony was also significant for other reasons. In the seventeenth
century it provided a strategic base from which to counter the rising Dutch threat in the
region. And in the context of the struggle over the Moluccas specifically, the Philippines
came to represent an additional front in Spain’s global war against Islam. Although
observing from a distance, in 1603 Botero neatly summarized the diversity of Spain’s
interests in the archipelago and its strategic value to the crown’s broader global ambitions:
These states are much more important than anyone can imagine. Because
beyond being extremely copious in victuals, and having gold there, they are
in a very a good place to subject the neighboring islands, and to maintain the
Moluccas, and to introduce trade between the peoples of the archipelago and
New Spain, and to facilitate commerce between China and Mexico, things of
extremely great consideration and esteem. But what is without doubt most
important of all is to begin to put an end there to the sect of Mohamed.614
When the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in the sixteenth century, they
encountered a diversity of peoples spread across the archipelago’s roughly 7,000 islands.
Although the precise population is unknown, Linda Newson, using rigorous standards of
historical geography, has estimated the total number at around 1.5 million, excluding
Mindanao.615 While there did exist certain semi-sedentary communities practicing sawah rice
cultivation prior to Spanish arrival, most Philippine indios were non-sedentary, practicing
slash-and-burn, or “swidden” agriculture, relocating every few years after their fields ran
fallow.616 Spaniards generally lumped the islands’ non-European inhabitants into the single
category of indios, thereby erasing the myriad distinctions between those groups and using
Botero, Relaciones universales del mundo (1603), part 1, 100a-101a.
Linda A. Newson, Conquest and Pestilence in the Early Spanish Philippines (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press,
2009). This makes Herrera y Tordesillas’ claim that, by the turn of the seventeenth century, the Spanish had
“pacified a million people, and baptized 300,000,” all the more spurious. For this claim, see: Herrera y
Tordesillas, Historia general del mundo (1601), vol. 2, ch. 20, 454.
616 John Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila: Two Concepts of Empire,” in Portuguese Asia: Aspects
in History and Economic History, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. Roderich Ptak (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987), 39.
See also Laura Lee Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms (Honolulu:
University of Hawai’i Press, 1999).
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the term in reference to all persons considered subjects of the crown, regardless of whether
those persons themselves recognized that subjecthood. In addition, Spaniards referred to the
Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao and elsewhere as moros, crudely. And in the occasional
instances where they did use more specific terms, they often used pejoratives like Igorots
and Negritos [literally, little black people], which were likewise catch-all terms that denied the
ethnic diversity of the various groups in the upland regions of northern Luzon.617
Prior to the advent of Spanish rule, the Philippines’ inhabitants had organized
themselves in relatively small, decentralized, and politically independent communities, called
barangays, which usually consisted of less than five hundred individuals.618 Each barangay, in
turn, was composed of what Spanish contemporaries and modern scholars alike have
identified as three or four social classes. Atop local social pyramids were the datus, members
of the ruling class, or maginoo, which the early Spaniards compared to the European nobility
given its hereditary nature of succession. Below the datus were a second class of elites,
consisting of the maharlikas and timawas, which, according to historian William Henry Scott,
were bound to their datu, not by debt or inheritance, but by patron-client contract.619 Like the
datus, the maharlikas formed part of the hereditary aristocracy and were free, but were
nonetheless vassals of a given datu, albeit of their own choosing, and were obliged to render

Felix M. Keesing, The Ethnohistoy of Northern Luzon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).
Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting. John Leddy Phelan has claimed that some exceptionally large barangays in
Manila, Vigan, and Cebu may have contained up to 2,000 people; see John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the
Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700 (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 15.
According to Spain’s first governor of the islands, Miguel López de Legazpi, the pre-Spanish Philippines
possessed no cabeceras, or seats of government, “nor did any of its towns obey any others; instead each
population group governed itself by its own account.” See, “Relación de los pueblos puestos en cabeza de
S.M,” 9 January 1574, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no.14, fols. 50r-51v.
619 William Henry Scott, “Oripun and Alipin in the 16th-Century Philippines,” in Looking for the Pre-Hispanic
Filipino and other essays in Philippine History, ed. William Henry Scott (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1992),
92. Phelan has suggested that dependents were linked to their masters not only by debt obligations, but also by
relations of extended kinship, or consanguinity; see, Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines (1967), 22.
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that datu military service, most often at sea.620 The timawas, on the other hand, rendered their
service in a range of labor activities, and were likewise considered free.621 Finally, the alipins
occupied the lowest rung and constituted the vast majority of the population of a given
barangay.622 Not exactly slaves, as the Spaniards mistakenly identified them, the alipins were in
fact debt servants, bonded to serve datus, maharlikas, timawas, and even, on occasion, to other
alipins. They served their masters as laborers, and although subjected to obligatory, noncontractual servitude, their duties were generally part-time. In addition, there existed at least
a degree of social mobility between the alipin, maharlika, and timawa classes.
When the first Spaniards arrived in the Philippines, Islam – although the religion of
the ruling elite in certain areas and adopted by some powerful communities in places like the
Sulus and Maguindanaos – had yet to take firm root in the rest of the archipelago, including
in Mindanao.623 Due most likely to the influence of fellow Muslim communities in Brunei
and beyond, Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, in the south, were the only regions of the
Philippines to develop political units, like the rajah, which united multiple communities into
what John Leddy Phelan has referred to as “suprabarangays.”624 This higher degree of
political consolidation may in part explain the success of Mindanao’s inhabitants in repelling
Spanish invasions.

Scott, “Oripun and Alipin in the 16th-Century Philippines,” 92; and Stephanie J. Mawson, “Philippine Indios
in the Service of Empire: Indigenous Soldiers and Contingent Loyalty, 1600-1700,” Ethnohistory 63, no. 2 (April
2016): 392.
621 Scott, “Oripun and Alipin in the 16th-Century Philippines,” 92.
622 Called alipin in Tagalog, these occupants of the lowest rung of the social ladder were referred to in Visayan
as oripun. See Scott, “Oripun and Alipin in the 16th-Century Philippines,” 86.
623 Laura Lee Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms (Honolulu:
University of Hawai’i Press, 1999); and William Henry Scott, “Mindanao,” in Barangay: Sixteenth-Century
Philippine Culture and Society (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994), 161-178.
624 Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines, 16-17. Although not using the term, “suprabarangay,” Villiers
discussion of the Sulu sultanate based in Jolo, describes similar socio-political structures; see, Villiers,
“Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila: Two Concepts of Empire,” 39.
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The first official Spanish expedition to reach the Philippines was that led by
Ferdinand Magellan, who, after proclaiming the archipelago for the crown of Castile, met his
death there in 1521 at the hands of Mactan soldiers defending their land. Although several
expeditions followed in next three decades – including that of Ruy López de Villalobos, who
in 1542 renamed the islands of Leyte and Samar, Las Islas Filipinas, in honor of the future
king Philip II of Spain – it was not until the late 1560s that Spaniards began attempting the
systematic conquest and occupation of the archipelago under the adelantado, Miguel López de
Legazpi.625 Throughout the sixteenth century, many Spaniards maintained as their ultimate
goal the political and spiritual conquest of China, regarding the Philippines as an antesala, or
stepping-stone and remote base of operations from which to attempt a larger enterprise of
territorial conquest.626 In addition to China, the Spanish crown also sought to conquer a
range of other important polities in the region, to submit their existing rulers to Castilian
lordship, and to control the maritime spice trade throughout that vast region.627 But as the
The name, Las Islas Filipinas, was subsequently extended to encompass the entire archipelago.
Manel Ollé, “El Mediterráneo del Mar de la China: Las dinámicas históricas de Asia Oriental y la formación
del modelo colonial Filipino,” in Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico, Vol. 1, La formación de una colonia: Filipinas, ed.
María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, Josep María Fradera, and Luis Alonso (Madrid: Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Científicas, 2001), 64; see also, Boxer, “Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the Conquest of
Southeast Asia,” 118-136; and Carlos Vega, “Un proyecto utópico: La conquista de China por España,” Boletín
de la Asociación de Orientalistas XIV-XVIII (1982). In fact, even one of the Philippines’ early Augustinian
missionaries, Martín de Rada, argued in a letter to the king that, “Si su majestad pretende la china, ques tierra
muy larga, rrica y de gran poliçía, que tiene ciudades fuertes y muradas, muy mayores que las de Europa, tiene
necesidad primero de azer asiento en estas islas [Filipinas]; lo vno, porque no sería azertado pasar por entre
tantas yslas y baxíos, como ay a la costa della, con navíos de alto bordo sino con navíos de rremos; lo otro tanbién, porque para conquistar vna tierra tan grande y de tanta gente, es necesario tener çerca el socorro y acogida
para qualquier caso que sucediere, avnque según me é informado [...], la gente de china no es nada belicosa y
toda su confiança está en la multitud de la gente y en la fortaleça de las murallas, lo qual sería su degolladero, si
se les tomase alguna, y así creo que mediante dios fácilmente, y no con mucha gente, serán sujetados,” quoted
in Luis Alonso Álvarez, “Don Quijote en el Pacífico: La construcción del proyecto español en Asia, 15911606,” Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 23, no. 1 (2005): 244245.
627 See, for instance, “Carta de Andrés Cauchela sobre ataque a Borneo,” 12 June 1578, Manila, AGI Filipinas,
leg. 29, no. 27. For the larger Spanish plan to control the spice trade, see “Capítulos de carta del factor Román
sobre la especiería,” 10 April 1584, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 46, fols. 203r-204v. Román argued that the
Portuguese had thus far failed to achieve due in large part to the attacks and interference of local corsairs, that
the Spanish navy was better equipped than the Portuguese to protect that trade, and that given the costs and
challenges of shipping spices west through the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, it would be cheaper and more
efficient to carry them east, via Panama, on their way back to Iberia.
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sixteenth century drew to a close, Spaniards increasingly recognized the enormity of those
goals, and the limits of their own manpower and resources. As a result, they shifted their
primary focus to the conquest of the Philippine archipelago itself, resigning themselves to
indirect trade with China via the local population of Chinese merchants, called “Sangleys.”
These merchants soon flocked to Manila in the tens of thousands to exchange their
porcelain, silks, spices, and other wares in exchange, primarily, for Spanish American
silver.628
At the founding of Spanish colonial government in the Philippines, Philip II made
clear his intentions. Noticeably influenced by the theories and discourses of Francisco de
Vitoria and other early critics of Spanish colonialism in America, Philip enjoined his first
governor of the Philippines in 1568 to seek the submission of natives by peaceful means of
persuasion, “to treat them well,” and befriend them, and to introduce them to “our holy
Catholic faith.”629 Predating the 1572-73, “Ordinances for the discovery, settlement, and
pacification of the Indies,” these instructions nonetheless reflected the impact of Vitoria’s

As Manel Ollé has explained, the Chinese economy was becoming increasingly monetized in the sixteenth
century, placing the Spaniards in a unique position given their access to Spanish American silver, see: Ollé, “El
Mediterráneo del Mar de la China,” 62. Chinese demand for silver thus played an important role in determining
the nature of the Spanish presence in the Philippines, which, over the course of the seventeenth century in
particular, became increasingly oriented around the trans-Pacific galleon trade that linked Spanish America to
China, via Manila. For detailed studies of Manila’s position within global circuits of trade and exchange, see
Flynn and Giráldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’,” 201-221; Carlos Martínez Shaw and Marina Alfonso Mola,
“The Philippine Islands: a vital crossroads during the first globalization period,” Culture and History Digital
Journal 3, no. 1 (June 2014): 1-16; Birgit Tremml-Werner, Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571-1644: Local
Comparisons and Global Connections (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015); and Birgit Tremml, “The
Global and the Local: Problematic Dynamics of the Triangular Trade in Early Modern Manila,” Journal of World
History 23, no. 3 (2013): 555-586; and Andrew Christian Peterson, “Making the First Global Trade Route: The
Southeast Asian Foundations of the Acapulco-Manila Galleon Trade, 1519-1650” (PhD diss., University of
Hawai’i, 2014). A testament to the truly global circuits in which Manila formed part, Chinese laborers, including
slaves, could be found not only in the Philippines, but also in the New World. See, for instance, Tatiana Seijas,
Asian Slaves in Colonial Mexico: From Chinos to Indios (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
629 “Instrucciones de gobierno a Miguel López de Legazpi,” 16 November 1568, El Escorial, AGI Filipinas, leg.
339, no. 1, fols. 1r-2v. In 1574, Philip reiterated his order to treat the natives well, evangelize among them, and
ensure that their tribute obligations not exceed the official rate; see: “Relación de los pueblos puestos en cabeza
de S.M,” 9 January 1574, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 14, fols. 50r-51v; and Kevin Joseph Sheehan, Iberian Asia:
The Strategies of Spanish and Portuguese Empire Building, 1540-1700, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of California,
Berkeley, 2008), 162-163.
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ideas – and those of the broader Salamanca school – and the king’s concern that further
expeditions in his name be portrayed as legal and just. To this end, Philip instructed his
agents to eschew the word “conquest,” and use instead the term, “pacification,” in order to
frame Spanish colonial expansion in more favorable terms and lend credence to the
ostensible claim that the Spaniards’ primary aim was to deliver Philippine indios from
oppression and offer spiritual salvation by leading them to the light of God and Christianity,
the one true religion.630
Hoping to avoid the violence and abuse that continued to characterize the process of
colonial rule in the New World, Philip hesitated to sanction slavery in the Philippines, but
nonetheless permitted the captivity of Muslims there who refused conversion.631 In addition,
reflecting another lesson learned in the fraught process of colonization in the Americas, in
an effort to prevent the rise of excessively autonomous landed settler aristocracy, Philip
For an example of such attempts to subjugate Philippine indios through more benign forms of persuasion,
see the Instructions then-governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas gave to his son, Luis, charged with leading an
expedition of “pacification” to Tuy: “Granting that one of the reasons for the hatred and hostility of the
Indians toward us is the collection of tributes, especially when it is not accomplished with suitable mildness and
moderation, this question shall by no means be discussed with them in the beginning. Rather, if the Indians
should be fearful of what should be collected from them, and should place obstacles in the way of their
reduction and our principal end, that of their conversion, good hopes shall be offered them that all satisfaction
shall be accorded them in this matter, and that the tribute shall be only what they choose to give. […] You shall
under no consideration allow any soldier to seize any gold or any other article of value from any Indian, in case
that any of the said Indians should flee through fear or any other reason, and abandon their gold or other
property to the power of the soldiers. […] As soon as you shall have come in sight of the district that you are
to seek, you shall send your message and protests, with show of great love and moderation, so that the natives
will admit our trade and friendship, as above stated. You shall under no consideration permit any soldier to
violate any woman, or to offer to either mother or daughter any uncivil or rough treatment. Rather you shall
see that no ill-treatment, or offenses to God, occur. You shall give the natives some silks or gifts of slight value,
which will be highly esteemed among the Indians, and which will be a partial way of making them understand
that we do not go there only for their property, but in order to give them ours, so that they will admit our
friendship and trade, which is beneficial to them,” see: “Expeditions to the province of Tuy, Juan Manuel de la
Vega,” 3 July 1609, Passi, in The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803: Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of the
Islands and their People and Records of the Catholic Missions, as Related in Contemporaneous Books and Manuscripts, showing
the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious Conditions of those Islands from their Earliest Relations with European
Nations to the Close of the Nineteenth Century [The Philippine Islands hereafter], eds. Emma Helen Blair and James
Alexander Robertson, 55 vols. (Cleveland, OH: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903-1909), vol. 14, 311-313.
631 In 1574, Philip eventually placed a categorical prohibition on the enslavement of “indios filipinos,” which
referred to the native inhabitants of the archipelago that had converted to Catholicism. He even demanded that
all such “indios filipinos” currently enslaved be emancipated, regardless of the manner in which they had been
procured or originally placed in bondage. See: “Prohibición de hacer esclavos entre los indios filipinos,” 7
November 1574, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 57v-58r.
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instructed Legazpi and his lieutenants not to apportion the main Philippine towns, ports, or
Spanish settlements in encomienda or land grants to private settlers. Instead, he made clear that
those places were to be placed under the direct jurisdiction “of our Royal crown as we
command that they remain.”632
Keen to legitimize the military campaign that led to the fall of Manila, the
expedition’s leader, Martín de Goiti, framed the war as defensive, as resulting from the
violation of an accord by the former ruling sultan.633 As Goiti contended, the Spanish
response in counterattacking and seizing the city’s fortress was both lawful and just. In
addition, since, “according to the said natives,” Manila was “the capital of all the towns of
this said island,” by occupying that city “in his Majesty’s name,” the crown of Castile thereby
gained “royal ownership and possession, actual and quasi,” over the entirety of Luzon and
“all other ports, towns, and territories adjoining and belonging to it.”634 In a final, symbolic
act of conquest and occupation, Goiti ordered a soldier “to raise the flag of his company on
the fort built by the natives.”635
In recognition of its position as the center of Spain’s political, religious, and
economic power in the Philippines, in June 1574, Philip II bestowed upon Manila the title,
Insigne y Siempre Leal Ciudad de Manila [“The Distinguished and Ever Loyal City of Manila”],
raising it to the highest status a city could enjoy within the Spanish empire.636 At the same
time, Philip delegated to his new governor, Francisco de Sande, the task of delimiting

“Instrucciones de gobierno a Miguel López de Legazpi,” 16 November 1568, El Escorial, AGI Filipinas, leg.
339, no. 1, fol. 1v.
633 Martín de Goiti and Hernando Riquel, “Act of taking possession of Luzón,” 6 June 1570, Manila, in The
Philippine Islands, vol. 3, 105-108.
634 Ibid.
635 Ibid.
636 Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” 41; citing Cedulario de Manila, 3-4.
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Manila’s territorial jurisdiction, which came to radiate outward five leagues from its center
across the surrounding coast and hinterland.637
Despite the king’s instructions to submit Philippine indios peacefully, and despite
contemporary claims that the conquest had been achieved through minimal violence, the
larger documentary record reveals that the process of extending Spanish rule in the
Philippines was, from the outset, defined by violence and attempts at forceful coercion.638 As
early as 1572, the Augustinian, Francisco Ortega, wrote to the viceroy in New Spain to
inform him of an early expedition to Ilocos, the coastal region of western Luzon, north of
Manila. In “collecting tribute” from indios, Ortega noted that the Spaniards respected
“neither the law of God nor the instruction of your Majesty.”639 What they did, “on arriving
to any town or province, is to send a naguatato [an interpreter], not with gifts or presents, nor
to preach [to the natives] or tell them things of God,” but rather to seize their belongings.640
According to Ortega, the Spaniards demanded their gold chains and bracelets. Those who
refused to pay fled to the mountains, where the Spaniards followed them, firing their
“arquebuses and killing as many as they could without mercy, returning to their towns and
killing the hens and pigs they found, seizing all of the rice, […] and after taking all they could
from the [indios’] poor houses, set them afire,” allegedly burning and destroying over 4,000
houses on the expedition to Ilocos alone.641

“Orden de señalar los terrenos de jurisdicción a Manila,” 21 June 1574, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, 339, leg. 1,
fols. 52v-53r: “Real Cédula a Francisco de Sande, gobernador de Filipinas, para que señale a la ciudad de Manila
los terrenos que estime conveniente para su jurisdicción.”
638 Philip seemed to accept the claims of his officials, applauding them for their “loyalty and goodness,”
“having done very well” by largely eschewing violent wars of conquest; see: “Instrucciones de gobierno a
Miguel López de Legazpi,” 16 November 1568, El Escorial, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fol. 1r.
639 AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 27, cfr. Rodríguez (1978), 137-138.
640 Ibid.
641 Ibid. Nearly two decades later, the king himself acknowledged the violence and arbitrariness of tribute
collection, writing that, “Asimismo he sido informado que en el cobramiento de los tributos de los indios ha
habido por lo pasado, y hay al presente, mucha desorden a causa de que los gobernadores que han sido de las
dichas Islas hicieron las tasas muy confusas; [de lo que] se tomó ocasión para la dicha desorden de cobrar cada
637
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By 1574, in addition to Manila and large of parts of the rest of Luzon, Hernando
Riquel, chief royal notary in the Philippines, also claimed broad swathes of Cebu, Panay, and
even Mindanao on behalf of the Spanish crown.642 A closer examination of Riquel’s text,
however, reveals the superficiality of these claims and the limits of Spain’s effective
sovereignty there. Regarding Cebu, Riquel acknowledged how little Spaniards actually knew
about that territory and that they had yet to establish any seats of government there.643 On
Panay, he noted that the Spanish had thus far only established a single town. As for
Mindanao, Riquel claimed Spanish sovereignty over the island’s main river, although even
that was likely an exaggeration. In reality, the Spanish had achieved control over little more
than a discontinuous series of enclaves in the Visayas and Luzon, including Manila and its
environs, Pampanga, the shores of Laguna Bay southeast of Manila, and the coast of
Ilocos.644
In addition to armed expeditions of conquest, and often as part of them, the Spanish
crown also enlisted the support of missionaries in extending the reach of Spanish influence
across the archipelago. The Augustinians were the first to arrive to the islands, having
accompanied Legazpi, and thus enjoyed an early start in expanding their operations across
the islands.645 They were soon joined by substantial numbers of Franciscans, Jesuits,
Dominicans, and the Augustinian Recollects.646 As in the Americas, competition arose
uno como quiere, con grande escándalo y agravio de los dichos Indios,” see: “Cédula Real con Instrucción de 9
de Agosto de 1589,” AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 365v-389r.
642 “Islands and towns declared Cabeceras for his Majesty,” 9 January 1574, in The Philippines Under Spain: A
Compilation and Translation of Original Documents, eds. Virginia Benítez Licuaran and José Llavador Mira, book 3
(Manila: National Trust for Historical and Cultural Preservation of the Philippines, 1991), 63-65.
643 Ibid.
644 Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” (1987): 44.
645 Antonio García-Abasolo, “La expansión mexicana hacia el Pacífico: La primera colonización de Filipinas,
1570-1780,” Historia Mexicana 32, no. 125 (1982): 79; and Isacio Rodríguez y Rodríguez, O.S.A., Historia de la
provincia agustiniana del Santísimo Nombre de Jesús de Filipinas (Manila, 1965-1993, XIII).
646 A. Pastrana, “The Franciscans and the Evangelization of the Philippines, 1578-1900,” Boletín eclesiástico de
Filipinas 39 (1965): 80-115; and Dennis Morrow Roth, The Friar Estates of the Philippines (Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press, 1977), which focuses on the eighteenth century. See also, “Carta original del P. Diego de
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between the orders, prompting colonial authorities to divide the archipelago into exclusive
geographic zones of operation for each.647 In fact, in 1619, the Spanish attorney general in
the Philippines, Fernando de los Ríos Coronel, forwarded a petition to the Council of Indies,
which, while stressing the “much necessity” of more missionaries to join the efforts of
evangelization, argued forcefully that any new friars should come only from the four
“Orders that are [already] there,” so as not to further complicate these tensions.648
Beyond the spiritual aspect of their work in spreading the Catholic faith, missionaries
also played a key role in the larger process of colonization by helping forge and reinforce the
allegiance of Philippine indios to the Spanish crown. On the one hand, missionaries
sometimes achieved this by seeking to defend indios against abusive and exploitative
conquistadors and settlers. At the same time, however, similar to soldiers, they often
represented the sole Spanish presence in many areas, and were instrumental in “reducing”
certain indigenous groups by gathering them into doctrinas, which eventually developed into
centers of formal Spanish sovereignty, called poblaciones.649
In general, however, missionaries had limited success, especially in the highlands.
Few remained there for more than a couple of years, and many were either killed by local

Cartagena, dirigida al P. Diego Martínez en Sevilla, con noticia de la travesía y de sus primeras impresiones en
tierra de Filipinas,” Manila, 22 August 1626, Real Academia de la Historia (RAH hereafter), Jesuítas 93681/134, fols. 497-498.
647 “Peticiones del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades,” 22 September 1600 (Probable), AGI Filipinas,
leg. 27, no. 36, fols. 216r-224v; and “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September
1619, AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, fols. 651r. For further evidence of the conflict and competition between
the various orders, see “Carta de Francisco de las Misas denunciando desórdenes,” 16 June 1596 Manila, AGI
Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 61, fols. 420r-424r.
648 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619, AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no.
108, fols. 651r-652r.
649 Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” 48-49. Describing this process, one contemporary indio
named, “Panpanga,” reportedly explained in a letter to his brother that, “the friars of St. Francis […] showed
him such love […] that he came to town, and there, when he saw the holy life of the friars and there were no
Spaniards to impede it, he became a Christian helped by the grace of God,” which was likewise “the cause of
many other indios coming down” from the mountains and settling in the town of Guamaca; see: Scott, “The
Conquerors as Seen by the Conquered,” 71-72; originally in Philippine Studies 34 (1986), 493-506.
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indios or died of disease.650 Nevertheless, Philip II himself recognized the importance of
missionaries in consolidating Spanish rule on the peripheries of his empire. And as early as
1574, he enjoined his governor in the Philippines, alongside those in Florida, Tucumán, and
the Río de la Plata, to discourage missionaries from leaving those remote areas, warning that
if they did so, and came back to Spain or Portugal, they would be prohibited from ever
returning to the Indies.651

Debating Spanish Sovereignty

Despite the vast distances that separated Manila from Mexico City, Madrid, and
Salamanca, Spaniards in the Philippines were hardly removed from the larger controversies
surrounding the legality and morality of Spanish imperium. On the contrary, they were
keenly attuned to debates gripping the broader Iberian imperial world, and sought to devise a
new colonial policy for the islands that would facilitate the successful subjugation of new
subjects while at the same time shielding themselves from critiques of the legitimacy of
Spanish sovereignty there. In addition to seeking the willful submission of native peoples,
Spanish authorities also sought to reinforce the legitimacy of Spanish rule in the eyes of
Philippine indios through indirect means by co-opting traditional elites, preserving their
position atop the local political hierarchy, and formalizing their role within the emerging
colonial administration. Nevertheless, a number of early theorists continued to doubt the

650 William Henry Scott, “The Spanish Occupation of the Cordillera in the 19th Century,” in Philippine Social
History: Global Trade and Local Transformations, eds. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. De Jesus (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1982), 40-42.
651 “Orden sobre la vuelta de Indias de religiosos,” 21 April 1574, Madrid, AGI Indiferente, leg. 427, no. 29,
fols. 98v-99v.
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legitimacy of Spanish sovereignty in the islands, based on the exploitative behavior of
colonists.
As a result, a series of controversies quickly engulfed the Philippines, centering on
the issues of slavery, tribute and just war, the rights of indigenous peoples, the competing
jurisdictions of civil versus ecclesiastical authorities, and the Castilian crown’s basic title to
sovereignty in the islands. Although distinct in their chronology and geographic focus, the
essential themes of these debates echoed those of America, and tended to pit local settlers
and civil authorities against the clergy, who were led initially by the Augustinian priest Martín
de Rada and later by the first bishop of the Philippines, the Dominican, Domingo de
Salazar.652
The first major issue of contention to emerge regarded the institution of slavery. On
the one hand, the debate over slavery revolved around the colonists’ right to take slaves
(largely in the case of just war in Mindanao, Joló and against the Zambales). But they were
also concerned with determining whether indigenous elites, including those incorporated
within the Spanish colonial administration, should be allowed to continue to practice the
pre-existing institution of debt-servitude, which the Spanish dubbed “slavery,” but which
was actually quite different. Notwithstanding the protests of several early priests, however,
the Spanish ultimately had no effective authority to eradicate the institution. Moreover, local
colonial authorities proved hesitant even to attempt such a prohibition since it risked
undercutting the crucial yet tenuous support they received indigenous headmen.

In general, the religious establishment in the Philippines was more united than its counterpart in the
Americas in its opposition to settler abuse, although there were certain exceptions. The arrival of the
Dominican bishop in 1582, for instance, sparked concerns from the Augustinians over the jurisdictional
control they exercised over their own doctrinas. Nor was there always unity among civil authorities. The
municipal council of Manila, in that same year, likewise expressed their own concerns that the maestre de campo,
captains, and other royal officials respect their own jurisdictions. For evidence of both, see “Carta del Cabildo
secular de Manila sobre llegada de Salazar,” 20 May 1582, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 13, fols. 100r-101v.
652
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The first decree from Madrid on the issue was promulgated in 1570, when Philip
informed his officials that neither gentiles nor Muslims in the islands should be enslaved
unless they had explicitly rejected Christianity and refused to convert.653 The decree likewise
allowed for certain exceptions in the case of just war.654 This latter qualification set a
standard of justification that would be mobilized by countless colonists in succeeding
decades seeking legal cover for the continuation of slavery.655

653 Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, La Recta Administración. Primeros Tiempos de la Colonización Española en Filipinas: La
Situación de la Población Nativa, (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 2001), 90-91. This decree proclaiming the general
freedom of Philippine indios was followed up by others in 1574 and 1583 (see “Expediente sobre gobierno islas
Filipinas, 1583,” AGI Patronato, leg. 25, ramo 2), as well as by a 1591 Papal bull from Gregory XIV, “Liberty
of the Indians in the Philippinas,” 8 April 1591, Rome, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 8,
70-73, which stated: “we have learned that our very dear son in Christ, Philip, the Catholic king of the Spains,
has ordered that in view of the many deceits usually practiced therein, no Spaniard in the aforesaid Philippine
Islands shall, even by the right of war, whether just or unjust, or of purchase, or any other pretext whatsoever,
take or hold or keep slaves or serfs; and yet that in contravention of this edict or command of King Philip,
some still keep slaves in their service.”
654 Hidalgo Nuchera, La Recta Administración, 90, citing the Royal Cédula of 4 July 1570, which was revalidated
on 29 May 1620. Both were collected in Law 12, Title II, Book 6, of the Recopilación of 1680. Although a 1574
decree prohibited the enslavement of indios regardless of whether they had been captured in “good war,”
subsequent decrees and practices suggest that slavery was indeed permitted of indios captured in wars deemed
just. Philip II, in his 1574 decree on the issue, exclaimed that “mi voluntad es que no su puedan hazer esclavos
los dhos yndios yo vos mando que proveays como ningun espanol pueda tener yndio alguno, por esclavo en
manera alguna aunq’ el tal yndio y esclavo lo aya sido de los yndias y abido en buena guerra, y si algunos
esclavos tubieren desta o otra manera los dhos espanoles les hagais dar livertad que nos por la presente los
livertamos y damos por libres,” see “Prohibición de hacer esclavos entre los indios Filipinos,” 7 November
1574, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 57v-58r. In 1580, the king further specified that no Indians
could be taken into personal service as a payment of tribute. See, “Orden de guardar las instrucciones sobre
descubrimientos,” 24 April 1580, Logrosán, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 181v-184v.
655 In 1592, for instance, in response to a request from the king for their opinion on whether war against the
Zambales was licit, the Augustinians in the Philippines replied in the affirmative; see: “Parezer de los P.
Augustinos sobre el hazer guerra a los Zambales,” (anonymous), 19 January 1592, Manila, in Historia de la
Provincia Agustiniana del Santísimo Nombre de Jesús de Filipinas (HPAF), ed. Isacio Rodríguez Rodríguez (Manila:
Monumenta Provinciae Philippinarum, 1981), 498-514, original source: AGI Filipinas, leg. 18B. Citing the
theories of St. Augustine and Graciano, they began outlining the conditions for just war, “According to all of
the doctors and theologians, canonists and jurists, three conditions are required for a war to be just […]. The 1st
condition is that there be authority to wage war; the 2nd, just cause to wage it; the 3rd, right intention” (p.499).
Then, based on these conditions, they drew on specific examples from Luzon to explain precisely why war
against (and by extension the enslavement of) the Zambales was indeed licit: “These Zambales impede the
general movement of those that go by sea and land to Pangasinan, Ilocos, and Cagayan. And the endangered
passages are not theirs nor of their lands, but rather are public routes, upon which they kill and rob those who
pass. It fulfills the second condition because the Zambales offend and kill without being bothered by ours
[Spaniards and Spanish-allied indios]. Beyond this, having promised obedience to the King our Lord and to the
Governor, in his name, they have rebelled and risen up. Finally, it is justified since [the Zambales] have broken
their word [many times] and the friendships they made [with us]” (p.508). See also the “Petición de informe
sobre ataques de indios enemigos,” 30 August 1608, Valladolid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 3, fols. 51r-52r,
which refers to a proposal of the attorney general of the Philippines, Rios Coronel, to enslave a range of natives
for their attacks on Spaniards, including the “Indian enemies” of Mindanao, Jolo, Burney (Borneo), and other
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Beyond representing the first issue of moral and legal contention in the early colonial
Philippines, the debate over slavery also contributed to polarizing the colonial
administration, forging a fundamental rift between the clergy on the one hand, and civil
officials and settlers on the other. The rift sharpened in subsequent decades and soon
transcended the issue of slavery to encompass a range of other related aspects of Spanish
colonialism in the Philippines. The Augustinian priest, Martín de Rada, who had arrived with
Legazpi in 1565, emerged as an early critic of slavery in the islands and a staunch advocate
for the protection of Philippine indios.656 Already in July of 1574, however, under pressure
nearby lands because, he claimed, they constantly attacked Spanish possessions, killing, robbing, and burning
churches; as well as the Zambales and Negritos, “who live in the montes as assaulters.” As late as 1655,
Spaniards still debated the question of whether Muslims from Mindanao could be held as slaves or
emancipated: see “Pleitos del Consejo,” 1655-1656, AGI Escribanía, leg. 1027C, pieza 7, 1655 “Sebastián
Hurtado de Corcuera, gobernador y capitán general de las islas Filipinas sobre declaración de si dos esclavos
que trajo de la isla de Mindanao, debían ser tales esclavos o libres. Pendiente en 1655,” (2 folios). In 1620, in
the context of war with the Dutch and the continued resistance of Philippine indios, especially Muslims, to
Spanish rule, the crown adjusted its policy. While the enslavement of Philippine “gentiles” remained prohibited,
“in order not to prejudice their evangelization,” colonists were from there forward permitted to make war on
and enslave “the indios of the islands of Mindanao and other adjacent [islands] that had rebelled;” see: “Orden
sobre hacer esclavos a los mindanaos mahometanos,” 29 May 1620, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 3, fols.
67r-68r.
656 P. Hernández, “El Padre Martin de Rada, O.S.A. y la pacificación de Filipinas,” Archivo Agustiniano 62, no.
180 (1974): 79-103. For early evidence of Rada’s protests to viceroy in New Spain about colonists’ abuse of
Philippine indios, see: “Carta del P. Martín de Rada al Virrey de la Nueva España dando cuenta de la gran
miseria y destrucción a que ha venido aquella tierra por los daños y robos que se hacen a los naturales,” 21 July
1570, Panay, AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 9; cited in HPAF, 41-42. The protests of Rada and his Augustinian
brother succeeding in eliciting from the crown a further prohibition of slavery in 1574, this one even more
categorical, stating that no Philippine indio could be held as a slave in any manner whatsoever. In any case,
Legazpi’s successor as governor, Guido de Lavezaris, lodged a protest against the 1574 decree, citing the
capture of slaves in just war and refusing to enforce it, and in the early 1580s, then-governor Gonzalo
Ronquillo de Peñalosa sought to placate the church by promulgating the earlier decree, only to subsequently
suspend it pending further clarification from the king and his Council of Indies. The suspension of the decree
by both Lavezaris and Ronquillo, pending clarification, represents a clear example of the exercise of the legal
principle, obedezco pero no cumplo, in which Spanish officials on the ground recognized the reception of the decree
and affirmed their obedience to the king, but delayed its implementation on the grounds that the king had been
ill-informed by the ecclesiastics about the origins of slavery and its suitability in the Philippine context. And in
any case, the remoteness of the archipelago, and the perpetual state of war that characterized many areas, like
Mindanao, meant that, as Antonio de Morga himself, the historian and then-lieutenant governor, noted,
Spaniards continued to hold slaves in the Philippines as late as 1598. We also see evidence that Spaniards
continued to benefit from the coerced labor of converted indios into the seventeenth century. In 1605, for
instance, the attorney general of the Philippines, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, decried “the exploitation of
the indios in the cutting wood [the timber industry]” through the polo, and “domestic services” [los tanores], had
been expressly abolished on several occasions; see: “Petición del procurador Ríos Coronel sobre varios
asuntos,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 51, fols. 310r-322r. Ríos Coronel, however,
continued to support the movement to enslave indios of the Muslim faith, in particular those from “Minadanao
and Joló, and other neighboring Mohammedan kingdoms,” since enemigos de los españoles y de la fé católica,
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from early ecclesiastics like Rada who decried Spanish violence and abuse of natives,
Lavezaris and twelve other local officials penned a declaration defending what they claimed
were their just wars of conquest in the islands and their exaction of tribute from native
communities. “War has not been waged against the natives except when necessary and in
cases of defense,” they wrote, claiming that ever since the very beginning, they had “always
sought peace.”657 While framing their own actions as defensive, the officials portrayed the
indios themselves according to the now classical trope as “bellicose and traitors,” in a
perpetual state of war even “before the arrival of Spaniards.”658 In addition, according to
prevailing European theories of just war, if one polity entered into a treaty of alliance and
subsequently broke that treaty, the other polity would be justified in taking retribution
through war. Independent of whether the terms and implications of such agreements were
fully and mutually comprehensible to both parties across the cultural and linguistic divide,
this argument was mobilized frequently to justify military actions against indigenous
populations across many of the vast territories claimed by the early modern Iberian empires.
Beyond the simple argument of self-defense in justifying the Spanish military action,
Spanish officials also emphasized their role as liberators, there to free indio commoners from
the tyranny of local indigenous headmen, from their spiritual enslavement by the devil, and
from the alleged continuous depredation of internecine war and foreign invasion.659
Purporting to speak on behalf of indios, one Spanish official asserted that, “now they feel
protected by the Castilians, who spare their towns from being assaulted by enemy indios and
que roban la tierra, matan y capturan vasallos, profanando templos y ornamentos sagrados […],” in “Petición
de Ríos Coronel sobre esclavizar indios mahometanos,” 30 June 1607 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 63,
fols. 423r-424v.
657 AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 11.
658 Ibid.
659 Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines, 25. For evidence as late as 1632 of the attempt of Spaniards to
justify their activities by acting as liberators or protectors of Philippine indios against the abuses of their own
traditional headmen, see “Orden a Távora sobre trato a los indios,” 26 March 1632, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg.
329, no. 3, fols. 222r-222v.
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corsairs.”660 On the issue of tribute in particular, they claimed that “the indios” pay it “with
pleasure in exchange for this protection.”661 Spanish authorities did not stop there, however,
also asserting that their presence brought vast economic benefits to natives while at the same
time emphasizing the relative penury of Spaniards themselves. “The indios do not feel
aggravated in paying tribute, since it is little and they pay it with ease, and even more so now
that they are enriched with the commerce that the Spaniards have generated.”662 On the
other hand, for Spaniards themselves, “life is very expensive there because of the lack of the
things of the Castile.”663
In response to these claims, in June of 1574 Rada issued his so-called Parecer, which,
while focused specifically on the issue of tribute, presented a comprehensive critique of the
broader bases of Spanish claims to sovereignty in the Philippines.664 According to Rada,
Spanish authorities in the Philippines had violated the king’s order to persuade indios by
peaceful means to submit to Spanish rule and engaged instead in unsanctioned, illegitimate
wars of conquest. By extension, he argued, the encomiendas awarded in the wake of the
Spaniards’ initial entradas were illegal since the king, on confirming them, was unaware of the
true manner in which the natives that comprised those grants had been subjugated.665
Moreover, beyond challenging the legal bases of such grants at their founding, Rada
censured encomenderos for exacting tributes without fulfilling their duties of protection and
evangelization.666 This critique had deeper ramifications that exceeded the rights of

AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 11.
Ibid.
662 Ibid.
663 Ibid.
664 “Parescer del provincial fray Martín de Rada agustino sobre las cosas destas yslas,” 21 June 1574, San Pablo
de Manila. AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 29. For the response from Governor Lavezaris and the encomenderos,
see, AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 29.
665 Hernández, “El Padre Martin de Rada, O.S.A. y la pacificación de Filipinas,” Archivo Agustiniano 62, no. 180
(1974): 91-92.
666 Ibid. 91-94.
660
661
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encomenderos to collect tribute. By exposing the lack of religious instruction in native
communities, Rada called into question the basic legitimacy of Spanish dominium in the
islands, based as it was on the obligation, made clear in the Patronato Real, to provide for the
spiritual wellbeing of the king’s indigenous subjects. He concluded that, from a theoretical
perspective, neither the king nor his Spanish subjects held legitimate title over the
archipelago given that they had submitted its native population by force and neglected to
provide sufficient religious instruction. However, anticipating José de Acosta’s arguments for
prescription by over a decade, Rada nonetheless accepted that since the conquest had been
affected and Spaniards had occupied the land (itself a questionable claim), they should be
permitted to exact tribute, although only the minimal amount necessary to sustain
themselves.667
On Rada’s death in 1578, the Dominican Domingo de Salazar arose as the primary
defender of native rights in the Philippines. That same year, Philip appointed him as Manila’s
first bishop. Salazar, a follower of both Vitoria and Las Casas, had, like Las Casas, gone to
Madrid personally to lobby on behalf of indigenous peoples, emphasizing his personal
experience in the Indies to bolster his credibility. As Horacio de la Costa has shown,
Salazar’s two overarching objectives were to defend the rights of indios against abuse at the
hands of encomenderos and the Spanish colonial administration, and to expand the influence of
the church in the Philippines and protect its authority vis-à-vis the civil administration.668
According to Salazar, Spaniards had failed in their collective duty to safeguard the
indigenous population from degradation and exploitation. His deep frustrations about the

667 Ibid. 95-96. In this way, arguing for the effective prescription of Spanish rule in the Philippines, Rada
foreshadowed José de Acosta, who advanced a similar argument regarding Spanish possession of the Americas,
which, he contended, represented a demonstrated fact for over forty years.
668 Horacio de la Costa, S.J., “Church and state in the Philippines during the administration of Bishop Salazar,
1581-1594,” Hispanic American Historical Review 30 (1950): 314-335.
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desperate state of affairs among many indio communities under Spanish rule compelled him
to convoke a meeting of the Philippine church to formulate a united position on the
morality and legality of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines. In the so-called Synod of
Manila of 1582, local ecclesiastics debated a range of issues including slavery, tributes, the
titles of Spain to sovereignty in the Philippines, the administration of justice, the duties of
encomenderos, and the consequences encomenderos should face for their abuse of natives
during the conquest and thereafter.669
During Salazar’s tenure as bishop, relations between civil and ecclesiastical power
strained further still. Just as the religious accused the colonists and civil authorities of
exploiting Philippine indios, so too did the latter accuse the former.670 In 1598, for instance,
Morga sent to the king a detailed list of some thirty-four alleged infractions committed by
the doctrineros, including abusing and exploiting their indio charges. Morga accused the local
clergy of a range of vices including dishonesty; trading goods and merchandise, which were
supposed to be channeled through the official galleon trade; and usurping “Royal
Jurisdiction, [by] hearing all kings of lawsuits from Indians.”671 He went on to accuse the
priests of overstepping their authority by sentencing and imprisoning Philippine indios and
imposing “on them [the idea] that they do not have to obey the justices of the King, but

Hidalgo Nuchera, La Recta Administración, 55-56.
For an example of an individual critical of virtually every faction of colonial society for their complicity in
exploiting the Philippine indio population, see the “Relación de Diego de Zárate sobre Filipinas,” 1581-06-10,
AGI Filipinas, 34, no. 38, fols. 280r-282v. Zárate censured encomenderos for demanding extra tribute and
personal service, the missionaries for their abuses, arguing that this was why the natives did not follow the
faith, and royal officials, for the bandala, which saw alcaldes mayores purchase goods from the Indians below the
true market rate. On the king’s efforts to punish certain “religiosos doctrineros” for their “excesses,” see
“Respuesta a Juan de Silva sobre asuntos de gobierno,” 1613-12-02 El Pardo, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 2,
fols. 172v-175r.
671 “Relación hecha por el Dr. Antonio de Morga para S.M. de lo que se le ofrece sobre el estado de las Islas
Filipinas, tanto en lo secular como en lo eclesiástico,” Manila, 8 June 1598, AGI Filipinas, leg. 18B, ramo 7; see
the transcription in Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 1997): 517-519.
On the galleon trade, see: Marina Alfonso Mola and Carlos Martínez-Shaw, eds. El Galeón de Manila. Madrid:
Ediciones Aldeasa, 2003.
669
670
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rather that which the religious command.”672 Morga also accused the clergy of afflicting, “the
Indians with bandalas and repartimientos of rice, wine, hens, and other things, without paying
them, or paying them very little.”673 Most grave of all was his accusation of slavery. The
priests, he claimed, held many as, “yndios de servicio, without paying them” at all.674
Salazar built upon the efforts of Rada, and in several respects exceeded his
predecessor, and even Vitoria, in his arguments in favor of indios’ liberty.675 First of all,
beyond protesting the enslavement of Philippine indios, Salazar contended that they should
never be coerced into labor – without their willful consent – even if paid.676 Spaniards should
likewise never impose Christianity by force, nor should soldiers accompany missionaries
672 “Relación hecha por el Dr. Antonio de Morga para S.M. de lo que se le ofrece sobre el estado de las Islas
Filipinas, tanto en lo secular como en lo eclesiástico,” Manila, 8 June 1598, AGI Filipinas, leg. 18B, ramo 7; see
the transcription in Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 1997): 517-519.
673 Ibid.
674 Ibid.
675 Beyond these theoretical, juridical protests, Salazar also led the church in practical efforts to alleviate the
suffering of indios at the hands of rapacious settlers. While on a trip to Spain in 1593, Salazar outlined for the
king what he saw as the major challenges facing Philippines, which, he argued, impeded both the spread of the
Gospel and the consolidation of crown rule. Salazar identified three main problems. First, the abuse committed
by Spanish settlers on the native population was perhaps the prime obstacle. “Spaniards,” he alleged, “commit
so many injuries, aggravations, and harm to the natives, subjecting them to death and capturing them, their
children, and women, with robberies of the dwellings, burning and desolation of their towns, houses, palm
groves, and gardens, […] making tributaries […] of those of much poverty and misery. […] And if they don’t
have money to pay [the tribute, the Spaniards] make them slaves to serve them or make them pay ransom.”
Salazar likewise implicated royal officials in this abuse, claiming that, “all those who have governed or govern
those lands in the name of Your Majesty orient their government toward this end.” Moreover, despite
commitments to return indigenous headmen control over their local communities, “No native nor hombre
principal has maintained his position, […] the government which they previously had has been stripped.”
According to Salazar, the second major factor inhibiting the success of Spain’s colonial project in the
Philippines was the lack of religious instruction, “in many small islands […] where the [native] residents of
those islands cannot receive the doctrine.” Related to this was a third factor Salazar identified: “the lack of
ministers in those [islands].” In order to address these problems and set the Spanish colonial project in the
Philippines on a more righteous, prosperous, and sustainable path, Salazar likewise proposed three main
solutions, all of which, in one way or another, aimed to improve the condition of the native population. First,
he urged the king to once again “declare the native Filipinos in liberty, which neither had they enjoyed in the
past nor do they have now.” Second, he proposed a fundamental reform of the encomienda system across the
islands, including small ones, to ensure that encomenderos were able to provide both food and doctrine to the
Indians under their care. Finally, in reparation for past abuses and as a symbol of goodwill toward natives, he
implored the king to command the encomenderos to return the tributes to indios that have been extracted unjustly.
See, Fray Domingo de Salazar, O.P., “Tratado del título que los reyes de España tiene para ser señores de la
Indias,” 1593, Madrid, in Cuerpo de documentos del siglo XVI, sobre los derechos de España en las Indias y las Filipinas, ed.
Lewis Hanke, 185-193 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1977), original document held in the
Archivo de la Provincia del Santísimo Rosario (Manila), vol. 420.
676 De la Costa, “Church and state in the Philippines during the administration of Bishop Salazar, 1581-1594,”
Hispanic American Historical Review 30 (1950): 330-333.
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since, even if they did not engage in violence, their very presence might strike fear among
natives and encourage submissions to Catholicism and Spanish political rule that were not
purely voluntary.677 Underlying Salazar’s arguments was the fundamental belief that Spain’s
legitimate rule in the Philippines could only be based on the indios’ free and willful transfer of
sovereignty, or on their defeat and submission in a truly just war.678 However, given that, in
his view, neither scenario reflected the past or current reality, Salazar expressed grave doubts
about the fundamental title of Spain to sovereignty in the Philippines.679
Despite the persistence of Rada, Salazar, and their allies, and despite a series of royal
decrees that supported their critiques and proposals in theory, colonial authorities did little
to reign in abusive encomenderos. As a result, indigenous suffering intensified, compelling one
governor, Santiago de Vera, to attempt to bring together the various sectors of Spanish
society and administration in the Philippines in an effort to build consensus on how best to
tackle the problem. In recognition of Salazar’s broad influence in the colony, in 1586 Vera
appointed him head of a council that included representatives of the secular church and
missionary orders, the high court, the municipal council and commercial elite, the military,
and the local judicial administration from several prominent towns.680
These collective efforts toward improving the condition of Philippines indios, while
achieving the illusion or potential of progress, failed to result in substantive change.681 For
Ibid.
Ibid.
679 Ibid.
680 Ibid. 325.
681 Visitas a la tierra, which consisted of expeditions of royal officials sent from Manila to inspect and ensure the
operation of good governance in distant territories, were few and far between, and those few that did
materialize, failed to result in any substantive change. In addition, despite succeeding in eliciting from the
crown the creation of the office of protector de indios in 1589, a post first held by Salazar, within a decade,
according one leading historian, that official’s effective authority had been severely undermined in particular by
the exigencies of war with the Dutch, a circumstance which convinced Spaniards across the archipelago of the
necessity of Indian exploitation as a means of strengthening and replenishing the colony’s defenses. See:
Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, “Visitas a la tierra durante los primeros tiempos de la colonización de las Filipinas,
1565-1608,” in Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico, ed. Maria Dolores Elizalde, Josep Fradera, and Luis Alonso, vol.
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instance, although the representative council issued a Memorial that decried the exaction of
tribute from infidels, citing encomenderos’ obligation to evangelize, such practices persisted, as
did slavery and pre-existing forms of debt-servitude, particularly in remote regions where
colonial authorities had little to no effective authority in everyday affairs.682 At the same time,
however, the pro-indio lobby did see certain cases of limited success in the Philippines, in
particular regarding the principle that the Castilian crown’s legitimate claim to sovereignty in
the islands was based on the natives’ willful submission.683 As a consequence, in 1594 Philip
issued a decree that returned indio headmen to the government of their towns, affirming the
notion, articulated most forcefully by Salazar, that the natives maintained certain political
rights of self-government.684 This compromise sought not only to placate the more critical
voices in opposition to Spain’s presence in the Philippines. It also aimed to provide a more
cost-effective means of governing Philippine indios, while simultaneously bestowing an air of

1 (Madrid: CSIC, 2001), 207-225; and Hidalgo Nuchera, La Recta Administración, 103, 109, 114. For the king’s
early consideration of the proposal to create the position of protector de indios as early as 1583, see “Petición de
informe sobre protector de indios de Filipinas,” 10 May 1583, Aranjuez, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols.
232r-232v.
682 De la Costa, “Church and state in the Philippines during the administration of Bishop Salazar, 1581-1594,”
325.
683 Debates between ecclesiastical authorities on the one hand, led by Salazar until his death in 1594, and civil
officials on the other, including the governor, persisted well into the 1590s and beyond. In large part, these
disputes continued to focus on the rights of indigenous peoples, tribute, and the question of Spain’s just title to
sovereignty over the islands. In 1591, reflecting on the deliberations of various councils on the issue, and in
particular on the contents of another Memorial submitted by Salazar the previous month, then-governor Gómez
Pérez Dasmariñas issued a set of new rules for the archipelago dictating the relative extent to which tributes
should be collected from three different types of encomiendas. According to these rules, full tribute could be
extracted from both Christians and non-Christians in encomiendas where religious instruction was provided and
royal authority established. In encomiendas that had submitted to Spanish rule but which had no religious
instruction, tribute could be collected except that normally set aside for the missionaries. No tribute could be
collected in encomiendas in which neither Spanish law nor religious instruction had been established. Finally, in
the many encomiendas formerly subjected to Spanish rule but that had since rebelled, encomenderos were permitted
to extract as much tribute as possible. See: De la Costa, “Church and state in the Philippines during the
administration of Bishop Salazar, 1581-1594,” 330-333, citing “Memorial of the Junta of Manila,” in Colín I,
612-613.
684 Hidalgo Nuchera, La Recta Administración, 55-57, citing “Real Cédula,” 11 June 1594, Madrid, AGI Filipinas,
leg. 339, no. 2, 64. According to Hidalgo Nuchera, this was included as Law 16, Title VII, Book VI in the 1680
Recopilación.
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legitimacy on Spanish colonial rule in the islands through the co-option and collaboration of
indigenous elites.685

Manila: Stronghold of Spanish Power?

While questions continued to swirl regarding the legitimacy of Spanish colonialism in
the Philippines, by the 1580s, Manila had emerged as the colony’s undisputed center of
Spanish settlement and administration.686 This was reflected primarily in the city’s position as
the seat of the main institutions of colonial government for the region, including the high
court, or Audiencia. At the same time, however, even in Manila, the crown’s capacity exercise
its effective authority was far from absolute. Prominent officials of government, including
the high court justices and municipal councilmen, each held wide autonomy and jurisdiction,
which often overlapped.
Beyond these internal dynamics of colonial administration that dispersed political
authority, external forces also converged to challenge Spanish sovereignty in Manila in more
overt, existential terms. In opposition to Spanish abuse and persecution, the city’s massive
Chinese merchant community arose on several occasions in armed opposition to Spanish
abuse and persecution. The scale of these uprisings, and their frequency, reflect the reality
that Manila was, in many ways, just as much a Chinese city as a Spanish one. Beyond the
impact of their various uprisings and revolts, Chinese power in the city was likewise evident
in their control over commerce (including the silver trade within the domestic economy),
Luis Ángel Sánchez Gómez, “Las elites nativas y la construcción colonial en Filipinas, 1565-1789,” in España
y el Pacífico: Legazpi, ed. Leoncio Cabrero, vol. 2 (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales,
2004), 37-70.
686 For a detailed study on local life in Manila, see Inmaculada Alva Rodríguez, Vida municipal en Manila: Siglos
xvi-xvii, (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 1997); and Lourdes Díaz-Trechuelo, “Evolución urbana de
Manila,” Cuadernos del Centro Cultural 9, no. 44 (1978): 447-463.
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over the skilled labor force, as well as over the basic supply of food. As a result, the Spanish
presence in Manila depended on a fragile, unstable coexistence with the city’s Sangleys,
which erupted periodically into brutal explosions of violence.
After bestowing Manila with the title, “Distinguished and Ever Loyal City,” in 1574,
raising it to the highest status a city could enjoy within the empire, the next significant step
in cementing its prominence was the creation of a high court there in 1583.687 The
foundation of the Audiencia resulted in part from the joint request of the governor, Gonzalo
Ronquillo de Peñalosa, and Domingo de Salazar, the first bishop, who sought an impartial
institution to mediate disputes between the church and civil authority. From the king’s
perspective, the Audiencia would also serve to diffuse the power of both the governor and
bishop by placing a third institution of government to temper the power of the latter two, all
while enhancing royal authority in the islands by expanding the crown’s institutional
footprint.688
In theory, the Spanish monarchy laid claim to the entire Philippine archipelago. Its
ambition was even greater, however. In discussing the foundation of the high court, Juan de
la Plaza wrote that, “the King wishes to assign to the government of the Philippines
everything from point of Malacca forward, all the way to China, Japan, and Maluco.”689
Pending the successful conquest and incorporation of new territories in the region,

Although a royal cédula decreed the establishment of the Audiencia in 1583, it was not actually instituted until
the following year, after the cédula has reached Manila from Spain.
688 The Audiencia likewise soon came into conflict with both competing civil and religious sources of authority.
Yet while the king sought to limit the intensity of such conflict, a certain degree was welcomed was a sign of
the limits of the power of each. For an example of such a conflict between the bishop and Audiencia regarding
the dispersal of royal treasury funds, see 13 July 1589, Letter of the Audiencia of Filipinas about the rebellion of
the Indios in 1588 in Tondo, Cebu, and Cagayan; and the dispute between the bishop and the Audiencia; see:
The Philippines Under Spain, ed. Virginia Benítez Licuaran and José Llavador Mira (1991): vol. 4, 547. In this case,
the bishop accused the Audiencia of not releasing certain funds owed to the bishopric.
689 Monumenta Mexicana, ed. Félix Zubillaga (Rome: Apud “Monumenta Historica Soc. Iesu,” 1956) vol. 2, 182;
quoted in Manel Ollé, “Competencia Macao-Manila en el contexto inicial de la monarquía dualista, 1581-1593,”
Illes e Imperis 3 (Spring 2000): 10.
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therefore, the court’s jurisdiction could have potentially expanded to cover all Spanish
subjects across East Asia. As Antonio de Morga described it, by the early seventeenth
century Manila had clearly emerged as “the capital of the kingdom and the head of the
government of all the islands. It is the metropolis of the other cities and settlements of the
islands.”690
As in other parts of the Indies, conflict soon erupted between the Audiencia judges
and other royal officials including the governor himself, who sat atop the Audiencia as its
president. Already in 1585, less than two years after its formal establishment, two officials, at
least one of which was a treasury officer, proclaimed that all the Audiencia judges did was
meddle in military affairs and complicate the exercise of government of the relatively small
settlement of Spaniards.691 At roughly the same moment, the newly appointed governor,
Santiago de Vera, called for the dissolution of the Audiencia, frustrated by the limits it placed
on his own power.692 By meddling “with the administration of the government and military
matters,” the Audiencia proved a counterproductive impediment to the development of the

Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las islas Filipinas (Mexico, 1609), in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and
Robertson, vol. 16, 137.
691 “It seems proper at this time that the Audiencia be abolished and that these Islands be governed by a
Christian person whom Your Majesty might choose; or by anyone whose qualifications are certified to Your
Majesty as faithful servants and vassals,” they wrote. The audiencia judges, “have developed such a mortal hatred
for us and maltreat us by word and deed so that we live oppressed and deprived of the freedom to use our
positions.” The letter was written by Andrés Cauchela and Domingo Mendiola. See “Letters of the Officials of
Filipinas about interesting points for the welfare of those Islands and about the importance of removing the
Audiencia,” 20 June 1585, in The Philippines Under Spain, vol. 4, 309-315, original document found in AGI
Patronato, leg. 25, ramo 2. While Domingo Mendiola’s specific position is unknown, his co-author, Andrés
Cauchela, was a veteran bureaucrat and accountant in the royal treasury of the Philippines. For an account of
Cauchela’s career and his request for retirement, see “Petición de jubilación del contador Andrés Cauchela,” 23
September 1592 (Probable) Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 55.
692 Warning of the great expense the audiencia incurred in its operation and the rise in tensions between judges
and military officials, Vera explained that, “Your Majesty has very little revenue in this Treasury, barely reaching
35,000 pesos. […] As the President and Magistrates have to be provided for, it is expected that nothing is left for
other things that are required. The soldiers and the military go without shirts.” Beyond this, the proliferation of
superfluous, drawn-out lawsuits between Spaniards and Indians, he argued, drained the resources of each. “All
of this can be avoided,” Vera suggested, “by removing the audiencia and so their differences with the Governor
can be avoided,” see Santiago de Vera, “President of the Audiencia of Manila, proposing the removal of the
Audiencia,” 20 June 1585, in The Philippines Under Spain, vol. 4, 307-309, original document found in AGI
Patronato, leg. 25, ramo 2.
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colony.693 Given that “the land is so newly discovered and has such a small Spanish
population,” he proposed that simply, “a Christian person with judicial experience,” was all
that was needed “to govern the [settlers] and mete out justice” among them, “considering
they are mostly soldiers and military men.” 694 Near the close of his six-year tenure, Vera
successfully eliminated the Audiencia in 1590 after protracted debate, much to the pleasure of
the municipal council, which presumably opposed the court’s efforts to curb the autonomy
of the local settler elite.695
Just five years later, however, Philip II equipped his newly appointed governor and
captain-general of the Philippines, Francisco de Tello de Guzmán, with clear instructions to
re-establish the high court. Providing a detailed explanation of the ceremonial process by
which the Audiencia should be formally re-inaugurated, Philip likewise articulated an
argument for how that body would not simply serve as a check on the governor’s power, but
also enhance the governor’s effectiveness by allowing him to focus on political and military
affairs, and providing him with competent counsel. “If you are disengaged from matters
pertaining to justice, you will have more time for matters of government and war,” wrote
Philip; “or in important and arduous cases you may find it advisable to have those with
whom to take counsel, that matters may be considered with the requisite continuity and by a
sufficiently large body of advisers.” “For these reasons,” the king concluded, “I have decided
to reestablish an Audiencia in that city of Manila, as in former years.”696
In addition to tensions at the highest level of colonial government in the Philippines
between the governor, bishop, and judges of the high court, another persistent source of
Santiago de Vera, “President of the Audiencia of Manila, proposing the removal of the Audiencia,” 20 June
1585, in The Philippines Under Spain, vol. 4, 307-309, original document found in AGI Patronato, leg. 25, ramo 2.
694 Ibid.
695 “Carta y peticiones del Cabildo secular de Manila,” 24 June 1590, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 21, fols.
126r-129v.
696 “The Audiencia of Manila reestablished, Felipe II,” 26 November 1595, El Pardo, in The Philippine Islands,
ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 9, 189-193.
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jurisdictional conflict concerned the autonomy and authority of Manila’s municipal council.
As the local governing body of the center of political, economic, and religious power in the
Philippines, Manila’s municipal council held significant sway, was fiercely protective of its
exclusive jurisdiction, and often sought to expand that jurisdiction at the expense of
competing institutions. Highlighting its own prominence, in 1638 the council noted that, “as
head of the Islands, it dealt with affairs of importance and gravity,” and that, as a result, “its
Councilmen […] should enjoy the same privileges and preeminencias as those enjoyed by [the
councilmen] of other cities of the same quality, particularly those of the cities of Mexico and
Lima, which in greatness, population, and authority do not equal Manila, which is neither
inferior nor of less importance than any other [city] in the Indies.”697
Noting the myriad conflicts between the municipal councilmen of Manila and royal
officials in the city, the councilmen expressed particular frustration at the governor’s alleged
overreach. Such overreach, they alleged, encompassed the forceful appointment of a number
of personal friends and relatives within the council body itself in order to ensure personal
loyalty through patronage, demands that the municipal council to meet in the governor’s
residence, and the illicit practice of opening the councilmen’s letters to the king when they
sought nothing but “to inform him [ie. the king] what was best for the royal service, and its
conservation.”698 Regarding the first of these allegations, the authors argued that the
governor’s appointees served essentially as spies, meaning that, “nothing happened in the
Cavildo of which he [the governor] was not aware, and as such things did not proceed with

“Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable),
AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, pts. 37-38, fols. 1269v-1270r.
698 Ibid. fol. 1269v. For the governors’ appointment of relatives and friends, see “Petición de Ríos Coronel
sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 32.1,
fol.651v. Regarding the governor’s forcing the cabildo to meet on occasion in his residence, see “Petición del
procurador Ríos Coronel sobre varios asuntos,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 51, fols. 310r322r.
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any liberty, nor did anyone dare to speak with Christian liberty.”699 As a result, the council
appealed to the king to command the governor not to appoint his allies as “Councilmen
[Regidores], nor Alcaldes, nor even as secretary/scribe [escrivano].”700 In addition, further
evidence of the governor’s wide-ranging power in the city, the councilmen lamented to the
king that when cedulas prejudicial to the governor’s authority arrived to the municipal council,
no member wished to be the one to inform the governor, out of fear of reprisal. In response,
in a separate decree of 1638, the king explicitly prohibited governor from taking punitive
action against any councilman that informs him of the contents a royal decree.701
Perhaps the most salient aspect of this debate concerned the geographical reach of
the council’s territorial jurisdiction. The same year the city was formally founded, Philip II
explicitly defined Manila’s geographical limits as radiating outward five leagues from the city
center.702 While the Audiencia served as the high court of appeals for all Spanish subjects
across East Asia, it also exercised jurisdiction over a variety of criminal cases within that fiveleague radius. Municipal council magistrates [juizes ordinarios] held jurisdiction over most civil
matters within that area, and likewise enjoyed effective authority over a range of other
aspects of local Spanish legal, political, and economic life.
699 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas,
leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 32.1, fol.651v.
700 Ibid.
701 8 December 1638, Cedulario de Manila, 22-23. Beyond this, the council also made reference as well to the
governor’s illicit manipulation and alteration of tribute requirements, not only from the subjected Philippine
indio population, but also from the sangeleyes, Japanese, blacks, and slaves,” see: “Petición del Cabildo secular de
Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, pt.
58, fols. 1274r.
702 Cedulario de Manila, 14-17. There is some inconsistency in the early documentation. A copy of another cédula,
purportedly from the previous day, 21 June 1574, contained a provision from Philip instructing his new
governor and captain general, Francisco de Sande, “to assign twenty leagues of territory and jurisdiction given
that the natives within [those 20 leagues] are settled and held in encomiendas by the residents of the said city.” See
“Royal Cedula, indicating the jurisdiction of the city of Manila,” 21 June 1574, AGI Escribanía, leg. 403B, fols.
62v-63r. This appears to have been either an exception or a mistake, as the vast majority of documentation
from the period refers to a 5-league radius. Although folios 69r-70r of the same document (AGI Escribanía,
leg. 403B) refer to a painting that shows the true and precise boundaries of jurisdictions, such a painting has, to
my knowledge, thus far not been located or identified by historians. For reference to the earlier cédula of 8 May
1596, which established Manila’s five-league jurisdiction, see “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre
necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, fols. 1260r-1354r.
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Conflicts over the council’s jurisdiction in and around Manila intensified in particular
after the turn of the seventeenth century as the city expanded and Spanish influence spread
through parts of the surrounding region. In one instance, in response to repeated appeals
from Manila’s municipal council to correct the governor’s overreach, in 1614, the king
ordered the governor to respect the municipal council magistrates’ right to hear cases within
the five leagues, while at the same time protecting the rights of crown-appointed indigenous
alcaldes mayores to primary jurisdiction over indio towns beyond the five-league limit. He
proclaimed clearly that, “the municipal council magistrates [alcaldes ordinarios] may hear
without hindrance any cases [negocios] in any Indian towns within the five leagues as well as in
any settlement of Spaniards within the said district.”703 “Regarding the towns of Indians”
beyond the city’s jurisdiction, he continued, “I remind you that they have their own alcaldes
mayores to govern and administer them, and that this should not change.”704 “You should be
very careful to seek peace and quietude and see that the Indians are protected,” he
concluded.705
The rise of the port of Cavite as the main shipbuilding center and harbor serving the
greater Manila Bay also sparked tensions between the governor and municipal council. While
the former sought to expand his own influence in the port by exempting Cavite from the
authority of the municipal council, the latter protested repeatedly, appealing directly to the
king and his Council of Indies on several occasions to defend its jurisdiction. In separate
petitions from 1633 and 1638, the municipal council and its attorney general [procurador
general], Juan Grau y Monfalcón, decried what they framed as the governor’s usurpation of its
power by illegally placing Cavite under the jurisdiction of the alcaldes mayores of Tondo and
703 “Pleitos de la Audiencia de Filipinas,” AGI Escribanía, leg. 403B, for this particular matter from 23 June
1614, see fols. 175v-177r.
704 Ibid.
705 Ibid.
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Bulacán, thereby depriving the Manila council of its rightful authority to set provision prices
in the local market and generate revenue through taxation.706 The council explicitly requested
from the king, “a cédula to conserve its jurisdiction in the manner it always had.”707
After over a decade of seeking redress from the king to curtail the governor’s
authority and buttress their own, in 1638 Philip IV dispatched a new cédula to, “Sebastian
Hurtado de Corcuera, […] my governor and captain general of the Philippine Islands and
president of the my royal Audiencia, or to the person or persons then in government,” “to
respect the five league jurisdiction of the city of Manila, […] and not to perturb it.”708 This
represented a significant victory for municipal power in its effort to curb that of even the
highest crown official, the governor.

Beyond its status as the seat of colonial government, Manila’s centrality was likewise
based, perhaps foremost, on its existence as an increasingly bustling entrepôt for the China
trade. The association with commerce became so tightly linked that contemporaries
commonly referred to it by the phrase, Manila, Ciudad y Comercio [“Manila, City and
Commerce”].709 Despite the crown’s early intention to make the Philippines a self-sufficient,
agricultural colony and apportion it into encomiendas, the rising profits of the Manila trade
706 “Peticiones del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre su jurisdicción,” 15 July 1633 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg.
27, no. 173, fols. 960r-975v, and “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9
August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, fols. 1260r-1354r.
707 “Peticiones del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre su jurisdicción,” 15 July 1633 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg.
27, no. 173, fols. 960r-975v.
708 “Orden sobre la jurisdicción de la ciudad de Manila,” 21 June 1641, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 5,
fols. 71r-73r. See also “Copia de Real Cédula de 21 de junio de 1641 sobre respetar la jurisdicción de cinco
leguas de la ciudad de Manila,” AGI Filipinas, leg. 28, no. 51, fols. 205r-208r. This document, although from
1641, references an earlier 1638 document containing another cedula of similar effect. Likewise, a few short
years later, the king issued another decree addressed to his governor, Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, “not to
create new governorships in the Port of Cavite or in the Parián of the Sangleyes,” but rather to maintain the
existing officials there, “the justicia mayor del puerto de Cavite and the alcaide de la Alcaicería del Parián.” This was a
way of ensuring the superior status of Manila over these two neighboring jurisdictions. See, “Orden sobre
nombrar gobernadores en Cavite y Parián,” 24 October 1642, Zaragoza, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 5, fols.
192v-193v.
709 Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” 53.
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drove many encomenderos to abandon their grants in the countryside and flock to the city to
pursue their fortunes in the China trade and its ancillary industries.
While Chinese merchants had long visited the Philippines for trade, their numbers,
and the commerce they brought, expanded dramatically after the Spanish had established
their base at Manila. In the 1520s, an early Spanish fleet in the archipelago recorded that just
two Chinese merchant ships came “each year for the purpose of trade.”710 But as Manila’s
trade grew, so too did its population, particularly the number of Chinese residents. The
Sangleys came to form a major portion of the city’s population, only slightly smaller than the
community of Philippine indios, and dwarfing the population of Spaniards. If in 1570 Manila
was home to just forty Chinese heads of households, in 1589 the total number stood at some
4,000, and just six years later around 12,000.711 At around the same, at the turn of the
seventeenth century, there were a total of roughly 20,000 Philippine indios in Manila, 3,000
Japanese, and a minority of 2,400 Spaniards, according to one estimate.712
From the very beginning of the Spanish presence in the Philippines, the Chinese
proved critical to the survival of the colony’s economic development.713 As the governor
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space of fourteen years; see: Bartolome Leonardo de Argensola, Conquista de las Islas de Molucas (Madrid, 1609),
trans. in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 16, p295. The Chinese population of Manila
fluctuated dramatically as a result of such outbreaks of revolt and repression. Despite such large-scale
decimation, however, the Chinese population continuously regenerated itself with the influx of new migrants
from the mainland. In 1639, in another brutal repression, the Spanish, by their own estimate, killed another
23,000 Sangleys, for instance, but by 1649 the Chinese population in the city had already recovered to some
15,000. See, Bartolome de Letona, “Description of the Philippine Islands,” 1662, in The Philippine Islands, ed.
Blair and Robertson, vol. 36, 200.
712 Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” 53.
713 One of the unexpected, negative by-products of the dominance of Chinese commerce in Manila was that
the cheap, easy access to goods imported from China discouraged the development of Philippine manufactures
and agriculture, including the vital production of rice and cotton. As governor Dasmariñas observed in 1591,
given the affordability of Chinese products, even indios could afford to “pay for them,” and as a result, to the
general detriment of the colony, to “abandon work and the cultivation of their fields.” Beyond providing much
711
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Guido de Lavezares reported to the king in 1574, “the Chinese continue to increase their
trade each year, and supply us with many articles, like sugar, wheat and barley flour, nuts,
raisins, pears and oranges, silks, choice porcelain and iron, and other small things which we
lacked in this land before their arrival.”714 In addition to importing the majority of foodstuffs
and manufactures, Sangleys also represented the vast majority of the artisan class, providing
a range of skilled labor in both urban trades and agricultural production.715
Relations between Spaniards and Sangleys were tense and occasionally violent.716 At
the same time, however, the two groups were dependent on each other for their livelihood
and survival. The chafing of Sangleys under attempted impositions of Spanish rule, and the
periodic violence that resulted, gave rise to a series of proposals to expel the Chinese
altogether. Short of expelling the Sangleys, which was proposed on several occasions yet
never carried out, Spanish authorities did attempt to implement a policy of supervision and
social exclusion.717 In theory if not always in practice, the Spanish required the Chinese to
of the goods and services consumed by the local Philippine economy, the Sangleys also brought vast majority
of silks, porcelain, and other valuable commodities that were exchanged for Spanish American silver and
shipped via the Pacific Galleon to Acapulco, in New Spain. See, Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, “Ordinance
Forbidding the Indians to Wear Chinese Stuffs,” April 9-May 20, 1591, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and
Robertson, vol. 8, 70-80; and Rafael Bernal, “The Chinese Colony in Manila, 1570-1770,” in The Chinese in the
Philippines, 1570-1770, ed. Alfonso Felix, Jr., vol. 1, 45 (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1966).
714 “Guido de Lavezares to Philip II,” July 17, 1574, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 3, 276.
715 As John Leddy Phelan points out, the Chinese were generally more skilled and efficient farmers than
Philippine indios, and that the Jesuits, for instance, largely preferred them as laborers on their agrarian estates.
See Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor: Mexico and the Philippines 1540-1648,” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 1, no. 2 (1959): 196. As the Jesuit priest Pedro Chirino noted in 1604, “from China come
many persons able and willing to engage in all sorts of trades and they are skillful, quick and economical. They
are physicians and barber and even stevedores,” he continued. “They are the tailors, the shoemakers, the
silversmiths, the sculptors, the locksmiths, the masons, painters and weavers and finally they take over all
classes of work in the city;” Pedro Chirino, S.J. Relación de las Islas Filipinas (Rome, 1604), quoted and translated
in Rafael Bernal, “The Chinese Colony in Manila, 1570-1770,” in The Chinese in the Philippines: 1570-1770, ed.
Felix, Alfonso (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1966), 61-62.
716 Relations were likewise tense between the Chinese and indios, the latter of which viewed the former with
contempt for depriving them of economic opportunity, causing the decline in their own productive industries
through competition, and exploiting them by charging excessively high prices for basic commodities, including
food. See, Bernal, “The Chinese Colony in Manila,” 65.
717 For evidence of the deep-seated fear the Spaniards felt from the Chinese, see “Salazar to King,” Manila, 24
June 1590, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 7, 220-224. In addition to cyclical outbreaks of
violence, there were several proposals from leading officials in the Spanish administration to expel the Chinese
altogether. But given the Spaniards’ utter dependence on the Chinese, few saw their expulsion as a desirable or
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inhabit a compact, defined area, known as the Parián, which lay adjacent to but just beyond
the walls of the Spanish Intramuros, within reach of its cannons.718 Several decades later, in the
wake of a fresh wave of violence between Spaniards and Chinese, the king himself endorsed
the arrangement, expressing his conviction that the Chinese should live “enclosed by a wall,
just as is done with the Jews in Rome, Alexandria, and other places, in order to control them
more easily.”719
Beyond Spanish attempts to ghettoize the Chinese community, the crown also
established a series of policies and institutions aimed at regulating the Sangleys’ social,
political, and economic life, while at the same time seeking to shield them from abuse and
exploitation. As in other aspects of imperial administration, some of these policies and
institutions functioned more in the realm of aspiration than reality. In 1593, for instance, the
Spanish attempted to regulate trade with the Sangleys through the so-called pancada through
which the colonial administration would purchase Chinese goods wholesale at pre-arranged
prices. In theory, the administration would then distribute those goods among Spanish
merchants in proportion to their initial investment. The scheme aimed to ensure that both
commodity prices and Chinese immigration in general would remain low since Chinese
merchant activity would be restricted to the docks. The pancada was a failure from its

viable alternative. As Antonio de Morga noted in 1609, without the Chinese, “there were no men to practice
the various trades or to supply the City, so that food could not be found nor shoes be bought even at
exorbitant prices.” Morga, Sucesos de Filipinas (1609). Bernal provides no specific page number in Morga for this
quote.
718 Domingo de Salazar, “The Chinese and the Parian at Manila,” June 24, 1590, in The Philippine Islands, ed.
Blair and Robertson, vol. 7, 220. Parian’s exited in Cebu, Panay, and Jolo as well, but the Parian of Manila was
by the far the busiest and most populous. See Alberto Santamaría O.P., “The Chinese Parian (El Parian de los
Sangleyes),” The Chinese in the Philippines: 1570-1770, ed. Felix, Alfonso (Manila: Historical Conservation Society,
1966), 67-118; and Manel Ollé, “La formación del Parián de Manila: La construcción de un equilibrio
inestable,” in La investigación sobre Asia pacifico en España, ed. Pedro San Ginés Aguilar (Granada: Editorial
Universidad de Granada, 2007), 27-49. In its early years, the Parian was moved several times after fires, but
always remained just beyond the walled Spanish quarter of Intramuros.
719 “Petición de informe sobre reducción de sangleyes en Manila,” 4 August 1643, Zaragoza, AGI Filipinas, leg.
330, no. 4, fols. 155v-156r.
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inception, however, since both Spaniards and Sangleys readily circumvented it, seeking
higher individual profits through an illicit yet hardly clandestine contraband trade.720
The Spanish colonial administration also pursued other, supposedly more benevolent
policies aimed at currying the favor of the Chinese, in particular those recently converted to
Christianity, and at encouraging their successful integration within the Spanish social and
cultural world. In 1627, for instance, the Spanish authorities decided that, “the Sangleys
converted to our holy Catholic faith shall not pay tribute for the first ten years after their
conversion.”721 Likewise, a few years earlier, Spain’s attorney general in the Philippines, Ríos
Coronel, proposed the creation of separate towns in the countryside for recently converted
Chinese that had married Philippine women.722 The plan sought to reward those individuals
for their conversion by exempting them from the obligation to reside in the Parián, while at
the same time helping buttress the colony’s agricultural production.
Exploitation and abuse persisted, however, despite the efforts of certain sectors
within the colonial administration to foster coexistence. As a result, tensions between the
two communities, as well as between the Sangleys and Philippine indios continued to
smolder, breaking out periodically in intense eruptions of violence.723 In May 1603, for
instance, a Chinese Imperial fleet arrived in Manila Bay on the pretext of inquiring into

720 From 1620, in a move that further centralized the China trade in Manila, the crown also began requiring all
inbound China ships to dock there and pay official customs duties before proceeding on to their final
destinations across the archipelago. In addition, the between 1591 and 1614, the royal treasury introduced a
series taxes on the Chinese, including a residence tax, as well as two other which together amounted to a 16percent tax on goods imported from China. See, Bernal, “The Chinese Colony in Manila,” 43.
721 “Orden sobre tributos de sangleyes cristianos,” 14 June 1627, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 3, fols.
397r-398r. See also, “Laws regarding the Sangleys” [from Recopilación de leyes de las Indias], in The Philippine Islands,
ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 22, 151-160, law 7.
722 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas,
leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 31, fol. 651v.
723 For relatively recent, nuanced analyses of Hispano-Chinese relations in the early modern Philippines, see
Jonathan Gebhardt, “Microhistory and Microcosm: Chinese Migrants, Spanish Empire, and Globalization in
Early Modern Manila,” Journal Of Medieval & Early Modern Studies 47, no. 1 (January 2017): 167-192; and Lucille
Chia, “The Butcher, the Baker, and the Carpenter: Chinese Sojourners in the Spanish Philippines and their
Impact on Southern Fujian,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 49 (2006): 509-534.
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reports of gold mines in Cavite. Suspicious that the fleet had actually come to survey Spanish
defenses in preparation for a full-scale invasion, both the Spanish and Chinese began arming
themselves. Although a second Chinese fleet never arrived, Manila’s resident Sangleys
nonetheless took matters into their own hands.724 Numbering some 30,000 compared to less
than 1,000 Spaniards, and chafing under the yoke of Spanish oppression, the Sangleys
commenced the conflict with an attack on the Spanish quarter, setting a number of houses
alight and defeating the first Spanish squadron sent to retaliate.725 The Spanish then
regrouped, gathered Pampangan, Tagalog, and Japanese reinforcements, and, over the course
of several days, eventually turned the tide.726 The Pampangan troops, numbering some 4,000,
were crucial to that effort.727 In the wake of this violence, the Spanish, deprived of the
necessary foods and manufactures brought from China, reluctantly allowed the Sangleys to
re-enter the city. Despite demanding that the total population of Chinese in the colony be
capped at 6,000, the Spanish had little power to curb Chinese immigration. The following
wave of Chinese immigration swiftly exceeded that number.728
Among the main issues of contention between Spaniards and the Sangleys was
agricultural production and access to food. For example, to address the shortage in
foodstuffs, then-governor, Corcuera, attempted the forcible displacement of Sangleys from

724 For three more or less contemporary, pro-Spanish accounts of these events, see “The Sangley Insurrection,
Letter from the Audiencia, Pedro de Acuña and others,” 12-23 December 1603, Manila, in The Philippine Islands,
ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 12, 142-169; “Carta a S.M. de Juan de Bustamante sobre el alzamiento de los
sangleyes de Manila y victoria que sobre ellos obtuvieron los españoles,” 18 December 1603, Manila, in HPAF,
419-436; and Rodríguez Maldonado, Miguel, Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los Sangleyes en las Islas Filipinas y
el milagroso castigo de su rebelión con otros sucesos de aquellas Islas (Seville: Clemente Hidalgo, 1606).
725 Bernal, “The Chinese Colony in Manila,” 51.
726 In the years immediately following the massacre, the Spanish attorney general in the Philippines, Ríos
Coronel, proposed, “to reward some of the principales of the environs of Manila, Laguna Bay, and Pampanga,
whose indios assisted the Spaniards in the Sangley uprising,” see: “Petición del procurador Ríos Coronel sobre
varios asuntos,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 51, fols. 310-322r.
727 Bernal, “The Chinese Colony in Manila,” 53, citing Argensola.
728 For evidence of such abuse, and in particular that of the Spanish fiscal of Manila, Juan de Alvarado
Bracamonte, see: “Sentencias del Consejo: Sentencias y autos dados en residencia, Juan de Alvarado
Bracamonte fiscal en Manila,” 1630, AGI Escribanía, leg. 1188.
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their urban, commercial lives to the countryside of Calamba, on the Laguna Bay just south
of Manila, where he sought to force them into labor in the intense heat of the rice paddies.
In response to that effort, however, the Sangleys arose in protest once more, resulting in a
revolt that engulfed virtually the entire region around Manila. Despite such devastation, the
cycle of violence continued to repeat itself. Each time, the Chinese immigrant population
continued to surge, only to be diminished before replenishing itself yet again. Several more
such broad scale clashes occurred, including in 1662, 1686, 1762, and
1819. Although none of these conflicts succeeded in permanently uprooting the Spanish
from Manila’s Intramuros, their presence remained precarious throughout the first two
centuries of Spanish occupation.729

Limits of Colonial Authority

From within their walled city in Manila, Spanish authorities employed a range of
strategies aimed at extending and consolidating colonial authority over the rest of the
archipelago. Drawing on experience gained in America, these strategies included the
apportionment of encomiendas and land grants to both Spaniards and indios, and attempts to
“reduce” indios to Spanish-style urban living and subject them to tribute obligations. The
crown had earlier attempted to suppress encomienda in the Americas in order to curb the
abuses of native populations and prevent the rise of autonomous colonial aristocracies. The
institution gained a new lease on life in the Philippines, however, and like in America, soon
attracted a torrent of criticism from local clergy. The Philippine encomienda arose as its
729 Compounding the challenges posed by uprisings and invasions, the city was also wracked by devastating
earthquakes and fires, which required large, costly efforts of recovery and reconstruction. See, “Al Obispo
virrey, dandole cuenta de un terremoto que arruinó la ciudad de Manila y del encuentro con la flota holandesa
que intento invadir aquellas islas,” 24 December 1648, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 3, exp. 56.
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American counterpart was in decline, but the institution shared the same fundamental
characteristics. As in the New World, it was the primary means by which Spain sought to
consolidate control over native populations and exploit them economically.730
Although the king omitted mention of encomienda in his initial instructions to Legazpi,
in an early missive to Madrid, prior to the conquest of Manila, Legazpi sought permission to
introduce the institution. “It would be in Your Majesty’s interest,” he wrote, “to distribute
the conquered Indians in this archipelago, given that they have no lord nor recognize any
lordship, and for their tranquility [quietud] and pacification, which is in the service of God
our Lord and Your Majesty […].”731 Convinced of the expedience of encomienda in extending
Spanish sovereignty, colonial authorities soon assented.732
By 1572, Legazpi had ostensibly apportioned in encomienda all the native inhabitants
of the regions under Spanish control.733 These included Manila and its environs, Pampanga,
the area around Laguna Bay, and a series of enclaves in Ilocos and the Visayas. Then, in the
following two decades, Spain’s purported control in the archipelago expanded dramatically.
According to one contemporary source, there existed 267 encomiendas by 1591, representing a
total of some 667,612 indios under Spanish colonial rule.734

One of the key obligations of encomenderos in the Philippines was to cultivate their lands. See, “Instrucciones
de gobierno a Francisco Tello,” 25 May 1596, Toledo, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 2, fols. 146r-170v.
731 Legpazpi, 1 June 1565, cited in Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, “La base de la encomienda en las Islas Filipinas,”
Revista de Indias 53, no. 199 (1993): 787-788.
732 Legazpi apparently began apportioning such encomiendas as early as 1570. See [“Copia de carta que el general
miguel lopez de legazpi scrive al virrey de la nueva españa, fecha en la ciudad de manila a XI de agosto de
1572,” AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 23, in which he explains: “Por el mes de noviembre del dicho año de
[15]70 fui de Panay a la isla de Cebu, donde se fundó en nombre de su Majestad una villa de españoles […], a
los cuales se repartió los indios que en aquella comarca estaban hechos de paz, conforme a lo que su Majestad
tiene mandado, aunque en los repartimientos hubo alguna confusion por no saberse los pueblos ni la cantidad
de gente que había en aquellas islas comarcanas que estaban de paz, [por lo que] se señalaron tantos vecinos en
cada isla para que pro indiviso gozasen de los aprovechamientos de ella.”
733 Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” 44.
734 “Relación de las encomiendas de indios de Luzón,” 31 May 1591, Manila, AGI Patronato, leg. 25, ramo 38.
See also, Newson, Conquest and Pestilence in the Early Spanish Philippines (2009); and, for an English translation of
the report, see “Account of the encomiendas in the Philippinas Islands [G. P. Dasmariñas],” Manila, 31 May
1591, in The Philippine Islands, vol. 8, 96-142.
730
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Beyond seeking to subject Philippine indios to Spanish political and religious
domination, royal officials also saw the encomienda as a key means of integrating indigenous
peoples within the emerging colonial economy and ensuring a steady supply of food through
agricultural production. To do so, Spanish authorities experimented by introducing a variety
of tribute obligations on Philippine indio encomendados in the hopes of efficiently exploiting the
colony and making it self-sufficient.735 In its early stage, the Philippine encomienda tribute
encompassed labor service as well as payment in a range of other forms including coin and
foodstuffs. Eventually, however, Spanish authorities forbade personal service as a means of
payment, concerned by the potential that such an arrangement could devolve, as it often did
in practice, into conditions akin to slavery.736 This stance enabled the crown to claim the
moral high ground despite rarely enforcing the prohibition in practice.737
Although always an exploitative institution, the early years of encomienda in the
Philippines were defined by particularly acute abuse.738 While some encomenderos extracted
tribute from their charges, few fulfilled the obligation to protect them or facilitate their
instruction in Spanish Catholic religion and civilization. In addition, many encomenderos tried
demanding more than the official rate of one peso (or ten reales), some even requiring tribute
in scarce or expensive products, making indios’ work of procuring payment all the more
taxing.739
735 Spaniards demanded tribute from all Philippine indios, including both Christian converts and infieles, although
in reality only those under effective Spanish control could be made to pay. See “Instrucciones de gobierno a
Francisco Tello,” 25 May 1596, Toledo, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 2, fols. 146r-170v.
736 “Orden sobre no cobrar los tributos en servicios personales,” 26 May 1609, Aranjuez, AGI Filipinas, leg.
329, no. 2, fols. 85v-86r.
737 In 1619, Spain’s attorney general in the Philippines, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, even proposed that the
wives of indio soldiers serving in the Spanish army, most of which were from Pampanga, be relieved of their
tribute and polo labor obligations until their husbands returned home. See, “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre
necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, fols. 644r-663r.
738 For a report on abusive encomenderos in Pampanga, see, “Relación de Diego de Zárate sobre Filipinas,” 10
June 1581, AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 38, fols. 280r-282v.
739 Initially, Spanish authorities required Philippine indios to pay tribute in agricultural products, unlike in New
Spain, where Indians were required to pay in precious metals. In an attempt to incorporate indios into the
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Nevertheless, although in the early 1590s, the Spanish crown claimed over half a
million Philippine indios under its dominion and Christian tutelage, a closer look at
contemporary documents reveals the hollowness of such claims.740 Of all the encomiendas
apportioned in the islands, the king himself (via his colonial authorities in the islands)
directly administered just 31 of them, while another 236 were reportedly in the hands of
“private individuals.”741 Importantly, however, and this detail was crucial, “from many of
those in Cagayan and some in other districts no tribute can be collected, because they are not

Philippines’ monetary economy, however, beginning in 1580, royal authorities permitted indio tributaries to pay
their due either in agricultural products (especie) or in money (dinero). The decision backfired, however, driving
many indios away from agricultural labor given the relative ease of obtaining money through trade, resulting in
acute food shortages. In response, in 1595 the crown revised its policy, requiring indios to pay tribute half in
money and half in foodstuffs, and in 1604 Spanish authorities further clarified the policy, requiring four reales in
coin, one fowl, and six reales in other foodstuffs. See, “Orden de guardar las instrucciones sobre
descubrimientos,” 24 April 1580, Logrosán, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 181v-184v; Phelan, The
Hispanization of the Philippines, 95; and Luis Alonso Álvarez, “La inviabilidad de la hacienda asiática: Coacción y
mercado en la formación del modelo colonial en las islas Filipinas, 1565-1595,” in Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico,
Vol. 1, La formación de una colonia: Filipinas, ed. María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, Josep María Fradera, and
Luis Alonso (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2001), 204. Hidalgo puts the date at
1602: see, Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, “Sistemas para la explotación de las islas: Encomiendas, tributos y
comercio. La recta administración versus el mal comportamiento: La situación de la población nativa en el
contexto del marco colonial temprano,” in Las relaciones entre España y Filipinas, siglos XVI-XX, ed. María
Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso (Madrid: CSIC, 2002), 77. Royal instructions to the current governor,
Dasmarinas, for instance, ordered that, “que no se pudiere forzar a los indios a pagarlo en cosa señalada [producto] sino en dinero si lo tuvieren o quisieren dar, o en cualquier otra cosa de sus frutos o granjerías,” see:
AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 365v-389r. For the perspective of a local official in Manila, Francisco de las
Misas, who argued for the preference of tribute payments in foodstuffs (especie) rather than money (dinero), see
“Carta de Francisco de las Misas sobre varios asuntos,” 31 May 1595, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 57,
fols. 382r-404v. Debate over the issue of how tribute should be paid persisted into the early seventeenth
century; see, “Petición de informe sobre tributos de los indios,” 6 March 1608, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340,
no. 3, fols. 26v-27r; and Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines, 96.
740 Pedro Galende, “The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1565-1890,” Boletín eclesiástico de Filipinas 39 (1965): 41;
and “Account of the encomiendas in the Philippinas Islands,” 31 May 1591, Manila, in The Philippine Islands, ed.
Blair and Robertson, vol. 8, 96-142, which contains the following quote: “In the city of Manila, along its coast
and the coast opposite, and in the provinces of Pampanga, Pangasinan, Ylocos, Cagayan, La Laguna,
Camarines, Masbate, Zebu, Panay, Balayan, and Calilaya, which is all of Luzon and the other Philippinas
Islands settled, there are 166,903 whole tributes. Each tribute includes husband, wife, and excepting the sons,
the children. Therefore there are 667,612 souls in the said provinces, besides the religious of the convents of
Manila.” Another interested document, although from the second half of the seventeenth century, is the 1667
royal decree demanding a report from the viceregal authorities in New Spain, which reflected the crown’s
suspicions that local officials in the Philippines were inflating the number of encomiendas that were actually
occupied in order to increase the amount the royal situado subsidy that the Philippines received from México.
See, “Oficiales reales de Mexico. Que informe si los oficiales reales de Filipinas mandan relación de las vacantes
de encomiendas para su descuento de los situados remitidos de Mexico,” 6 March 1667, in AGN-México,
Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 9 exp. 88.
741 “Account of the encomiendas in the Philippinas Islands,” 31 May 1591, Manila, in The Philippine Islands, ed.
Blair and Robertson, vol. 8, 96-142.
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pacified,” implying that Spaniards exercised no control whatsoever in these particular
communities over which they laid claim.742 In this case, the governor ascribed the situation
simply to geographic distance: “In some of these districts it is impossible to go to administer
justice, because of their distance from the capitals where the alcaldes-mayor live.”743 It was
painfully clear to Spanish authorities, however, that native resistance to encomienda, and to
Spanish rule in general – not the geographic distance of colonial authorities or simply the
commercial attraction of Manila – was the prime cause of the vast numbers of vacant
encomiendas by the mid seventeenth century.744 The perpetual state of violence and insecurity
throughout much of the Philippines contributed to a steady contraction of the geographic
reach of encomienda across the islands.745 As Luis Alonso Álvarez has shown, by the mid
1590s, while encomiendas continued to exist in theory as legal entities, most had lost their
productive economic function as suppliers of food and manufactures.746 Crown-subsidized
military intervention was the only means of reversing this trend, but as events would attest,

Ibid.
Ibid.
744 According to the historian, Eric A. Anderson: “Between 1636 and 1650, 65% of vacant private grants
reverting to the crown were in areas in or near Luzon. A much smaller percentage (35%) reverted to the crown
marginal regions.” See, Eric A. Anderson, “The Encomienda in Early Philippine Colonial History,” Asian Studies 14
(1976): 33. While private settlers were in theory required to remain present within the lands of the encomienda,
beginning in 1619, certain officials, like the governor and the regidores of the municipal council, were exempted,
and permitted to appoint someone to manage the encomienda in their stead while the resided in Manila and
tended to matters of government; see, “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,”
September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 28, fol. 650v. For record of a lawsuit from 1606
issued against one Gabriel de Ribeira, who had left his encomienda vacant and gone to Mexico, see: “Pleitos de la
Audiencia de Filipinas,” AGI Escribanía, leg. 403B, part 3.
745 Corruption also appears to have played a small yet certainly secondary role in this process. According to the
attorney general, Juan Grau y Monfalcón, accused the then-governor, Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, in order
to enrich himself, of intentionally awarding a number of encomiendas to individuals who never took charge of
them, instead funneling the corresponding subsidies for those encomiendas into his own personal coffers. See:
“Petición de Juan Grau sobre encomiendas con pensiones,” 13 June 1642 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 28,
no. 23, fols. 101r-105v.
746 “Alonso Álvarez, “La inviabilidad de la hacienda asiática,” 183.
742
743

262
Madrid possessed neither the resources nor the political will necessary to buttress the
encomienda and secure Spanish authority over the archipelago in the long-term.747
Beyond seeking to extract tribute from the Philippine indios the encomienda, Spanish
authorities also tried forcing many to sell certain merchandise below market rates and
implementing heightened labor obligations upon certain communities, especially in the
timber and shipbuilding industry.748 Such labor service, which Spanish authorities were keen
distinguish from slavery, was akin to the mita and repartimiento systems in the New World.749
The first of these two methods of exploitation was known as the bandala, and was intended
to exist alongside conventional forms of tribute.750 The bandala consisted in theory of
demands on the native population to offer Spaniards their textiles, food, and a range of
other agricultural goods, including timber, for artificially low prices, which the Spaniards
then consumed or resold for substantial profit.751 The second method, the polo, entailed the
coerced labor service of Philippine indios to benefit Spaniards.752 Whereas in the Americas
such laborers tended to engage in mining, in the Philippines most worked in the timber

747 In 1590, the king also issued a royal cedula in which he ordered his authorities to send “50 settlers and 50
farmers to the Islas Filipinas who can settle and attend to the cultivation of the land.” See: “Royal cedula to
bring 50 settlers and 50 farmers to the Islas Filipinas who can settle and attend to the cultivation of the land,”
11 July 1590, in The Philippines Under Spain, edited Benítez Licuaran and Llavador Mira, vol. 4, 599. Despite such
intentions like these to increase Spanish settlement of the archipelago, however, its distance and reputation for
violence, insecurity in the hinterland discouraged most Spaniards from ever making the journey. Moreover, the
few settlers that did eventually arrive increasingly flocked to Manila, leaving much of the territory uninhabited
by Spaniards.
748 Hidalgo Nuchera, La Recta Administración, 17-18.
749 Ibid.
750 For an example of protest against the exploitative nature of the bandala in forcing indios in Pampanga to sell
their goods to Spaniards at below-market rates, see, “Relación de Diego de Zárate sobre Filipinas,” 10 June
1581, AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 38, fols. 280r-282v.
751 Luis Alonso Álvarez, “Financing the Empire: The Nature of the Tax System in the Philippines, 1565-1804,”
Philippine Studies 51, no. 1 (2003): 81-82; and Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor,” 192-193. See also
Hidalgo Nuchera, La Recta Administración, 47.
752 Josep M. Fradera, “La formacion de una colonia: Objetivos metropolitanos y transacciones locales,” in
Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico, Vol. 1, La formación de una colonia: Filipinas, eds. María Dolores Elizalde PérezGrueso, Josep María Fradera, and Luis Alonso (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2001),
88. The repartimiemto of New Spain in turn derived from the Incan mita and the Aztec cuaquetil.
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industry, in shipyards, as well as in domestic and military service, especially in the navy.753
Philippine polistas rarely received the token wages to which they were entitled, and were often
subjected to intense physical abuse and appalling working conditions.754
Importantly, however, the Spanish were not sufficiently powerful to impose their will
on the native population unilaterally. Instead, they relied on the instrumental support of
allied indigenous elites and soldiers in extending and defending Spanish imperial rule. It was
no coincidence that in the small handful of regions successfully submitted to Spanish rule
(Pampanga, Laguna de Bay, and parts of Pangasinan and Ilocos), colonial authorities
depended heavily on the collaboration of native elites in extracting tribute and enforcing the
bandala and polo. The Spanish co-opted native elites by offering certain economic and
jurisdictional privileges, by respecting their positions atop traditional Philippine hierarchies,
and by awarding them prestigious titles in the Spanish colonial administration. Indigenous
headmen, called principales or cabezas de barangay, were key figures through which the crown
extended its authority, albeit indirectly. Philip II himself made this last point a priority in
1594, demonstrating a surprising respect for the native elite and lamenting the suffering that
many of them endured in the early days of conquest, in particular those that had allied with
Spain and converted to Christianity. “It is not just,” wrote Philip, that the traditional elite “be
in a worse condition after having converted.”755 As a result, he instructed his officials in the
islands to “treat them well, and to grant them in my name the Government of the Indios over
which they were [previously] lords.”756
The strategy of reinstituting the local authority of traditional headmen not only
endowed the Spanish regime with an air of legitimacy by recognizing the station of local
Alonso Álvarez, “Financing the Empire,” 81-82.
Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor,” 192-193.
755 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 2, fols. 64r-64v.
756 Ibid.
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754

264
indigenous leaders, but also provided a means of extending Spain’s sovereignty indirectly at
minimal cost to the crown. In an effort to reinforce the allegiance of certain principales,
Spanish authorities even granted encomiendas and land grants to many of them, particularly
those in Pampanga who had assisted the Spanish in the early expeditions of conquest, or
“pacification.”757 Many principales benefited from, and often abused, their position as
collectors of tribute and enforcers of the polo and bandala, an arrangement which formalized
the sovereignty of the Spanish crown in local Philippine indio communities indirectly, by
ensuring a durable link between the indigenous elite and the Spanish colonial bureaucracy.758
Describing this arrangement, the Augustinian priest, Martin de Rada, explained in 1577 that
Spanish authorities, “make the principal pay the tribute of all of his community [parcialidad],
and that he,” in turn, “charges the rest,” referring to the indio commoners within his
jurisdiction.759 While the greed of individual principales no doubt contributed to the frequent
abuse of commoners, such exploitation was often heightened by the pressure of fines on
those principales who, for a variety of complex reasons often beyond their control, failed to
meet the strict annual quotas of rice and other foodstuffs demanded by colonial
authorities.760
Beyond enforcing the bandala and polo, principales also fulfilled the role of raising
Philippine commoners for military service in support of the crown. As in the New World, in
the Philippines native soldiers were crucial to the expansion and consolidation of Spanish
Nicolas Cushner and John A. Larkin, “Royal Land Grants in the Colonial Philippines (1571-1626):
Implications for the Formation of a Social Elite,” Philippine Studies 26, nos. 1-2 (1978): 102-111.
758 Alonso Álvarez, “Financing the Empire,” 67-68. For an attempt by the Spanish crown to limit the abuse of
indios by their own native principales, see “Orden a Távora sobre trato a los indios,” 26 March 1632, Madrid,
AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 3, fols. 222r-222v.
759 “Carta del P. Martin de Rada, OSA, al P. Alonso de la Veracruz, OSA, dandole noticias de las costumbres,
ritos y clases de esclavitud que hay en Filipinas, con otras informaciones de las Islas,” 1577, in Rodriguez,
Historia de la provincial vol. 14, 493. Original document in the Bibliotèque Nationale, Paris, FE, Secc. Mss., no.
325, fols. 39-46.
760 Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor,” 195; see also Alonso Álvarez, “El tributo indígena en las islas
Filipinas entre los siglos XVI y XVII,” 23.
757
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rule, especially in the seventeenth century. As Stephanie Mawson has recently demonstrated,
Philippine indio soldiers comprised an important portion of both special expeditionary forces
and standing armies in the archipelago, including in Manila.761 For instance, in describing a
mission to the mountains of northern Luzon in 1624, the Spanish captain Alonso Martín
Quirante explained that his company included some, “seventy Spanish soldiers and officers,
[…] two Japanese miners, […] eleven of his Majesty’s negro slaves, […] nine Indians
imprisoned for crimes; 47 sangley carpenters, smiths, and sawyers; and 1,748 other Indians –
893 from the province of Ylocos, formed into twelve companies; and 855 from the province
of Pangasinan, formed into ten other companies.”762 In addition to Ilocanos and
Pangasinanes, natives of the Tagalog and Camarines regions of Luzon likewise formed part
of Spanish armies, as did Pampangans, who represented the vast majority of native soldiers
in the service of Spain.763 While it is generally estimated that some 40,000 indio soldiers
served the Spanish crown in the period from 1575 to 1640, often outnumbering Spanish
soldiers by five to one, Mawson suggests that the ratio was often even higher.764
Spaniards’ heavy reliance on indigenous elites and soldiers resulted from and in turn
reflected the harsh reality that the handful of enclaves of Spanish authority in the Philippines
were surrounded by vast seas of territory under indigenous control. If the crown’s effective
control was somewhat circumscribed and unstable within Manila itself, it was even more so
the case beyond the city’s walls and its broader five-league jurisdiction. Over the course of
the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Castilian crown sent armed expeditions of
conquest (or “pacification”) to numerous areas across the archipelago, garnering nominal

Mawson, “Philippine Indios in the Service of Empire,” 386-388.
“Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June
1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20, 263.
763 Mawson, “Philippine Indios in the Service of Empire,” 386.
764 Ibid. 385.
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pledges of submission from local indios communities.765 When Spanish soldiers and their
indigenous allies left, however, these areas rarely remained loyal to colonial authority for
long. The inhabitants of many such areas fled, refused to pay tribute, and in several cases
rose in open, violent revolt, ultimately re-establishing their own effective sovereignty free
from Spanish imperial rule until well into the nineteenth century. In certain regions, like
Mindanao, the Spanish secured little more than a series of temporary footholds and
beachheads, the vast interior of that southern island remaining virtually beyond the reach of
Spanish influence altogether.
In addition to the limits on imperial sovereignty placed by Philippine indios and
Sangleys, a range of other external groups also arose frequently to challenge Spanish colonial
rule in the islands. Throughout the late sixteenth century and the entirety of the seventeenth,
the Spanish faced continuous challenges in the region from several foreign enemies,
including Dutch, English, Japanese, Chinese, Malaysian, and Bruneian corsairs and
privateers.766 In certain cases, multiple of these groups collaborated against the Spanish.767 In

For an account of the service of one particular settler, which provides a detailed description of his
participation in a range of early “pacification” campaigns across the Philippines, see “Petición de Francisco de
Rivas de vara de alguacil de Fernandina,” 7 July 1583, AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 54.
766 While northern European corsairs had already begun challenging Spanish and Portuguese positions in the
Far East in the latter sixteenth century, such threats increased considerably soon after the turn of the
seventeenth century with the formation of the Dutch and English East India Companies. For an example of an
English attack on the Pintado islands of the Philippines as early as 1588, see “Letter from Santiago de Vera to
His Majesty about the attack of the English pirate on the shipyard in the Pintados,” 26 June 1588, in The
Philippines Under Spain, vol. 4, 492-499. For evidence of a Dutch corsair attack prior to the formal establishment
of the Dutch East India Company, see “Oliver van Noort’s attack on Luzon, Francisco Tella, and others,”
October-December 1600, Manila, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 11, 140-173. In some
cases, suspicious Spaniards even accused the Portuguese, during the period of Iberian Union no less, of allying
with anti-Spanish enemies, as they were alleged to have done with the Japanese in 1597, when they sacked and
pillaged the Spanish ship, San Felipe, having been incited by the Portuguese. See “Carta de oficiales reales sobre
varios asuntos,” 29 June 1597, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 62, fols. 425r-426v. For recommendations
from the king to the viceroy in New Spain to reinforce Manila’s defenses, see “Recomendación al Virrey de la
Nueva España, para que por leva se formen infanterias para Manila y el cuidado del Socorro de Filipinas,” 14
July 1643, Madrid, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 2, exp. 9; “Al virrey de la Nueva España,
mandandole envie a Filipinas, municiones, artilleria, polvora, y demas cosas necesarias para evitar la invasion
que quieren hacer los holandeses en esas islas,” 23 January 1644, Madrid, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas
Originales, vol. 2, exp. 29; and “Manifestando que la perdida de la Isla Hermosa es muy lamentable y que
importa mucho al conservación de aquellas islas, recomendando se les asista en todo lo que necesitan,” 18
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one such example, the Japanese in the archipelago reportedly provided key intelligence to the
Dutch for their raid of Manila.768 In another, the Dutch allegedly supported the Muslim
Maguindanao sultanate of Mindanao in its extended campaign to repel the Spanish
invaders.769 Such anti-Spanish coalitions spurred important calls from Spaniards in the
Philippines in particular to establish a more robust and effective military union with the
Portuguese in East Asia to combat such threats.770
The Spaniards’ prolonged campaign in Mindanao took on special significance since
many of its inhabitants were Muslim and it thereby represented another front in Spain’s
global holy war against Islam.771 Spanish authorities initially sought to secure the friendship

January 1648, Madrid, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 3, exp. 3. For a report from 1618 on
recent Dutch assaults and indigenous uprisings in various parts of the archipelago, see “Relacion de lo que ha
sucedido en las islas filipinas desde el mes de junio de 617 hasta el presente de 618,” 1618, RAH, Jesuítas 93657/8, fols. 1r-41r. For another report, this one from 1621, listing Mozambique, Ormuz, and the Philippines
as the three colonies most under threat by Dutch assaults, see “Relación de los successos, que ha auido en las
islas Philipinas y otras Prouincias, y Reynos del Oriente desde el mes de julio de 620 hasta el presente de 621,”
2 July 1621, RAH, Jesuítas, tomo 84, fols.116r-123v.
767 For an example of Japan’s support for the Dutch, as well as of collaboration between the Dutch and English
in East Asia, see “Respuesta a Alonso Fajardo sobre asuntos de gobierno,” 9 August 1621, Madrid, AGI
Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 2, fols. 402v-424r. Two decades on, the king was so incensed by northern European
threats on the archipelago that he ordered his viceroy in New Spain to fine a range of royal officials in the
Philippines for not doing more to repel them; see: “Al virrey de la Nueva España, avisandole que haga multar a
los oidores, gobernador, fiscal y oficiales reales de Filipinas, por haber permitido en esas islas, dos
embarcaciones de ingleses y daneces,” 21 September 1643, Madrid, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales,
vol. 2, exp. 162.
768 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas,
leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 38, fol. 652v.
769 Fradera, “La formación de una colonia,” 89. See also, “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre
necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, pt.77, fol. 1277v.
770 See “Instrucciones a Ruy González de Sequeira,” 6 March 1613, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 2, fols.
163r-167r. González de Sequeira was captain-general of Spain’s naval armada; and “Petición del Cabildo secular
de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235,
pt. 77, fol. 1277v. “The Dutch,” wrote the Manila cabildo in 1638, “have much force in [the] seas, which they
increase by uniting and confederating with the Iaos (?), Japanese, Mindanaos, and other Moors and Gentiles,
enemies of the Spanish in the Philippines.” “And in order to oppose them,” the cabildo proposed, “it would be
very convenient to unite and join together the arms of Castile and Portugal […] in the said Islands and in India,
as one saw in the restoration of Maluco,” which a joint-Iberian force had recovered from the Dutch. An
Iberian military union in the East would be “in the service of His Majesty, and of both Crowns,” the cabildo
concluded, see: “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid
(Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, pt. 77, fol. 1277v.
771 To this end, in the 1591 capitulación made on king’s behalf between the Spanish governor of the Philippines,
Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas, and Esteban Rodríguez de Figueroa, the newly-appointed adelantado tasked with
“pacifying” Mindanao, Dasmariñas proclaimed as his “dignified [digno] and principal duty […] in these islands
the propagation of our holy faith among the natives, […] converting and saving them,” introducing them to
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and collaboration of local elites on that southern island. But their failure to do so soon
compelled them to take violent action in successive raids on the island.772 They sought to
establish fortified strongholds in Zamboanga and along the Mindanao River in an attempt to
provide the Philippines broader protection from the seaborne raids by the Maguindanaos,
Sulus, Camucones and Borneans.773 In this conflict, as in others, the Spanish relied heavily
on support from allied indio groups, like the Pampangans, and thus proposed that their allies
be permitted to enslave the “Mohammedans of Mindanao, Joló, Borneo and other
neighboring islands” as a means of “animating those that go to fight against them.”774
Despite these efforts, however, Spanish attempts to “pacify” the island remained incomplete
including well into the late seventeenth century.
As the documentary record suggests, a vast gap existed between Spain’s claims to
sovereignty in the islands and its effective authority in practice. For instance, colonial
authorities had apportioned the lion’s share of the physical territory of Mindanao and Joló in
encomienda, thus projecting an expansive claim to sovereignty, which vastly exceeded their
actual ability to exercise full, indivisible rule. Spaniards’ inability to “pacify” and evangelize in
those regions, despite several attempts, was clear evidence of this.775 While the Spanish did

“the true God, reducing them to the obedience of his holy church, and to that of the king, our lord,” see:
“Copia de la capitulación para la pacificación de Mindanao,” 12 May 1591, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no.
27, fols. 156r-157v.
772 “Royal decree to the Governor of Filipinas asking him earnestly to try to befriend the king of Borney and
the chief of the Mindanao River,” 4 June 1576, in The Philippines Under Spain, vol. 3, 177-179.
773 “Relación de la pelea, y victoria de los españoles contra la armada del Mindanao en su misma costa y en el
cabo, que llaman punta de flechas,” 21 December 1636, RAH, Jesuítas 9-3657/39, fols. 285r-288r; and
“Respuesta a Corcuera sobre asuntos de guerra,” 2 September 1638, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 330, no. 4, fols.
71v-73r.
774 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre defensa de las islas,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 52,
fols. 337r-340v.
775 As Bishop Salazar lamented in 1588: “much of [Mindanao] is apportioned in encomienda to Spaniards, and
some [natives] pay tribute; [but] preachers of Mohamed have entered this region, having come from Brunei and
Ternate, and we have news that some Moors from Mecca are among them.” “Fifty leagues from the island of
Mindanao is that of Joló,” Salazar continued, “which many years ago was apportioned in encomienda. […]
Neither in this region nor in that of Mindanao has there been evangelization, nor can there be until they are
pacified,” see “Informe del Obispo de Filipinas, Fr. Domingo de Salazar, O.P, sobre el censo de las Islas
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manage to win a handful of battles in these islands in the seventeenth century, they were
unable to hold and defend the positions they had previously won, and were ultimately
expelled from the islands altogether by the early 1660s.776

Beginning in the late sixteenth

century and lasting throughout the seventeenth, Luzon itself, where Manila was located, was
wracked by continuous outbreaks of violence against Spanish rule. Combatants in these
conflicts included not only Zambales, Negritos, and Igorots, well known for their effective
armed resistance, but also traditional allies of the Spanish, including the Tagalogs and
Pampangos.777 Although the so-called Tondo Conspiracy was discovered and suppressed
before coming to fruition, it was nonetheless evidence of the groundswell of unrest, and of
certain Philippine indios’ collaboration with foreign agitators like the Japanese, even near the
heart of Spanish control in central Luzon.778
Then, in the seventeenth century, at least seventeen major uprisings broke out across
the archipelago, including in Luzon, but also in more distant locales such as Leyte (1622) and
the Pintados (1640-1650).779 In the context of the revolt in the Pintados, one contemporary

Filipinas en los años 1587-1588,” 25 June 1588, Manila, in HPAF, 365-366, original document found in AGI
Filipinas, leg. 74.
776 Stephanie J. Mawson, “Convicts or Conquistadores? Spanish Soldiers in the Seventeenth-Century Pacific,”
Past and Present 232 (August 2016): 121.
777 The Spanish were especially alarmed by the revolt that gripped Pampanga and Pangasinan in 1660-61 given
the close partnership that colonial authorities had long enjoyed with the inhabitants of those lands. “In the
early days of October, 1660, the loyal population of Pampanga made their first rebellious movements - the
people being exasperated against the overseers of the wood-cutting, who had been ill-treating them,” one
observer remarked. “All the islands were imperiled by this war,” he continued, “since all the tribes were on the
watch for its outcome.” On the insurrection in Pampanga and Pangasinan (1660-61), see “Insurrections by
Filipinos in the seventeenth century [Accounts by various early writers covering the period 1621-1683],” in The
Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 38, p139-161.
778 “Conspiracy against the Spaniards: Santiago de Vera and others,” May-July 1589, Manila, in The Philippine
Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 7, 95-112.
779 “Insurrections by Filipinos in the seventeenth century [Accounts by various early writers covering the period
1621-1683],” in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 38, 87-241). These included in Gadanes
(1621), Bohol and Leyte (1622), Mandayas (1625), Caraga and Cagayan (l620), Nueva Segovia (l629), Pampanga
(1645), Bulacán (1643), the Pintados (1640-50), Pampanga and Pangasinan (1660-61), Ilocos (1660-61), Otón
(1663 and 1672), Playa Honda (1681), and in various Zambal villages (1683). See also, “Letter of the Audiencia
of Filipinas about the rebellion of the Indios in 1588 in Tondo, Cebu, and Cagayan; and the dispute between
the bishop and the Audiencia,” 13 July 1589, in The Philippines Under Spain, edited Benítez Licuaran and
Llavador Mira, vol. 4, 544-551.
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Spaniard insisted on the link between proximity, civility, and loyalty to Spanish rule, while
portraying as barbarous those natives that lived at greater distances, especially those in the
highlands. “As the Indians have grown up in their wretchedness and in the life of brutes in
their remote mountains, it seems to them that they are maintaining their liberty. They
resented greatly this political compulsion to citizenship and the formation of a village, [so
that they would live] as men.”780 “Those in the provinces that were most civilized and were
nearest to Manila,” he continued, “had obeyed the decree without opposition, but these
[remote] provinces immediately made such demonstrations of displeasure that all of us
perceived the difficulty [of enforcing the demand].781
The Valley of Cagayan presents yet another fascinating case for the study of the
limits of Spanish sovereignty in Luzon.782 Given concerns of strategic defense against pirates
and corsairs (Asian and European), reports from indigenous allies of immense natural wealth
in the region including gold, crops, and fauna, and the Cagayan’s proximity to China,
colonial authorities soon initiated a major effort to submit the region to Spanish rule.783 As

780 On the insurrection in the Pintados (1640-50), see “Insurrections by Filipinos in the seventeenth century
[Accounts by various early writers covering the period 1621-1683,” in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and
Robertson, vol. 38, 99-139.
781 Ibid.
782 The Spanish province by that name encompassed a vast area of some 26,000 square kilometers along the
Cagayan River whose headwaters originated in a mountain pass just above Pampanga and which flowed
through a lush, fertile valley before emptying into the China Sea on the Philippines’ northern coast. A gauntlet
of mountain chains that reach over 3,000 meters at their highest peaks bounded the province to the south, east,
and west. Despite a handful of reconnaissance expeditions to the northern coast, the interior of Cagayan was
mostly unknown to Spaniards throughout the sixteenth century. As the historian, Ed. C. de Jesus noted, “the
physical contours of the Cagayan region contrasts with the vagueness of the term, ‘Cagayan,’ when used for an
administrative area or to identify the region’s indigenous population. In theory, the Spanish province of
Cagayan extended over the entire valley;” Ed. C. de Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,”
in Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. De Jesus
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1982), 21-22.
783 In fact, when a Spanish expedition reached the mouth of the Cagayan River in the early 1580s, it found a
settlement of Japanese pirates there, which it expelled en route to establishing the first Spanish town in the
region at Nueva Segovia. For a report on one Spanish attempt to forge an alliance with a specific native group
in Cagayan, see “Testimony of the Expedition to Nueva Segovia, Province of Cagayan, made by Sargento
Mayor Diego Chaves de Cañizares,” 15 October 1590, in The Philippines Under Spain, eds. Benítez Licuaran and
Llavador Mira, vol. 5, 6-18.
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one official wrote to Philip II just two years prior, Cagayan was, “a foothold and stepping
stone by which to enter the realm of Great China.”784
While the Spanish encountered serious difficulties subjugating large portions of the
indigenous population, they did nonetheless see limited success in establishing small enclaves
of European settlement, at least at the outset.785 The major center of colonial settlement and
administration in the region, Nueva Segovia, was home to some 200 Spanish settlers in the
early 1700s, alongside another 50 to 100 troops and officers.786 However, despite repeated
attempts to expand settlement the region and compel its early encomenderos to remain, already
by 1622, the total combined Spanish population had declined to just 70, a collective result of
diminishing dreams of conquering China, the draw of the Manila trade, and the general
effectiveness of local indigenous communities in subverting Spanish attempts to subjugate
them.787

“Gaspar de Ayala to Felipe II,” Manila, 15 July 1589, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 7,
124.
785 The region was home to range of distinct groups, including the Ibanags, Itaves, and Gaddanes, which the
Spaniards often referred to using an overarching term of their invention, “Cagayanes,” and which, for the
purposes of evangelization, Spaniards distinguished as either Christians or infieles; see: De Jesus, “Control and
Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,” 22. For a description of the settler population and political and religious
administration in Cagayan as of 1588, see, “Informe del Obispo de Filipinas, Fr. Domingo de Salazar, O.P,
sobre el censo de las Islas Filipinas en los años 1587-1588,” 25 June 1588, Manila, in HPAF, 351-353.
According to Salazar, “the city of Nueva Segovia, two leagues inland, has 40 encomendero vezinos, and there is
a monastery of St. Augustine with two priests, one alcalde mayor, two alcaldes hordinarios, one alguazil mayor,
six regidores [aldermen], which form the cabildo, a hospital of the king, […] there is a fort with seven wide
pieces and several small ones, […] and some muskets and arquebuses, and pikes and cotas, which are weapons
they use in these parts. For its repairs, this fort depends on the tribute worth 100 pesos from a [nearby] town,
and in addition to its 40 vezinos, it has 40 soldiers, whose task is pacification and the collection of the
encomiendas [tribute]. Ten of the residents are married, and the rest are single, and 33 of the vezinos hold
encomiendas on the main river of Taxo/Tajo, and the rest nearby. There are 26,000 Indians in the region of
which 7,000 are peaceful and pay tribute. On this river and its environs, your Majesty has 700 tributaries, and of
these 1,000 are peaceful and pay the tribute.”
786 De Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,” 24.
787 “Petición del procurador Ríos Coronel sobre varios asuntos,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27,
no. 51, fols. 310r-322r. For the population estimate, see De Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan
Valley,” 24, although my interpretation seems to diverge somewhat with that of De Jesus regarding the relative
power of Spaniards and the natives of Cagayan.
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The first major Spanish expedition to the region disembarked at the mouth of the
Cagayan River in 1582.788 Supported by Pampangan, Tagalog, and Visayan troops, the joint
force quickly expelled a settlement of Japanese “pirates” before establishing the first Spanish
town in the region at Nueva Segovia.789 As in Pampanga and elsewhere, in Cagayan the
Spanish sought to co-opt native elites by integrating them within the colonial administration,
enshrining their position as principales atop the local social hierarchy, and entrusting them
with the duties of tribute collection. With few resources in arms or personnel, however, the
Spanish had little direct means of maintaining order there. In some cases, principales arose as
local despots while many soon led their communities in rejecting Spanish rule.790
In response to these frustrations, in 1591 the Spanish governor in Manila dispatched
another major expedition, this one overland and led by his son, Luis, who depended on the
instrumental support of two native guides: Dionosio Kapolong and an unnamed woman.791

“Carta de Juan Pacheco Maldonado al virrey sobre Maluco, China y Filipinas,” 1582-06-06 Manila, AGI
Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 47, fols. 305r-313v.
789 De Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,” 24, “Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa to Felipe
II,” Manila, 16 June 1582; “Juan Baptista Roman to Viceroy,” 25 June 1582, Cavite, in The Philippine Islands, ed.
Blair and Robertson, vol. 5, 26 and 192-193.
790 De Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,” 24-27. For a detailed analysis, based on the
1657 account by an audiencia judge, Gómez de Espinosa, entitled, Discurso Paranético, of how native principales
exploited their own commoners, see James S. Cummins and Nicholas P. Cushner, S.J., “Labor in the Colonial
Philippines: The Discurso Paranético of Gómez de Espinosa,” Philippine Studies 22 (1974): 190-191. As the justices
of the Manila audiencia reported in July 1589, alongside a range of other rebellions throughout the archipelago,
“the Indians of Cagayan have likewise revolted. The uprising has been going on for two years now. They go
against the Spaniards in that province killing many of them and their indio allies.” Highlighting the Spaniards’
immense frustration at their inability to establish colonial rule and order, the audiencia explained how, “Last year
Your Captain general sent an armada with all that is necessary to punish and pacify those indios. [But] the
rebels fled to the mountains. Seeing that they got away with the affront and refused to make peace, another
armada was sent which was also as ineffective as the first one for the same reason.” Highlighting the fragility of
Spanish power throughout the region, the authors noted that, even beyond Cagayan, “there have been many
other uprisings of Indios in many parts and provinces, killing many Spaniards and the pacified Indios. The
rebel Indios are emboldened because they see how few the men are and how difficult it is to impose the
punishment because the Royal Treasury is very poor,” see: 13 July 1589, Letter of the Audiencia of Filipinas
about the rebellion of the Indios in 1588 in Tondo, Cebu, and Cagayan; and the dispute between the bishop
and the Audiencia, in The Philippines Under Spain, eds. Benítez Licuaran and Llavador Mira, vol. 4, 545-546.
791 Its goal was “to discover, pacify and clean” the area along the river of Cagayan all the way from its origin to
the city of Segovia. Alongside the relatively modest column of 70 Spanish soldiers marched a native auxiliary
force some 1,400 strong. On approaching the town of Tuy, in the mountain pass near the origin of the Cagayan
River, the Spanish captain, accompanied by two Augustinian priests there to ensure that any conquests were
conducted according to the customs and precepts of Spanish law, “carved a cross in the bark of a tree there,
788
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Although successful in securing pledges of obedience – albeit coerced – from numerous
principales all along the Cagayan Valley in the short-term, as after earlier attempts, such
promises soon proved hollow. After the withdrawal of the expedition, much of the region
slid back into a state of open rebellion against Spanish rule.792 By the late seventeenth
century, Spanish-led forces had managed to erect a string of isolated forts along the Cagayan
Valley, but exercised little military power in much of the rest of the region.793 After the early
1620s, in fact, missionaries, who faced a range of challenges and frustrations themselves,
represented the sole Spanish presence in much of Cagayan, including in the towns and
villages most loyal to Spanish authority.794 While many natives took up armed opposition
against the Spanish, others chose to flee into the mountains, hoping to avoid war or
exactions of tribute, where they encountered a range of other groups, including the so-called
thereby taking possession of the land and surrounding provinces in the name of the his majesty.” Upon
entering Tuy, they reportedly met with some 50 principales from the surrounding region, whom, no doubt
fearful of the Spaniards’ vast force, agreed on behalf of their communities to submit to Spanish rule and to
begin an annual tribute payment after one year had elapsed. See: 7 July 1591, Anon. “Relación de la jornada que
hizo don Luys Dasmariñas … al descubrimiento de la Nueva Tuy y sus provincias,” in HPAF, 447-497; and
“Información del descubrimiento y pacificación de Ituy (…y rrio de cagayan),” 15 February 1593, Manila
(Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 193, no. 1, fols. 2r-2v. See also, Scott, Barangay, 263-264. The unnamed native
woman was reportedly from Tuy, in the present-day Philippine province of Nueva Vizcaya.
792 In fact, just three years after his 1591 expedition to Tuy, Dasmariñas sent a second expedition farther into
the mountains. However, assaulted by more than 1,000 natives, the expedition was forced to turn back, unable
to extend Spanish sovereignty any further in the region; see: “Expeditions to the province of Tuy, Juan Manuel
de la Vega,” 3 July 1609, Passi, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 14, 292. Also, for an
additional report, likely from 1594, containing a list of the villages throughout the Philippines at least nominally
subjected to Spanish rule, see “List of Philippine villages reduced by the Spaniards,” in The Philippine Islands, ed.
Blair and Robertson, vol. 9, 81-86. In the 1620s, the even the supposed Spanish stronghold of Nueva Segovia
was vulnerable, desperately undermanned, and surrounded by vast stretches of countryside in open revolt
against Spanish authority. According to Alonso Martín Quirante in 1624, “[Various royal officials, and] the
president [of the Audiencia, Alvaro de Mesa y Lugo] declared that the infantry stationed in the city of Nueva
Segovia are very needy and destitute, as it is many days since any aid has been sent to them from this city; and,
as the greater part of that province has revolted, his Majesty does not possess in it any royal revenues with
which to be able to sustain the soldiers. [Accordingly, it should be considered] whether it would be advisable
that the infantry established in the presidio at the mines be assigned to the province of Nueva Segovia, so that,
with greater forces, our purpose to subdue the natives who have revolted there might be attained, since the said
mines are in the middle of the path,” see: “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante,
captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June 1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20,
302.
793 Mawson, “Philippine Indios in the Service of Empire,” 397.
794 See, “History,” in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, 30:304; 31:38-39, 263-64, 294-295, 32:102;
and Diego de Aduarte, “History of the Dominican Missions,” in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson,
vol. 30, 284-85; Fernandez, Dominicos, 34-35.
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Negritos [or Negrillos].795 These highlands remained beyond the influence of Spanish
political and religious rule for virtually the entirety of the Spanish colonial era in the
Philippines.796
Throughout the Philippines, the highlands were universally represented as uncharted,
hostile territory beyond Spanish control.797 Philippine highlanders were fiercely independent
and resistant to Spanish encroachments, used their expert knowledge of the terrain to foil
Spanish attempts to subjugate them, and proved a perpetual scourge both to the Spanish and
to Spanish-allied indio groups like the Pampangos.798 With few exceptions, despite numerous
attempts to subjugate them, the majority of these peoples remained independent of Spanish
authority throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The Spanish divided the native highlanders of Luzon into three general overarching
groups: the Negritos, Zambales, and Igorots. Spaniards used the term, Negrito, to refer to a
“Carta a S.M. dando cuenta del estado de las Islas Filipinas,” 1 November 1587, Manila, Audiencia de
Manila, in HPAF, 312-319. Page 318 contains a paragraph describing that Indians buried their gold and fled to
the mountains to avoid paying tribute: “que an querido dexar sus tierras y poblazones e yrse a los montes, y
otros an enterrado las joyuelas de oro que para su uso tenían…;” Domingo Fernandez Navarrete, O.P., Tratados
historicos, politicos, ethicos, y religiosos de la monarchia de China (Madrid, 1676), 304, 318; and Mawson, “Philippine
Indios in the Service of Empire,” 400.
796 In an effort to consolidate control over the valley’s lowland population at the very least, in 1642 Spanish
authorities expressly prohibited, “all intercourse, communication or trade with the heathen, apostate, and
fugitive Indians, negroes and Zambals, who inhabit the mountains and hills, and are not reduced to the royal
obedience, under penalty of 100 lashes and two years’ service in the harbor of Cavite,” see: “Ordinances of
Good Government,” 1642, 1696, 1768, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 50, 214. But such
laws proved ultimately academic and largely ineffectual. Throughout the seventeenth century, lowland and
highland indios maintained a vigorous system of exchange profitable to individuals and communities on both
sides, including in particular local principales, see: Julian Malumbres, Historia de Isabela (Manila: Santo Tomas,
1918), 70; William Henry Scott, The Discovery of the Igorots: Spanish contacts with the Pagans of Northern Luzon
(Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1974), 65; and The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 50, 248249. According to De Jesus, this consisted principally of trade in goods such as salt, cotton, cloth, and metal
tools and tobacco for mountain bees-wax and gold.
797 In Luzon and elsewhere, the Spanish drew a sharp distinction between inhabitants of the lowland and
highland, whose relations were often defined by mutual enmity and warfare. On the island of Panay, for
example, the Miguel Loarca explained that, “There are two kinds of men in this land [Panay] who, though they
are all one, behave somewhat differently and are almost always enemies—the one, those who live on the coast,
and the other, those who live in the mountains, and if they have some peace between them it is because of the
necessity that they have of one another to sustain [themselves], because those of the mountains cannot live
without the fish and salt and other […] jars and plates which come form other parts, nor can those on the coast
without the rice and cotton which the mountaineers have,” see: Miguel Loarca, Relación, 120.
798 “Petición de informe sobre ataques de indios zambales,” 8 August 1609, Segovia, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329,
no. 2, fol. 104v.
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range of sub-groups throughout the archipelago, which, in addition to having a dark
complexion, likewise all seemed to have inhabited the mountains.799 Some early observers
even called them, “black Chichimecos,” in reference to their martial ferocity and the
independent spirit they shared with the Chichimecos of Mexico.800 Noting the inability to
subdue these highlanders, Ríos Coronel noted in 1605 that, “although many times the
governors send soldiers to punish them, they [the soldiers] are only able to kill a few, because
the [Negritos and Zambales] they run like deer and because they have neither towns nor
houses, nor do they plant, but sustain themselves with wild fruits and hunting.”801
In addition to Negritos and Zambales, the mountains of the Cordillera Central – the
imposing range of towering peaks that separated the Cagayan Valley from Ilocos on Luzon’s
western coast – were likewise home to another important group. The Igorots, whose name
translates literally as, “people of the mountains,” were also known for their intractability
against Spanish encroachment.802 Beyond the desire to Christianize them and stem their
799 Scott, Barangay, 252-253. Spaniards reported seeing “Negritos” (or “Negrillos”) in Mindanao, Palawan,
Calamianes, Panglao, Negros, Panay, Mindoro, Pampanga, Zambales, Pangasinan, and the Cagayan Valley. In
Luzon, however, Spaniards referred to Negritos and Zambales of the central mountains almost
interchangeably, in one instance describing them collectively as, “an inhumane and savage people,” that “live in
the hills naked; they are bandits and desire nothing other than to hunt head [cortar las caveças] in order to suck on
their brains.” The Spaniards described headhunting as so central to these peoples’ society, that “no woman
wishes to marry [a man] who has not cutoff heads,” and that those that had “cut the most heads” were
considered “the most valiant.” See: “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre defensa de las islas,” July 1605 (Probable),
AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 52, fol. 337v.
800 Scott, Barangay, 253-256.
801 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre defensa de las islas,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 52,
fol. 337v.
802 Given the inaccessibility of Igorot territory, and their successful resistance to Spanish encroachment, the
Spanish had little knowledge of political and social organization, relying largely on what little sketchy
information about them trickled down to Cagayan or Ilocos through their indigenous allies who, much to
Spanish chagrin, continued to trade with the Igorots. Noting that, “is not very easy to ascertain the number of
those people, who are scattered, for they are so intractable, and do not let themselves be seen, moving from
one place to another on slight pretext, without any hindrance,” Quirante nonetheless suspected their overall
number not to be large. “If those called Ygolotes reach one thousand men, that is a great number,” he
conjectured. See: “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain and SargentoMayor,” 5 June 1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20, 266. See also, William
Henry Scott, “The Word Igorot,” in On the Cordillera: A Look at the Peoples and Cultures of the Mountain Province
(Manila: MCS Enterprises, 1969), 155. Similar to the Negritos and Zambales, early Spanish reports described
the Igorots as living in small, decentralized political units consisting of around ten households, as beastly
headhunters, and as ferocious in battle. In a report on the Spaniards first attempt to subjugate the Igorots in
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attacks against Spaniards and Spanish-allied indios, colonial authorities also desperately sought
access to their famous gold mines.803 This goal proved a continuous challenge, however.804
At least two major expeditions reached the supposed location of the mines in the
seventeenth century, but given the ruggedness of the terrain and the low quality of the ore
uncovered, both expeditions soon withdrew in disappointment.805

1576, the expedition leader reported that: “I was sent with 40 soldiers and 200 indios to discover the gold
mines of the Ygolot province from which it is understood that all of the wealth comes which is known
throughout the land, and I do not know by what chance it was that after such great fame and expectations, not
even one grain of gold was obtained after discovering more than 200 mines, but only a lot of hardship and
spear-thrusts, and the land was most rugged and almost uninhabitable for want of provisions and being 80
leagues from Manila,” see Ceballos (1576). The Igorots, however, long familiar with Spanish tactics of
deception, were highly suspicious and avoided contact with Spaniards wherever possible. In a fascinating
passage providing a rare glimpse of indigenous perspectives on the Spaniards, the Spanish captain, Alonso
Martín Quirante noted that even when Spaniards ventured into Igorot villages accompanied by an interpreter,
for example, if unable to physically expel them, “they flee from the Spaniards. Then, if perchance they hear
some arguments that are shouted out to them, they laugh, and answer that we are deceiving them, and that they
will not trust us; that they know us for people of bad faith.” See: Scott, Barangay, 259. According to the Spanish
captain, Alonso Martín Quirante, in 1624, “There are more chiefs than in other nations, for there is one in
every ten or twelve houses, who is head of his kinsfolk,” see, “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso
Martin Quirante, captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June 1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and
Robertson, vol. 20, 270. See also: “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain
and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June 1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20, 276. In
another interesting passage, reflecting indigenous critiques of Spanish behavior, the principales of Tuy, when
asked if they had enemies, they answered: “Yes, we would have them if we would leave our land to commit
depredations. But we are not like you Castilians, who rob everywhere,” see: “Expedition to Tuy [Luis Perez
Dasmariñas],” 1 June 1592, Manila, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 8, 250-252.
803 In describing the richness of the province of Pangasinan and Ilocos, for example, the priest Gaspar de San
Agustin referred not to the natural resources of those provinces in themselves, but rather to “the commerce
which they have with the mountaineer Indians, called Sambales and Igolotes; who possess the richest mines in
the whole island,” in Gaspar de San Agustín, Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas, vol. 2 (Madrid, 1698), xv.
804 Spaniards continuously lamented their inability to subdue the Igorots, and frequently both the natives’
bellicosity and expertise in warfare, as well as the ruggedness of the terrain, of which the Igorots were well
capable of turning to their advantage. Describing early resistance his army faced in a 1624 expedition to the
territory, the Spanish captain, Alonso Martín Quirante, wrote that, at one point, “all three divisions had halted
because the Ygolote Indians had occupied the road; and they were building forts at a narrow passage on it, with
a stockade, where, when the said adjutant tried to pass ahead, they wounded him and some of the other
Spaniards, and some Indians who accompanied him.” On the general ruggedness of the mountains, Quirante
explained that, “wherever one looks from the height, very many mountains are to be seen, so jagged, steep, and
near together that it seems impossible for men or any other living thing to exist on them.” And on the
impenetrability of Igorot defenses within those ranges, he described how, “their settlements are established on
the peaks of the mountains, and on the roughest of them, whence afar off they can see all the paths, so that no
one can approach them without being seen by their sentinels, who always guard their posts day and night.” “If
there is any danger,” Quirante continued, “they can easily retire without being seen, leaving behind nothing
more than their miserable huts; and, not fearing whether any go to seek them, they defend themselves as they
may by hurling down huge rocks which they have suitably placed, sharp-pointed reeds, and stones.” See,
“Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June 1624,
Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20: 275-276.
805 Scott, “The Word Igorot,” 157-158. Other contemporaries, including Morga, believed that the Igorots
periodically ceased or suppressed their own mining activities so as so avoid being discovered by the covetous
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Spaniards continuously lamented their inability to subjugate the Igorots. In
describing the expedition he led to their territory in 1624, the Spanish captain, Alonso
Martín Quirante, wrote that, at one point, “all three divisions had halted because the Ygolote
Indians had occupied the road; and they were building forts at a narrow passage on it, with a
stockade, where, when the said adjutant tried to pass ahead, they wounded him and some of
the other Spaniards, and some Indians who accompanied him.”806 On the terrain, Quirante
explained that, “wherever one looks from the height, very many mountains are to be seen, so
jagged, steep, and near together that it seems impossible for men or any other living thing to
exist on them.”807 And on the impenetrability of Igorot defenses within those ranges, he
described how, “their settlements are established on the peaks of the mountains, and on the
roughest of them, whence afar off they can see all the paths, so that no one can approach
them without being seen by their sentinels, who always guard their posts day and night.”808
“If there is any danger,” Quirante continued, “they can easily retire without being seen,
leaving behind nothing more than their miserable huts; and, not fearing whether any go to
seek them, they defend themselves as they may by hurling down huge rocks which they have
suitably placed, sharp-pointed reeds, and stones.”809
In 1630, a Spanish priest remarked on their continued intractability, explaining that,
“When peaceful they would bring down gold which they extract there from their mines […]
but when the Igorots are on the warpath […] then these mountaineers come down to hunt
heads, which they take with great pleasure.”810 Manila sent yet another expedition of conquer

Spaniards; see: Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Mexico, 1609), transcribed in The Philippine Islands,
ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 16, 102.
806 “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June
1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20, 266.
807 Ibid.
808 Ibid.
809 Ibid. 275-276.
810 Medina (1630), 150.
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to the area in 1654. This latest expedition was likewise forced to retreat, however, after an
outbreak of disease crippled the Spanish-led army before it was able to make any significant
progress.811 In the end, after over half a century and several more attempts to subjugate the
region, the Igorots, like many other groups throughout the archipelago, remained effectively
independent from Spanish colonial rule.

Conclusions

A variety of factors converged to diffuse Spanish imperial sovereignty in the
Philippines. Some were integral to the political and institutional culture of the Spanish
monarchy, including in Spain itself, and actually served to buttress the ultimate authority of
the king by limiting the sphere of jurisdiction of any one individual, faction, or institution.
The competing jurisdictions of the governor, bishop, and high court justices, for instance,
brought those figures into frequent conflict with one another. At the local level, the
municipal council represented yet another key component in the constellation of colonial
authority. While professing loyalty to the crown, each of these officials and the institutions
they represented, continuously defended, and often sought to expand, their own exclusive
jurisdiction against the pretensions of other colonial officials and institutions. Such conflicts
were generally manifest in routine political squabbles over jurisdictional overreach, but also
arose on occasion to sophisticated yet acrimonious arguments over the morality and legality
of specific colonial policies, or even over the fundamental legitimacy of Castilian sovereignty
in the islands.

“Carta de Sabiniano Manrique de Lara sobre materias de guerra,” 19 July 1654, Cavite, AGI Filipinas, leg.
285, no. 1, fols. 30r-41v.
811
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Even more significant than internal struggles among Spaniards was the effectiveness
of Philippine indios and other non-European groups in defining the limits of Spanish colonial
rule at the local level. On the one hand, certain communities or individuals, especially native
elites, allied with Spain or collaborated in official capacities within the Spanish colonial
administration. They did this either to limit the violence and exploitation they might face,
enrich themselves and preserve their social status, or to advance their own interests against
traditional enemies. On the other hand, many indigenous polities and communities actively
opposed the expansion of Spanish rule, often violently, including certain groups that had
initially submitted to the Castilian crown, either willfully or at the barrel of a gun.
In any case, despite persistent efforts to extend colonial rule across the archipelago
and to subject local populations to the authority of the crown of Castile, by the 1650s, nearly
a century into the Spanish colonial project in the Philippines, Spain’s territorial sovereignty in
the archipelago had diminished considerably. After reaching a high point in the first two
decades of the seventeenth century, Spanish authority began three-decades of decline after
the series of uprisings that wracked the Visayas in the 1620s, hastened by a combination of
local conflicts both among Spaniards themselves in Luzon as well as between Spaniards and
a range of external groups.812 Rebellions in Cagayan even predated these, beginning in 1575
and lasting well through the 1630s, representing one long continuous rejection of Spanish
colonialism in that key region. While many Philippine indios rose in open revolt, others fled
to mountains beyond Spanish control, leaving vast stretches of land, formerly apportioned in

812

Mawson, “Convicts or Conquistadores?” 121; and Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor,” 194.
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encomienda, depopulated and uncultivated.813 As Spain’s territorial sovereignty contracted, so
too did its population of indio subjects.814
Local factors were fundamental in shaping Spanish colonial policy in the Philippines.
The commercial draw of Manila, factional disputes among Spaniards, and the threat of
European rivals (especially following the separation of Portugal from the Spanish Monarchy
in 1640) all combined to limit the crown’s capacity to exercise its effective authority over
much of the archipelago.815 Equally if not more important, as this chapter helps demonstrate,
non-European individuals and groups were likewise fundamental in determining the pace
and contours of Iberian imperial expansion, including at the height of Spanish and
Portuguese power in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

813 Domingo Fernández Navarrete, O.P., Tratados historicos, politicos, ethicos, y religiosos de la monarchia de China
(Madrid, 1676), 304, 318. The author was in the Philippines around the year 1650; see also Phelan, “Free
Versus Compulsory Labor,” 194.
814 According to Phelan, the total number of Philippine indios under Spanish rule likely never exceeded 600,000
at any point in the seventeenth century. See Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor,” 195.
815 “Carta de Diego Fajardo sobre distintos puntos,” 15 August 1645, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 1,
no. 1, fols. 70r-78r. For integrated analyses of the Iberian empires in East Asia, see various works by Rafael
Valladares, including, Valladares, Castilla y Portugal en Asia; Valladares “Dominio y Mercado: Sobre la
contratación luso-española en Asia en el siglo XVII;” Valladares, “Olivares y Oriente: La Unión de Armas en
Asia;” and Valladares, “Soberanías y Conveniencias.”
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CHAPTER 5
THE RÍO DE LA PLATA

The acclaimed Hollywood film, The Mission, immortalized the struggle for
sovereignty over the peoples and territories straddling the contested region of eastern
Paraguay and the interior of São Vicente, Brazil’s southernmost captaincy, on the lush upper
reaches of the Río de la Plata watershed. Like the film, historiography has focused on the
culmination of the conflict in the mid eighteenth century or tended toward a dichotomous
narrative of a clash between the Jesuits of Spanish Paraguay and slave raiding colonists from
Portuguese Brazil. In this chapter, however, I analyze the origins of that conflict in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the variety of factions involved, and the methods and
instruments the Iberian crowns used to extend their influence in the region, often indirectly.
Analyzing local municipal council records, royal laws and decrees, chronicles and treatises,
and reports from missionaries and imperial officials both in South America and Europe, I
reveal the fluid range of interests within the supposedly unified groups of “Spaniards” and
“Portuguese.” I demonstrate the central role of numerous Tupi, Guaraní, and mestizo
groups in shaping European expansion in the region and defining its limits, especially in the
early phase. Finally, I highlight how the Iberian crowns’ effective jurisdiction and authority
there remained indirect, circumscribed, and constantly unstable even at the height of Iberian
global hegemony during the dynastic union of Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
In places like São Paulo and Guairá, on the margins of the Iberian empires in
southern Brazil and eastern Paraguay, the diffusion of sovereignty was a reality both de facto
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and, to a large degree, de jure. Physical distance from centers of both metropolitan and
colonial power combined with jurisdictional layering to limit the crown’s effective control.
The crown was forced to cede wide autonomy to missionaries, colonists, and local officials
in the region in its effort to maintain a semblance of sovereignty from afar. Nevertheless,
although missionaries and colonists were always protective of their autonomy, they also
sought to demonstrate their obedience to the king’s ultimate authority, and, from the 1620s,
even came to serve at the vanguard in extending and validating the sovereign claims of their
respective empires.

Figure 15
Map of the Río de la Plata Region
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The Early Iberian Presence in Paraguay and São Vicente

Prior to the late sixteenth century, Europeans had little knowledge of the vast
hinterland separating the coastal enclaves of Portuguese Brazil from Spain’s isolated
outposts in Paraguay and the Río de la Plata.816 As late as 1574, the famous Spanish
geographer, Juan López de Velasco, wrote that, “the provinces of the Río de la Plata have a
diverse situation.”817 “The Portuguese, in their descriptions, put the provinces […] almost all
within their demarcation,” he noted. “But according to the descriptions of Castile, not only
the Río de la Plata […], but also a large part of that which the Portuguese have populated is
within the demarcation of Castile.”818 Although it was agreed that the boundary line
separating each of the Iberian-claimed hemispheres of imperial jurisdiction cut somewhere
through the Río de la Plata watershed, its precise location remained a matter of dispute, as
Velasco’s quote makes clear. As a result, the vast region slowly emerged as a center of
conflict for sovereignty not only between Iberians and indigenous peoples, but also between
the two Iberian empires themselves.
Although there did exist some mostly nomadic groups in the region, the majority of
the Amerindian societies the Iberians encountered there organized themselves into semipermanent villages and engaged in small-scale subsistence agriculture, which they typically
supplemented with hunting, gathering, and occasional raiding of rival communities.819

816 In the 1520s, Aleixo García, a Portuguese explorer in the service of Spain, became the first European to
traverse the hinterland region that today encompasses parts of southern Brazil, Paraguay, and southern Bolivia.
Thanks to the instrumental support of his Guaraní guides and guards, García reached the Andean foothills at
the eastern limits of the Inca empire. But García’s Guaraní entourage soon rebelled and killed him, before he
made it back to the coast.
817 López de Velasco, Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias, 549.
818 Ibid.
819 For excellent studies on the region’s indigenous history, which analyze how indigenous peoples conceived of
ways of alliances, space, political structures, cultural forms of resistance, and material culture, see John
Monteiro, Negros da terra: Índios e bandeirantes nas origens de São Paulo (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994);
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Despite the prevalence of war, capturing, and sacrificing of prisoners that characterized
intra-Amerindian politics in the region, intermarriage was common among the myriad
indigenous groups. As a result of this complex social and political fluidity, contemporary
European observers showed considerable confusion in reporting on the state of Amerindian
politics and even in simply distinguishing the various indigenous groups from one another.
Spaniards encountered a multiplicity of Amerindian societies in the southeastern
viceroyalty of Peru, including the Guaraní, Guaycurú, Payaguá, and Charrúa, among many
others. Although certain Guaraní groups did occasionally raid Spanish settlements, for the
most part Hispano-Guaraní relations were peaceful, and the Guaraní eventually came to
constitute the vast majority of Amerindians under Jesuit missionary administration in the
region.820 The latter three groups, on the other hand, remained more hostile to Spanish
expansion and managed to limit Spaniards’ encroachments into their ancestral lands for
much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
In Brazil, the Portuguese encountered a diversity of Amerindian groups as well, and
classified them as belonging to one of three general linguistic categories: Tupi, Tapuia, or
Guaraní.821 Adding to this complexity, within the Tupi population, there were two major
subgroups: the Tupiniquim, which inhabited the interior plateau around São Paulo, and the
Tupinambá, which generally clustered around areas adjacent to the coast and, like the
Maria Regina Celestino Almeida, Os índios na história do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2010); and,
although focused on a slightly later period, Guillermo Wilde, Religión y poder en las misiones de guaraníes (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Sb, 2009); and Elisa Frühauf Garcia, “As diversas formas de ser índio: Políticas indígenas e
políticas indigenistas no extremo sul da América portuguesa” (PhD diss., Universidade Federal Fluminense,
2007).
820 For an illuminating recent study on the Guaraní and their mission settlements, but which focuses primarily
on the eighteenth century, see Julia J. S. Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions: A Socioeconomic History (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
821 The Tupis were, for the most part, friendlier to the Portuguese and intermarried with them, whereas the
Portuguese had more hostile relations with the Tapuia, and portrayed them negatively as more barbarous as a
result. See, Monteiro, Negros da terra, 19. Some authors have emphasized the shared origin of the Tupi and
Guaraní in central Amazonia, and have described them collectively as Tupi-Guaraní. See Barbara Ganson, The
Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 17.
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Tapuias, were less amenable to Portuguese encroachment. Beyond the various Tupi and
Tapuia groups, there was also the Carijó, a sub-group of Guaraní, which inhabited the
southern reaches of captaincy of São Vicente.822
Compared to the larger, more unified polities of central Mexico and Peru, the
Amerindian communities of both the Spanish- and Portuguese-claimed territories in the Río
de la Plata were relatively small and decentralized. In describing the Amerindians of the
Brazilian coast, in 1576, the Portuguese chronicler, Pero Magalhães de Gândavo, wrote that
the native peoples, “have no king among them, nor any other government of justice, but
rather a principal [headman] in each village, who is like a captain, whom they obey voluntarily,
and not by force.”823 Their villages, he explained, consisted of “seven or eight houses, which
are very long […] made only of wood and covered with palm or other similar herbs made
from the jungle.”824 Although we know that in certain cases villages would unite, often
against a common enemy, for the most part they lacked larger, centralized polities.825
To the extent that both the Portuguese and Spanish were able to maintain an early
presence even in coastal Brazil and the immediate environs of Asunción, they depended
largely on alliances or integration with local indigenous societies. Indigenous groups were
powerful, and the Iberians were simply unable to impose their own legal and political
regimes upon them unilaterally. In fact, the early Spanish settlers of Paraguay were utterly
dependent on the goodwill and support of local indigenous peoples for their very survival.826

822 Carijós and other Guaraní communities further west in Paraguay became the target of devastating raids by
the residents of São Paulo in the early seventeenth century.
823 Pero de Magalhães Gândavo’s, Historia da prouincia Santa Cruz (1576) and Tratado da terra do Brasil, no qual se
contem a informacao das cousas que ha nestas partes feito por P’o de magalhaes (1576 mss.). For the quote, see the 1858
edition, Pero de Magalhães Gândavo, Historia da Prouincia Santa Cruz (Lisbon: Academica Real das Ciências,
1858), ch. 10, 43.
824 Ibid. 46.
825 Monteiro, Negros da terra, 23.
826 Elman R. Service, “Spanish-Guaraní Relations in Early Colonial Paraguay,” in The Paraguay Reader, ed. Peter
Lambert (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 28-31.
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When desperate Spaniards fled indigenous attacks in Buenos Aires and arrived at what
would become the Spanish city of Asunción, the local Guaraní welcomed them, giving them
food and other basic supplies. In addition, the Spaniards, at least in the early days, also
depended on the Guaraní for protection against the hostile Payaguás, Charrúas, and
Gauycurús, and later depended on Guaraní auxiliaries in expanding the reach of Spanish
power in the second half of the sixteenth century.
Recent scholarship in the so-termed New Conquest History has significantly
enhanced our understanding of the fundamental role of Amerindian and mixed-race soldiers
in virtually every major “Spanish” and “Portuguese” victory over other indigenous polities
throughout the region and beyond in the early colonial period.827 Consistent with this view,
on the Spanish side, Guaraní allies were absolutely crucial not only to Aleixo García’s early
expedition in the 1520s, but also to those led by Domingo Martínez de Irala and Álvar
Núñez Cabeza de Vaca into the Paraguayan hinterland in the 1530s and 1540s. These
expeditions included some 200-300 Spanish soldiers, buttressed by another 1,500-2,000 or so
Guaranís.828 The Portuguese in southern Brazil were equally reliant on allied indigenous
groups. Alongside the European residents of São Vicente and their mixed-race LusoBrazilian offspring, Tupi soldiers were absolutely critical to each and every military
expedition into the sertão, or backlands. One contemporary Spanish source reported that in
827 This phenomenon is central to the so-called, “New Conquest History,” discussed in the Introduction. This
was true throughout the rest of the American mainland as well. In Mexico, for instance, hundreds of thousands
of Tlaxcalans, longtime enemies of the Aztecs, seized the opportunity to ally with the Spanish and were
instrumental in the series of battles which led to the fall of Tenochtitlan in 1521. From there, many more
thousands of indigenous allies, including but not limited to Tlaxcalans, Cholulans and even defeated Nahua
groups from central Mexico joined the Spanish in their expeditions south and east into Yucatán, Guatemala
and Honduras, northwest against the Cazcanes and Zacatecas, and later against a diverse confederation of
Chichimeca peoples in the region of Bajío, in which Cazcanes fought alongside Spaniards. Likewise, in their
various campaigns in South America the Spanish relied on support from Nahuas, Mayas, Nicaraguans of
various groups, as well as Cañaris and other local South American societies who had long resented and resisted
Inca domination.
828 Branislava Susnik, “Contact, Servitude, and Resistance,” in The Paraguay Reader: History, Culture, Politics, eds.
Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 24-25.
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his famous attack on the Jesuit missions of Guairá in 1628, António Raposo Tavares, who
went on to become one of the fiercest and most infamous entrada leaders in São Paulo’s
history, enjoyed the support of 900 Portuguese and mixed-race mamelucos alongside another
2,000 Tupis.829
Relations between Iberians and Amerindians were defined not simply by opposition
or alliance, but also by exchange and intermixture. In Paraguay, Spaniards began sleeping in
Guaraní-style hammocks, cultivating corn and manioc, and consuming those and other
indigenous staples, including yerba mate, which soon emerged as a major force for social,
cultural, and economic cohesion across the region.830 The Guaraní in turn adopted European
tools and clothing.831 Beyond the simple exchange of goods and customs, immediately upon
the arrival of the first Spaniards in Paraguay, local Guaraní peoples entered into relations of
real and fictive kinship in order to cement their political alliance.832 They did so by offering
their daughters in marriage to early Spanish settlers and to the growing population of mixedrace mestizos. Likely lost in cultural translation, the process of becoming kin, from the
Guaraní perspective at least, signified their status as relatives of the Spaniards and thereby
equals.833
In early colonial São Vicente, Portuguese colonial authorities relied on indigenous,
mestizo, and European intermediaries, or “go-betweens,” who had integrated within local
indigenous communities.834 The Tupiniquim chief, Tibiricá was perhaps the earliest example
of this. Tibiricá had offered his daughter in marriage to the early Portuguese settler, João
829 Monteiro, Negros da terra, 71. The historian Jaime Cortesão argued that a typical bandeira consisted of 5-10
percent “whites,” and 90-95 percent Indians, primarily, Tupi; see, Jaime Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a formação
territorial do Brasil (Brasília: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, 1958), 179.
830 Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Mercado interno y economía colonial: Tres siglos de historia de la yerba mate (Rosario,
Argentina: Prohistoria, 1983); and Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata, 29.
831 Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata, 29.
832 Susnik, “Contact, Servitude, and Resistance.”
833 Susnik, “Contact, Servitude, and Resistance.”
834 Metcalf, Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil.
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Ramalho, who became his successor.835 As a result of large-scale intermarriage – often
polygamous – between Iberian men and indigenous women, within the short space of three
to four decades, the vast majority of early colonial society in both São Paulo and Asunción
was mestizo.836 In some cases, contemporary authors referred to these individuals explicitly
as “mestizos,” or as “children of Portuguese” or “children of Spaniards.” In general,
however, as in the Zambezi Valley, the lion’s share of persons referred to as “Spaniards” or
“Portuguese” were not in fact individuals of full European extraction, but were mixed-race
peoples who retained many of the social and cultural conventions of their Amerindian
relatives and ancestors.837
Relations with local Amerindians were integral to virtually every aspect of the early
European presence in São Paulo. The lack of European women meant that, from the
colony’s inception, the Paulistas (residents of São Paulo) intermarried with local Amerindian
women, giving rise to a predominantly mixed-race population. In fact, Spaniards increasingly
referred to the Paulistas as mamelucos, alluding to the Mamelukes of Egypt, in denigrating
reference to their mixed-race and skin tone, as well as to their alleged religious infidelity.838
Even Gândavo, a Portuguese, wrote in his 1576 manuscript, Tratado da terra do Brasil, that,
Monteiro, Negros da terra; and Metcalf, Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil.
Service, “Spanish-Guaraní Relations in Early Colonial Paraguay,” 29-30; and Susnik, “Contact, Servitude,
and Resistance.”
837 Magnus Mörner, The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the Plata Region: The Habsburg Era
(Stockholm: Library and Institute of Ibero-American Studies, 1953), 48. For an introduction to the rich
literature on mestizaje/mestiçagem and its significance in the development of early colonial cultures throughout
Iberian America and beyond, see Serge Gruzinski, The Mestizo Mind: The Intellectual Dynamics of Colonization and
Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2002); María Elena Martínez, Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza de Sangre, Religion,
and Gender in Colonial Mexico (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Feros, Speaking of Spain; Berta Ares
Queija and Serge Gruzinski, eds. Entre dos mundos: Fronteras culturales y agentes mediadores (Sevilla: Escuela de
Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1997); Berta Ares Queija, “Las categorías del mestizaje: Desafíos a los
constreñimientos de un modelo social en el Perú colonial temprano,” Histórica 28, no. 1 (2004): 193-218;
Eduardo França Paiva, Dar nome ao novo: uma história lexical da Ibero-América, entre os séculos XVI e XVIII, as
dinâmicas de mestiçagens e o mundo do trabalho (Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, 2015); Joanne Rappaport, The Disappearing
Mestizo: Configuring Difference in the Colonial New Kingdom of Granada (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014);
and Joanne Rappaport and Thomas Cummins. Beyond the Lettered City: Indigenous Literacies in the Andes (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2012); among other works.
838 On the mamelucos specifically and their significance in the history of early colonial Brazil, see Sérgio Buarque
de Holanda, Caminhos e fronteiras (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994).
835
836
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“the majority [of the residents of São Paulo] are mamelucos, children of Portuguese men and
of Indian mothers of the land.”839 In 1585, the Jesuit P. Cardim counted some 120
Portuguese (referring to both European and mixed-race individuals) alongside many
indigenous slaves (com muita escravaria da terra).840 The population became even further mixed
in subsequent decades. As another observer noted in 1610, “the residents are the majority
mamelucos, and rarely Portuguese. There is only one [Portuguese] woman, called Maria
Castanha [Castanho].” “These [people] are in a terrible condition,” the observer continued,
“and go about […] barefoot [with] bows and arrows, which are their ordinary weapons.”841
Mestizos dominated colonial society in Paraguay as well. If in 1545 there were some
500-600 mestizos in Asunción, by 1575 there were several thousand.842 By that same year,
one contemporary reported to the king that there were less than 300 Spaniards in the entire
province of Paraguay.843 This imbalance only increased with the passage of time and
provoked a series of conflicts between colonists and civil authorities recently arrived from
the Iberian Peninsula. Like the inhabitants of São Vicente, the mestizo residents of Asunción
were also the targets of scorn for their perceived impurity of lineage. Given that, in keeping
with local indigenous traditions, the residents of Asunción, like their counterparts in São
Paulo, often kept multiple indigenous women as wives or concubines, the city soon became
infamous throughout the rest of the viceroyalty as, “Mohamed’s Paradise.”844 Although an
exaggeration, in 1545, less than a decade after the city’s founding, the priest Francisco

Gândavo, Tratado da terra do Brasil (1576 mss.), fol. 17r.
Tratados da terra e gente do Brasil [c.1590] (1978), 214; cited in Benedito A. Prezia, “A Câmara da Vila de São
Paulo como manifestação da sociedade civil nos séculos XVI e XVII,” Histórica: Revista Eletrônica do Arquivo
Público do Estado de São Paulo 29 (2008): 2-3.
841 P. Jácome Monteiro, “Relação da Provincia do Brasil, 1610,” in História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil
(HCJB), ed. Serafim Leite, vol. 8 (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1938-1950), 395.
842 Adalberto López, The Revolt of the Comuñeros, 1721-1753: A Study in the Colonial History of Paraguay (Cambridge,
MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1976): 16-17.
843 López, The Revolt of the Comuñeros (1976): 16-17.
844 Ibid. 9-10.
839
840
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González Paniagua reported to the king that some Spaniards in Asunción had up to seventy
women, “most having fifteen, twenty, thirty, and forty,” while even the poor had five or
six.845
Even more so than in much of the rest of Spanish America, the tension that
developed between peninsular-born Spaniards (peninsulares) and the colonial settler
population with longstanding roots in the local community was defined increasingly along
such lines. The majority of colonists had married indigenous or mestizo women and had
mixed-race children who were then incorporated into the local colonial population and the
República de españoles. From a relatively early date, king Charles V recognized the rights of
mestizos to formal authority in Paraguay by possessing grants over Amerindian labor.
Mestizos likewise held official positions in the local civil and ecclesiastical administration,
and although in the early years they competed with peninsulares for these positions, by the
mid-seventeenth century mestizos dominated local colonial politics in both Paraguay and
São Vicente.

Incorporating Territories and Subjects

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Iberian presence in the
region consisted of islands of European and mestizo settlement surrounded by seas of
indigenous land. Amerindian headmen remained de facto sovereigns over the lion’s share of
territory there. However, highlighting the gap between theory and practice, between
ambition and effective rule, the Iberian crowns nonetheless claimed sovereignty over the

845

Ibid. 16.
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entirety of America, citing the authority they derived from the Inter cætera bulls of donation
and the Treaty of Tordesillas in the late fifteenth century.
Interestingly, tensions between Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy for imperium in
South America peaked during the latter part of the period of Iberian union, when the two
polities shared a common monarch, these tensions emerging most clearly beginning in the
1620s. According to the terms agreed upon at the Cortes de Tomar, which cemented that
union, although the Portuguese were afforded certain privileges to travel and trade in Spain’s
imperial possessions, the two empires, like their peninsular realms, were in theory to remain
separate and governed by their own respective laws and institutions.846 The reality, however,
was more complex. Although this continued to be true throughout most of the first four
decades of union, by the second quarter of the seventeenth century, a range of conflicts and
pressures in both the colonial and metropolitan contexts converged to degrade that
separation, in turn provoking further tensions on both sides of the Iberian peninsular and
imperial divide.

Spanish American legal codes were relatively uniform regarding the incorporation of
territories and subjects in the New World. The Castilian crown and its colonial agents
claimed exclusive rights to the discovery and conquest of all American territory west of the
ill-defined line agreed upon at Tordesillas in 1494. According to some Spaniards, the
Castilian crown’s claim extended east all the way to Cananéia, at the southern boundary of
the Portuguese captaincy of São Vicente and cut north from there through the continent’s
interior.847 In theory, although by no means in fact, the jurisdiction of the viceroyalty of Peru

Bouza, Portugal en la Monarquía Hispánica.
Enrique de Gandía, Las misiones jesuíticas y los bandeirantes paulistas (Bernabé: Editorial “La Facultad,” 1936),
which located Cananéia, in the present-day State of São Paulo, as the southern original of the “ray of division
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ran all the way from Panama to Patagonia, encompassing nearly the whole of Spanish South
America.848 By the early seventeenth century, the viceroyalty had been divided into six
administrative sub-jurisdictions each home to a high court, or audiencia, subject to the direct
authority of king and his Council of Indies in Spain.849 The high court at Charcas held
jurisdiction over the crown province of Paraguay (sometimes referred to alternatively as
Guairá) and the Río de la Plata.850 In 1617, in an effort to ameliorate the challenge of
governing such a vast territory, the crown divided the crown province of Paraguay in two,
the northern part of which maintained its name (Paraguay), with Asunción as its
administrative center, while the southern part was renamed the Río de la Plata and was
centered at Buenos Aires.
Adding to this complexity, there also existed the Jesuit mission province of Paraguay,
which, although overlapping with the crown province by that name, was distinct from it.
The territorial reach of the Jesuit province encompassed all of present-day Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Argentina, plus parts of Bolivia and Brazil.851 In 1609, the Jesuits created the
mission sub-province of Guairá, which formed part of the larger Jesuit province of
Paraguay.852 The crown of Castile always claimed ultimate territorial sovereignty over the
missions, but the missions themselves and the territories in which they were clustered,
enjoyed substantial jurisdictional autonomy from local civil authorities in Asunción and
of the jurisdictions of the crown of Castile and Portugal.” See also, C. R. Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for
Brazil and Angola, 1602-1686 (London: Athlone Press, 1952): 71, footnote 8.
848 The sole exception was coastal Venezuela.
849 In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the crown established six audiencias in the viceroyalty of
Peru, which were located in Lima (1544), Santa Fé de Bogotá (1549), La Plata de los Charcas (1559), Quito
(1563), Panamá (1567), and Santiago de Chile (1609).
850 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 70.
851 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 70.
852 In theory, the Jesuit province of Guairá was bounded by the Paranapanema River to the north, the Iguazú
River to the south, the Paraná to the west, and the Atlantic coast to the east. See, Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the
Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 25, citing Ramon I. Cardozo, La Antigua provincial de Guayrá y la Villa Rica del
Espíritu Santo (Buenos Aires, 1938). The Portuguese likewise claimed sovereignty over much of this territory,
leading to a major conflict in the late 1620s.
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Buenos Aires. The Jesuits fiercely defended their autonomy and strove, to the extent
possible, to restrict colonists’ contact with the Guaraní converts in order to shield the
Indians from exploitation and ensure their own access to Amerindian labor in the missions.
As a result, they were frequently at odds with the local settler community and its
representatives in the municipal council of Asunción. This tension persisted throughout the
Jesuits’ presence in South America, and pitted them not only against the local colonists of
the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru, but also against the Luso-Brazilian colonists of São Vicente.
Exacerbating this tension with civil authorities was the fact that the Jesuits
maintained a simultaneous allegiance to two separate sovereigns. On the one hand, they
obeyed the king of Spain and his official representatives in America, which provided a large
part of their funding and licensed their very presence in the New World through the
Patronato Real. At the same time, the Jesuits also looked to the pope – and the central Curia
in Rome – as the prime arbiter in spiritual matters, in governing appointments and
assignments within the order, and in mandating strategies of organization, expansion, and
catechismal instruction.853
Although São Vicente represented the southern and western limit of Portugal’s
effective occupation in the sixteenth century South America, Portuguese claims to territorial
jurisdiction on the continent were far greater. Like the Spanish, the Portuguese also claimed
broad swathes of land the vast majority of which remained under indigenous control and
much of which was subject to competing claims by the crown of Castile. The lack of
accurate geographic knowledge of the continent’s interior is reflected in the fact that,
Despite the Jesuits’ autonomy from civil authority and their maintenance of a dual allegiance to king and
pope, the fact that they were under direct crown control through the Padroado Real belies the characterization
common in the historiography that the Jesuits functioned as a separate “state within a state” in Paraguay and
the Río de la Plata. For one such characterization of the Paraguayan Jesuits as representing a state within a
state, see Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 201-202; and Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle
for Brazil and Angola, 71 and 143.
853
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throughout the first century and a half since the arrival of Pedro Álvares Cabral to the
Brazilian coast in 1500, most Portuguese believed Brazil to be bound by natural frontiers.
Although eventually proven to be myth, until the mid seventeenth century, the Portuguese
Jesuits that educated many early colonial elites argued that Brazil was an island. Its territorial
limits, they claimed, were the Amazon River in the north and the Río de la Plata in the south,
both of which flowed from a common source, a lake in the center of the continent, called
the Dourada, Eupana, or Paraupaba, located well into the continent’s hinterland to the
west.854 In fact, despite their opposition to the activities of Portuguese slave-raiders in the
region, many Portuguese Jesuit proponents of the Ilha Brasil theory, including António de
Araújo and Simão de Vasconcelos, claimed that the Spanish Jesuit mission territory of
Guairá [as well as those of Tape and Itatin] actually fell within the territorial dominium of
the crown of Portugal, not Castile. Araújo wrote from São Paulo that, “all of this State of
Brazil is closed with two limits, as with two keys, one of which is named the Rio da Prata, and
the other, Amazonas.”855
The legal and political aspects of territorial jurisdiction in Portuguese Brazil were
equally complex as those in the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru.856 In an effort to colonize and
defend Brazil at minimal cost to the crown, the Portuguese king initially divided the territory
into fifteen “donatory captaincies,” each headed by a lord proprietor with wide seigniorial
dominium and jurisdiction.857 São Vicente, Brazil’s southernmost captaincy, was one of only

854 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 14, citing the map of Brazil by João Teixeira
Albernas, dated 1667 and reproduced in História da expansão portuguesa no mundo, vol. 3, 137; see also Cortesão,
Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 56.
855 Quoted in Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 157.
856 Rodrigo Faustinoni Bonciani, “Guerra, domínio e soberania: Experiências coloniais e império no Atlântico
Sul, década de 1570,” Revista de Indias 76, no. 268 (2016): 613-640.
857 “Carta Regia de Doação a Martim Affonso de Sousa, 20 de janeiro de 1535,” Arquivo do Estado de São
Paulo (AESP) Documentos interessantes para a história e costumes de São Paulo (São Paulo: Casa Eclética, 1894-1978):
vol. 47, 19-20. For a monograph-length study of the formation of captaincies in Brazil, see, António
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two that had relative economic success and as a result was allowed to maintain its
jurisdictional autonomy when king John III converted the rest into royal captaincies under
the direct authority of the crown in 1549. As such, the Portuguese residents of the hinterland
town of São Paulo, for instance, in the captaincy of São Vicente, were subject to two
separate authorities: the king of Portugal and their lord proprietor, Martim Afonso de Sousa,
and his descendants.858 Like local Spanish civil authorities in the Jesuit mission province of
Guairá, beyond the presence of itinerant representatives and visitadores, neither Lisbon nor
Bahia had any substantial direct institutional presence in the town of São Paulo until arrival
of Francisco de Souza in 1599, then-governor-general of Brazil, and even then, his stay was
only temporary.
In both Iberian empires, the extension of European rule came slowly, advanced
through the establishment of towns as nuclei of Iberian imperial jurisdiction and civilization
within vast territories the majority of which remained under indigenous control. Fleeing the
raids of indigenous peoples on the nascent outpost at Buenos Aires, in 1537 the Spanish
settlers founded Asunción, on the Paraguay River just above its confluence with the
Pilcomayo. In the following decades, Asunción arose as the base of Spanish forays into
adjacent areas, and soon became the seat of the Spanish governorship of Paraguay.859 It was
from Asunción that Spaniards radiated outward, establishing smaller satellite towns at
Ciudad Real (1557), Santa Cruz de la Sierra (1561), Villa Rica (1570), Santa Fe (1573),
Corrientes (1588), and Buenos Aires (which they re-founded in 1580).860

Vasconcelos de Saldanha, As capitanias do Brasil: Antecedentes, desenvolvimento e extinção de um fenômeno atlântico
(Lisboa: Comissão Nacional para Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 2001).
858 “Carta Regia de Doação a Martim Affonso de Sousa, 20 de janeiro de 1535,” Arquivo do Estado de São
Paulo (AESP) Documentos interessantes para a história e costumes de São Paulo (São Paulo: Casa Eclética, 1894-1978)
vol. 47, 19-20.
859 Ricardo de Lafuente Machain, Los Conquistadores del Río de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Ayacucho, 1937).
860 Mörner, The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the Plata Region, 46.
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If by the mid-sixteenth century the Spanish presence in the Río de la Plata region
was restricted to a discontinuous series of isolated enclave towns along that river’s various
tributaries, the Portuguese footprint was even more circumscribed. In 1574, the Spanish
geographer, Juan López de Velasco, explained that, “the entire population of Christians in
[Brazil] is … along the coast, the interior of which is not populated, because the Indians do
not consent to it.”861 Over a half-century later, in 1627, the Portuguese Franciscan friar,
Vicente de Salvador, echoed López de Velasco’s description of the colony’s maritime
orientation. In his, História do Brasil, Salvador wrote that he could not even discuss the
“sertão” [the hinterland], because it remained beyond the reach and knowledge of
Europeans. “The Portuguese,” he explained, “being great conquerors of territories, do not
take advantage of them, but content themselves with scurrying along the coast like crabs.”862
Although in the late sixteenth century the Portuguese footprint in South America
was significantly smaller than that of Spain, towns were equally fundamental to Portuguese
colonization. Martim Afonso de Sousa founded the town of São Vicente on the southern
coast in 1532.863 When the crown formalized his grant as lord proprietor of that captaincy
two years later, Sousa’s jurisdiction also came to include several towns and settlements
occupied by indigenous Tupis and the mestiço offspring of João Ramalho, a Portuguese
explorer who had shipwrecked off the coast in 1513 and settled in amongst the local
Guaianases, a Tupi subgroup. Within three decades the Portuguese had founded several
more settlements along the coast including Itanhaém, Iguape, Cananéia, and Santos, the last
of which was just a league and a half from São Vicente and became the seat of the
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captaincy’s government.864 In addition, the town of São Paulo, which the Jesuits founded as a
mission outpost in 1554, soon became home to a growing number of European and mestiço
settlers as well. Throughout the first century and half of the Portuguese presence in Brazil,
São Paulo, twelve leagues inland from the coast, was the only major exception to the
colony’s otherwise maritime profile.865 In expanding the reach of Spanish and Portuguese
authority, provincial officials or local municipal councils granted the lands around those
towns to prominent colonists, many of which had participated in the initial conquest of the
territory or had ties to the local elite.866 However, since land was abundant throughout the
early colonial period, for individual colonists, control over Amerindian labor was arguably
even more important than control over the soil itself since, as they saw it, land had little
value if they lacked the labor to exploit it.
In Spanish America, early colonial authorities introduced the encomienda as a means to
address that problem, while prohibiting Amerindian slavery.867 Rather than land grants,
encomiendas were grants of subjugated indigenous groups, which the crown, through its local
colonial authorities, bestowed to individual settler-grantees, called encomenderos. Encomenderos
864 Moraes, Bases da formação territorial do Brasil, 319-320; see also Gândavo, Historia da Prouincia Santa Cruz
(Lisbon: Academica Real das Ciências, 1858 [1576]), ch. 3, 13.
865 For the most authoritative, comprehensive study on the history of São Paulo during the period of Iberian
Union, see José Carlos Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dos Felipes: Conexões na América Meridional, 1580-1640 (São
Paulo: Editora Intermeios, 2014). For another insightful monograph, see Rafael Ruiz, São Paulo na Monarquia
Hispânica (São Paulo: Instituto Brasileiro de Filosofia e Ciência, Raimundo Lúlio, 2004); and for broader
analyses of Brazil under Habsburg rule, see, Roseli Santaella Stella, Brasil durante el gobierno español, 1580-1640
(Madrid: Fundación Hernando de Larramendi, 2000); Guida Marques, “O Estado do Brasil na União Ibérica,”
Penélope: Fazer e desfazer a história 27 (2002): 7-35; and Schwartz, “Luso-Spanish Relations in Habsburg Brazil.”
866 Actas da Câmara da Cidade de São Paulo (ACSP) (São Paulo: Publicação da Divisão do Arquivo Histórico;
Divisão do Arquivo Histórico do Departamento de Cultura) for those years are full of references to such local
land grants.
867 For sophisticated studies on the issue of slavery and other forms of coerced labor, of both Africans and
Amerindians in Brazil, see, Rodrigo Faustinoni Bonciani, “Repúblicas da instabilidade: O domínio sobre os
indígenas e africanos e a soberania régia nas Américas, 1542-1549,” História Unisinos 20, no. 3
(September/December, 2016): 351-364; Rodrigo Faustinoni Bonciani, “O dominium sobre os indígenas e
africanos e a especificidade da soberania régia no Atlântico” (PhD diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 2010);
Carlos Zeron, Linha de fé: A Companhia de Jesus e a escravidão no processo de formação da sociedade colonial (Brasil, séculos
XVI e XVII) (São Paulo: Edusp, 2011); and Carlos Zeron, “O debate sobre a escravidão ameríndia e africana
nas universidades de Salamanca e Évora,” in Jesuítas, ensino e ciência. Séculos XVI-XVIII, eds. Luís Miguel
Carolino and Carlos Ziller Camenietzki, (Casal de Cambra: Caleidoscópio, 2005), 205-226.
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were permitted to extract tribute from the Amerindians entrusted to them, usually in the
form of seasonal labor, and in return incurred the obligation to instruct them in the Catholic
faith and Spanish civilization, and to defend them and the territory within their jurisdiction.
As a result of missionaries’ outcry against abusive encomenderos, in 1542 the Spanish crown
abolished the institution, as it had slavery several decades prior. Nevertheless, the encomienda
persisted into the seventeenth century in remote regions, like Paraguay, where the crown had
less capacity to enforce its decrees.868 Local municipal officials were hardly in favor of
enforcing the royal prohibition since many were encomenderos themselves.869
Luso-Brazilian colonists were equally interested in exploiting Amerindian labor.
Colonial officials never formally introduced encomienda in Brazil, however, in part because
indigenous slavery remained legal there until well into the second half of the sixteenth
century. And even as the crown began restricting the Amerindian slavery, it maintained
several legal loopholes, which Luso-Brazilian slavers exploited to perpetuate the institution.
Although Brazil’s first missionaries were initially ambivalent about Amerindian slavery, by
the late 1560s they increasingly opposed it, and succeeded in lobbying the crown to issue its
first prohibition of the practice in 1570, which declared the general liberty of the “gentios,”
as they called them, and appealed “to the consciences of those people who capture them.”870

868 “Encomiendas de indios del Paraguay. Medidas tomadas para reprimir abusos cumpliendo lo ordenado en
Reales Cédulas de 2 de octubre de 1605 y 27 de mayo de 1606,” Archivo General de la Nación-Argentina
(AGNA hereafter), sala 9, doc. 23.
869 According to Barbara Ganson, in 1556, for instance, some 20,000 Carijó-Guaraní were divided among 320
Spaniards in encomienda. Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata, 26.
870 Georg Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil, 1500-1640 (São Paulo: Ediçoes Loyola, 1982), 221222. Regarding the early Jesuits’ ambivalence toward the institution, in 1559, for instance, P. Manuel da
Nóbrega described the condition of servitude as an advance for Amerindians toward “gentility.” Drawing on
the Spanish American examples of “Peru and the Antilles,” Nóbrega claimed that Amerindians should be
“subjected and placed under the yoke of obedience to Christians,” since, “being tamed,” it was easier to firmly
“inscribe” within them “the faith of Christ,” see: “Do P. Manoel da Nóbrega a D. João III Rei de Portugal,” 14
September 1551, Olinda, Pernambuco, in Monumenta Brasiliae, ed. Serafim Leite, vol. 1 (Rome: Monumenta
Historica Societatis Iesu, 1956), 291; and “Do P. Manoel da Nóbrega a Tomé de Sousa Antigo Governador do
Brasil,” 5 July 1559, Bahia, in Monumenta Brasiliae, vol. 3, 72. Frustrated at early efforts to subjugate the
Tupiniquim of São Vicente, four years earlier, P. José de Anchieta, Nóbrega’s co-founder of the Jesuit order in

299
The law contained two key exceptions, however. The first allowed the enslavement of
Amerindians “taken in just war, […] with my license and authority, or that of my
governor.”871 It also permitted the enslavement of groups known for cannibalism, those
which “customarily assaulted the Portuguese and other gentios in order to eat them,”
including the Aymures, in particular.872
Concerned by the ubiquity and abuses of the Amerindian slavery, the Portuguese
crown issued a series of subsequent laws and decrees that reinforced the basic sentiment of
the first, but added specific provisions. A second law, for instance, issued in 1587, included
several regulations on settler activity and authority.873 It specified that colonists, no matter
their status or influence, were prohibited from entering the sertão to make war on indigenous
groups without express license from the governor.874 It also stipulated that two or three
Jesuits must accompany each expedition since, “because of the good faith they have among
the Indians, [they] can persuade [Amerindians] more easily to come and serve my vassals on
their mills and plantations without force or deceit.”875 Importantly, the law placed the
Amerindians under the direct administration of the colonists, not the Jesuits, although it
decreed that the governor, a royal magistrate, and the local Jesuits must collectively oversee
the distribution of indigenous captives among colonists to ensure that the process was

Brazil, remarked that “conforming to […] the will of God, the Indians [should be] subjected to the yoke of
slavery and [be obliged to] accept the banner of Christ,” see “Do Ir. José de Anchieta ao P. Inácio de Loyola,
Roma,” Fim de Março 1555, São Vicente, in Monumenta Brasiliae, vol. 2, 207. At the same time, however,
Nóbrega conceded that, despite the Jesuits’ best intentions, settlers tended abused the institution. When the
settlers enslaved Amerindians, he reflected, “it is not to save them nor for them to know Christ or live in justice
and reason, but to rob them of their farms, their sons, their daughters, and their women,” see, “Do P. Manuel
da Nóbrega ao P. Simão Rodrigues, Lisboa,” 9 August 1549, Bahia, in Monumenta Brasiliae, vol. 1, 122-125; and
“Do P. Manoel da Nóbrega a Tomé de Sousa Antigo Governador do Brasil,” 5 July 1559, Bahia, in Monumenta
Brasiliae, vol. 3, 80-81.
871 Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil, 221-222.
872 Ibid.
873 Metcalf, Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 191-192.
874 “Lei que SM passou sobre os Indios do Brasil que nao podem ser captivos e declara o que o podem ser,” in
Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil (1982): 222-224.
875 Ibid.
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conducted licitly.876 Finally, the 1587 law legalized the practice of resgate, the buying of slaves
from Amerindian groups known for cannibalism in order to save them from that practice.877
A series of royal laws and decrees followed in the late sixteenth and first half of the
seventeenth century, all of which upheld the dictates of previous ones, but added specific
clarifications.878 For instance, the 1596 version first prioritized the role of “the religious,”
mostly the Jesuits, in “reducing” and administering indigenous communities, and decreed
that Amerindians should be paid for their work.879 Philip III issued a further series of laws
and decrees in 1609, 1611, 1621, and 1628, which continued to reaffirm the general liberty of
Amerindians, except those taken in “just” or defensive war.
Despite the series of laws and decrees restricting the practice, and despite the shift to
African slavery across much of coastal Brazil in the late sixteenth century, Amerindian
slavery continued to flourish in the hinterland region around São Paulo, in particular. This
was due in large part to the fact that it was prohibitively expensive to import African slaves
there given the arduous uphill trek required to reach the town from the ports on the coast.880

Ibid.
Monteiro, Negros da terra, 33. Resgate remained difficult since many Indians continued their ritual sacrifice and
even cannibalism.
878 The 1621 iteration, for instance, referred back to the original 1570 law of “the Lord King Sebastian, my
cousin,” in which “God had informed us of the illicit ways in Brasil that gentiles were captured and of the great
inconveniences that resulted from this,” in Registo Geral da Câmara da Cidade de São Paulo (RGCCSP), vol. 1, 1621
(São Paulo: Typographia Piratininga, 1917-1919), 326-335.
879 Monteiro, Negros da terra, 132; and Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil, 225-226.
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American Historical Review, 120, no. 2 (April 2015): 433-461; Zacarías Moutoukias, “Power, Corruption, and
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American Historical Review 68, no. 4 (1988): 771-801; Macarena Perusset, Contrabando y sociedad en el Río de la Plata
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At the same time, São Paulo’s prime position at the entrance to the continental plateau, on
the river Anhembi (now called the Tietê), also gave it unique access to the myriad
Amerindian societies of the interior, in particular, the Guaraní, their relatives, the Carijó, and
several Tupi groups as well, which had fled from the coast as the Portuguese encroached.
Local royal and municipal officials frequently awarded land grants on the outskirts of
town to extend the towns’ own jurisdiction as well as to serve as a buffer between European
and mestiço settlements and the mass of unconquered hinterland inhabited by hostile
Amerindian groups.881 In November of 1587, São Paulo’s municipal council recommended
that the Tupi and Carijó [Guaraní] peoples be brought down, or “descended,” from the sertão
and either “distributed among the residents of the towns of this captaincy,” or settled into
“an aldeia on the outskirts of this town, which needs it, since it is on the frontier of [the
territory of] gentio Guanonimis and many other [hostile] Hybiribabaca nations.”882 In fact,
according to the council members, it was precisely “because they [the Hybiribabaca nations]
were so daring and risen up,” that the Tupi and Guaraní had begun coming voluntarily and
taking refuge in the environs of São Paulo.883 By the early seventeenth century, Carijó were
reportedly arriving voluntarily as well.884

XVII,” in Portugal na Monarquia Hispânica: Dinâmicas de Integração e de Conflito, eds. Pedro Cardim, Leonor Freire
Costa and Mafalda Soares da Cunha (Lisboa: CHAM, CIDEHUS, GHES, RC, 2013), 309-331; Enriqueta Vila
Vilar, Hispano-América y el comercio de esclavos: Los asientos portugueses. (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios HispanoAmericanos, 1977); Enriqueta Vila Vilar, “Los asientos portugueses y el contrabando de negros,” Anuario de
estudios americanos 30 (1973): 557-609; among others.
881 For a study on the broader diffusion of land grants and property rights across Brazil and beyond, see,
Carmen Margarida Oliveira Alveal, “Converting Land into Property in the Portuguese Atlantic World, 16th-18th
Century” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2007); Carmen Margarida Oliveira Alveal, “Senhores de
pequenos mundos: Disputas por terras e os limites do poder local na América portuguesa,” Sæculum: Revista de
História 26 (January/June 2012): 63-77; and Lígia Osório Silva, Lei da terra: Um estudo sobre a história da propriedade
da terra no Brasil, Ph.D. Dissertation, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1990);
among others.
882 18 November 1587, Actas da Câmara da Cidade de São Paulo (ACSP), vol. 1 (São Paulo: Publicação da Divisão
do Arquivo Histórico; Divisão do Arquivo Histórico do Departamento de Cultura), 332.
883 18 November 1587, ACSP, vol. 1, 332.
884 3 April 1609, ACSP, vol. 2, 239.
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Unlike in Spanish America, Portuguese law did not formally establish a separate,
legally defined “Republic of Indians” as distinct from the “Republic of Portuguese,”
comprised of the European, African, and mixed-race population. However, the
formalization of indigenous aldeias (or aldeiamentos) did nonetheless reflect certain similarities
to the system in Spanish America, in aiming to ensure the jurisdictional autonomy of
indigenous peoples from European settlers.885 Like their Spanish American counterparts,
rather than incorporating indigenous peoples within European settlements, royal officials in
Brazil sought to settle Amerindian groups into separate towns, and expressly prohibited
Portuguese and mestizo colonists from residing within the limits of those lands or cultivating
them.886 As a result, although there existed no similar, official use of the system of two
republics, there did exist parallel, non-overlapping exclusive jurisdictions, one of which
encompassed indigenous aldeiamentos and the other the European and mestizo settlements.887
In addition to lay settlers, local authorities often awarded land grants to mendicant
orders as well, which established missions there housing local Amerindians. Beyond serving
as buffers, local officials argued that many of those Amerindians came to the aldeiamentos
voluntarily, seeking peace and protection. As such, colonial officials saw aldeiamentos (or
missiones or reducciones in the Spanish case) as an expedient means of bringing Amerindians
within the general orbit of Iberian influence and political administration. They directly served

By the late sixteenth century, the average aldeia contained a multiplicity of indigenous ethnicities, due in part
to the forces of disease, which meant that aldeias experienced an almost continuous process of de- and repopulation. This also resulted from the fact that the Jesuits sought conscientiously to erase social distinctions
among indigenous groups in order to homogenize them. See: Monteiro, Negros da terra, 47. On one occasion,
São Paulo’s municipal council recommended separating “the Christian Indians,” meaning the Tupi, from the
Carijós, since they were historical enemies and “used to warring.” See, 15 August 1611, ACSP, vol. 2, 293-295.
For an introductory work on the history of the formation of the aldeiamentos around São Paulo, see Pasquale
Petrone, Aldeamentos paulistas (São Paulo: Edusp, 1995).
886 8 July 1604, RGCCSP, vol. 1, 357-359.
887 Janice Theodoro and Rafael Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade: A fundação, o poder político e a visa
política,” in História da Cidade de São Paulo, vol. 1: A Cidade Colonial, ed. Paula Porta, ch. 2 (São Paulo: Paz e
Terra, 2004): 96-97.
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the interests of both the crown and local Iberian colonists since they enhanced towns’
security, provided them a pool of subdued, concentrated labor, and also, in theory if not in
fact, served to “conserve” the local Amerindian population by providing for their spiritual
and material wellbeing.888 The king himself, for instance, instructed his first governor-general
of Brazil, Tomé de Sousa, to gather the Amerindians “near the settlements in the said
captaincies so that they may come into contact with Christians and not with heathens.”889
In order to facilitate the process of conversion in their aldeiamentos or reducciones, the
Jesuits on both sides of the imperial divide maintained certain aspects of Amerindian social
organization, including the maintenance of indigenous headmen, which the Jesuits mobilized
as intermediaries in extending their own authority over indigenous commoners.890 One of
the Jesuits’ main strategies was to focus on converting headmen first in order to ease and
expedite the conversion of the rest of the community. Lamenting the lack of large
centralized polities, the priest, Pedro Correia, noted in 1551 that although “they have no
King, in each Aldeia there was a Headman.”891 Describing the situation in São Paulo, another
Jesuit reported in 1583 that, “they live in aldeias, under our administration, communally,” and
that in those aldeias they continued to live “in very large houses with a headman of their
nation whom they obey,” as they had prior to the Europeans’ arrival.892 Beyond converting
headmen, the Jesuits also placed particular emphasis on converting the youth, on learning
888 In reality, however, it could be argued that gathering Amerindians into aldeias had the opposite effect since
their proximity to European settlements made them more vulnerable to the outbreak of disease, which
frequently ravaged aldeia populations.
889 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 124.
890 By the second quarter of the seventeenth century the Jesuits represented the major missionary presence in
Guairá, but the Franciscans had also had a substantial number of reducciones, particularly in central Paraguay and
the immediate environs of Asunción. These included the Franciscan reducciones of Altos, Atirá, Caázapá,
Guarambaré, Itá, Tobatí, Yaguarón, Yutí, Ytapé, Ypané, Perico, Jejuy, and Itatí, all of which, according Barbara
Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata, were founded between 1580 and 1615. All the
Guaraní inhabitants of these reducciones were subject to encomienda, Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the
Río de la Plata.
891 “Do Ir. Pero Correia ao P. Simão Rodrigues, Lisboa,” 20 June 1551, São Vicente, in Monumenta Brasiliae, vol.
1, 231.
892 Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro [IHGB], Ar. 1.2.31, CU, fols. 207r-228r.

304
indigenous languages, and, to the extent possible, on eradicating shamans and other
manifestations of traditional spiritual beliefs and practices.893
The Jesuits, it is worth noting, were not the first or only forces shaping the
development of the vast hinterland region between São Paulo and Asunción. The area was
not simply an empty space or tabula rasa, which the Jesuits (and Paulistas for that matter)
entered and transformed according to will and design. The Castilian towns mentioned
earlier, for instance, were already there, and established close commercial ties with the Jesuits
missions, especially through the yerba mate trade. Myriad indigenous groups also continued to
shape the region’s development throughout the period in question, not simply those that
settled within the missions themselves, but also those existed on the missions’ fringes, at
times in conflict with European and mestizo settlements and at other times in coexistence.
Nevertheless, the Jesuits did represent a significant force for change, and their arrival
contributed to a series fundamental shifts in the region’s social, political, and economic
organization. As a result, the presence of Jesuit mission towns soon became a major focus of
contention. While they offered the benefits mentioned above, the Jesuits’ efforts to protect
Amerindians from settler abuse brought them increasingly into direct conflict with local
settlers. The main reason was that, in their power as administrators of the Amerindians
within their missions, the Jesuits controlled the distribution (repartimiento in Spanish and
repartimento in Portuguese) of Amerindians for temporary – in theory paid – labor on settlers’
estates. As Amerindian populations began dropping precipitously from the combined force
of disease and settler abuse, the Jesuits restricted their repartimentos. In addition, by the early
seventeenth century, the Jesuits began establishing missions farther from centers of colonial
settlement in order to minimize their converts’ contact with exploitative colonists. The
893
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process drove an increasingly sharp wedge between Jesuits, settlers, and their Amerindian
allies in both Spanish and Portuguese America. That conflict eventually developed into the
central dynamic of historical change defining political, legal, and military developments in the
region throughout the first half of the seventeenth century.

Native Sovereignty and the Persistence of Amerindian Power

Despite the gradual expansion of Iberian power, Guaraní, Guaycurú, Tupi, Tapuia,
and a range of other Amerindian groups maintained their effective sovereignty over the vast
majority of the region throughout much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Although the indigenous peoples in the environs of São Paulo and Asunción soon became
the targets of slave raids and were subjected to widespread oppression and various forms of
coerced labor, including slavery, in many interactions with Europeans, Amerindians held the
balance of power. They frequently repelled European encroachments into their territory,
entered into willful alliances with them to exploit divisions among Europeans to their benefit
or to advance their own interests against those of Amerindian rivals, and even developed real
and fictive kinship bonds in order to cement those alliances and integrate Europeans within
indigenous lineages of social and political organization. Far from passive subjects of Iberian
domination, Amerindian groups across the region played an active, central role in shaping
the political, social, and economic development of the region throughout the colonial period.
Amerindians asserted their power almost immediately upon the arrival of Europeans
in their territory, and continued to do so throughout the early colonial era. In response to
slave raids on their communities by the early settlers of São Paulo, neighboring Tupi and
Tapuia groups launched frequent assaults on the town throughout the first three decades
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since its foundation, frequently threatening the town’s very existence.894 The first Spanish
settlement at Buenos Aires faced similar assaults and reprisals, and as a result was abandoned
soon after its original settlement, only to be re-founded four decades later. As contemporary
reports attest, the Amerindian threat to the Spanish settlement of Buenos Aires remained
substantial even well into the mid seventeenth century.895 In 1613, Francisco de Quiñones,
the procurador [attorney general] of Asunción, lamented Spaniards’ inability to subjugate the
Payaguás and Guaycurús, who persisted in raiding and robbing local haciendas and
neighboring “towns of royal patrimony,” ensuring “that others are not repopulated, to the
great detriment of the health and haciendas of the Spaniards, who are continually in alarm
for their own defense as well as that of the Indians” under Spanish protection.896 In the
midst of a major Amerindian revolt in 1630-31, the governor of Paraguay, Luis de Céspedes
y Xería, condemned the Payaguás and Guaycurús as “indomitable rebels who deny His
Majesty’s sovereignty and defy his Royal Justice, inflicting widespread damage and robbery,
murdering Spaniards and domesticated Indians.”897 In 1643, over a century after the
foundation of Spanish Paraguay, the Jesuit provincial, Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, described
the Payaguás in particular as “cruel enemies of the Spaniards, on whom they inflict atrocious
deaths.”898 “They terrorized that whole region,” Montoya continued, “without it being
possible to subdue them by force of arms.”899

Municipal council records point to numerous such indigenous assaults and uprisings, see ACSP, 1:332,
1:388-390, 1:393-394, 1:417-418, 1:423-424, 1:446-447. Even the Tupiniquim, allies of the early Paulista
residents in the area, rebelled against the Portuguese and their mameluco kin from 1590 to 1595. See ACSP,
1:404.
895 In 1610, the Governor of the Rio de la Plata penned two reports on punitive expeditions carried out to
punish the Indians who had risen up in the environs of Buenos Aires. See, Pablo Pastells, ed., Historia de la
Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Perú, Bolivia y Brasil) según los documentos
originales del Archivo General de Indias, vol. 1 (Madrid: V. Suárez, 1912,: 177, 179.
896 Pastells, ed. Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay, vol. 1, 235.
897 Quoted in Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 90.
898 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 91, citing Montoya’s, Memorial, of 1643.
899 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 91, citing Montoya’s, Memorial, of 1643.
894

307
Although many of the Amerindians that Spaniards and Portuguese referred to as
“friendly” or “allies” were actually either slaves or otherwise dependents of Iberian colonists,
many indigenous Amerindian groups entered into voluntary alliances with Europeans or
joined their expeditions to the interior. The Guarambarenses, a Guaraní sub-group in the
province of Paraguay, saw the advantage of allying with Spaniards in order to raid the
territory of their ancestral enemies (the Payaguás and Guaycurús), which they did on several
occasions. Likewise, the Tupiniquim peoples in southern Brazil, allied quickly with the
Portuguese and mestiço residents of São Paulo to advance their own intra-indigenous
political interests.900 Together, Tupiniquim-Portuguese forces launched slave-raids and
assaults on their rivals, the Tupinambás, on the Carijós (a Guaraní sub-group in São
Vicente), and eventually on the Guaranís of Paraguay, as they moved farther west in the early
seventeenth century.901 For their part, the Tupinambás deftly exploited inter-European
rivalries by allying with the French in the War of the Tamoios to harass Portuguese
settlements along the southern coast.902 Although the Tupiniquim-Portuguese allies
eventually prevailed with the arrival of the new governor-general of Brazil, Mem de Sá, with
reinforcements in 1567, the conflict seriously threatened Portugal’s early foothold on the
southern Brazilian coast.
The frequency with which many Europeans integrated within native society provides
further evidence to Amerindians’ influence in defining local social and political realities,
especially in the early period of Iberian settlement. João Ramalho was a prime case in point.
Moraes, Bases da formação territorial do Brasil, 321.
John Monteiro, “Dos campos de Piratininga ao Morro da Saudade: A presença indígena na história de São
Paulo,” in História da cidade de São Paulo: A cidade colonial, 1554-1822, ed. Paula Porta (São Paulo: Editora Paz e
Terra, 2004), 26.
902 The French posed an early and significant threat to Portuguese colonies in Brazil. In 1548, for instance,
Luiz de Góes wrote to the king from the coastal town of Santos, warning him of the threat and requesting
assistance from Lisbon for the fortification of the coast. See IHGB, Arq. 1.3.10, 12 May 1548, Santos, CU, fols.
263r-264v. The king responded the following year by installing the first governor-general of Brazil, Tomé de
Sousa, to remain in the colony, with overarching power for its defense and administration.
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Although Portuguese by birth, Ramalho fully embraced many Tupiniquim social and cultural
conventions. Manuel da Nóbrega, a Jesuit leader in early colonial Brazil, scorned Ramalho
for this. In every aspect of his life, Nóbrega asserted, Ramalho “follows that of the Indians.
[…] He and his children have many women. […] His children go to war with the Indians
[…] and go about nude like the Indians themselves.”903 Ramalho was not the only
Portuguese to practice polygamy in early colonial Brazil, and the practice, notwithstanding
the denunciations it provoked from Jesuits and other religious, nonetheless served to
enhance an individual’s power and prestige among the local indigenous population. Wives
were symbols of power; having several not only served therefore to root an individual within
the local Amerindian community, but also, according to Tupi custom, to expanded one’s
political power through an extended network of kinship. Another early Jesuit, Pedro Correia,
wrote that, “recently a mameluca was asked who were the female Indians and slaves you
brought with you. She replied that they were the women of her husband, who she always
brought with her, and [she] looked upon them as an abbess with her nuns.”904
At the same time, however, despite the ubiquity of intermarriage and miscegenation
between Amerindians and Iberians, and despite the relations of alliance Spaniards and
Portuguese developed with particular Amerindian groups, as Iberian and mestiço influence
in the region slowly expanded, so too did the exploitation of Amerindian populations, both
by newly arrived settlers from Europe as well as by the early generations of mestiços.
Despite maintaining many of their indigenous customs and traditions, many mestiços
nonetheless identified as European and became increasingly alienated from the local
Amerindian population. In Paraguay, for instance, rapacious Spanish colonists [many of

903 “Do P. Manuel da Nóbrega ao P. Luís Gonçalves da Câmara, Lisboa,” 15 June 1553, São Vicente, in
Monumenta Brasiliae, vol. 1, 498.
904 “Do Ir. Pero Correia ao P. Simão Rodrigues, Lisboa,” 10 March 1553, in Monumenta Brasiliae, vol. 1, 438.
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them mestizos] openly flouted royal laws and decrees prohibiting Amerindian slavery. Ulrich
Schmidl, a German explorer who had come to Paraguay on Mendoza’s early expedition to
the Río de la Plata, reported that on one such expedition, the Spaniards captured “nearly
12,000 persons, […] men, women, and children, who must become our slaves.”905
As a result of the growing tendency of Spaniards and mestizos to regard the
Guaranís less as kin and more as servants and to treat them with disdain, Asunción
experienced its first indigenous uprising. In 1539, during the first governorship of Domingo
Martínez de Irala, the city’s Guaraní residents rose up violently against abuse they suffered at
the hands of local Spaniards.906 Asunción, the ostensible stronghold of Spanish power in
Paraguay, in fact remained under sustained existential threat throughout much of the
sixteenth century. Tensions re-erupted less than a decade later, in 1546.907 In that case, Irala
and the Spaniards of Asunción made a temporary pact with their long-time enemies, the
Guaycurús and Yaperus, to quell the second Guaraní uprising. But settler abuse persisted
and, as a result, in 1559-1560, a third, even more widespread Guaraní revolt exploded,
putting Spaniards on high alert across the entirety of the Province of Paraguay.908
Contemporary records indicate that even six years on the city of Asunción remained in a
state of “continuous war […] with the indios naturales of that locale [comarca]” and was forced
to plead to the viceroy for assistance in its rescue.909

Ulrich Schmídel, Derrotero y viaje a España y las Indias (Sante Fe: Instituto Social, Universidad Nacional del
Litoral, 1938 [Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2003]): 44, 138-39, 162-64, 176-77, 181, 206.
906 Susnik, “Contact, Servitude, and Resistance,” 24.
907 Susnik, “Contact, Servitude, and Resistance,” 26.
908 Rui Díaz de Guzmán, Historia argentina del descubrimiento, población y conquista del Río de la Plata, ed. Pedro de
Angelis, ch.8 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1835 [1612]).
909 “Pleitos de la Audiencia de la Plata: Probable 1606/1608,” AGI Escribanía, leg. 846C: [1606] “Juan Alonso
de Vera y Zárate, adelantado de las provincias del Rio de La Plata, y sus hijos, Francisco y Juan Alonso de Vera
y Zárate, con el fiscal sobre las conquistas del Rio de La Plata, Paraguay y Tucumán y ocho ciudades que
fundaron en dichas provincias el general Juan Ortiz de Zárate y Juan de Torres Vera; asimismo sobre el
cumplimiento de ciertas capitulaciones que Juan Ortiz de Zárate firmó con S. M. en 1571.”
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A similar dynamic unfolded in São Vicente. Despite the early collaboration and
integration between certain early settlers, like Ramalho, and Amerindian groups like the
Tupiniquim, there was also substantial opposition among neighboring Tupi groups to the
growth of São Paulo already by the early 1560s. In particular, the increasing Portuguese and
Tupiniquim-allied raids on several indigenous groups in search of slaves led to numerous
punitive attacks against the town threatening its very existence. In the early years, the
Portuguese were far from the hegemonic force in the region, but rather became yet another
among a variety of groups vying for hegemony and survival in the complex world of
sixteenth century São Vicente. The forces of Amerindian politics were fundamental in
shaping the fluid expansions and recessions of Iberian power in the region throughout the
sixteenth century.
The increase in Portuguese-Tupiniquim-allied raids from São Paulo on neighboring
Amerindian communities in search of slaves led to numerous punitive attacks of retribution
against the town threatening its very existence. The first occurred in July of 1562, when a
group of headmen from supposedly converted Amerindian communities coordinated a
large-scale raid on São Paulo that threatened the settlement with the same fate as that
suffered by Buenos Aires less than three decades prior. Tibiriçá and Ramalho were both
decisive in the defense of the town, and in the wake of the attack the residents completed its
fortification with walls and bastions encircling the town.910
Tensions hardly subsided after this early flare-up in violence, however. As São
Paulo’s population grew so too did its appetite for indigenous slaves to serve in the domestic
and agricultural labor force. Amerindian punitive assaults on the town continued throughout
the 1570s and 1580s. Tensions eventually came to a head in the early 1590s when an alliance
910
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of Guaianá and formerly-allied Tupiniquim groups initiated a systematic campaign of attacks
on São Paulo.911 In April of 1590 the town’s municipal council reported that, “each day come
news from Christian Indians, our friends, who say that Indians of the sertão [backlands] are
already marching toward us, and […] that their intent is to cut off the road to the sea so that
people” and reinforcements would not be able to reach the town from the coast.912
The early warnings were correct. Three months later, the council reported that “the
gentio of the sertão” had come “against us in war.” “All of the aldeias of the sertão of the
captaincy came together,” attacked a slaving expedition led by Antonio de Macedo and
Domingos Luis Grou and killed all of its members, including fifty “white” men and an
unmentioned number of “male and female slaves, Christians Indians,” and destroyed “many
fazendas of both whites and Indians, burning Churches and destroying the image of Our Lady
of the Rosary of Pinheiros.”913 The council members also sought to notify royal authorities
throughout Brazil, warning that such unrest could spread. Indicative of the Amerindians’
power, and the fear they instilled among Portuguese settlers, the councilors warned that such
attacks “could expand and spread,” as these “enemies,” who were “barbarous people and
experienced in war” had “gathered more people” and would no doubt “advance their
assaults.” “Once finished with this captaincy,” the councilors, noting the Amerindians’
capacity in playing Europeans against each other, warned that they “would go on to Rio de
Janeiro, offering peace and commerce to the captains and priests of the English.”914 Warning
of the “much damage that could result to this captaincy, which was at risk of depopulating,”
the council petitioned the procurador, Jerónimo Maciel, to authorize what they framed as a
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punitive war against the Amerindians for the crimes they committed “for which they deserve
grave punishment.”915
The following year, in February of 1591, the council members forwarded an
exasperated demand to the captain of São Vicente to come to their aid “against the Indians
who threatened the town.” And in the following entry, the council, appealing in vain to
colonial authorities, warned the captain and council officials and São Vicente and Santos that
“if your graces do not help us, God our Lord, His Majesty, and Lopo de Souza [the lord
proprietor and donatory-captain of São Vicente] will take notice.”916 In addition, in July of
that same year, the council members appealed yet again to Jerónimo Leitão to come to their
assistance in war, citing the latest attacks by Indians of Pirapintingui that “had killed, taken
some slaves, and waged pitched war against us.”917

Jesuits at the Vanguard of Spanish Expansion

Given the remoteness of the Río de la Plata from the main centers of colonial
authority in Brazil and Spanish America, local actors enjoyed wide autonomy in virtually
every aspect of colonial life and administration.918 At the same time, however, the fact that
the crown had such a limited direct presence in the region meant that, for the most part, the
responsibility of expansion and defense fell to missionaries and settlers themselves. Although
the Portuguese Jesuits of São Vicente played an important role in extending European
influence into hinterland west of São Paulo, local Luso-Brazilian colonists were far more
7 July 1590, ACSP, 1:403-405.
18 February 1591, ACSP, 1:417-418.
917 7 July 1591, ACSP, 1:423-424.
918 Despite the relative directness by which a ship could reach Buenos Aires from Seville, Spain’s impulse to
control trade and migration within its empire meant that goods and people could only reach the Río de la Plata
legally by way of a single official route from Seville to Panama, then on to Callao, and eventually by mule over
the Andes and down to Asunción to Buenos Aires.
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fundamental to that process. For the most part, the Portuguese Jesuits’ influence was
restricted to the main centers of Portuguese settlement and their immediate environs. In
Paraguay, however, the situation was the reverse. While Spanish and mestizo colonists did
make occasional forays into the hinterland to the east of Asunción, establishing a handful of
settlements there, the Jesuits emerged as the primary agents in extending Spanish influence
in the region.919
From the earliest days of royal government in Iberian America, the Spanish and
Portuguese monarchs made clear the priority of evangelization. The “principal reason that
moved me to order the settlement of Brazil,” claimed king João III in his instructions the
first governor-general of Brazil, “was so that the people of that land would be converted to
our holy Catholic faith.”920 In order to facilitate this process, the Iberian crowns encouraged
missionary orders to dispatch priests to America for the combined purpose of evangelizing
among the Amerindian population and attending to the spiritual needs of local setter
communities. But relations between Jesuits and settlers were by no means uniformly smooth.
The central issues of contention between the two groups in both the Spanish and
Portuguese realms were the settlers’ alleged lack of adherence to Christian norms and
customs and their maltreatment of Amerindians. In his first letter from Brazil in 1549, the
priest, Manuel da Nóbrega reported that, “the people here all live in mortal sin, and there is
not one man who desists from having many Indian women, all of whom have many
children.”921

919 Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 74. Also, for a report of a Jesuit attempt to find the route from the Río de la
Plata to Brazil in 1585-1587, see Anais do Museu Paulista (AMP) (São Paulo: Museu Paulista, 1922-): 1:2:139.
920 “Regimento de Tome de Sousa,” 17 December 1548, in HCJB, vol. 1, 347.
921 “Do P. Manuel da Nóbrega ao P. Simão Rodrigues, Lisboa,” 10? April 1549, Bahia, in Monumenta Brasiliae,
vol. 1, 110.
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Slavery and other slightly less exploitative forms of coerced labor, like encomienda,
were deeply ingrained in the early colonial societies and economies of Paraguay and São
Vicente. Certainly, slavery existed among the Amerindian population prior to European
arrival. As settlers arrived in greater numbers, however, and as the mining and plantation
industries took root, Amerindian slavery expanded on an unprecedented scale. As the
residents of São Paulo frequently attested in particular, Amerindian slavery had been integral
to their economy and way of life from the very beginning of that colony. The early Jesuits
noted this too, although in great lamentation. “Nearly all the men who inhabit the coastal
areas, particularly in this captaincy, possess slaves,” wrote Nóbrega in 1553.922 But, he noted,
because of the pitched resistance of local settler-slaveholders, “we can do nothing for them,
nor do we dare preach to them. This means that through lack of justice, they remain
captives, and their masters remain in mortal sin.”923 Nóbrega noted that he had brought the
issue to the governor-general, but asserted that the latter had refused to act because he
believed Amerindian slavery was “in the interest of the king and for the greater good of the
territory and its settlers.”924 Without the consistent support of local or central colonial civil
authorities the Jesuits of Brazil were largely hamstrung, and failed to achieve the level of
success and influence as their counterparts in Paraguay.
As in São Vicente, the violent tension that gripped Paraguay had arisen primarily as a
result of the harsh exploitation of Amerindian communities, particularly the Guaraní, by
Spanish and mestizo settlers. Unlike the governors of São Vicente, however, all of whom
largely supported Amerindian slavery, Paraguay’s series of governors had differing opinions
“Letter from Manuel da Nóbrega in São Vicente to the Inquisitor-General, Simão Rodrigues in Lisbon,” 10?
March 1553, in Early Brazil: A Documentary Collection to 1700, ed. Stuart B. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 142-147.
923 Ibid.
924 Ibid. In addition, Nóbrega noted that several of the governor’s advisers held indigenous slaves and that, as a
result, he was hesitant “because of the harm it could cause to many men [slaveholders], and that it is better for
them [the Indians] to remain slaves and work on estates.”
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on the issue.925 Some governors, like Irala, for instance, sided with local settlers, and
facilitated the expansion of encomienda under their respective regimes.926 While others, like
Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, Hernando Arias de Saavedra (Hernandarias), and Diego
Martín de Negrón, provoked the ire of local settlers for relatively tolerant views of
indigenous communities and efforts to protect them.927
In the remote region of Paraguay and the Río de la Plata, provincial governors and
local municipal officials, enjoyed wide autonomy from viceregal authority in Upper Peru. For
instance, although the Council of Indies in Seville had supreme power to appoint governors,
the municipal council of Asunción had the authority to appoint governors in interim periods
– after one died, had been deposed, or vacated office for other reasons – before his
replacement arrived or was confirmed by the crown.928 In this way, local elites, the majority
of whom were mestizo encomenderos, held dominant sway over political life in Asunción.
Given the relatively low priority of Paraguay as compared to the many other, more
economically and strategically valuable possessions in the Americas, the settlers of Asunción
operated with relatively little oversight from higher crown authorities.929 One result of this
limited oversight was that Amerindian slavery and encomienda persisted in the region despite
the repeated royal prohibitions of both.930
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In direct response to the exploitation of Paraguayan settlers, the Jesuits began
increasing their sphere of influence with the combined goal of spreading the gospel and
protecting the Guaranís from encomenderos and hostile Amerindians like the Guaycurús and
Payaguás. The first such Jesuit evangelization around the immediate environs of Asunción
came in 1575.931 Roughly two decades later, in the mid 1590s, Jesuit evangelization in the
region expanded further thanks to the support of the newly appointed governor,
Hernandarias.932 The support Hernandarias lent the Jesuits, in accordance with the directives
he received from the king himself, was crucial since the local Paraguayan colonists had so
strongly opposed their efforts, jealous as they were of the Jesuits’ wealth, access to
indigenous labor, and the exemptions they and their Amerindian charges enjoyed from local
taxes and encomienda.933
Keen to curb the rapid decline of Paraguay’s indigenous population, a combined
result of disease and the harsh treatment at the hands of rapacious encomenderos, in 1609 the
crown formally and systematically began facilitating Jesuit evangelization.934 Philip III himself
advocated for the “sword of the word” as the best means of subjugating indigenous
Paraguayans, rather than military conquest.935 Philip enjoined Hernandarias not only to
promote Jesuit evangelization as means of subjecting the Guaraní to Spanish colonial rule,
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but also to ensure that no new encomiendas were to be awarded throughout the entirety of
Paraguay.936 The following year, the newly arrived governor, Negrón, echoed the king’s
sentiments, arguing for Jesuit evangelization as the most effective, not to mention humane,
way of bringing Indians “to the service of his Majesty,” describing the Jesuits as “perfect
soldiers for this war.”937 Even if the Amerindians in Jesuit missions enjoyed exemptions
from certain taxes and labor obligations, their gathering by the Jesuits into reducciones served
both the Spanish and Portuguese crowns’ interests in instructing those Amerindians in
Iberian social, cultural, and political norms, and, eventually, in substantiating each crown’s
claim to dominium in that territory thanks to its effective occupation by Jesuit proxy in the
name of the crown.938
In establishing the Jesuit province of Guairá in 1609, the crown, through its local
representatives in Asunción, explicitly forbade Paraguayan colonists from venturing there
without royal permission.939 That year, the captain Antonio de Añasco wrote to his fellow
captain, Pedro García, relaying the orders to prevent malocas (entradas) from entering the areas
of Parapane and Atibajiba [in Guairá] and to prohibit their access to any of the rivers that go
through them.940 The prohibition was aimed precisely at preventing the slave-raiding settlers
from disturbing the work of the Jesuits in their evangelization of the region’s indigenous
Guaraní. According to one priest in the region, “the Indians loved the law of God, but not
the Spaniards.”941 Among the most important aspects facilitating the large scale conversion
and retention of Amerindians within Jesuit reducciones were the many parallels and
continuities between Guaraní and Jesuit forms of social organization. Such parallels could
Caraman, The Lost Paradise, 34.
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938 Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 74.
939 AMP, 1:2:147.
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be seen in the Jesuits’ commitment to communal living, in the lack of private property, and
in the systems of collective, ceremonial labor that was common both to Jesuit and precontact Amerindian settlements.942 Equally important was the fact that, even after their
integration within a given reducción, the Guaraní maintained their traditional internal
organization of governance through a cacique, or headman.943
After the crown’s formal recognition of the Jesuit province of Guairá in 1609, Jesuit
missions expanded dramatically across much of the hinterland region east of Asunción, in
the direction of Portuguese São Vicente. The first such settlements in the region were
established by two Italian priests, Simón Maceta and José Cataldino. Beyond these Italians
and some Spaniards, Flemish priests were also important to the development of Guairá’s
missions.944 In the province of Guairá, Amerindians were gathered into the Jesuit-run
reducciones but came under the direct jurisdiction of the crown, rather than any encomendero or
civil authority in the missions’ vicinity. A royal decree of 1631 affirmed this status, further
alienating colonists and reinforcing Jesuit autonomy from provincial authorities in
Asunción.945 The 1620s saw the most frenzied, and successful, Jesuit activity, with the
establishment of some thirty new reductions in the region in that decade alone.946 If the
combined total number of Amerindians in Jesuit missions stood at some 30,000-40,000 in
the late 1620s, by the late 1640s that number had reached as many as 100,000 by one
estimate, this despite the numerous devastating attacks from the colonists of São Paulo that
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had massacred, enslaved, or put to flight many thousands of Amerindians, particularly in the
late 1620s and early 1630s.947
Even from an early date, however, Jesuit expansion provoked intense repudiation
from settler communities in both Paraguay and São Vicente. Settlers slandered one of
Guairá’s leading priests, Torres, as a “turbulent and restless spirit.”948 Tensions arose to such
an extent that, in the 1610s, on the heels of the crown’s formal endorsement of the Jesuit
evangelization, angry colonists in Asunción forced the priests to temporarily abandon the
town’s college, forcing them to take refuge in the hinterland of Guairá, at a safe distance
from the colonists’ reach.949 The Spanish settlers of Asunción, wrote Torres, “despise us
because we reprimand their abominable greed and defend the liberty of the Indians.”950 Yet
despite the fierce challenge posed by the settlers of Asunción, however, by the late 1620s,
the province of Guairá represented the densest mission territory in all of America.951

“Corsairs of the Sertão”: Paulista entradas and the Expansion of Brazil

Originally founded as a Jesuit outpost for the conversion of local Amerindians, it is
no small irony that São Paulo soon became a hotbed of anti-Jesuit sentiment and colonial
Brazil’s major center of indigenous slavery.952 The Amerindian uprisings of the 1580s and
1590s, threatening as they were to the still-fledgling settlement of São Paulo, ultimately
provoked a series of efforts on the part of its residents to increase their own security and
947 For these various estimates, see Moraes, Bases da formação territorial do Brasil, 353-354; see also Caraman, The
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952 Noting the secure location of the Jesuit College of São Paulo of Piratininga, atop a hill, in 1560 the
governor-general of Brazil, Mem de Sá, ordered the relocation of the inhabitants of Santo André da Borda do
Campo (Ramalho’s village) to the Jesuits’ site at São Paulo.
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pivot from a defensive to an offensive posture as they steadily extended control over the
surrounding lands and peoples.953 One early strategy, begun in earnest in 1592, whilst the
town was still described as “at war,” was to apportion land grants to settlers increasingly
deep into the hinterland to expand the town’s jurisdiction and extend its defense.954 In
addition, the residents of São Paulo began organizing armed expeditions, which, although
framed as defensive to provide legal cover, were, in reality, aimed at enslaving Amerindians
and impressing Paulista power throughout the western interior.955 By second quarter the
seventeenth century, the mestiço residents of São Paulo had emerged as the primary force
on the interior plateau.956
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Despite its isolation and early vulnerability to Indian attack, the town began
attracting large numbers of settlers, especially after the turn of the seventeenth century.
Located as it was in a donatory-captaincy, with all of the jurisdictional privileges that
entailed, one of São Paulo’s primary draws was its exemption from most royal taxation.957 As
a result, a multinational range of settlers began flocking to the town, despite official
prohibitions, including in particular Castilians and Flemings, as well as at least some
Frenchmen and Englishmen.958 The lack of censuses, plus the fact that the names of many
immigrants were Lusophonized in contemporary municipal documents, makes it impossible
to ascertain with precision the number of foreigners resident in the town at any given time.
Nevertheless, the litany of references to foreigners in the contemporary documentary record
suggests that their presence was indeed substantial.959
While the captaincy’s coastal settlements languished, São Paulo flourished as its
center of growth, largely on the backs of Amerindian slaves. By the turn of the seventeenth
century, the coastal towns of São Vicente and Santos had only 80 residents each, while

Theodoro and Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade,” 102. For a 1636 text, which asserted that settlers
preferred São Paulo to other Portuguese settlements in Brazil since there they could avoid paying taxes, see the
Informação, by Manuel Juan de Morales. Morales argued in particular that, for the most part, the independentminded Paulistas chose indigenous slaving over mining since that way they would not have to pay the quinto tax
to the crown.
958 For a partial list of the names of some Castilians and Flemings; see, Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dos Felipes,
188. One Castilian had apparently even risen to become an alcalde in São Paulo. Subsequently, in order to
ensure block foreigners from positions of power in the local community, in 1638 the municipal council called
for adherence to “the laws of his majesty which mandated that no person that was not a natural of the kingdom
of Portugal become an official of justice,” 5 June 1638, ACSP, 4:391.
959 Many of these references, in particular those from Spaniards, came in the form of insults, noting the
infidelity of the residents given alleged presence of many Jews or crypto-Jews, and Protestants from northwest
Europe. Municipal authorities did not always look so kindly on the presence of outsiders, however. In 1635, the
council record stated that, “in this town there were many foreign loafers [vadios forasteiros] who prejudiced this
town and its people,” and noted demanded that if within four days these individuals had not opened a shop
and made themselves productive, they would be expelled and fined 6,000 reis, see, 20 October 1635, ACSP,
4:267. The council likewise made clear that foreigners were prohibited from holding local office. The position
of almotacel, to name but one example, was reserved for the founding “brothers, fathers, and grandfathers of the
republic, and lacking them it can be those who are married to the daughters and granddaughters of them so
long as they are not of the Moorish race, or Jewish, and infamous in any other way,” see, 24 September 1633,
ACSP, 4:180-182. The almotacel was the official responsible for regulating weights, measures, and the price and
distribution of foodstuffs.
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Itanhaém had less than 50.960 The population of São Paulo, on the other hand, grew from
around 170 in 1589 to 534 in 1610, an increase of over three hundred percent in just two
decades.961 According to another estimate, by 1640 the number had grown to around 1500,
meaning that in a half century São Paulo’s population had grown by nearly ten times.962
As São Paulo’s population grew, so too did its number of factions and the
complexity of its internal politics. As a result, the king and his central colonial officials took a
series of incremental steps to enhance royal authority in the town, which saw varying degrees
of success. In 1585, the secretary of the town’s municipal council noted that there existed no
formal compilation of local laws and ordinances, “except for one old book,” whose pages
were “unbound and missing.”963 This loose bundle of documents represented the basis on
which the town’s judges and magistrates were expected to rule, and it was not until that year,
over three decades since the town’s foundation, that the full collection of ordinances was
read aloud in their entirety before the municipal council in order to apprise its members of
their contents.964
In an attempt to enhance the force of royal law and decree in São Paulo, in 1609 the
king dispatched the former governor-general of Brazil, Francisco de Souza, to the town as
“superintendent of the mines” and “governor” of the newly created, “Repartição do Sul,” an
administrative unit largely independent of viceregal authority in Bahia, and comprised of the
southern captaincies of Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, and São Vicente.965 Keen to the
realities of local politics, Souza understood well the resistance of certain factions within São

Theodoro and Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade,” 98.
Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dos Felipes, 168-169.
962 Theodoro and Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade,” 98.
963 14 September 1585, ACSP, 1:282-283.
964 14 September 1585, ACSP, 1:282-283.
965 For a description of the powers the king invested in Souza during his tenure as governor-general, see, “Carta
da governança,” IHGB, Arq. 1.2.15.
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Paulo to the encroachment of royal power on local authority and jurisdiction, and showed an
impressive capacity for negotiation, alliance building, and adaptation.
Despite strong local protest, Souza was firm in maintaining crown-appointed juizes
dos indios in Amerindian aldeiamentos.966 In addition, he facilitated the official establishment of
new towns beyond São Paulo, including São Felipe, Mogi das Cruzes, and Parnaíba.967 While
serving to accommodate the growing numbers of settlers to the region and expand
Portuguese occupation of the interior plateau, the scheme also had the effect of diffusing
Paulista power since each new town enjoyed its own territorial jurisdiction, independent
from that of São Paulo.968 The granting of lands, of Amerindian labor, of knighthood and
other prestigious titles, and the various fiscal, administrative, political positions he created
helped Souza govern effectively, cultivated loyalty, and minimized opposition by integrating
local interests with those of the forasteiros [ie. “outsiders” or “foreigners,” several of whom
were Castilian or Flemish] that had arrived in his retinue.
Throughout the first five decades of São Paulo’s early colonial history, the formal
royal institutional presence in the town was limited to a small handful of crown-appointed
officials, including representatives of the king’s treasury and administrators of the estates of
missing and deceased persons. In addition, the king or his governor-general in Bahia also
appointed a captain and superintendent of the mines, although (with the exception of Souza)
this official tended to be itinerant and only resided in São Paulo on a temporary basis.
Beyond these officials, the rest of the local political administration was comprised of the
966 For an example of an appeal from São Paulo’s municipal council to transfer the administration of
Amerindians from crown-appointed juizes dos indios to locally-elected juizes ordinarios, see, 16 January 1600,
ACSP, 2:70.
967 Parnaíba (today referred to as Santana de Parnaíba) was on the site where the mixed-race granddaughter of
Tibiriçá, Susanna Dias had founded an estate several decades prior, in 1580, together with her son, the captain
André Fernandes; Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dos Felipes, 172. See also, Alida Metcalf, Family and Frontier in
Colonial Brazil: Santana de Parnaíba, 1580-1822 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992).
968 For a protest from the municipal council of Sao Paulo that Parnaíba had usurped its territorial jurisdiction,
see, 18 August 1640, ACSP, 5:51-54.
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juizes ordinarios and members of the municipal council, all of which were locally elected.
Arriving in the midst of a heavy influx of settlers to São Paulo, Souza oversaw a major
expansion of the local administrative bureaucracy to accommodate the town’s growing
population and better channel its wealth toward the royal treasury. In his capacity as the
highest crown representative in São Paulo, Souza creating a number of new offices –
mamposteiro de cativos, avaliador, partidor, medidor, avaliador da fazenda, juiz dos orfãos, repartidor de
terras, procurador e escrivão do campo, capitão da gente de cavalo, escrivão da ouvidoria, alferes etc. – which
helped deepen the connection between the local settler community and Portugal’s colonial
administration in Bahia and Lisbon.969 Moreover, the creation of these positions helped
augment Souza’s own power in the town since most of the holders of these offices owed
him personally for their appointment.
At the same time, however, despite Souza’s successes in introducing a degree of royal
authority in São Paulo, the town, like many others throughout the Iberian world, maintained
certain autonomous tendencies. In the face of stiff pressure, he acquiesced to a series of
demands from the municipal council.970 First, he agreed to relieve local residents of the
obligation to go all the way to Santos to register all “Indians of service” [a euphemism for
slaves], newly acquired or “descended” from the sertão. Also, recognizing the validity of their
arguments in citing the foral (a legal provision or jurisdictional protection) awarded to their
lord proprietor, he assented that they be exempt from paying the ten percent royal dízimo tax
on fish.971 In another example, when Souza (while still governor-general) nominated one
Diogo Arias de Aguirre to be the new captain of São Vicente, local authorities resisted,
arguing yet again that the appointment violated the jurisdictional rights of their lord
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971 Ibid.
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proprietor who, according to the original donation, maintained the exclusive right to appoint
all new captains.972 In this instance, Souza ultimately backed down and acquiesced to the
proprietor’s own preferred appointee, Roque Barreto.
With time, as Souza’s ties to the local community took root, his own interests
increasingly converged with those of the Paulistas themselves. In his capacity as
“superintendent of the mines,” he organized a series of expeditions to the sertão, which, while
purportedly aimed at securing precious metals, in reality had the joint goal of procuring
Amerindian captives.973 In fact, it was at Souza’s encouragement that Pedro Vaz de Barros
led an expedition into the Spanish-claimed territory of Guairá.974 That expedition,
undertaken in 1611, captured some five hundred Guaranís who were marched back in chains
to enslavement in Brazil.975 Further evidence of this convergence of interests is Souza’s
collusion with several of São Paulo’s most notorious slavers. In tightening his relationship
with São Vicente’s new captain, Roque Barreto, Souza also sponsored an entrada led by
Barreto’s brother, Nicolau. In addition, in 1601, Souza made Sebastião de Freitas “a knight
of the regiment of His Majesty,” for his service in the “discovery of silver,” in “warring
against enemy gentios,” and for various other entradas, which “he himself conducted with his
slaves,” and which were deemed as being “for the good of the captaincy.”976 That same year,
Souza also approved a request for knighthood from one António Raposo – not the same
person as António Raposo Tavares, who arrived in São Paulo in the 1620s and went on to
Ibid. 192-193.
On the efforts to locate and exploit precious metals, see Miriam Ellis, “Pesquisas sobre a existência do ouro
e da prata no planalto paulista nos séculos XVI e XVII,” Revista de História, USP, São Paulo 1, no. 1 (1950): 5171; and Francisco de Assis Carvalho Franco, História das minas de São Paulo: Administradores gerais e provedores,
séculos XVI e XVII (São Paulo: Conselho Estadual de Cultura de São Paulo, 1964); Lucy Maffei and Arlinda
Rocha Nogueira, “O ouro na capitania de São Vicente nos séculos XVI e XVII,” Anais do Museu Paulista, 20
(1966): 7-135.
974 Monteiro, Negros da terra, 60-61. See also, Francisco de Assis Carvalho Franco, “Dom Francisco de Souza e o
início do impulso bandeirante,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de São Paulo 29 (1932): 247-258.
975 Monteiro, Negros da terra, 60-61.
976 16 March 1601, RGCCSP, 1:104-106.
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become one of the fiercest and most infamous entrada leaders in São Paulo’s history. Souza
praised Raposo’s service to the crown in “the discovery of mines of gold, silver, and other
metals,” and for having gone to “the mountains of Birassoyaba and Cahativa and Betiruna in
person and with his slaves and later to the gold mines of Jaraguá.”977 Although certainly
somewhat exceptional, Souza’s tenure nonetheless serves to demonstrate that local interests
in São Paulo were not categorically or unequivocally opposed to those of the crown and its
direct colonial representatives. Instead, it reflects the negotiation and fluidity that
characterized the relationship between local and central imperial government, while at the
same time serving to highlight jurisdictional exclusivities and ambiguities.
Even before Souza’s arrival to the captaincy, already by the mid-1580s, Paulista
slaving had become so widespread that, on several occasions, the town was left virtually
empty as all the able-bodied men were away in the sertão.978 The emptying of the town, albeit
temporary, posed a serious challenge for defense.979 Fearing attacks from Amerindian groups
by land and competing Europeans from the coast, São Paulo’s municipal council issued
repeated ordinances forbidding anyone from entering the sertão without the council’s express
permission. Crucially, these ordinances represented less a desire to obstruct the enslavement
of Amerindians for the immorality or illegality of that practice, than an attempt to ensure the
presence of a sufficient quantity of men on hand to ensure the town’s defense.
The first major expedition beyond the immediate environs of São Paulo was directly
west to the Paranapanema Valley in 1581. The next four decades saw the steady increase of
18 June 1601, RGCCSP, 1:117-119.
In June 1586, to take just one example, the municipal council met to address the issue of the captaincy’s
languishing bridges over its various streams and rivers, which were in much need of repair for the good of “the
republic.” But, the council members lamented, “all the people are absent from the captaincy with the captain
Jerónimo Leitão who had gone to war [in the sertão], and that no one stayed except women.” For that reason,
they concluded, they could not fix the bridges. See, 14 June 1586, ACSP, 1:297.
979 In February of 1632, the procurador of the municipal council, reported that, “the residents of this town have
gone to the sertão, leaving it helpless,” and demanded that the council officials penalize those who go to the
sertão; see, 28 February 1632, ACSP, 4:115.
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Paulista entradas. In 1592, Raposo led an early entrada against the Amerindian communities
of Barueri, on the western outskirts of São Paulo.980 Six years later, Affonso Sardinha
reportedly went to some unnamed part of “the sertão, taking in his company more than a
hundred Christian Indians, with the [combined] intent of making war and assaults,” on
Amerindians and “seizing gold and other metals.”981 Two groups from Paranapanema (the
Tememinó and Tupinaé) became the primary victims of Paulista raiding, particularly in the
first decade of the seventeenth century.982 But it was the Carijós who constituted the majority
of captives in the early seventeenth century, at least until the beginning of large-scale
invasions of the Guaraní reducciones in Guairá in the late 1620s.983
A forty to sixty day march to the west, Guairá, and its Jesuit reducciones in particular,
soon arose as the primary target of Paulista entradas.984 In 1611, Pedro Vaz de Barros led
what was perhaps the first expedition from São Paulo to Guairá, capturing some five
hundred Guaranís and marching them back in chains for enslavement in Brazil.985 The
following year, the municipal council of Ciudad Real reported to the governor in Buenos
Aires, Diego Marín Negrón, that the Paulistas had entered Guairá again, this time taking
away some three thousand indigenous captives.986
As the seventeenth century progressed, the conflict that played out in this remote
hinterland region ultimately took on imperial significance and reverberated all the way from
São Paulo and Asunción to Lima, Bahia, Madrid, Lisbon, and Rome. As early as 1614, the
high court of Charcas in Upper Peru, which had jurisdiction over Guairá, wrote to the king
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to report the Paulistas’ entradas into Paraguay.987 That same year, and again in 1616,
Hernandarias, the governor of the Río de la Plata, likewise wrote to the king, informing him
of the entradas, and urged him to order the depopulation of São Paulo to put an end to the
Paulistas’ abuses.988 More than simply conducting raids into territory claimed by Spain,
several years later, Juan de Lizarazu, a royal official in La Plata, reported that in the wake of
one such attack, four hundred residents from “the river of São Paulo in Brazil” had actually
settled there, in Itatim, just thirty leagues from the Spanish American city of San Lorenzo la
Vieja.989 The implication was that, in certain cases, Paulista entradas served not simply to
destroy Spanish missions, but also, by the 1620s, to extend Portuguese dominium at the
expense of that of Spain through the effective occupation of the region by Luso-Brazilian
settlers.
In response, the Jesuit priest, Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, appealed to the king to take
action to prevent further Paulista raids on the reducciones of Guairá.990 Importantly, Montoya
noted that the Amerindian captives taken by the “vezinos of São Paulo” were trafficked not
only in Brazil, but also in other Spanish jurisdictions, including in Buenos Aires, and that a
busy, illicit commercial route had been opened, stretching “from São Paulo to the outskirts
and environs of Potosí, where they have already taken Indian captives.”991 Montoya appealed
to higher authorities in Europe to enforce the royal law proclaimed in Lisbon in September
of that year, and the bulls of popes Paul III and Clemente VIII, that no Amerindian could be
enslaved. He likewise implored the appropriate civil and religious authorities in the
Americas, like bishops, commissaries, and governors, to impose the various punishments
AMP, 2:2:5-8. Beyond reporting the Paulista entradas, the high court also noted that Spanish American
settlers, like their Luso-Brazilian counterparts in São Paulo, wanted to make war on hostile Indians in the
environs of Asunción.
988 AMP, 2:2:8-9; and Quarleri, Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata, 81-82.
989 Pastells, ed. Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay, vol. 2, 8.
990 IHGB, DL219, 10, doc. 9.
991 IHGB, DL219, 10, doc. 9, fols. 3-5.
987

329
according to the law, including, most seriously, excommunication and prosecution by the
Inquisition.992 In terms of more specific measures, Montoya suggested the creation of a
bishopric in the region, with the status of papal nuncio [ambassador].993 Aware of the fact
that Philip was sovereign of both Portugal and Castile, Montoya likewise suggested that the
king delegate expanded jurisdiction to the governor of Rio de Janeiro over the towns of São
Paulo and São Vicente in order to expedite the political and judicial process so that he no
longer have to refer such cases to the central colonial authorities in Bahia.994
Montoya’s early protests failed to elicit the results he desired, however. Beyond
repeated royal and papal decrees outlawing indigenous slavery, and the São Paulo municipal
council’s own persistent prohibitions of individuals entering the sertão, Paulista raids grew
apace in the period, reaching crescendo in particular from 1628 to 1632 and again from 1635
to 1637, when indigenous slavery and slave-raiding in the region reached its apex.995 In that
first conjuncture, from 1628 to 1632, Paulista expeditions destroyed thirteen of Guairá’s
fifteen Jesuit reducciones and forced the other two to relocate.996
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Figure 16
Provincia de Guayrá convertida por los Jesuítas; y destruida por los Mamalucos
Portugueses997
Testifying in 1631, one Jesuit, Simón Maceta, who had been present in Guairá at the time of
the attack, condemned the Paulistas as “corsairs of the sertão” [corsarios del serton].998 Maceta
alleged that the total number of Indians in their missions had decreased by some “200,000
souls in the last three years,” some of whom were “robbed and killed by the Portuguese of
São Pablo,” and others whom, “fleeing their furor, […] died of hunger in the mountains.”999
The historian Luiz Filipe de Alencastro has suggested that between 1627 and 1640 the
number of indigenous Brazilians enslaved equaled the total number of enslaved Africans
997 Anon., “Provincia de Guayrá convertida por los Jesuítas; y destruida por los Mamalucos Portugueses,” in
Cartografía Jesuítica del Río de la Plata, ed. P. Guillermo Fúrlong Cárdiff, S. J. (Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa
Jacobo Peuser, Ltda., 1936).
998 Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE), Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta, fol. 5r.
999 BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta, fol. 5r.
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introduced to both Portuguese and Dutch Brazil throughout the same period. According to
Alencastro, the Paulistas captured total of 100,000 Amerindians from the interior regions of
Guairá, Tape, and Itatim, 7,143 per year on average, constituting “one of the most rapacious
enslavement operations in modern history.”1000
The issue of entradas was a complex one for the residents of São Paulo. On the one
hand, the municipal council formally endorsed royal and papal prohibitions on entering the
sertão and, in September 1627, even called for the arrest of António Raposo Tavares and
Paulo Amaral, calling them “mutineers” [amotinadores] for organizing such expeditions.1001 At
the same time, however, the Paulistas, including several members of the municipal council,
were alarmed by the rise of Spanish encroachments onto what they claimed was Portuguese
territory. Less than two months later, the council alerted the governor and captain-major of
São Vicente that the Spaniards and mestizo residents “of Villa Rica and other settlements are
entering into the lands of the crown of Portugal, each time taking possession of more and
more of them.” 1002 Beyond that, the council noted, the Paraguayan settlers were engaging in
essentially the same activity as the Paulistas in their expeditions, “taking away all of the gentio
of that land for their repartimientos and service.” The Paulistas saw these incursions as
resulting “in great harm to this captaincy,” not simply because of the immorality and
illegality of Amerindian slavery, but, more likely, because they further exacerbated São
Paulo’s already depleting pool of indigenous labor.1003 In this sense, even if certain factions
within São Paulo opposed Paulista entradas, the entradas nonetheless served to extend
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1001 25 September 1627, ACSP, 3:281.
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Portuguese power, at the expense of that of the Spanish, throughout the greater Río de la
Plata region.1004

Royal Law, Local Custom, and the Jurisdictional Politics of Amerindian Slavery

Despite their administrative separation and a handful of isolated acts of internal
dissension within Jesuit ranks, the conflict over Amerindian slavery in the region contributed
to a general unification of Jesuit strategy and solidarity across the Iberian imperial divide
aimed at restricting colonists’ access to Amerindian labor and eliminating Amerindian slavery
altogether. The Society of Jesus was, of course, a supranational entity, which, while beholden
to the dictates of the Iberian crowns through the patronato/padroado real, nonetheless
maintained a distinct sacred allegiance to the pope, and ultimately to God. At the same time,
the larger Jesuit effort to curb colonists’ control over Amerindians also meant that, despite
the mutual animus that persisted between many Paraguayan and Paulista colonists and
officials, the Jesuits emerged as the primary targets of their collective ire and aggression. In
this sense, the conflict was not simply a dispute between “Spaniards” on one side and
“Portuguese” on the other.
In addition to the tension that gripped Paraguay and Guairá, the conflict also played
out on a local level within São Paulo itself. In 1632 and 1633, a group of restive settlers
pressured the municipal council to expel the Jesuits from the aldeiamento of Marueri
[Barueri].1005 The settlers argued that the lands belonged to them, and that, led by a handful

1004 For evidence of this factionalism, see the copy of a protest lodged by the ouvidor, Amador Bueno, in which
he decried the elections the municipal council conducted in his absence and the permissions it granted to
conduct entradas into the sertão, and commanded that “the said officials […] be dispossessed of their duties to
give order to the laws and orders of his majesty,” see 3 March 1629, ACSP, 4:18.
1005 22 May 1632, ACSP, 4:121-122.
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“Castilian forasteiro clerics,” the Jesuits had “usurped” the “law of his majesty” and his “royal
jurisdiction.”1006 Insisting on their obedience as loyal subjects to the crown, the council
presented a petition for the Jesuits to vacate the aldeiamento, “with a long list of names in
support of this stance,” proclaiming themselves the true “protectors” and “defenders of the
law and jurisdiction of his majesty.”1007 When the Jesuits refused to leave, the settlers
ultimately forced them out, took possession of Barueri, and established it as a “royal aldeia”
[aldeia d’El Rei] under the direct authority of the crown, not the Jesuits, and administered
locally by locally-elected juizes ordinarios.1008
Tensions also erupted within Paraguay between local civil officials and the secular
clergy on the one hand, and the Jesuits of that province on the other. For instance, in 1631,
the priest Simón Maceta condemned the crown-appointed governor of Paraguay, Luis de
Céspedes y Xería, alleging that he had supported the Paulistas, and that on his return from
Spain via Brazil, he had accompanied the caravan that ravaged Guairá before continuing on
to Asunción.1009 Mazeta further accused Céspedes y Xería, who had close familial and
commercial ties in Brazil, of slave trading himself, and of colluding directly with the Paulistas
in sending “to São Paulo many Indians from [Guairá].”1010
Reflecting back on the events of 1632 and 1633, the Jesuit, Nicolás del Techo,
writing several years later, criticized Céspedes y Xería for inhibiting the Jesuit evangelization
efforts by usurping their authority in the mission provinces, by unjustly imprisoning a
20 August 1633, ACSP, 4; and 21 August 1633, ACSP, 4:174.
21 August 1633, ACSP, 4:174.
1008 Monteiro, Negros da terra, 144; Georg Thomas seems to suggest here that the Jesuits were not expelled from
Barueri until 1640, see, Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil.
1009 BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta fol. 5r. Céspedes y Xería’s lack of
action in opposition to Paulista incursions raised widespread suspicions among Spanish Americans regarding
his potential complicity with the Paulistas, especially given his various interests in Brazil and the large amount
he spent there. Spanish colonial authorities tried and ultimately convicted him on these charges in 1633, and
again in 1635.
1010 BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta fol. 5v. In 1628, Céspedes y Xería had
married Victoria de Sá, the Portuguese niece of the governor of Rio de Janeiro.
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prominent cacique, and even by authorizing the enslavement of the “New Christian”
Amerindians of Paraná, which, Techo noted, went against both royal and papal decree.1011
Highlighting the persistence of conflict between the secular and regular clergy, Techo
likewise accused the bishop, Cristóbal de Aresti, of the order of São Bento, of colluding with
the governor and of falsely accusing them of not paying their taxes in an attempt to strip the
Jesuits of their missions and place them under the direct administration of secular priests.1012
While jurisdictional disputes within Paraguay and São Paulo were fundamental in
sharpening tensions at the local level, the primary focus of conflict remained the vast
hinterland region of Guairá, Tape, and Itatim, in the contested borderlands between the
Spanish- and Portuguese-claimed territories of imperial sovereignty in South America.1013
The unprecedented scale and devastation of Paulista raids on Guaraní missions in those
territories in the 1620s and 1630s provoked a multi-pronged reaction from the Jesuits, which
took the form of a vigorous campaign of legal and political protest, and eventually of armed
resistance.

1011 Projeto Resgate, Colonia do Sacramento e Rio da Prata, Cx.1, doc.3; and Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino
(AHU), ACL, CU, 071, caixa 1, doc. 3.
1012 Techo noted, however, that the Jesuit superior, Pablo Romero, intervened, “showing [the governor] the
papal bulls and royal decrees in favor of the Company [of Jesus]”, and eventually succeeded in persuading the
governor to maintain the reducciones under Jesuit administration, see, AHU, ACL, CU, 071, caixa 1, doc. 3.
1013 Carlos Ernesto Romero Jensen, El Guairá, caída y êxodo (Asunción: Academia Paraguaya de
História/FONDEC, 2009), 199; Enrique de Gandía, Las misiones jesuíticas y los bandeirantes paulistas (Bernabé:
Editorial “La Facultad”, 1936); Regina Maria Gadelha, As missões jesuíticas do Itatim: Estruturas sócio-econômicas do
Paraguai Colonial, séculos XVI e XVII (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980); Bartolomeu Melià, El Guarani
conquistado y reducido (Asunción: Litocolor, 1986).
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Figure 17
Provincia del Itatin convertida a la fé por los Jesuítas, y destruida por los Mamalucos1014
Seeking redress and relief from the king, the Jesuit Francisco Crespo sent a missive to the
Council of Indies in 1628 reporting that “many of the Portuguese from the town of São
Paulo, […] against all Christian piety, go each year to capture Indians and take them to sell in
Brazil as if they were slaves.”1015 Accenting the Paulistas’ barbarism and brutality, the report
went to claim that, “they do this with such cruelty that those [Amerindians] that cannot walk
are killed and fed to the dogs.”1016 Alarmed at the devastation of this latest round of Paulista
incursions, the council recommended that the king “order that they [ie. the Paulistas] cease

1014 Anon., “Provincia del Itatin convertida a la fé por los Jesuítas, y destruida por los Mamalucos,” in
Cartografía Jesuítica del Río de la Plata, ed. P. Guillermo Fúrlong Cárdiff, S. J. (Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa
Jacobo Peuser, Ltda., 1936).
1015 AMP, 1:2:179-180, Madrid, 31 August 1628
1016 AMP, 1:2:179-180, Madrid, 31 August 1628
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and punish them accordingly.” The king, in turn, agreed and instructed his governor of the
Río de la Plata, Francisco de Céspedes, to “rigorously punish the Portuguese that from São
Paulo and Brazil went to capture Indians from the reducciones that the religious of the
Company of Jesus had in Paraguay.”1017
Another priest, Luis de Ernote noted in 1631 that a number of local colonists from
Guairá had aggravated the situation by harboring some Paulistas and had failed to defend the
lands for the crown of Castile.1018 Unconcerned with the “service of the two Majesties [ie.
God and king], but rather with theft, like the Portuguese,” Ernote alleged that on two or
three occasions these colonists had captured “many Indians that had escaped the fury the
Portuguese,” and had left “the Portuguese as Lords of the land,” thereby enabling them to
continue, “thieving according to their taste and will.”1019
The priest, Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, traveled to Madrid personally to deliver an
appeal to the king in which he echoed all of these reports of Paulista barbarity, noting that
their entradas violated “royal decrees and orders, […] leaving three provinces of Indians
[Guairá, Tape, and Itatin] and three cities of Spaniards, which were Jerez, Ciudad Real, and
Villa Rica, completely desolate, debasing them hostilely, even taking away some of the
Spaniards, [including] a Priest.”1020 Attempting to spur the king into action, Montoya stressed
the larger global geopolitical risk that the Paulista entradas posed vis-à-vis European
competitors and hostile Amerindian groups. “In communication with the heretics from
Holland,” Montoya warned, likely in exaggeration, the Paulistas “open the route toward the
provinces of Peru,” a development he considered of “manifest danger, even more so since
AMP, 1:2:180-182, Madrid, 12 September 1628; also in Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil
(1982), 235-236.
1018 BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta fol. 6r-6v.
1019 BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta fol. 6r-6v.
1020 “Representação de Antonio Roiz de Montoya,” IHGB, lata 219, doc. 18. Montoya explained that he had
“traveled more than 1500 leagues to prostrate himself at the feet of His Majesty” and deliver the report.
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the said rebels [the Dutch] have established a foothold in [northeast] Brazil.”1021 Montoya
noted in addition that, “the residents of S. Pablo were [a mere] eighty leagues from the
Chiriguana nation.” “If they entered into confederation” with those Indians, “it will be easy
with their intervention to empower the Dutch in Brazil.” 1022 All of this, he concluded,
“requires swift and effective remedy.”1023
In 1636, Manuel João Branco, a longtime resident of São Paulo – who the historian
Jaime Cortesão described as a Spanish “spy” – wrote yet another scathing report to the king
decrying the Paulistas’ and their activities.1024 In it, Branco suggested the king (Philip, who
was then king of both Portugal and Spain) should overthrow the Count of Monsanto, the
captaincy’s lord-proprietor, and convert São Vicente into a royal captaincy under direct
crown control. After all, according to Branco, the territory did not actually belong to
Monsanto, but was in fact within the king’s dominion and had thus been awarded in
error.1025 Branco went on to claim that the residents of São Paulo expressed full allegiance to
their lord proprietor (Monsanto) rather than to the king himself, and to allege that the
Paulistas’ king “is not Your Majesty” but is rather he who “fosters injustice and masks evil,”
a clear if implicit reference to the Count of Monsanto.1026

“Representação de Antonio Roiz de Montoya,” IHGB, lata 219, doc. 18.
“Representação de Antonio Roiz de Montoya,” IHGB, lata 219, doc. 18.
1023 “Representação de Antonio Roiz de Montoya,” IHGB, lata 219, doc. 18.
1024 Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 249.
1025 “That which falls between [the rivers] Curparê and São Vicente (which are the towns of São Vicente,
Santos, São Paulo, Parnaíba, and other aldeias of Indians) belong to Your Majesty.” Branco likewise criticized
Monsanto’s captains, who, he noted, destroy Christianity and the world by painting injustices with a gold
veneer, and declaring prohibitions against slavery in the municipal councils, but doing nothing to stop them,
and occasionally even facilitating them, sometimes publicly; see, Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do
Brasil, 251.
1026 Branco was not the only contemporary to express this opinion, however. The Jesuit Diego de Boroa, for
instance, who was in the reducción, Jesus María, in Tape, when the Jesuits attacked, also argued that the Paulistas’
loyalty was not to the king but to Monsanto. In a letter to the king informing him of the invasion of Tape led
by Raposo Tavares and imploring him take action to protect the Amerindians and punish the Paulistas, in 1637,
Boroa alleged that the Paulistas appealed “to the Count Lord of São Paulo as if he were not a vassal of Your
Majesty, saying that by his order and mandate they went there [to Tape] to expel the priests.” Boroa went on to
portray the Paulistas as criminals and barbarians, saying that the violence they committed against the Indians
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In the midst of this heightened struggle in the late 1620s and early 1630s, the Jesuits
and their allies succeeded in eliciting a series of royal and papal decrees, which, for the first
time, explicitly singled out the Paulistas for their crimes and cruelty, accusing them of having
“perturbed the peace and quietude of the republic.”1027 As a result, the king instructed his
Council of Portugal to punish those individuals responsible in order to prevent further
damage and disorder.1028 In addition, in a 1633 decree, he denied the Paulistas’ request to
take over the administration of the aldeiamentos around São Paulo.1029 Basing his decision on
information received from the Jesuits and his chief magistrate in Bahia, the king accused the
Paulistas of extorting and harassing the Jesuits, of breaking down the gates of the
aldeiamentos, and of profaning the church, all with the goal of “capturing” Amerindians, a
practice prohibited by the series of royal laws and decrees stretching back over six
decades.1030
Five years later, the king convened a junta of five councilors to reflect on the conflict
and offer recommendations on an appropriate course of action.1031 Importantly, the junta
consisted of three Portuguese councilors, including Sebastião Zambrana, the bishop of
Porto, alongside two of Spain’s leading jurists and theologians, Juan de Solórzano Pereira

was worse than that committed by heretic Calvinists and Huguenots, an important linking of the conflict in
South America to that in Europe and beyond. The Paulistas, he wrote, went about “killing with inhumanity a
great number of Indians, men and women, children, beheading them, opening them up with knives, burning
them, showing themselves to be more cruel than wild beasts and more inhumane than Arabs [alarbes], Calvinist
heretics and Huguenots,” quoted in Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 296.
1027 Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil, doc. 9, 235-236: 12 Sep 1628 (Madrid): Royal decree “To
the governor of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata that seeks to vigorously punish the Portuguese that go
from the town of Sao Paulo to capture Indians form the reductions of Paraguay to sell them.”
1028 Ibid.
1029 1633, RGCCSP, 1:485-488.
1030 1633, RGCCSP, 1:485-488.
1031 Pastells, ed. Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay, 2:18-19. Although registered on 29
March 1639, the junta likely presented its recommendations to the king sometime the previous year.
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and Juan de Palafox y Mendoza.1032 Drawing on their recommendations, the king issued his
most forceful order to date. The 1638 decree enjoined the viceroy of Peru, the Marquee of
Mansera, to punish “the Portuguese of São Paulo” for their insolence and effrontery and for
the harm they had done to the Indians.1033 Those Amerindians, he wrote, “were reduced and
baptized” at “the cost of my royal treasury,” but are now “dead, or wounded,” many either
in captivity or having either fled to the mountains beyond Iberian control.1034 Philip
threatened that any individuals deemed in violation of his decree would be expelled from
Brazil and subjected to the Council of Indies and the Inquisition for judgment.1035
In his 1638 decree, Philip alluded to the 1611 law, which had passed through the
Council of Portugal and was promulgated in Lisbon, but attempted to close some of its
loopholes. In this latest version, he ordered “that no Indian of any quality, even [those that
are] unfaithful, can be captured or put into slavery for any cause or reason, nor can they be
deprived of the natural dominion that they possessed over their goods, children, or wife.”1036
Philip acknowledged that both Portuguese and Castilians participated in these expeditions,
and, for the first time, explicitly forbid all “Portuguese of Brazil” from crossing “the line of
demarcation between that crown and the crown of Castile,” or from entering into Spanish
territory “to reduce or take away Indians, to trade in any good, or for any other reason, on
penalty of death and confiscation of one’s goods [so pena de la vida, y predimento de vienes].”
Philip also accused their expeditions of incorporating many “Dutch, French, and from other
Europeans of the north,” and therefore of exposing Potosí and Santa Cruz de la Sierra to an

1032 Ibid. The other two Portuguese councilors were Cid de Almeida and Francisco Pereira Pinto. Although
registered on 29 March 1639, the junta likely presented its recommendations to the king sometime the previous
year.
1033 Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil (1982): doc. 10, 236-242: 16 September 1638 (Madrid).
1034 Ibid.
1035 Ibid.
1036 Ibid. Among the Paulistas’ other crimes, the king accused them of violating royal authority by appointing
“captain-majors and ordinary captains and other officials of war” without permission.
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eventual invasion by the arch enemies of Portugal and Spain. And he even demanded that
any illicitly Amerindians sent as far away as Lisbon, Madeira, and Cabo Verde be returned to
their native lands in Brazil.1037
Although the Jesuits and other detractors portrayed the residents of São Paulo as
barbarous heretics and brutes, the Paulistas, for their part, remained committed to
vindicating themselves from the priests’ condemnation. Most Paulistas had little to no
formal education beyond what basic instruction some may have received from the priests of
the college of São Paulo. Nevertheless, they showed an impressive capacity for argument and
rhetoric, even attempting to shift blame onto the Jesuits themselves. In addition, they and
their supporters demonstrated a clear awareness of the jurisdictional autonomy they
possessed as inhabitants of a seigniorial captaincy and even of the general principles of
natural law, customary law, and the law of nations. Many if not most Paulistas were firmly
convinced of both the legality and morality of their activities.
First of all, consistent with their understanding of the natural boundaries of the Ilha
Brasil, they argued that Guairá and the Jesuits’ other mission territories were located within
Portuguese jurisdiction and that the presence of Spaniards in the region – Jesuits or not –
represented therefore a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the lord proprietor of São
Vicente and of the king of Portugal, by extension. Despite calls from the municipal council
for the opening of trade and communication with Spanish Peru in the late sixteenth century,
by the 1620s, as tensions between the Jesuits and Paulistas hardened and the conflict took on
imperial significance, São Paulo’s leading residents protested vociferously against the
incursions of Castilians who, “took away all of the gentiles [i.e. Amerindians] of this

1037
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kingdom [coroa] for their repartimentos and service.”1038 Moreover, the Paulistas argued that the
Jesuits were the true tyrants and enslavers, portraying themselves in contrast as just
“administrators” of Indians, as treating them more humanely once gathered into aldeiamentos,
and ultimately as providing “a great service to God, king, and the Indians themselves” in
delivering Amerindians from barbarism to civilization.1039
In addition, the Paulistas saw their activities as in no way illegal or in contravention
of the series of royal prohibitions of Amerindian slavery. São Paulo’s municipal council
registry displays how the officials of that body continuously reaffirmed their loyalty to the
crown and acknowledged the receipt of royal laws and decrees prohibiting indigenous
slavery and slave raiding.1040 However, reminiscent of the Spanish legal principle, obedezco pero
no cumplo [I obey but do not comply], the actual acts of the council show that while claiming
to honor the spirit of the laws and prohibitions, local authorities often asserted their right to
grant special “licenses” and “permissions” to settlers to “enter the sertão and make war on
the gentiles.”1041
One of the earliest of the Paulistas’ defenses of their practice was also one of the
most comprehensive. In April of 1585, the municipal councils of São Paulo, São Vicente,
and Santos presented a collective request for license from the crown-appointed captain,
Jerónimo Leitão, to, among other things, make war on the Carijó Indians and distribute
them as slaves among the residents.1042 Presenting their request as “on behalf of God and
His Majesty,” the councilmen argued that it was thanks to Amerindian slaves that, “this land
2 October 1627, ACSP, 3:282-283.
Monteiro, “From Indian to Slave,” 114. See also BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, 1631. According to
the Jesuit Simón Maceta, the Paulistas, “decían publicamente a los indios que nosotros eramos unos
pobretones, y que los eclavamos […], y otras palabras, con que nos desacreditavan a nosotros y a nuestros
ministerios sagrados.”
1040 RGCMSP, 1: 326-335 (1621); 1:419-420 (20 May 1623); 1:501-502 (28 May 1635); 1:514-515 (1 March
1636); 2:77-78 (19 March 1639); 2:115 (4 February 1640).
1041 26 June 1563, ACSP, 1:25.
1042 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
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became ennobled” and that “the settlers sustained themselves and made their plantations
which paid the dizimos [taxes] to God and to his Majesty and sustained them honorably.”1043
“Given the waning of the slave population [escraveria],” due to “the many diseases and
illnesses in this land,” they continued, “now there is no resident that can make small farms to
sustain themselves let alone raise sugarcane.”1044 They requested permission to “make
pitched war against the Carijó Indians,” and made a case for the justness of such a war as
defensive by noting that in the past “forty years they have killed more than 150 white men,
both Portuguese and Spaniards, and have even killed priests of the Company of Jesus, who
had gone forth to indoctrinate and teach our Holy Catholic Faith.”1045 The council noted that
the Carijó were enemies both of “white men” and the “Tupiniquim Indians, our friends,”
and alleged that they practiced cannibalism in order to provide further justification.1046 The
councilmen requested that the captives taken in that war not be, “placed into aldeias, […]
where the residents of this land will not reap any benefit,” but rather that they be distributed
among the residents since as servants [slaves], they claimed, “being here,” among the
residents, “they will make themselves Christians, live in the service of God,” and be safe
from other hostile indigenous that “eat human flesh.”1047 In this case, the captain consented,
replying two weeks later that, “I conformed to [the request] and am ready to do everything,”
for the “service of our lord and the good of the land.”1048
As the demand for indigenous slaves increased in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, colonists grew increasingly impatient in awaiting the captain’s official
license of expeditions into territories west. As a result, beginning in the 1590s the Paulistas
10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
1045 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
1046 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
1047 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
1048 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279. In September of that year, Leitão and the members of the three councils
finally met and formally approved, ratified, and signed the original request; see, 6 Sep 1585, ACSP, 1:281-282.
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began articulating a range of alternative justifications, several which obscured the true nature
of their entradas. One such justification was to portray those expeditions as commercial in
nature. Seeking to gain the unfettered right of colonists to visit indigenous aldeiamentos, in
1598 São Paulo’s municipal council protested that “it is a great oppression to always have to
await the permission of the captain since it was a custom of the land to not have so many
licenses and since the Indians are our friends and neighbors.”1049 Without doing so explicitly,
the argument evoked principles from natural law and the law of nations advanced five
decades prior by Francisco de Vitoria in regards to Spanish America regarding the right to
free commerce and movement in foreign lands.1050
Five years later, in 1603, one Pero Coelho de Sousa sought to justify his own entrada
by harmonizing his own private interest with that of the crown.1051 According to Sousa, his
primary objective in leading this expedition was “to become worthy of the graces [mercês] and
honors of His Majesty.”1052 It also sought to locate the large quantities of “amber and gold”
said to exist in the captaincy, items of particular interest to royal authorities.1053 That same
decade, the municipal councilmen of São Paulo wrote another appeal directly to their lord
proprietor, which likewise stressed the captaincy’s potential to become a “great kingdom”
13 December 1598, ACSP, 2:49.
13 December 1598, ACSP, 2:49.
1051 Sousa’s army consisted of two hundred Portuguese and mixed-race individuals of low social standing (gente
do sertão, mamelucos, tangos maus [tangomãos], and homiziados [fugitives]) alongside another eight hundred or so
Potiguar and Tabajara Indian bowsmen; see, Bonciani, “O dominium sobre os indígenas e africanos e a
especificidade da soberania régia no Atlântico,” 231-232, citing the “Auto que mandou fazer o Senhor
governador-geral Diogo Botelho,” 26 January 1603, in Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (RIHGB)
73, no. 1 (1910): 42-43.
1052 “Auto que mandou fazer o Senhor governador-geral Diogo Botelho,” 26 January 1603, in RIHGB 73, no. 1
(1910): 42-43.
1053 Ibid. Also among Sousa’s goals was, “to make some licit ransoms [resgates], […] which the gentio place on
cords in order to eat.” Sousa assented, in accordance with royal law regarding such ransoms, that that those
captives, “having come [to São Vicente], must be examined by religious priests, and if not, must be placed in
liberty, and [those responsible for] the disorder that took place on the said expedition must be punished.” Soon
after the expedition, in response to the governor’s threat to excommunicate any individuals caught
“ransoming” the gentio “Guoararemi,” the councilmen, displaying a keen awareness of the rights they possessed
according to royal law, claimed that he had violated the seigniorial rights and forais “that the king had bestowed
on the residents of this captaincy” in its original donation to Martim Afonso de Sousa; see 24 December 1612,
ACSP, 2:323-326.
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given its abundant natural resources.1054 In order to best exploit those resources, however,
the councilmen stressed the need “to conserve” the Indians, given their diminution as a
combined result of disease and abuse.1055 The councilmen also pointed out their unjust
treatment at the hands of Brazil’s highest civil authorities. In reference to a recent expedition
led by Roque Barreto, the councilmen condemned the governor-general for demanding one
third of the Amerindian captives procured in that expedition and for initiating “a large
investigation” which saw a whopping 65 of the town’s less than 200 residents become
“fugitives” for the participation in that expedition.1056 As a result, the councilmen beseeched
their lord proprietor to consider the “protection” he owed “to his own” – meaning the
residents of his captaincy – and to lobby on their behalf at the royal court, arguing that “no
one has suffered so much abuse” as they had.1057
The Paulistas frequently portrayed themselves as victims in order to justify their
activities. Beyond the persecution they claimed at the hands of central colonial authority,
however, they also emphasized their poverty and the material privations they endured, all
while purporting to maintain unflagging obedience to both the king and their lord
proprietor.1058 In justifying their activities, roundly condemned by the governor-general, the
Paulistas reminded their lord proprietor that despite their reputation, there was “no one who

ACSP, 2:497-500. Rather than precious stones and metals, in this case the councilmen emphasized the
abundance of cotton and lumber for shipbuilding.
1055 Estimating that there remained some 200,000 Carijós in the sertão, the council beseeched their lord to
finance the effort to “bring them down [descer]” from the sertão “and make them Christians” noting that the
town itself could recruit the necessary manpower since there were already some 300 Portuguese men at ready,
alongside some 1,500 Indian slaves all of whom were experienced in “the work of the sertão” and whom
regularly went “to Peru by land,” see, ACSP, 2:497-500.
1056 ACSP, 2:497-500.
1057 Ibid.
1058 See, for example, 1 November 1632, ACSP, 4:101; 7 February 1632, ACSP, 4:113-114; and 21 February
1632, ACSP, 4:114-115, among other entries.
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suffers more effrontery” than they, “and there are no people” in the entire “estado [of
Brazil]” who “are more humble and obedient than us given what we suffer.”1059
Perhaps most notable was the Paulistas’ repeated reference to custom.1060 Several
council records were more transparent about the motives of Paulista entradas, but appealed to
the power of customary law in stressing that the slaving expeditions were, since the town’s
foundation, a “use and custom” of the settlers “of this land,” which, by 1600, they “had
been in possession of for more than forty years.”1061 In the early modern Iberian empires,
local custom as defined by municipal councils was often as forceful as royal law, and in some
cases even more so. As a result, when local custom contradicted royal law, individuals in the
local context had powerful legal means of defending their practices and their refusal to
adhere to royal law was not necessarily seen as illegal in a modern sense.
In one particularly relevant example, in the Apologia pro paulistis, examined in detail by
historians Janice Theodoro and Rafael Ruiz, an anonymous Jesuit in Rome conceded during
an internal investigation into the matter that the Paulistas’ appeals to customary law were
fully valid. Basing his argument on Francisco Suárez, Graciano, and Tomás de Aquino, the
author argued in defense of São Paulo that, “the Paulistas were never obliged by the law.”
Their customs could legitimately supersede royal law because, according to Suárez, laws do
1606, RGCCSP, 113.
In 1609, for example, when Hilaria Luis petitioned the governor to maintain possession of the enslaved
Indians that belonged to her recently deceased husband, he flatly refused, noting that Indians were free
according to royal law. However, after having consulted the procurador dos indios and a local ouvidor, the governor
agreed that, rather than setting them free, they be put under the care of the juiz dos orfãos of Sao Paulo, since, as
that juiz had argued, “it was use and custom to give freed Indian pieces [peças forras] to the orphans for their
sustenance and service and not to sell them,” see, Monteiro, Negros da terra, 140, citing the Petição de Hilaria
Luis, 3 November 1609, in the “Inventario de Belchior Dias Carneiro,” 1607, Inventários e testamentos - IT (São
Paulo: Departamento do Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo - DAESP, Typographia Piratininga, 1920-), vol. 2,
163-65. The 1633 will of Lourenço de Siqueira granted legal freedom to his slaves (which, according to royal
law, should have already been their status), but also, paradoxically, requested that the crown permit his wife to
keep them in servitude in order to provide her sustenance; see, Monteiro, Negros da terra, 139.
1061 ACSP, 1:501 (5 February 1595), 2:49 (13 December 1598), 2:70 (16 January 1600), 5:8 (7 January 1640).
This reference to the Paulistas’ long-term possession of the land served the dual purpose of reinforcing their
(or their proprietor’s) claim to dominium by prescription, as well as their claim to have developed such “custom”
over a sufficiently long period of time (despite it being only forty years).
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not take effect “if they are not [formally] received.”1062 In other words, according to
Graciano this time, “laws are instituted when they are promulgated and [only] gain force
when they correspond to use and customs.” Basing these arguments on those of the three
influential theologians, the author qualified that custom could only trump law if it did
contradict natural and divine law.1063 And in this case, he concluded, it did not. Moreover, he
justified the Paulistas’ activities by saying that such entradas had been conducted since the
town’s foundation. “Since the beginning of the foundation of the republic and of the
kingdom,” referring in this case to the founding of the town of São Paulo in 1554, when the
settlers “began to frequent the interior and submit the native Brazilians [os brasis] to the
Paulistas’ way of life,” “such a custom did not seem senseless [insensato].”1064
Although the Paulistas’ defense of their activities failed to elicit any positive response
from the king or his Council of Portugal back in the Peninsula, one of Brazil’s highest
colonial authorities was more supportive, albeit for strategic reasons. Keen to enlist their
support in the struggle against the Dutch in Pernambuco, in 1639, Salvador Correia de Sá,
then the captain-major and governor of the “Repartição do Sul,” sought to placate the
Paulistas and defend them in the face of Jesuit condemnation and papal excommunication.
Already the previous year he had called on São Paulo, São Vicente, and Espírito Santo to
prepare supplies and provisions, including “wheat, flour, rice, meats, and beans” to “sustain
the infantry” in northeast Brazil in the war to uproot the “rebellious enemy,” the Dutch.1065
A few months later, in a clear example of Portuguese colonial authorities mobilizing
indigenous and mestiço soldiers against European imperial competitors, Correia de Sá called
on “Rio de Janeiro, São Vicente, and São Paulo to raise 300 soldiers […] native sons of the
Theodoro and Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade,” 123.
Ibid. 103-104.
1064 Ibid. 104.
1065 9 October 1638, registered in São Vicente, RGCCSP, 2:70-75.
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land,” noting that they were of great effectiveness, given the “use and experience” they
gained “in entradas to the sertão.”1066 The governor promised that, since their efforts in
Pernambuco would be in the service of His Majesty, not only would they be paid but they
would also receive various “favors and graces.”1067 In one example, Correia de Sá pardoned
Francisco Sutil for his “crimes committed in entradas to the sertão,” because Sutil had sent his
son “to serve in the fight against the Dutch,” and allowed him to maintain his slaves, by
commanding that, “the Indians he has remain under his administration.”1068 In 1639 and
1640, Correia de Sá then subsequently attempted to issue a defense of the Paulistas and an
appeal for a blanket pardon to all those “fugitives” hiding “in the forests of São Paulo,”
noting how useful they would be in the “Restoration” of northeast Brazil from Dutch
occupation.1069
Although Correia de Sá’s appeal was ultimately denied, its contents reflect the
persuasive weight of pro-Paulista arguments. In many ways, Correia de Sá’s longer, more
comprehensive appeal represented a comprehensive synthesis of the Paulistas’ own
arguments, and more.1070 For instance, he argued that, “those who go to the sertão, where
there are gentios, do not go” for the purpose of “extortion or tyranny, but with love and in
order to bring Christianity, as do the Fathers of the Company [of Jesus],” and to rescue them

1639, RGCCSP, 2:79-82.
1639, RGCCSP, 2:79-82.
1068 1639, RGCCSP, 2:101-102.
1069 3 August 1639, RGCCSP, 2:103-106.
1070 Stressing the legality and economic value of Paulista entradas, Correia de Sá asserted that their, “entradas into
the sertão were always permitted by the governors-general of Brazil given the mortal tyranny of the Indians.” In
addition, he added that, “it would and will be impossible for Brazil to sustain sugarcane plantations without”
these Indians brought from the sertão since, “everyone from the richest to the poorest in Brazil depends on
them.” “It is impossible to sustain Brazil […] without the service of these Indians.” “If they were not serving in
the houses of whites or in their aldeia colonies under the administration of the white residents, Brazil would
lose its sugar cane plantations completely as well as the dízimo taxes that came from them. Brazil itself would
come to an end without them,” see, “Registo da provisão digo de um pardão,” [to those from São Paulo who
entered the sertão against the laws of his majesty],” points 8 and 14, 1640, RGCCSP, 7:187-198.
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from cannibalism.1071 Regarding the Amerindians’ own sovereignty, dominium, and property
rights, Correia de Sá asserted that, “the entradas into the sertão do not result in the extortion
or seizure of the Indians’ plantations or estates [fazendas],” since the Amerindians had none,
“nor any other movable goods or possessions.”1072 The Amerindians he continued, “deal
with nothing more than the present, nor do they have their own lands nor houses nor any
other things, and [simply] go about nude in the sertão.”1073 Moreover, he claimed, the
Amerindians “come from the sertão not by force, but by their [own free] will.”1074 After all, he
surmised, no doubt disingenuously, “if they had come against their will,” by now they would
have returned “to their lands and forests.”1075
The residents of Brazil’s southern captaincies, Correia de Sá noted, “are the poorest,
and in their penury they have necessity of the Indians, and as such it would be very difficult
to protect and accept the said excommunication which the bull discusses given that there is
no other remedy than the service of these pagan Indians.”1076 In any case, he rightly
observed, if the excommunications were to be published, it would be impossible to ensure
“the liberty of the Indians, according to the laws of his Majesty” given the power of local
opposition.1077 Moreover, although eschewing the term “rebellion,” surely a conscious
omission, Correia de Sá warned that the excommunications could provoke “great mutinies,
1071 “Registo da provisão digo de um pardão,” points 6 and 7, 1640, RGCCSP, 7:187-198. Echoing the appeals
of the Paulistas themselves, however spurious they might have been, Correia de Sá stressed that “the
information” the king received was “false in claiming that the whites impede the Indians from being
Christians.” In reality, he argued, the Paulistas had gone to the sertão precisely in order “to bring them into the
fold of the Church.” “His Majesty and his Board of Conscience should be aware of the great spiritual benefit”
such entradas afforded the Indians “brought down [descidos] from the sertão” since previously they had been
“arrested and tied along cords to be eaten or to suffer other punishments according to their barbarous rites and
laws.” Having come into the power of the Christians they have been, he argued, “they have been removed
from that risk and danger,” see, “Registo da provisão digo de um pardão,” points 10-12, 1640, RGCCSP, 7:187198.
1072 “Registo da provisão digo de um pardão,” point 11, 1640, RGCCSP, 7:187-198.
1073 Ibid.
1074 Ibid.
1075 Ibid.
1076 Ibid.
1077 Ibid.

349
uproar, and disobedience” from the white population as well, “and would lessen respect for
the ecclesiastical ministers.”1078 That resistance had the potential to cause “many deaths and
fights seeing that,” according to Correia de Sá, the bulls of excommunication lacked “the
order or permission of his majesty and would usurp the jurisdiction of his secular judges.”1079
Moreover, noting the security such entradas ensured by placing the indigenous population
under Luso-Brazilian control, Correia de Sá argued that “if they were not subjects and under
the servitude of the [Portuguese] residents and living together, […] they might rise up as they
have many times” in southern Brazil and as was then happening northeast Brazil, “in Paraíba
and Pernambuco, where the Indians are uniting with the Dutch, who likewise benefited from
the support of the said Indians […] when their ships and armada came to Bahia” in 1624.1080
Ultimately, neither the Paulistas nor their supporters were successful in persuading
other higher authorities. In response to Correia de Sá’s appeal in particular, one official [the
promotor], rebuked it as “unjust and against all truth,” and argued that, as such, it “should not
be considered.”1081 After all, the official concluded, it was “public knowledge and notorious”
that “many residents [of São Paulo] bring the Indians forcefully from the sertão and use them
as slaves.”1082
Nevertheless, the Jesuits and their Amerindian allies and charges were the only group
to take effective steps to oppose the Paulistas in practice. Beyond issuing laws and public
condemnations, no Spanish or Portuguese civil authority proved willing or able to reinforce
their words with meaningful action.1083 On the contrary, beginning in the 1640s, Portuguese
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1080 Ibid..
1081 “Vista ao promotor,” 1640, RGCCSP, 7:200.
1082 Ibid.
1083 Even São Paulo’s own municipal council consistently decried entradas and slaving, but, like the provincial,
viceregal, and metropolitan authorities, never took effective action to curb such activity. For examples of
municipal council’s the formalistic prohibitions on entradas to the sertão, see for example, 22 March 1603, ACSP,
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authorities actually encouraged Paulista entradas, hoping to channel their efforts in support of
the crown’s own direct objectives. Although professing consistent concern for the
protection of Amerindians, the Iberian crowns were likewise concerned with the conquest,
occupation, and economic development of their American colonies and therefore let Paulista
slaving continue into the second half of the seventeenth century almost completely
unfettered.

The 1640s: Imperial Sovereignty in Flux

The 1640s were momentous, tumultuous years in the Río de la Plata, as they were
throughout the Iberian world. Among the decade’s most significant developments was
Portugal’s self-fashioned “Restoration” of independence from the Spanish Monarchy in
December of 1640. In a fascinating turn of events, when news of John IV’s coronation
reached São Paulo in May of the following year, a pro-Castilian faction within the town
urged the residents to reject the new dynasty, to proclaim São Paulo’s independence, and to
declare as king Amador Bueno, one of the town’s leading residents. Bueno promptly – and
prudently – declined the proposal, and quickly persuaded his partisans to recognize the new
Braganza king as their rightful ruler.1084 Nevertheless, the episode shed light on the complex
factionalism within São Paulo and highlighted the autonomous impulse of at least a portion
of its residents.

2:125-126; ACSP, 2:168-169; 1 February 1612, ACSP, 2:307-310; 4 October 1625, ACSP, 3:199; 26 February
1629, ACSP, 4:17; 28 February 1632, ACSP, 4:115; 28 May 1635, RGCCSP, 1:501-502; 1 March 1636,
RGCCSP, 1:514-515; 19 March 1639, RGCCSP, 2:77-78, 4 February 1640, RGCCSP, 2:115.
1084 For an account of this episode written in the eighteenth century, see Gaspar da Madre de Deus’, “A
Defense of the Paulistas,” in The Bandeirantes: The Historical Role of the Brazilian Pathfinders, ed. Richard Morse
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965). Boxer is dismissive of this episode’s larger significance, writing that, “an
inordinate amount of ink has been expended in Brazil on this relatively insignificant affair,” see, Boxer, Salvador
de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 148.
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Another roughly contemporaneous event of particular significance, albeit form the
previous year (1640), was the simultaneous expulsion of the Jesuits from São Paulo, Santos,
São Vicente, and Rio de Janeiro when their representatives returned to the southern
captaincies from Europe with a freshly minted papal bull in hand. Unmoved by Correia de
Sá’s appeal, in June of that year, they publicly promulgated the bull, which called for the
excommunication of all individuals who had gone to the sertão to make war on the
Amerindians without the proper license and permission. Since the bull implicated virtually all
of São Paulo’s residents either directly or indirectly, the colonists revolted and, in concert
with the residents of the other towns, resolved to expel the Jesuits from the southern
captaincies entirely. After a week of wrangling, on June 13 at two o’clock in the morning, a
group of leading residents read aloud the order of expulsion as a group of 200 colonists
stormed the convent, arrested the priests, and dispatched them to Santos.1085 The following
day, municipal officials transferred administration of the aldeiamento of Barueri to the secular
clergy, who had supported the Jesuits’ expulsion.
Despite the fact that all of their legal or political pressure had thus far come to
naught, the Paulistas remained firm in their commitment to demonstrate the legality of their
conduct and to combat their reputation as traitors or criminals in violation of royal law and
decree. In a letter to the king, the municipal council argued that, in promulgating the bull of
excommunication, the Jesuits had sought to “deprive and strip the residents of their
immemorial and ancient possession,” a thinly veiled reference to indigenous slavery, “which
they held from the foundation of this State to the present.”1086 More specifically, the
Paulistas’ primary strategy in presenting their case was to shift the debate from a focus on
slavery, which favored the Jesuits’ position, to a focus on the Jesuits’ jurisdictional overreach
1085
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2 July 1640, ACSP, 5:34-35; and Ney de Souza, Catolicismo em São Paulo (São Paulo: Paulinas, 2004), 97.
“Representação da Câmara Municipal de São Paulo a Coroa, s.d.,” RIHGSP, 3:98-104.

352
into temporal power.1087 As the colonists noted, according to the terms of the padroado real,
bulls of excommunication, despite bearing the authority of Rome, could not be legally
promulgated in America without prior ratification in Lisbon [or Madrid] and the
corresponding royal seal to make it official.1088
The Paulistas were steadfast. Even Brazil’s first viceroy, the Marquee of Montalvão,
was unable to dissuade them. When Montalvão intervened, appealing to the residents of
“such remote parts,” to offer full obedience and accept the Jesuits’ return, the Paulistas
refused, citing the arguments above, while continuing to profess their loyal obedience to the
crown.1089 It was only in 1653 that the Paulistas accepted the Jesuits’ return, and this on the
clear condition that the latter not intervene in secular affairs, in particular those relating to
Amerindians.1090 In a major concession that completely shifted the course of political
struggle and debate in the captaincy, the Jesuits agreed not to oppose indigenous slavery and
even pledged to refuse sanctuary to runaways.1091

Theodoro and Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade,” 107.
Ibid. The Franciscans, often rivals of the Jesuits throughout the Iberian world, had supported the colonists
in the process of expulsion. Several years later, in 1649, they issued a list detailing the legal bases for that
expulsion, which focused almost exclusively on jurisdictional overreach: the Jesuits had forced vast concessions
from the heirs of various settlers, likely in lands and indios; they had stripped lands away from farmers through
legal subterfuge; they traded and sold Indian lands and goods without the Indians’ permission; they abused the
Indians worse than settlers did, often making Indians carry them on their backs. Finally, and most generally, the
Franciscans argued that the Jesuits had become too rich and powerful; see, “Causas que os moradores de São
Paulo apontam da expulsão dos padres da Companhia de Jesus,” 1649, Biblioteca Nacional de Brasil - Rio de
Janeiro (BNRJ), II, 35.21.53, doc. 2.
1089 Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dos Felipes, 383-384.
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Figure 18
Willem Blaeu, “Paraguay, Provincia de Rio de la Plata,” in Atlas Novus (Amsterdam, 1642)
Despite the Jesuits’ dramatic setbacks in southern Brazil, at around that same
moment their power in the hinterland began rebounding significantly. In response to the
devastating Paulista raids on Guaraní reducciones throughout much of the 1630s, the Jesuits
and their indigenous allies began fighting back. Although lacking formal permission to do so,
the Jesuits started training and arming their converts. Already in the mid 1620s, mission
Indians from St. Xavier and Encarnación managed what was perhaps the first Jesuit-Guaraní

354
victory against the Paulistas in Guairá.1092 Again, in 1637 and 1638, the Jesuits and their
Guaraní allies managed to repel two more Paulista attacks, this time on reducciones in Tape.1093
As early as 1635 one Jesuit, P. Tomás de Urueña, petitioned to civil authorities in
Buenos Aires to procure weapons and munitions to defend the Guaraní of Guairá.1094
Although this initial request was denied, as Paulista raids intensified, the Jesuits heightened
their appeals to civil authorities in Paraguay and Spain to supply their Amerindians with
firearms. Many settlers in Spanish America remained staunchly opposed to the idea, worried
that, if given firearms, the Indians might turn them against Spaniards once the Paulista threat
had subsided. In 1639, for instance, the municipal council of Asunción petitioned to the
city’s sergeant-major, Francisco de Rivas Gavilán, to forbid the arming of Amerindians in
the missions, warning that such an act would threaten “the sovereignty of Spain in those vast
regions.”1095 That same year, however, Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, the Jesuit provincial of
Paraguay, took the appeal to the royal court in Spain itself, presenting a sophisticated case
for arming the Amerindians. Citing ecclesiastical law and the works of various influential
canonical theologians, including Aquinas, the Jesuits proclaimed that, “defense is permitted

1092 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 84. Those same Indians suffered a devastating
defeat, however, when António Raposo Tavares led another expedition there that succeeded in destroying the
missions between 1629 and 1632.
1093 In an annual report to their superiors in Rome, the local Jesuits described how Diego de Alfaro, the leader
of all the region’s reducciones, raised a force of 1,200 lightly equipped indigenous allies to confront the Paulista
army of 200 Portuguese and mameluco soldiers alongside some 500 Tupis, which was “very well armed and
disciplined militarily.” “With great valor,” Alfaro’s force “attacked the enemy, and obliged them to flee,” killing
“some of the Lusitanians and many more of their Indian allies, the Tupi.” On 11 February 1638, the Paulistas
attacked yet again. This time, “their army had increased by a good number of combatants.” According to the
Jesuits, their indigenous allies fought in the name of “Christ and liberty, in a very just war,” attacking their
“powerful enemy […] valorously like lions.” “Both sides fought furiously for five hours,” the report continued,
until the mission forces prevailed, putting the surviving Paulistas to flight; see, Ernesto J. A. Maeder, ed., Cartas
anuas de la Provincia del Paraguay, 1637-1639 (Buenos Aires: FECIC, 1984), 71-76.
1094 AMP, 13:337-346, 1635.
1095 Pastells, ed. Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay, vol. 2, 24, 9 May 1639, Asunción.
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to any person according to natural and human law.”1096 Linking theological and legal
arguments with evidence from the local colonial context, Montoya cited the case of Chile,
where even when the “rebelled Indians,” despite having “sacked seven cities and seized
many muskets and arquebuses,” had “never used them against Spaniards.”1097
In May 1640, Montoya returned from Madrid with a royal order authorizing the
viceroy to permit the arming of Amerindians if he deemed it prudent and necessary.1098
Despite vocal opposition from Paraguay’s settler community and a number of local civil
officials, the viceroy eventually consented.1099 For the Jesuits and their Guaraní allies, the
viceroy’s decision could not have arrived sooner. On 11 March 1641, the very same day that
news of Portugal’s Restoration first reached São Paulo, a well armed and equipped JesuitGuaraní force repelled yet another a Paulista column, this time near the confluence of the
Uruguay and Mbororé rivers.1100 The Guaraní victory at Mbororé proved decisive and
marked the true turning point in their struggle with the Paulistas. When the Paulistas
launched another raid the following year, the well-armed Guaranís easily repulsed it. In the

1096 “Informe e justificação jurídica do uso de armas de fogo pelos indios, apresentados pelos Jesuitas do
Paraguai,” 1639, in Jesuítas e bandeirantes no Tape, 1615-1641: Manuscritos da Coleção De Angelis (MCA), ed. Jaime
Cortesão, vol. 3 (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, Divisão de Obras Raras e Publicações, 1969), 303-314.
1097 “Informe e justificação jurídica do uso de armas de fogo pelos indios,” 1639, in MCA, vol. 3 (1969): 303314. The same was true, Montoya continued, of “the Calchaquies Indians, because arquebuses without powder
and ammunition are useless.”
1098 Caraman, The Lost Paradise, 75. The following year, Gabriel de Ocaña y Alarcón wrote to the Peruvian
viceroy, the Count of Chinchón, advocating Montoya’s proposal. Noting that despite the initial defeats of
1637-1638 and the recent “uprising of Portugal,” against Spanish rule in December 1640, the Luso-Brazilian
residents of São Paulo continued their “entradas” into territory claimed by Spain, capturing “the few Indians
that had remained.” Given the circumstances, Ocaña likewise urged the arming of those Indians, “of whose
loyalty there is no doubt,” he stressed; see, Pastells, ed. Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay,
vol. 2, 67-71, 14 October 1641, Madrid.
1099 Caraman, The Lost Paradise, 77-78.
1100 For a detailed account of this battle, see, “Relação da derrota sofrida pelos bandeirantes em Mbororé,
escrita pelo Padre Claudio Ruyer,” Reducción de S. Nicolás, 6 April 1641, in MCA, vol. 3 (1969), 345-368.

356
wake of this victory, the Jesuits began expanding their mission footprint yet again, although
from the 1640s forward, they stayed west of the Uruguay River.1101
Beyond simply curbing Paulista incursions into territory claimed by Spain, Guaraní
troops began serving other functions as well.1102 Perhaps the most important of these was to
expand their own military autonomy. Unlike in New Spain, where Amerindian troops served
mostly as auxiliaries to Spanish-led battalions, in Paraguay, the Guaraní militias arose as the
pre-eminent military power in the region by the mid seventeenth century.1103 By that period,
they were largely able to protect the region’s missions from assaults by the Spanish and
mestizo colonists of Paraguay and the Río de la Plata, who, like the Paulistas, coveted the
missions as concentrated pools of Guaraní labor to be exploited for their benefit.1104 At the
same time, however, they also came to serve the interests of those colonists and their
representatives in the municipal council. For instance, even before receiving official
permission for their armament, in 1638 and 1639 the governor of Buenos Aires, Mendo de
la Cueva, mobilized units of hundreds of highly trained and equipped Guaranís from the
missions in punitive expeditions on Amerindians that had attacked the Spanish settlements
of Corrientes and Santa Fé.1105 Likewise, throughout the second half of the seventeenth

The Jesuits established an additional 22 reducciones in parts of present-day Paraguay and the Misiones
province of northeast Argentina; see, Ernesto J. A. Maeder, ed. Cartas anuas de la Provincia Jesuítica del Paraguay,
1641 a 1643 (Chaco: Instituto de Investigaciones Geohistóricas-Conicet, 1996), 80-81. As late as 1646, the
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de Reformas de la Misión de Itatin, Propuestas por el Padre Justo Mansilla al Padre Provincial del Paraguay de
la Compañía de Jesús,” 10 October 1646, Archivo General de la Nación-Argentina (AGNA), Compañía de
Jesus, sala 9, doc. 134.
1102 The Guaraní’s increasingly fearsome reputation discouraged the Paulistas, Spanish encomenderos, and other
rival indigenous groups from raiding their reducciones, as they had in the past. In addition, in return for these
services in these campaigns, and in recognition of the numerous displacements and depredations they had
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century, divisions of Guaraní assisted on several occasions in defending Buenos Aires against
the hostile Charrúa Indians of the pampas as well as against the French.1106 Stressing the
centrality of indigenous troops to the defense of Spain’s American colonies, one Jesuit priest,
writing in the early eighteenth century, proclaimed that: “In the space of one hundred years,
there has been almost no victory in this province which has not been made possible by the
bravery and loyalty of the [mission] Indians.”1107
Just as Spanish authorities increasingly mobilized Guaraní units in support of
Spanish colonialism, Portuguese colonial authorities in Bahia likewise began officially
recruiting Paulistas to advance their own aims and objectives. The newly independent
Portuguese crown was well aware of the impact of Paulista entradas in extending LusoBrazilian hegemony in the hinterland of São Vicente at the expense of that of Spain. As a
result, the crown looked increasingly to the Paulistas to ensure its sovereignty in other parts
of Brazil as well, especially in the wake of Portugal’s “restoration” of independence from
Spain in 1640. Although largely unsuccessful in eliciting Paulista assistance for campaigns
against the Dutch in Angola and Pernambuco, throughout the second half of the
seventeenth century the Paulistas agreed to conduct a series of campaigns against
Amerindians and African maroon groups resistant to Portuguese colonial rule.1108
The fiercely autonomous Paulistas likely participated in such actions more for their
own self-interest than for an overarching duty or desire to defend Portuguese imperial
sovereignty. According to the prominent Jesuit, António Vieira, the famous expedition of
1648-1651, led by an ageing António Raposo Tavares, had a singular motive: to take
Caraman, The Lost Paradise, 104. The historian Adalberto López has asserted that, “in a period of one
hundred years the Jesuit mission troops were mobilized more than fifty times by the authorities of the Rio de la
Plata and the Crown,” López, The Revolt of the Comuñeros, 44-45.
1107 P. Gaspar Rodero, Hechos de la verdad, […] en defensa de las misiones del Paraguay (c.1733): 11.
1108 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 174 and 254: discusses de Sá’s largely fruitless
efforts to recruit the Paulistas and the Amerindian auxiliaries for campaigns against the Dutch in Angola and
Pernambuco.
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Amerindians “from their lands, either by force or by will, and to bring them to São Paulo,
and there to make use of them as they are accustomed.”1109 Nevertheless, Vieira lauded that
enormous entrada as “one of the most notable events undertaken in the world until
today.”1110 Departing from São Paulo, Tavares and company had skirted the eastern Andes
before descending the Amazon all the way to Belém, at the mouth of that great river, tracing
the rough edges of the vast territory that would eventually expand even further to
encompass the borders of modern Brazil.

Conclusions

The priests of the Spanish Jesuit province of Guairá, the mestiço residents of São
Paulo, and various Tupi, Tapuia, and Guaraní groups all contributed in critical ways to
shaping early Iberian expansion in South America’s southern hinterland. Notably, the crown
had a minimal direct role in this process, and not solely due to its limited or overstretched
resources, or to the vast distances separating the region from the centers of colonial and
metropolitan power. The Jesuits and the Paulistas, while acutely aware of their position
within the broader Iberian imperial world, nonetheless enjoyed substantial autonomy from
royal authority thanks also to their distinct jurisdictional privileges. The two groups asserted
those privileges through physical acts of expansion as well as through juridical appeals in
defense of certain broader natural rights or specific local customs. Despite their remoteness
on the geographical fringes of empire, both the Jesuits and the Paulistas articulated
sophisticated arguments deftly attuned to broader Iberian currents of juridical, political, and
theological discourse. They did so to demonstrate their obedience to their respective
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sovereigns, as well as to protect their autonomy, to justify their conduct in the eyes of God,
as well as to elicit the support of higher authorities both in Iberia and in the centers of
colonial power in Lima and Salvador da Bahia.
Spaniards in the region did not unanimously support the Jesuits, nor did all
Portuguese in Brazil endorse Paulista aims and methods. Yet despite the specificity of their
aims and the opposition they received from particular factions in their midst, the two groups
emerged as the primary agents in advancing the territorial claims of their respective empires.
When conflict famously erupted between the two groups yet again in the second quarter of
the eighteenth century, it was not a new phenomenon, but a rekindling of latent tensions.
The border agreed upon at the 1750 Treaty of Madrid marked one point of culmination
within a longer process of contention that stretched back nearly two centuries.
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CONCLUSION

In less than a century after the initial landings of Columbus and Cabral in the New
World, Portugal and Spain had transformed from internally divided, relatively isolated
polities at the edge of Europe to possess two of the most extended empires the world had
ever known. The process of expansion prompted an array of new moral and legal questions
requiring fresh interpretations of natural and ecclesiastical law. These debates related not
only to questions of just war and conquest, but also to issues like slavery and other forms of
coerced labor, the legal rights and status of non-European peoples and polities, royal versus
private property rights, royal law versus local customary law, rights to monopolies on
commerce and navigation, and the lawful occupation and possession of overseas territories.
Portuguese and Spanish authors read each other’s work and often drew upon each other’s
styles and arguments in promoting or defending the claims of their respective sovereigns.
Over time, the collective interventions of Vitoria, Las Casas, Oliveira, Freitas, and countless
others, steadily developed into a recognizable set of norms and legal precepts that came
collectively to regulate Spanish and Portuguese imperial practice.
Alongside these debates, there emerged a distinct yet not entirely separate tradition
of Iberian imperial celebration in which authors from across Portugal and the Spanish
Monarchy showered their sovereigns with praise and lauded the exploits of their countrymen
in extending Spanish and Portuguese influence beyond Europe. This celebratory discourse
reached its crescendo around 1580, when Philip II of Spain ascended the Portuguese throne,
adding that kingdom and its colonies to his already sprawling possessions. The famous 1583
medallion emblazoned with the phrase, “The World is Not Enough,” was one of many

361
examples of this discourse. With the incorporation of Portugal and its empire, the monarchy
now claimed sovereignty over even larger parts of Africa, Asia, and America, where, in the
words of the eminent Spanish chronicler and jurist Gregorio López Madera, “Roman power
never reached, and which not even Alexander attempted to subject.”1111 Like their Spanish
counterparts, many prominent Portuguese also celebrated the union for its potential in
expanding the territorial reach of their common monarchy. As far away as Malacca, in 1584
the Portuguese bishop there, João Ribeiro Gaio, stressed the ease with which a joint Iberian
force could conquer all the lands from India to Japan, including China.1112 And Jorge de
Lemos, a Portuguese India official, claimed the following year that the conquest of Atjeh
would give Philip II the economic resources for a war to recover all Christian territory lost to
the Muslims and overthrow the Ottoman empire.1113
These visions of global imperium, however, contrasted sharply with the realities of
crown rule in many parts of the empires, as the king himself was all too aware. Moving
outward from the main cities and towns that served as islands of Iberian sovereignty beyond
Europe, the monarchies’ effective authority grew increasingly circumscribed. This was not
simply a question of success versus failure. Some of the factors diffusing political authority
were integral to the political and institutional culture of the Spanish and Portuguese
monarchies, including in Europe itself, and actually served to reinforce the ultimate
sovereignty of the king by restricting the jurisdiction of any one individual, faction, or
institution. But in remote regions like Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la
Plata, to name just three, isolated settlers or missionaries often represented the sole Iberian
presence beyond fortified enclaves. Each of these individuals maintained unique
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relationships to the crown, and often served as intermediaries at the vanguard in extending
Iberian cultural, political, and economic influence. On the edges of empire, official agents of
the crown played relatively minor roles in this process. Moreover, the initial arrival of
Europeans did not mark the beginning of progressive, uninterrupted expansions of Iberian
imperial sovereignty across those regions. Local indigenous, mestizo, and other nonEuropean peoples often resisted the encroachment of imperial rule, as did missionaries and
independent settlers in certain instances.
The Portuguese presence in Southeast Africa is a case in point. In the region of
Mozambique Island, despite efforts to extend Portuguese rule, the crown’s effective
authority remained limited to the island itself and to the farms lining the bay throughout the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Farther south, in the Zambezi Valley, after a century or
so as a tribute-paying vassal to the African ruler of Mocaranga, the Portuguese crown did
eventually emerge as an independent authority by exploiting conflicts within local indigenous
polities and confirming Portuguese and mestiço colonists’ ownership of territorial holdings
that those colonists had amassed in years prior. Colonial officials also incentivized several of
the region’s most powerful colonists to come into the imperial fold by offering them titles,
either in prestigious military orders or in the formal colonial bureaucracy itself.
A similar dynamic played out in the Río de la Plata. Throughout most of the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the leading residents of São Paulo resisted certain
efforts of the crown and central colonial authorities to intervene in their internal municipal
affairs But in the 1620s, as tensions mounted between Portugal and Spanish Monarchy
during the later phase of the union of the Iberian crowns, the Paulistas increasingly aligned
themselves with broader Portuguese interests, and several even accepted high military posts
to extend and defend Lisbon’s claims to sovereignty in the region at the expense of that of
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Spain. In both Southeast Africa and the Río de la Plata, powerful colonists represented an
important the face of Iberian expansion, skillfully leveraging their influence as intermediaries
between formal colonial authorities and local African and Amerindian polities.
In all three cases, the Iberians were forced to accept the persistence of certain
indigenous systems of social, political, and economic organization, despite attempts to
replace them with European ones. In the Philippines, the Spanish crown sought to urbanize
indigenous groups on the Spanish model. Local communities, however, including those most
successfully subjugated to Spanish rule, resisted such reorganization and continued to live in
their traditional barangays. The vast majority of the archipelago’s inhabitants, in fact,
remained effectively beyond the reach of Spanish power altogether. In Southern Brazil, the
leading settlers of São Paulo had risen to power precisely by allying with neighboring
indigenous groups, intermixing with them, and integrating large numbers of indigenous
soldiers within their own private armies, often by force. By the early seventeenth century, the
majority of prominent Paulistas were mestiços themselves, or had entered into marriages of
alliance with the daughters of powerful indigenous headmen. Their power depended not
simply on the number of European settlers they commanded, but even more so on the
indigenous and mestiço soldiers they could mobilize. This was especially true of the
Portuguese and mestiços residents of the Zambezi Valley. Throughout the period in
question, they based their power primarily on the loyalty they garnered from local indigenous
allies as well as those within their ranks, most of whom were enslaved and comprised the
overwhelming majority of the settlers’ total forces. In cultural terms as well, for most of the
sixteenth century, their legitimacy derived first and foremost from the authority they
inherited from their indigenous predecessors, and only second from their relation to the
Portuguese crown.
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In all three regions, the effective geographic reach of Spanish or Portuguese crown
rule was imprecisely defined, in a state of continuous flux, and in some cases saw substantial
contraction. Despite extending deep into the interior in the mid seventeenth century, by the
1690s the Portuguese presence in Southeast Africa had receded dramatically as the
Changamire dynasty rose to eclipse the Portuguese-allied Monomotapa and expel the
Portuguese from the Upper Zambezi plateau. The recession, or concentration, of Spanish
rule in the Philippines was in some ways even more pronounced. Although the early phase
of conquest – or “pacification” – had seemed to succeed in subjugating many Philippine
indio communities with relative speed and efficiency, within decades several of those groups
had thrown off Spanish rule, or relocated to the highlands beyond the sphere of Spanish
authority. In the Río de la Plata too, indigenous groups forcefully opposed Iberian
encroachments on their territory throughout the sixteenth century. And as late as the 1640s,
despite the impressive power of both the Jesuits and the Paulistas, the conflict between these
two groups left much of the interior largely unsettled and beyond the firm grasp of both
Lisbon and Madrid.

In 1601, the Calabrian theologian and political philosopher Tomasso Campanella
proclaimed triumphantly that given events of the past century the world now marveled at
“the Spanish Monarchy for its audacity and power because it conquered so many seas and
girdled the entire globe.”1114 Campanella’s portrayal of the monarchy’s global reach was
accurate in a sense. By then, having incorporated Portugal’s empire as well, the monarchy
possessed colonies in Europe, Africa, Asia, and America – all “four parts of the world.”1115

1114 Tomasso Campanella, La Monarquía Hispanica (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1982 [c.
1601]): 255.
1115 Gruzinski, Les quatre parties du monde.
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What’s more, the Iberians had linked those colonies through truly global circuits of
navigation, exchange, and migration. Yet despite the mellifluous discourse of Campanella
and so many other champions of Iberian imperium, the monarchy’s sovereignty over and
within many of its possessions was far from absolute, even at the height of Iberian global
hegemony.
Beyond simply highlighting the disparity between discourse and practice, or ambition
and effective rule, a focus on the limitations of empire places in sharper relief the true reach
and depth of Iberian colonial authority. It illuminates the relative efficacy of strategies of
imperial domination, including both institutional and discursive, ideological ones, and
displays how imperial sovereignty was by nature layered, fluctuating, and uneven across
space and time. It lends further nuance to scholarly understandings of how local actors
navigated these invariably complex and fluid relations of power, and of how, in different
moments, local actors on the peripheries of empire rearticulated concepts and discourses of
Iberian and broader European law and political theory, either to affirm their obedience and
belonging within the larger imperial body, or to claim authority as sources of law in their
own right and defend their autonomy against the extension of crown power. It helps reveal
the power of indigenous and mixed-race peoples in engaging and shaping colonial legal and
political frameworks, patterns of conquest, and relations of vassalage and alliance. And it
exposes the extension and maintenance of imperial rule as a continuous process of
negotiation and adaptation, not only between various European actors, but also between
Europeans and indigenous peoples, as a range of diverse individuals and groups balanced
tendencies toward autonomy with more centripetal forces of inclusion and obedience within
the larger framework of empire.
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